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[YUM] Yum! Brands: Q3 2026 Earnings Test Taco Bell's Lettuce Recall Recovery

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Published 26 min read

Summary

Yum! Brands grew Q2 2026 revenue 12% to $2,169 million with Core Operating Profit up 8% ex-Pizza Hut; Q3 tests whether Taco Bell U.S. margin holds 19%-21% after the lettuce recall.

Yum! Brands owns KFC, Taco Bell and Habit Burger & Grill, and franchisees operate 97% of its restaurants, so the company earns mainly continuing fees on franchised sales[1]. Yum! Brands is scheduled to report Q3 2026 earnings on 2026-11-03, covering the Third quarter 2026 (three months ended September 30, 2026)[2], and it is the first quarterly report since the Pizza Hut sale fully closed[3]. In the latest disclosed period, the second quarter of 2026, total revenue rose 12% to $2,169 million and operating profit rose 5% to $655 million[4], while EPS excluding Special Items was $1.62 against $1.44 a year earlier; excluding Pizza Hut, system sales grew 7% excluding foreign currency, units grew 6%, same-store sales grew 4% and Core Operating Profit grew 8%[5]. The company does not give quarterly earnings guidance, and its only official statement about this quarter is the 10-Q view that Taco Bell U.S. company restaurant margin will range between 19% and 21% in the third quarter[6]. The Drillr earnings calendar shows a consensus of $1.51 for EPS excluding Special Items from 10 analysts[2], and 9 analysts expect revenue of $2,059 million[7], below second-quarter actual revenue, which is consistent with Pizza Hut being consolidated only until its closing dates (August 7 for mainland China and September 1 for the rest of the world)[8][3].

Three things matter most in this report. The first is whether Taco Bell U.S. margin lands inside the company's 19%-21% range after the brand pulled lettuce supplied by Taylor Farms on July 17[6], and whether fourth-quarter-to-date same-store sales have turned positive, because that margin was still 26.2% in the second quarter[9] and U.S. same-store sales had fallen to -2% quarter-to-date through July 27[10]. The second is whether KFC can deliver better same-store sales on top of new openings: in the second quarter KFC units grew 7% while same-store sales grew only 2%[11], U.S. system sales fell 2%[12], and KFC accounts for 58% of divisional operating profit excluding Pizza Hut[13], so its pace decides whether the company's long-term growth targets hold. The third is where the roughly $2.3 billion of after-tax proceeds from the Pizza Hut sale goes[14]: the company plans to pay down the $675 million revolver balance outstanding at the end of June and set aside most of the rest for buybacks[15], and the quarter-end revolver balance, repurchase amount and Core Operating Profit growth excluding Pizza Hut will show whether the sale can make up for the exit of Pizza Hut's $340 million of 2025 divisional operating profit[16].

Company Background and Business Structure

Yum! Brands is a restaurant brand company that relies almost entirely on franchising, headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky, with Chris Turner as chief executive[17]. At the end of 2025 the company had 61,668 franchised and 1,617 company-owned restaurants[18]; of the more than 61,000 franchised units, about 40% operated under master franchise programs, including more than 17,000 units in mainland China[19]. Yum China, the largest master franchisee, pays the company a continuing fee of 3% on system sales in mainland China[20]. Franchisees buy or lease the land, buildings and equipment and fund later reinvestment[19], and store-level franchise agreements usually carry continuing fees of 4%-6% of sales, with lower rates for master franchisees[21].

After selling Pizza Hut in 2026, the company is left with three brands: KFC, Taco Bell and Habit. It signed two definitive agreements on June 16[15], selling Pizza Hut in mainland China to Yum China for $1.2 billion, which closed on August 7[8], and Pizza Hut outside mainland China to private equity firm LongRange Capital for about $1.5 billion, which closed on September 1, for $2.7 billion in aggregate plus a possible $75 million earn-out by 2030 based on future performance[3]. After the sale the company continues to provide its proprietary Byte by Yum! technology platform to Pizza Hut outside China and supplies certain technology and finance services under a transition services agreement[14]; because the company concluded the sale is not a strategic shift with a major effect on operations, Pizza Hut is not presented as a discontinued operation[22].

KFC is the largest and most international brand, while Taco Bell is the main source of company-owned restaurant profit. KFC had 34,747 restaurants at the end of June 2026[11], and at the end of 2025, 90% were outside the U.S. and 99% were franchised[23]; based on full-year 2025 system sales, China accounted for 26% of KFC system sales, Europe for 13%, and the U.S. and Asia for 12% each[12]. Taco Bell had 9,030 units at the end of 2025, 86% of them in the U.S., the company owned about 8% of U.S. units, and company restaurant profit was $310 million for the year[24], above KFC's $128 million[23]. Habit is small, and in the second quarter the timing of refranchising gains and Habit store closure costs together dragged Core Operating Profit growth excluding Pizza Hut by about 3 percentage points[13]; in the same quarter digital system sales excluding Pizza Hut approached $9 billion, with digital mix above 60%[5].

Financial History and Current Position

Revenue grew steadily over the past three years, and 2025 growth came mainly from company sales. According to the 2025 annual report, total revenue rose from $7,076 million in 2023 to $7,549 million in 2024 and $8,214 million in 2025, up 9% in 2025; company sales were $2,945 million, up 15%, and franchise and property revenues were $3,473 million, up 5%[18]. Operating profit was $2,574 million in 2025, up 7%, net interest expense was $501 million, net income was $1,559 million and diluted EPS was $5.55[18]. By division, operating profit was $1,503 million at KFC[23], $1,129 million at Taco Bell[24] and $340 million at Pizza Hut[16].

The company generates strong cash, but its balance sheet carries high leverage. Operating cash flow was $2,010 million in 2025, against capital spending of only $371 million[25], about 4.5% of revenue. Debt excluding the revolver was about $11.5 billion at year-end, about 96% of it fixed including swaps at an effective rate of about 4.5%; the company plans to keep net leverage at about 4.0x EBITDA over the medium term by issuing debt as the business grows, and its credit ratings are BB+ from S&P and Ba2 from Moody's[26].

Second-quarter 2026 growth was strong, but a one-time tax item lifted GAAP EPS sharply. Revenue was $2,169 million, up 12%, made up of $837 million of company sales, $895 million of franchise and property revenues and $438 million of franchise contributions for advertising and other services[4]. Operating profit was $655 million, up 5%, including $44 million of charges tied to the Pizza Hut strategic review, and Core Operating Profit was $683 million[27]; the quarter recorded a $320 million income tax benefit, compared with a $125 million provision a year earlier, which brought GAAP diluted EPS to $3.08[4], while EPS excluding Special Items was $1.62[5]. First-half operating cash flow was $923 million versus $850 million a year earlier, with capital spending of $175 million[28]; at the end of June the company held $674 million of cash and had drawn $675 million on its $1.5 billion revolving facility[15].

Operating Model

Yum! Brands' revenue is driven mainly by unit count and sales per restaurant, and franchise fees are the core of profit. Total revenue equals company sales plus franchise and property revenues plus franchise contributions for advertising and other services[4]; franchise and property revenues roughly equal franchised system sales times the effective royalty rate, which is usually 4%-6% for store-level agreements and billed monthly[21], 3% for Yum China[20] and lower overall for master franchisees. System sales equal unit count times sales per restaurant, so fee income moves in the same direction as openings and same-store sales with a lag of roughly one billing month; advertising contributions are collected as a share of sales and spent almost dollar for dollar, with $1,796 million collected and $1,799 million spent in 2025[18], so they barely affect profit.

The swing in operating profit comes mainly from company-owned restaurants rather than franchising. Operating profit equals franchise and property revenues minus small franchise and property expenses, plus company restaurant profit, minus G&A and other items; franchise fees carry almost no matching cost, so second-quarter division operating margin was 44.3% at KFC[11] and 36.4% at Taco Bell[9]. Company restaurant margins differ widely by brand, at 24.2% for Taco Bell in 2025[24] and 12.1% for KFC[23], and because labor and occupancy costs are relatively fixed, a drop in volume pulls margins down within the same quarter. G&A was $1,262 million in 2025[18], and management targets G&A of about 1.7% of system sales after the Pizza Hut sale[10].

Cash flow turns operating profit into shareholder returns, and the leverage target sets their size. Franchisees fund new restaurants, so capital spending is low: $2,010 million of operating cash flow in 2025 required only $371 million of capital spending[25], and the company adds debt as the business grows to keep net leverage near 4.0x[26]. The roughly $2.3 billion of Pizza Hut proceeds will first repay the revolver, with most of the rest set aside for buybacks, and in June 2026 the board authorized up to $4 billion of additional repurchases through June 30, 2028[15]; changes in interest expense show up in the next quarter, while the effect of buybacks on EPS depends on how fast they are executed.

Industry and Competitive Position

Yum! Brands' advantage comes mainly from brand scale and its global development engine, but performance varies widely by market. In the second quarter KFC opened 660 gross new restaurants across 55 countries[11], management sees a long-term opportunity of about 20,000 more KFC units in underpenetrated emerging markets[29], and it said KFC is on track for its best development year on record in 2026[10]. In the same quarter, KFC system sales excluding foreign currency grew 20% in the Middle East/Turkey/North Africa, 16% in India, and 10% each in Asia, Latin America and the United Kingdom, while the U.S. fell 2%, Canada fell 1% and Europe was flat[12]. Taco Bell is mostly a U.S. business, with second-quarter U.S. same-store sales up 7% and U.S. company restaurant margin of 26.2%[9].

Comparisons with competitors are limited by what is disclosed. In the U.S., KFC competes with chicken chains such as Chick-fil-A and Popeyes and with McDonald's chicken products, while Taco Bell leads Mexican-style quick service, but the disclosures cited here cover only Yum! Brands, so these competitive relationships serve only as background. Because the company is almost fully franchised, its revenue is more sensitive to sales per restaurant and the pace of openings; it also does not split same-store sales into traffic and check, and reports system sales growth by market only[12], which limits any judgment about why KFC U.S. is declining.

Core Debates

Will the lettuce recall hit to Taco Bell U.S. stay confined to the third quarter?

Taco Bell has been the fastest-growing profit source since the Pizza Hut sale, and the food safety incident interrupted the company's strongest growth engine. In the second quarter, Taco Bell division operating profit rose 19% to $311 million, U.S. same-store sales grew 7% and U.S. company restaurant margin was 26.2%[9]. On July 17, after communicating with state and federal health officials, Taco Bell U.S. voluntarily removed certain lettuce supplied by its vendor Taylor Farms, which Taylor Farms later recalled, and the company said the issue had a meaningful near-term impact on sales[6]. This quarter tests whether the loss is a one-quarter traffic gap or will carry into the fourth quarter.

Current evidence shows sales recovering, but margin will be well below pre-incident levels. In the 10-Q the company said sales were improving from their low point and should keep improving through the third quarter, and it put third-quarter U.S. company restaurant margin at 19% to 21%[6]. On the call, management disclosed U.S. same-store sales of -2% quarter-to-date through July 27 and attributed the margin pressure to temporarily depressed volumes, promotional investment to drive recovery, and the concentration of company-owned stores in the hardest-hit markets[10]. An alternative reading is that promotions bring back mostly low-check traffic, so same-store sales recover while margin sits at the low end of the range and the fourth quarter still requires discounting.

The financial transmission is direct, and margin recovery may lag same-store sales. A sharp traffic drop lowers franchise fees along with system sales, leaves company stores unable to spread fixed labor and occupancy costs, and adds promotional spending, pushing company restaurant margin from 26.2% in the second quarter[9] to the company's 19%-21% range[6] and slowing Taco Bell division profit growth. If traffic recovers in the fourth quarter, margin rises with volume; if promotions continue, margin recovery will trail same-store sales. What remains unresolved is that the only official U.S. quarter-to-date same-store sales figure covers July 1 to 27[10].

Four numbers in the third-quarter report will together show whether the hit ends this quarter. Investors need to see where U.S. same-store sales and company restaurant margin land against the 19%-21% range, whether management discloses October or fourth-quarter-to-date same-store sales, whether promotions continue into the fourth quarter, and whether Taco Bell division operating profit falls year over year. If U.S. company restaurant margin is below 19%, or management says fourth-quarter-to-date same-store sales are still negative, the hit is not a one-off; if quarterly same-store sales are no worse than -2% and October has turned positive, the hit is largely confined to the third quarter.

Is KFC still relying on new restaurants while same-store sales and the U.S. market lag?

KFC is the largest profit source after the Pizza Hut sale, and the quality of its growth decides how solid the company's long-term targets are. KFC accounts for 58% of divisional operating profit excluding Pizza Hut[13], and its growth comes mainly from franchisee openings: in the second quarter units grew 7% to 34,747, but same-store sales grew only 2%[11], and U.S. system sales fell 2%[12]. If openings slow or same-store sales turn negative, the company's long-term algorithm of 5% unit growth, 7% system sales growth and at least 8% Core Operating Profit growth[30] loses its biggest support.

Second-quarter data show openings still supporting revenue and profit while same-store sales stay weak. KFC opened 660 gross new restaurants, system sales grew 6% excluding foreign currency, franchise and property revenues were $477 million, up 6% excluding foreign currency, and division operating profit was $410 million, up 9% excluding foreign currency[11]. On the call, management said it is dissatisfied with 2% same-store sales growth and launched a new global strategy focused on consumer relevance, restaurant economics and digital and loyalty capabilities[29]. An alternative reading is that more of the growth comes from openings in master franchise markets, whose royalty rates are lower than store-level agreements[21], so unit growth overstates fee growth; the U.S. decline may also reflect competition and price wars rather than short-term factors.

Openings drive current revenue, while same-store sales shape future openings with a longer lag. Franchisee-funded openings lift unit count by about 7%, system sales follow, the company collects fees of 4%-6% (lower for master franchisees and Yum China), and those fees flow into KFC franchise and property revenues and division operating profit. Same-store sales, especially in the U.S., determine sales per restaurant and franchisees' returns on new units, so they affect the pace of openings over the following quarters. In the second quarter units grew 7% but franchise and property revenues grew only 6% excluding foreign currency[11], and that gap is a direct window into the fee-rate mix.

Four checkpoints in the third quarter will show whether the new strategy is starting to work. Investors need to see whether unit growth stays at 6%-7%, whether same-store sales exceed 2%, whether U.S. system sales stop falling, and how wide the gap is between franchise and property revenue growth and unit growth. If unit growth falls below 5% or same-store sales turn negative, the opening-driven growth model weakens; if same-store sales rise above 2% and the U.S. stabilizes, the early effect of the new strategy gains support.

Can the $2.3 billion from selling Pizza Hut offset the profit it leaves behind?

Selling Pizza Hut cost Yum! Brands a steady profit stream, and whether the cash fills the gap depends on how fast it is deployed. Pizza Hut contributed $340 million of divisional operating profit in 2025[16], the company expects about $2.3 billion of after-tax net proceeds from the two transactions[14], it plans to repay the revolver first and then buy back shares[15], and it aims to hold G&A at about 1.7% of system sales[10]. The third quarter is the first report after closing and will show how the cash was actually used, the size of the gain or loss on the sale, and the profit growth of the remaining business.

The transactions are complete, but the results of deploying the cash are not yet in the financial statements. The mainland China sale closed on August 7 for $1.2 billion[8] and the rest closed on September 1[3]; the revolver balance was $675 million at the end of June[15], remaining repurchase capacity was about $4,389 million[31], and first-half buybacks were about $670 million[32]. Excluding Pizza Hut, second-quarter Core Operating Profit grew 8%[5]. An alternative reading is that buybacks will not reduce the share count fast enough to offset the lost Pizza Hut profit and the cost of transition services, diluting EPS in 2026-2027.

The net effect of the sale on EPS depends on three lines: interest, share count and expenses. Pizza Hut closing brings about $2.3 billion of proceeds, repaying the revolver lowers interest, buybacks lower the share count, and together they are meant to offset the roughly $340 million of annual divisional operating profit that leaves with Pizza Hut; if corporate costs do not shrink with Pizza Hut's exit, G&A as a share of system sales rises and weakens EPS. Second-quarter G&A was $324 million, of which $44 million was a Special Item tied to the Pizza Hut strategic review, leaving about $280 million excluding it[4][27], and management said transition services will be phased out through 2027[10]. Because Pizza Hut is not presented as a discontinued operation[22], third-quarter consolidated figures include Pizza Hut only until closing and cannot be compared directly with the prior year.

Four checkpoints in the third quarter will show whether the cash is being deployed as planned. Investors need to see the gain or loss on the sale and actual proceeds, the quarter-end revolver balance, the quarter's repurchase amount and average diluted share count, and G&A and Core Operating Profit growth excluding Pizza Hut. If the revolver is not fully repaid and buybacks do not accelerate, or Core Operating Profit growth excluding Pizza Hut is below 8%, the EPS benefit of the sale will be delayed; the opposite would show the cash being deployed as planned.

Risks and Falsifiers

Yum China and Chinese consumer demand are the largest single-market risk. China accounts for 26% of KFC system sales and grew 6% excluding foreign currency in the second quarter[12], and Yum China, the largest master franchisee, pays a 3% fee[20]; a slowdown in Chinese consumption, geopolitics or anti-American sentiment would hit openings and sales per restaurant at the same time, directly affecting KFC fee income and unit growth. If KFC China system sales growth stays around the second quarter's 6%, this concern has not materialized.

High leverage and interest rates become a bigger risk as the profit base shrinks. Debt excluding the revolver is about $11.5 billion, the company targets net leverage of about 4.0x EBITDA and its credit ratings are BB+/Ba2[15]; net interest expense was $501 million in 2025[18] and $128 million in the second quarter of 2026[4]. With a smaller profit base and an unchanged leverage target, interest on refinanced and new debt would squeeze EPS; if net leverage stays around 4.0x after the sale and interest expense does not rise, this risk has not grown.

A slower-than-expected traffic recovery after the food safety incident is the most direct operating risk in the third quarter. If discounting continues into the fourth quarter, it would depress both Taco Bell U.S. company restaurant profit and franchise fees that move with system sales[6][10]. The falsifier is third-quarter U.S. company restaurant margin of at least 19% together with positive fourth-quarter-to-date same-store sales.

Persistently weak KFC same-store sales and a continuing U.S. decline would reduce franchisees' willingness to open restaurants. The exposed lines are KFC franchise and property revenues ($1,807 million in 2025) and division operating profit ($1,503 million in 2025)[23]. If unit growth stays above 6% and same-store sales are no worse than 2%[11], this risk has not materialized.

Fixed costs may shrink more slowly than profit leaves after the sale, with transition services weighing on G&A. Company G&A was $1,262 million in 2025[18], and management said transition services will continue through 2027[10]. If G&A excluding Pizza Hut grows no faster than the mid-single digits and Core Operating Profit growth is at least the 8% in the long-term algorithm[30], costs are shrinking in step with the business.

What to Watch Next

  • Taco Bell U.S. recovery, company restaurant margin: 26.2% in the second quarter of 2026[9] against the company's 19%-21% view for the third quarter[6]. A reading below 19% would mean the hit did not end this quarter.
  • Taco Bell U.S. recovery, same-store sales: +7% in the second quarter[9] and -2% quarter-to-date through July 27[10]. Third-quarter same-store sales no worse than -2% plus a positive October would confine the hit largely to the third quarter.
  • KFC openings and same-store sales: 34,747 units, up 7%, with same-store sales of +2% at the end of June[11]. Unit growth below 5% or negative same-store sales would damage the opening-driven model.
  • KFC U.S. and fee revenue: U.S. system sales down 2%[12] and franchise and property revenues of $477 million[11]. A U.S. stabilization with improving same-store sales would support the new strategy.
  • Pizza Hut proceeds, revolver and buybacks: $675 million revolver balance at the end of June[15] and about $670 million of first-half buybacks[32]. An unpaid revolver without faster buybacks would delay the EPS effect.
  • Pizza Hut proceeds, G&A and Core Operating Profit: second-quarter G&A of about $280 million excluding Special Items[27] and Core Operating Profit growth of 8% excluding Pizza Hut[5]. Growth below 8% would mean the profit gap from the sale has not been filled.

Conclusion

Yum! Brands is driven by franchisees' global openings and by high company restaurant margins at Taco Bell U.S., and both lines carry more weight after the Pizza Hut sale. In 2025 the company reported revenue of $8,214 million and operating profit of $2,574 million[18], and in the second quarter of 2026 Core Operating Profit excluding Pizza Hut grew 8%[5]; future growth now has to come jointly from KFC openings, Taco Bell margins and the deployment of about $2.3 billion of proceeds[14]. With about $11.5 billion of debt and a net leverage target of about 4.0x[26], a miss on any of the three would flow more directly into EPS.

Since the second-quarter results, only one independent outside analysis has addressed a core debate. On October 27, Lila Margalit of Placer.ai used mobile location visit data to show that Taco Bell third-quarter visits fell 10.1% year over year after the July 16 federal health advisory, ran roughly 21% below 2025 levels in the weeks right after the outbreak, narrowed steadily through August and September, and were only 1.9% lower by the week of October 5, concluding that Taco Bell's setback appears to have been temporary[33]. That outside view points the same way as the company's 10-Q statement that sales were improving from their low point[6] and supports the reading that the hit was concentrated in the third quarter; but visit counts exclude check size and promotional discounts, so they cannot show where company restaurant margin will land within the 19%-21% range. Most other public material in the period restated the July 30 call or covered the food safety incident, and independent assessments of KFC same-store sales and of capital deployment after the Pizza Hut sale remain a gap.

The combination that would most strengthen the current understanding is Taco Bell U.S. company restaurant margin of at least 19% with positive fourth-quarter-to-date same-store sales, KFC unit growth above 6% with same-store sales above 2% and a stable U.S. business, and a repaid revolver, faster buybacks and Core Operating Profit growth excluding Pizza Hut of at least 8%. Conversely, if Taco Bell margin falls below 19%, KFC same-store sales turn negative or unit growth drops below 5%, and G&A does not shrink with Pizza Hut's exit, the growth case after the Pizza Hut sale would be clearly weakened.

Sources

[1] YUM 10-K filed 2026-02-20 franchise reliance · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000084/yum-20251231.htm

[2] Drillr earnings calendar YUM updated 2026-10-31 · 2026-10-31 · Drillr earnings calendar · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[3] YUM 8-K filed 2026-09-01 Pizza Hut sale completed · 2026-09-01 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000187/a8kex991912026.htm

[4] YUM Q2 2026 8-K filed 2026-07-30 income statement · 2026-07-30 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000149/a8kex9917302026.htm

[5] YUM Q2 2026 8-K filed 2026-07-30 highlights · 2026-07-30 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000149/a8kex9917302026.htm

[6] YUM Q2 2026 10-Q filed 2026-08-05 Taco Bell food safety · 2026-08-05 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000160/yum-20260630.htm

[7] Drillr analyst consensus YUM Q3 2026 retrieved 2026-10-30 · 2026-10-30 · Drillr analyst estimates · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

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[9] YUM Q2 2026 8-K filed 2026-07-30 Taco Bell division · 2026-07-30 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000149/a8kex9917302026.htm

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[11] YUM Q2 2026 8-K filed 2026-07-30 KFC division · 2026-07-30 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000149/a8kex9917302026.htm

[12] YUM Q2 2026 8-K filed 2026-07-30 KFC markets · 2026-07-30 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000149/a8kex9917302026.htm

[13] YUM Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-30 segment mix · 2026-07-30 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[14] YUM Q2 2026 10-Q filed 2026-08-05 Pizza Hut sale · 2026-08-05 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000160/yum-20260630.htm

[15] YUM Q2 2026 10-Q filed 2026-08-05 liquidity · 2026-08-05 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000160/yum-20260630.htm

[16] YUM 10-K filed 2026-02-20 Pizza Hut division · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000084/yum-20251231.htm

[17] YUM Q2 2026 8-K filed 2026-07-30 · 2026-07-30 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000149/a8kex9917302026.htm

[18] YUM 10-K filed 2026-02-20 worldwide results · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000084/yum-20251231.htm

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[22] YUM Q2 2026 10-Q filed 2026-08-05 not discontinued · 2026-08-05 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000160/yum-20260630.htm

[23] YUM 10-K filed 2026-02-20 KFC division · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000084/yum-20251231.htm

[24] YUM 10-K filed 2026-02-20 Taco Bell division · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000084/yum-20251231.htm

[25] YUM 10-K filed 2026-02-20 cash flows · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000084/yum-20251231.htm

[26] YUM 10-K filed 2026-02-20 debt · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000084/yum-20251231.htm

[27] YUM Q2 2026 8-K filed 2026-07-30 core operating profit · 2026-07-30 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000149/a8kex9917302026.htm

[28] YUM Q2 2026 8-K filed 2026-07-30 cash flows · 2026-07-30 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000149/a8kex9917302026.htm

[29] YUM Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-30 KFC · 2026-07-30 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[30] YUM Q2 2026 8-K filed 2026-07-30 long-term algorithm · 2026-07-30 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000149/a8kex9917302026.htm

[31] YUM Q2 2026 10-Q filed 2026-08-05 repurchases · 2026-08-05 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1041061/000104106126000160/yum-20260630.htm

[32] YUM Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-30 capital · 2026-07-30 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[33] Placer.ai Yum! Brands Q3 2026 visits 2026-10-27 · 2026-10-27 · Placer.ai · https://www.placer.ai/anchor/articles/yum-brands-q3-2026-taco-bell-bounces-back-from-outbreak

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