[CMG] Chipotle: Q3 2026 earnings test for traffic as prices rise

Chipotle runs company-owned fast-casual restaurants in the US that serve burritos, burrito bowls, tacos and salads assembled to order from the rice, beans, protein and toppings each customer picks[1], and it operated 4,186 company-owned restaurants as of June 30, 2026[2]. Ahead of Chipotle's Q3 2026 earnings, the Drillr earnings calendar shows the company holding its call on 2026-10-28 to report the Third quarter 2026 (three months ended September 30, 2026)[3]. The latest disclosed quarter is the second quarter of 2026: total revenue rose 9.3% to $3,348.6 million and comparable restaurant sales grew 2.2%, made up of 1.0% transaction growth and a 1.2% increase in average check[4]; restaurant-level operating margin, however, fell to 25.2% from 27.4% a year earlier, and diluted EPS was flat at $0.32[5]. On the July 29 call, management set third-quarter comparable sales guidance at about +1% and said that figure assumes the roughly 2-percentage-point drag from industry food-safety concerns tied to cyclospora (a parasite outbreak) lasts the whole quarter[6]; it also guided third-quarter menu pricing to about 2.5%, food costs to just under 30% of revenue and labor costs to about 25.5%[7], with full-year comparable sales growth in the low single digits and 350 to 370 new restaurant openings[8]. The Drillr analyst estimate set puts third-quarter revenue consensus at $3,282.8 million from 19 analysts (range $3,252.8 million to $3,392.5 million) and EPS consensus at $0.29 from 22 analysts (range $0.28 to $0.31)[9].

Three things matter most in the coming third-quarter report. First, whether transactions stay positive once menu pricing rises to about 2.5%: second-quarter traffic growth of 1.0% came after a 2.9% decline in transactions across 2025[10], and if traffic turns negative as pricing accelerates, the first-half improvement may prove to be only a rebound from a weak base. Second, whether the year-over-year decline in restaurant-level margin shrinks below the 2.2 percentage points seen in the second quarter: revenue grew 9.3% in that quarter, yet beef and freight inflation, added staffing and marketing spending left EPS unchanged, so margin decides whether revenue growth becomes earnings growth. Third, how back-half openings and continued buybacks change cash: the company opened only 149 company-owned restaurants in the first half, while $1,354.9 million of buybacks already exceeded operating cash flow minus capital spending and cash and marketable investments fell to $667.1 million on June 30, so third-quarter openings and the period-end cash balance will show whether that pace can hold.

Company Background and Business Structure

Chipotle is a single-format restaurant company that earns almost all of its revenue from company-owned US restaurants. As of December 31, 2025, it owned 3,938 restaurants in the US and 104 international restaurants, plus 14 international partner-operated restaurants; it manages US operations through 11 regions, reports a single segment, and no customer accounts for 10% or more of revenue[1]. The US segment generated $11,679.4 million of revenue in 2025, about 97.9% of the total[11], and the company-owned restaurants in Canada and Europe and the international partner-operated restaurants are too small to report separately.

Customers can order in line at the restaurant, order through the app or website for in-store pickup or pickup at a Chipotlane (a drive-through lane for digital orders), or order through third-party delivery platforms. Digital sales were 36.7% of food and beverage revenue in 2025[12] and rose to 38.3% in the second quarter of 2026 from 35.5% a year earlier[13]. Delivery service revenue is small, at $59.6 million in 2025 and down 10.4% from the prior year[10], so the company's revenue is driven almost entirely by food and beverage sales.

Because Chipotle owns and operates its restaurants, food, labor, occupancy and other restaurant operating costs all sit on its own income statement, while international partner-operated restaurants contribute only royalties[1]. The company buys from multiple suppliers, and it sources some ingredients, including avocados, tomatoes, beef, pork, limes, peppers and spices, as well as equipment, packaging and paper products, from outside the US, including Mexico, Canada and China, which exposes it to tariffs, trade sanctions and tax changes[14]. This structure gives the company strong control over restaurant execution, but it also means cost swings land directly on its own margins.

In 2026 the company has centered its operating agenda on a strategy it calls Recipe for Growth and credits that strategy for its first-half improvement[15]. According to the second-quarter call summary, the High Efficiency Equipment Package (HEAP) is installed in more than 1,000 restaurants with a target of about 2,000 by year-end, and equipped restaurants produce 2 to 3 more entrees than the rest of the fleet during peak 15-minute periods; the company has also deployed a peak-hour support role called Linebacker in more than 70% of restaurants and relaunched its rewards program in mid-April[16]. These measures target peak throughput and visit frequency, which sit at the center of the traffic debate below.

Financial History and Current Position

2025 was Chipotle's weakest traffic year in recent history, but new restaurants still kept total revenue growing. According to the 2025 annual report, total revenue was $11,925.6 million, up 5.4%; comparable restaurant sales fell 1.7%, made up of a 2.9% decline in transactions and a 1.2% rise in average check, within which menu pricing added 2.1% and check mix subtracted 0.9%; average restaurant sales were $3.104 million, down 3.4%[10]. The gap between falling comparable sales and rising revenue was filled mainly by restaurants opened during the year.

Profit barely grew in 2025. US segment operating income was $2,587.5 million, below $2,628.6 million the year before; after $660.4 million of corporate and unallocated expenses and other operating items, consolidated operating income reconciled from the segment table was about $1,935.8 million, and income before taxes was $2,009.5 million versus $2,010.2 million a year earlier[11]. Because the share count fell, diluted EPS still rose 2.7% to $1.14 from $1.11[12].

Cash flow was enough to fund new restaurants and support large buybacks. Operating cash flow was about $2.1 billion in 2025, unchanged from the prior year, and financing outflows were about $2.5 billion, with the increase over the prior year driven mainly by about $1.4 billion of additional share repurchases[17]. At year-end the company held about $1.1 billion of cash and marketable investments with $1.7 billion of repurchase authorization remaining[18], and it had no outstanding debt[7].

In the first quarter of 2026, traffic turned positive but margins fell sharply. Total revenue was $3,088.2 million, up 7.4%; comparable sales rose 0.5%, with transactions up 0.6% and average check down 0.1%, within which menu pricing added 0.9% and check mix subtracted 1.0%[19]. Operating margin fell to 12.9% from 16.7%, adjusted restaurant-level operating margin fell to 23.7% from 26.2%, and diluted EPS fell 17.9% to $0.23 from $0.28[20].

Revenue accelerated in the second quarter, but profit stayed below the prior-year level. Operating income was $525.6 million, a 15.7% operating margin, compared with $559.1 million and 18.2% a year earlier[21]; net income was $403.5 million versus $436.1 million, and diluted EPS was flat at $0.32 as diluted weighted-average shares fell to 1,279.1 million from 1,350.2 million[22]. Adjusted net income was $418.9 million and adjusted diluted EPS was also flat at $0.33[8]. For the first half, total revenue was $6,436.8 million, up 8.4%, and comparable sales grew 1.4%[4].

First-half buybacks exceeded free cash flow and drew down cash on the balance sheet. Operating cash flow for the first half was $1,332.0 million, up from $1,118.4 million, mainly because of tax-payment timing: cash taxes paid were only $82.7 million versus $279.3 million a year earlier; capital spending was $397.6 million versus $305.4 million, and share repurchases were $1,354.9 million[23]. Cash and marketable investments fell to $667.1 million by June 30[24]; in the second quarter the company bought back $630.7 million of stock at an average price of $32.55 per share, and after the board added $1.3 billion of authorization on June 11, $1.7 billion of authorization remained[8].

Operating Model

Chipotle's revenue is set by restaurant count and sales per restaurant, and sales per restaurant break down into traffic and average check. Food and beverage revenue roughly equals company-owned restaurants times average restaurant sales; growth splits into comparable restaurant sales at restaurants open at least 13 full calendar months, which equal the change in transactions plus the change in average check, with average check further split into menu pricing and check mix, and the contribution from new restaurants not yet in the comparable base[12]. In the second quarter of 2026, food and beverage revenue was $3,332.8 million, delivery service revenue was $15.8 million, comparable sales grew 2.2% and total revenue grew 9.3%[4], and the gap of about 7 percentage points between the two came from new restaurants. Customers pay when they order and revenue is recognized when the food is served, so a change in traffic shows up in revenue in the same quarter.

Restaurant-level margin is what remains after four kinds of restaurant costs, and most of those costs do not move with traffic. In the second quarter of 2026, food, beverage and packaging, labor, occupancy and other operating costs were about 29.7%, 25.0%, 5.2% and 14.9% of total revenue[22], leaving a 25.2% restaurant-level margin; after general and administrative expenses of 5.7%, depreciation and amortization of 2.9%, pre-opening costs of 0.5% and impairment and closure costs of 0.4%, operating margin was 15.7%[21]. Labor, occupancy, depreciation and most other operating costs scale with restaurant count rather than traffic, so a 1-percentage-point change in traffic usually moves margins more than a price increase of the same size.

Each driver reaches the financial statements in a different direction and with a different lag. Beef and freight inflation lifts the food cost ratio in the same quarter, and wage inflation and added staffing lift the labor ratio in the same quarter, while menu price increases offset those costs only gradually as they roll through restaurants; new restaurants incur pre-opening costs before they open and, according to management, start at about 80% of the sales of a mature restaurant before ramping toward full contribution[16]. The more openings cluster in the second half, the higher third- and fourth-quarter pre-opening costs will be, while new-restaurant revenue shows up later.

Chipotle's cash flow comes from steady operating receipts under negative working capital, and it goes mainly to new restaurants, equipment for existing restaurants and buybacks. Customers pay on the spot and suppliers are paid on terms, so operating cash flow roughly equals net income plus depreciation, amortization and stock compensation, adjusted for tax-payment timing; the first-half 2026 increase in operating cash flow came mainly from that timing[23]. The company has said that spending on new equipment for existing restaurants will stay elevated through 2027[23], and with no debt, any buybacks above free cash flow can only draw on the cash and marketable investments balance.

This model covers traffic, average check, restaurant cost structure, new openings and capital allocation for company-owned US restaurants, with the US segment at about 97.9% of total revenue[11]. The company does not disclose traffic per restaurant, the delivery share of revenue, average check by channel or sales at individual new restaurants, and new-restaurant productivity of about 80% and year-two cash-on-cash returns of about 60% come only from the call summary rather than a verbatim transcript or audited data[16]. The roughly 2-point cyclospora drag is likewise a management estimate and cannot be treated as an auditable figure[6].

Industry and Competitive Position

Chipotle competes in fast casual dining for the same customers as quick-service chains, casual-dining restaurants and the many restaurants on delivery platforms, and its main rivals are formats that also emphasize quality ingredients, fast service and reasonable prices. Its first advantage is scale combined with full ownership: 4,186 company-owned restaurants[2] let it set execution standards, roll out equipment and adjust the menu without coordinating with franchisees. Its second is its digital business and pickup-lane network, with 257 of the 334 company-owned restaurants opened in 2025 including a Chipotlane[12]; management also says year-two cash-on-cash returns on new restaurants are about 60%, among the strongest in the industry[16].

The company's weakness is high sensitivity to traffic with no franchisees to share the costs. Transactions fell 2.9% in 2025[10], and when consumers turn cautious and perceived value slips, a fully company-owned system must carry fixed labor and occupancy costs itself rather than pushing restaurant-level cost risk onto franchisees as a franchise system can. Its menu centers on ingredients such as beef, chicken, dairy, avocados and tortillas, and the annual report states that price increases for these critical ingredients would have a particularly adverse effect on results[14], which leaves it more exposed to beef prices than peers built around chicken or noodles.

The competitive comparison available here has clear limits. The company does not disclose traffic, margin or sales-per-restaurant comparisons with named peers, and the claim that its new-restaurant returns are among the strongest in the industry comes from management itself[16]. What this section can establish, therefore, is the company's own structural strengths and weaknesses, not a precise margin of advantage over any specific rival.

Core Debates

Can Chipotle keep traffic growing as menu price increases accelerate?

Traffic is the most important variable in this report because the company has just come through its worst year in recent history. In 2025 comparable sales fell 1.7% and transactions fell 2.9%[10]; in the first and second quarters of 2026 transactions turned positive, growing 0.6% and 1.0%[19][4], and the company raised full-year comparable sales guidance from about flat at the start of the year[12] to low-single-digit growth[8]. But industry cyclospora concerns cut comparable sales by about 2 percentage points in late July[6], while third-quarter menu pricing is set to rise to about 2.5%[7], so traffic faces an outside shock and higher prices at the same time.

Second-quarter data show both traffic and average check contributing to growth, but the quality of each still needs to be tested. Comparable sales rose 2.2%, made up of 1.0% transaction growth and 1.2% average check growth; within the check, menu pricing contributed 1.6 percentage points and check mix subtracted 0.4 points, a much smaller drag than the 1.0 points in the first quarter[4][19]. The company attributes the improvement to HEAP, the Linebacker role, the rewards relaunch and limited-time menu items[16]. The prior-year base matters: in the second quarter of 2025, transactions fell 4.9% and comparable sales fell 4.0%[4], an extremely low starting point.

The financial path of this debate is direct, but an alternative explanation has not been ruled out. Peak throughput, the rewards program and limited-time protein items affect visit and digital-order frequency, which drives transactions and then comparable sales and food and beverage revenue; industry food-safety concerns and consumer caution push visit frequency the other way. Because labor and occupancy are largely fixed, changes in traffic are amplified in restaurant-level margin. The alternative explanation is that positive traffic in 2026 is only a rebound from the 2025 decline; if transactions turn negative after pricing accelerates in the third quarter, the explanation built on operating improvement will not hold.

The third quarter offers three data points to watch and clear falsifiers. The first is whether comparable sales reach about +1% and how much transactions and average check each contribute; the second is whether management says the cyclospora drag eased in August and September; the third is whether pricing contributes about 2.5 points and whether check mix deteriorates again. If transactions turn negative and pricing alone keeps comparable sales positive, perceived value has been damaged; if full-year comparable guidance is cut, the current reading of a traffic recovery also weakens.

Can price increases catch up with beef, freight and staffing costs and stop the margin slide?

Margin decides whether revenue growth turns into earnings growth, and in the second quarter the two clearly diverged. Total revenue grew 9.3%, but restaurant-level margin fell to 25.2% from 27.4%, operating margin fell to 15.7% from 18.2%, and diluted EPS was flat at $0.32[5]. With traffic only just recovering, that means rising costs absorbed almost all of the added revenue.

All three restaurant cost lines rose in the second quarter, and food was the largest source of pressure. The food cost ratio rose 0.8 percentage points: inflation, mainly beef and freight, added 1.4 points and higher protein and produce usage added 0.5, while menu pricing and lower avocado and dairy costs each offset 0.5 points[25]; the labor ratio rose 0.3 points, with wage inflation and performance bonuses adding 0.3, restaurant labor execution adding 0.2 and pricing offsetting 0.4[26]; the other operating cost ratio rose 0.9 points, with marketing and promotions adding 0.3 and insurance claims, maintenance and utilities also rising[27]. As baselines, the second-quarter food cost ratio was 29.7% versus 28.9% a year earlier[13], the labor ratio was 25.0% versus 24.7% a year earlier, compared with 26.1% in the first quarter and 25.7% excluding legal-related costs[20], and the other operating cost ratio was 14.9% versus about 14.0% a year earlier and about 15.2% for the first half[22].

The company's cost guidance has been accurate so far, but the nature of the margin decline remains disputed. On the first-quarter call, management guided second-quarter food costs to about 30% and labor to the low-25% range[28], broadly in line with the actual 29.7% and 25.0%[22]. On the cost side, beef and freight inflation and larger protein portions lift the food ratio, wage inflation, bonuses and added peak staffing lift the labor ratio, and marketing, insurance, maintenance and utilities lift other operating costs, while menu pricing and lower avocado and dairy costs only partly offset them before the result reaches restaurant-level margin, operating income and EPS. The alternative explanation is that the margin decline is not only inflation but a deliberate choice to spend on portions, staffing and marketing to win traffic, and that this spending will remain after prices rise; in that case, margin repair depends on sales leverage from traffic rather than on price.

Third-quarter cost ratios and the size of the margin decline can test this debate. Management guided third-quarter food costs to just under 30% and labor to about 25.5%[7]; the points to watch are whether actual results land in those ranges, how management reads beef prices, whether added staffing keeps pace with traffic, and whether the year-over-year decline in restaurant-level margin is smaller than the 2.2 points in the second quarter. If beef, freight or tariff costs keep rising faster than pricing can cover, or if the margin decline widens even in a quarter of faster price increases, the current view that pricing can gradually catch up with costs weakens.

Can roughly 350 new restaurants a year keep revenue growing near 10%?

New restaurants have been the main source of revenue growth over the past year, and they are also consuming cash. In 2025 comparable sales fell 1.7% while total revenue rose 5.4%, with the difference coming mainly from 334 new company-owned restaurants[12]; in 2026 the company plans 350 to 370 openings[8], but it opened only 149 in the first half, so the peak falls in the second half[2]. Meanwhile, first-half buybacks of $1,354.9 million exceeded operating cash flow minus capital spending of about $934.4 million[23], and cash and marketable investments fell from about $1.1 billion at the end of 2025[18] to $667.1 million on June 30[24].

Current data show restaurant growth in line with revenue growth and stable returns per restaurant. As of June 30, company-owned restaurants totaled 4,186, up 9.0% from 3,839 a year earlier, and the company opened 100 in the second quarter versus 61 a year earlier[2]; that matches the gap of about 7 percentage points between second-quarter revenue growth and comparable sales. Management says new-restaurant productivity has held at about 80% and year-two cash-on-cash returns at about 60%[16], and it anticipates that around 80% of new company-owned restaurants will include a Chipotlane[8].

The core of this debate is whether new restaurants are opening up new demand or pulling sales from existing ones. The cash path runs from site selection and construction, which create pre-opening costs in the current quarter, to new restaurants ramping from about 80% of mature-restaurant productivity and forming the non-comparable part of total revenue; capital spending on new restaurants and equipment for existing ones, together with buybacks, sets the cash and marketable investments balance. The alternative explanation is that growth relies mainly on denser placement, with new restaurants cannibalizing existing ones, which would show up as a persistent decline in average restaurant sales; trailing 12-month average restaurant sales as of June 30 were $3.102 million, down 1.3% from $3.142 million a year earlier[4], a smaller decline than the 3.4% for full-year 2025[10] and 2.9% in the first quarter[19], narrowing as comparable sales recovered but not yet enough to separate the two explanations.

Third-quarter openings, the revenue gap and the cash balance will provide the next set of evidence. The points to watch are the number of company-owned openings in the quarter and whether the full-year plan holds, whether the gap between revenue growth and comparable sales stays near 7 percentage points, and third-quarter buybacks, capital spending and the September 30 cash and marketable investments balance. If openings slip or new-restaurant productivity falls so that revenue growth drops below comparable sales plus 5 percentage points, or if buybacks keep exceeding free cash flow and cash keeps falling, the current understanding of the opening pace and capital allocation will need revision.

Risks and Falsifiers

Food-safety incidents and negative social-media attention can hit traffic directly, and that is the most immediate risk for the third quarter. In its second-quarter 10-Q, the company said it had recently seen low-single-digit headwinds to comparable sales that it ties partly to customer concern over recent US food-safety issues, and it warned that results could be materially hurt if those disruptions worsen in the third quarter[15]. Measured roughly against second-quarter revenue of $3,348.6 million, a drag of about 2 comparable points corresponds to revenue on the order of $60 million in a single quarter[6]. If third-quarter comparable sales reach the roughly +1% guidance and management says the cyclospora-related drag has faded, this risk poses less of a threat to the current understanding.

Broad turnover in senior management raises execution risk, and it shows up in expenses. In the first half of 2026, the chief brand officer and chief legal officer departed, a new chief brand officer and chief digital officer arrived between April and June, and new brand messaging and rewards experiences are still rolling out. Second-quarter general and administrative expenses were $190.5 million versus $172.2 million a year earlier[21], and first-quarter labor costs included about 0.4 points of legal-related costs[20]; management guided full-year marketing to the low-3% range of sales[7]. If third-quarter G&A falls back with no new restructuring or legal provisions, this risk has not turned into further profit pressure.

Industry food-safety worries and consumer caution could keep depressing visit frequency and offset operational gains. Second-quarter food and beverage revenue was $3,332.8 million[4], so each 1-point shortfall in comparable restaurant revenue removes roughly $30 million of revenue in a quarter, and because labor and occupancy are largely fixed, restaurant-level margin comes under greater pressure. If third-quarter comparable sales meet or beat the roughly +1% guidance with positive transactions, operational improvement has at least withstood this round of pressure.

Beef, freight and tariffs on imported ingredients could keep raising food costs while the company holds back on further price increases to protect perceived value. The annual report warns that prices for ingredients such as beef and avocados fluctuate with supply, weather, inflation and geopolitical conflict, and that some ingredients sourced from Mexico, Canada and China may face tariffs[14]. Second-quarter food, beverage and packaging costs were $993.6 million, or 29.7% of total revenue[22]; based on second-quarter revenue, each 0.5 points of extra food cost ratio removes about $17 million of restaurant-level profit. If the third-quarter food cost ratio lands below 30% and the company keeps its view of low-single-digit full-year food cost inflation[7], this risk remains contained.

Denser restaurant placement could cause cannibalization, and rising construction and equipment costs could lower new-restaurant returns. First-half 2026 capital spending was $397.6 million, up $92.2 million year over year, mainly for new restaurant development and new equipment for existing restaurants[23]; trailing 12-month average restaurant sales as of June 30 were $3.102 million, down 1.3% from $3.142 million[4]. If average restaurant sales turn positive year over year and management reaffirms new-restaurant productivity of about 80%[16], concerns about cannibalization and falling returns ease.

What to Watch Next

• Traffic after price increases: the baseline is second-quarter comparable sales of +2.2%, transactions of +1.0%, pricing of 1.6 points and check mix of -0.4 points. Watch whether third-quarter comparable sales reach about +1%, pricing reaches about 2.5 points and the cyclospora drag fades. Positive transactions with full-year guidance intact would confirm the current view; negative transactions with pricing alone holding comparable sales up, or a cut to full-year guidance, would falsify it.
• Pricing versus costs: the baseline is a second-quarter food cost ratio of 29.7%, labor of 25.0% and restaurant-level margin of 25.2% versus 27.4%. Watch whether food lands just under 30%, labor near 25.5%, and what management says about beef prices. A year-over-year margin decline smaller than 2.2 points would confirm; a wider decline despite faster pricing would falsify.
• New restaurants and revenue growth: the baseline is 149 first-half openings, a second-quarter gap of about 7 points between revenue growth and comparable sales, and trailing average restaurant sales of $3.102 million (-1.3%). Watch third-quarter openings against the 350 to 370 plan and the average restaurant sales trend. A gap near 7 points with a narrowing average-sales decline would confirm; revenue growth below comparable sales plus 5 points would falsify.
• Buybacks and cash: the baseline is $1,354.9 million of first-half buybacks, $397.6 million of capital spending and $667.1 million of cash on June 30. Watch the September 30 cash balance and the third-quarter buyback pace. Buybacks back within free cash flow would confirm; a continued fall in cash would falsify.

Conclusion

Chipotle's business runs on two forces: unit growth from more than 300 new restaurants a year, and the traffic and average check that set sales per restaurant. In 2025 comparable sales fell 1.7% and transactions fell 2.9%[10], yet total revenue still grew 5.4%; in the first half of 2026 traffic turned positive and second-quarter revenue grew 9.3%, but restaurant-level margin fell to 25.2% from 27.4% and EPS was flat at $0.32[5], while $1,354.9 million of first-half buybacks brought cash and marketable investments down to $667.1 million[24]. The central unresolved relationship is whether traffic can stay positive once third-quarter pricing rises to about 2.5%, while that pricing actually catches up with beef, freight and staffing costs.

Between the second-quarter release on July 29, 2026 and October 25, 2026, the coverage retrieved consisted mainly of results recaps, share-price moves and restaurant-opening news, and the only independent traffic analysis was published before the results, so there is no citable independent third-party interpretation from this period. The three core debates can currently be judged only through the company's own disclosures and management's comments on the call, and outside perspectives on traffic, margins and the opening pace remain a gap.

If third-quarter transactions stay positive, comparable sales reach about +1% and the year-over-year decline in restaurant-level margin is smaller than 2.2 points, while the gap between revenue growth and comparable sales stays near 7 points and cash stops falling with buybacks, the view that operating improvements are driving traffic, pricing is gradually repairing margins and new restaurants are supporting growth would strengthen materially. Conversely, if transactions turn negative after pricing accelerates, the margin decline keeps widening, full-year comparable guidance is cut, or delayed openings push revenue growth below comparable sales plus 5 points, that view would weaken significantly.

Sources

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[3] CMG earnings calendar updated 2026-10-24 · 2026-10-24 · Drillr earnings calendar

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[16] CMG Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-29 · operations and new restaurants · 2026-07-29 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

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[18] CMG 10-K filed 2026-02-04 · cash, investments and buyback authorization · 2026-02-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1058090/000105809026000009/

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[20] CMG Q1 2026 8-K filed 2026-04-29 · results · 2026-04-29 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=1058090&type=8-K&dateb=20260430&owner=include&count=10

[21] CMG Q2 2026 8-K filed 2026-07-29 · restaurant level operating margin reconciliation · 2026-07-29 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=1058090&type=8-K&dateb=20260730&owner=include&count=10

[22] CMG Q2 2026 10-Q filed 2026-07-31 · income statement · 2026-07-31 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=1058090&type=10-Q&dateb=20260801&owner=include&count=10

[23] CMG Q2 2026 10-Q filed 2026-07-31 · cash flows · 2026-07-31 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=1058090&type=10-Q&dateb=20260801&owner=include&count=10

[24] CMG Q2 2026 10-Q filed 2026-07-31 · cash and investments · 2026-07-31 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=1058090&type=10-Q&dateb=20260801&owner=include&count=10

[25] CMG Q2 2026 10-Q filed 2026-07-31 · food, beverage and packaging costs · 2026-07-31 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=1058090&type=10-Q&dateb=20260801&owner=include&count=10

[26] CMG Q2 2026 10-Q filed 2026-07-31 · labor costs · 2026-07-31 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=1058090&type=10-Q&dateb=20260801&owner=include&count=10

[27] CMG Q2 2026 10-Q filed 2026-07-31 · other operating costs · 2026-07-31 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=1058090&type=10-Q&dateb=20260801&owner=include&count=10

[28] CMG Q1 2026 earnings call 2026-04-29 · guidance · 2026-04-29 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private