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[BAM] Brookfield Asset Management: Q3 2026 Earnings Preview on Flagship Fees and DE

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Summary

Brookfield Asset Management's Q2 2026 fee-related earnings rose 20% to $808 million; Q3 results test whether new flagships and insurance credit lift DE per share.

Brookfield Asset Management (BAM) is a New York-headquartered global alternative asset manager with over $1 trillion of assets under management, and it earns most of its money from management fees on infrastructure, energy, private equity, real estate and credit funds[1]. The Drillr earnings calendar shows the company reporting results for the Third quarter 2026 (three months ended September 30, 2026) on 2026-11-06[2], the first quarterly report after BAM said it would change how it presents fee revenues and fee-bearing capital[3]. In the latest disclosed period, the second quarter of 2026, fee-related earnings (FRE) rose 20% year over year to $808 million, fee-bearing capital (FBC) rose 19% to $672 billion, and quarterly fundraising reached a record $77 billion[1]; distributable earnings (DE) were $707 million, or $0.44 per share[3]. For this Brookfield Asset Management Q3 2026 earnings preview, the analyst consensus compiled by Drillr puts third-quarter earnings per share at $0.46, a measure that lines up with the company's DE per share; the prior-quarter consensus was $0.43 against an actual $0.44. The same source shows a third-quarter revenue consensus of $1,588.6 million, but its basis, and whether it reflects the new presentation and the Oaktree consolidation, cannot be confirmed[4].

Three things matter most in the upcoming third-quarter results. The first is whether two flagship funds start turning into new management fees: the sixth infrastructure flagship, BIF VI, had raised $9.3 billion by the end of June and is targeting its first close this year[1], while infrastructure and private equity together generated only $502 million of second-quarter fee revenues[5], so the timing of that close decides whether these two lines can outrun the fee losses from older funds being realized. The second is how much credit growth is genuine net inflow: credit FBC rose $46.5 billion in the first half, including $48.6 billion of inflows from the affiliated insurance platform BWS[5], and Oaktree became a wholly owned subsidiary on July 31[6], so both consolidation and the new presentation will inflate the headline figures. The third is whether FRE converts into DE per share: under the new presentation, FRE would need to reach $867 million to be up 15% year over year[3], and the $0.5025 quarterly dividend already exceeds second-quarter DE per share of $0.44[1], so interest and cash taxes will determine whether dividend coverage improves or stays tight.

Company Background and Business Structure

BAM is the asset management business separated from the Brookfield group, and its controlling shareholder, Brookfield Corporation (BN), still keeps part of the carried interest. BAM is listed in New York and Toronto, and its chief executive is Connor Teskey[1]; according to the 2025 annual report, BN retains all carried interest on existing mature funds and receives 33.3% of the carried interest on new funds sponsored by BAM[7]. On July 31, 2026, Brookfield acquired the 26% of Oaktree it did not already own for about $3.0 billion of cash and shares, making Oaktree a wholly owned subsidiary[6]; about $2.2 billion of that consideration is attributable to BAM, and Oaktree, previously an equity-method investment, has been consolidated in BAM's financial statements since July 31[5].

BAM groups its products into three categories by capital duration, and each earns fees differently. At the end of 2025, long-term private funds held about $285 billion of FBC; these funds typically run for 10 years with two one-year extensions, and BAM earns base management fees on committed or invested capital plus transaction and advisory fees on co-investments and carried interest[7]. Permanent capital and perpetual strategies held about $241 billion of FBC, with fees based on the market capitalization of the listed affiliates BIP, BEP and BBU or on perpetual fund NAV, plus incentive distributions from BEP and BIP linked to their distribution growth[7]; of the $603 billion total FBC at the end of 2025, the remaining roughly $77 billion sat in liquid strategies[7].

Credit is now BAM's largest fee line, followed by infrastructure and real estate. Of $5,487 million of fee revenues in 2025, credit contributed $1,726 million, infrastructure $1,287 million, real estate $1,090 million, renewable power and transition $828 million and private equity $556 million[7]. In the second quarter of 2026, credit accounted for $509 million of the quarter's $1,494 million of fee revenues, infrastructure $357 million, real estate $259 million, energy $224 million and private equity $145 million[5].

BAM's client base is broad, but its credit growth depends heavily on one related party. The company serves more than 2,500 institutional clients and about 69,000 private wealth clients, relying on more than 5,800 investment and asset management professionals and employees across 32 offices to raise, deploy and realize capital[5]. Brookfield Wealth Solutions (BWS) is a paired entity to BN that offers retirement services and wealth protection products[7]; it entrusts annuity assets to BAM and contributed $48.6 billion of insurance capital inflows to credit FBC in the first half of 2026[5].

Financial History and Current Position

On the company's own measures, BAM's fee revenues and FRE have accelerated over the past three years. Fee revenues were $4,381 million, $4,706 million and $5,487 million from 2023 through 2025, and FRE was $2,241 million, $2,456 million and $2,995 million[7]. In 2025 fee revenues grew 17% and FRE 22%, but higher cash taxes and lower investment income held DE growth to 14%, at $2.7 billion; FBC rose by $64 billion, or 12%, to $603 billion, 87% of it long-dated or perpetual[7].

The 2025 cash and capital cycle shows fundraising, deployment and realizations expanding together. Operating cash inflows were $2.1 billion, up from $1.6 billion in 2024[7]. According to the 2026 shareholder letter, the company raised $112 billion across more than 50 funds in 2025, deployed over $66 billion and sold assets and businesses valued at nearly $80 billion[8]; at the end of 2025 private funds held $134 billion of uncalled commitments, about $63 billion of which will begin earning fees only once the capital is invested[7].

In the first half of 2026, FRE grew faster than DE. First-quarter FRE rose 11% to $772 million, and DE was $702 million, or $0.43 per share[9]; second-quarter FRE was $808 million and DE rose 15% to $707 million[5], bringing first-half FRE to $1,580 million and DE to $1,409 million. FBC stood at $672 billion on June 30[1], and accrued carried interest rose from $1,636 million at the start of the year to $2,413 million, though only $14 million was realized during the half[5].

BAM runs a light balance sheet, but dividends and buybacks already exceed first-half DE. Operating cash inflows were $883 million in the first half, up from $643 million a year earlier; net financing outflows were $810 million, mainly about $1.6 billion of dividends and $576 million of share repurchases[5], against DE of $1,409 million over the same period. In March the company set up a $1.0 billion commercial paper program fully backed by its five-year bilateral revolving credit facility[10], and it had no commercial paper outstanding at June 30[5]; the board declared a quarterly dividend of $0.5025 per share, payable on September 29[1].

Operating Model

Fee revenues come from four kinds of fees, and each responds to capital changes at a different speed. Under the old presentation, second-quarter base management fees were $1,357 million, incentive distributions from BEP and BIP $128 million, transaction and advisory fees $8 million and performance fees $1 million, for a total of $1,494 million; incentive distributions grew 10%, matching quarterly distribution increases of 5% at BEP and 6% at BIP[5]. The new presentation shows partner managers' fee revenues and expenses at BAM's proportionate share rather than folding in only their net FRE, which lifts second-quarter fee revenues to $1,587 million[3]. Closed-end fund fees start only after a first close, with catch-up fees paid at later closes, so fundraising reaches revenue with a lag of a quarter or more; perpetual strategy fees, by contrast, move in step with listed affiliates' market capitalization and fund NAV.

FRE depends on whether fee revenues grow faster than people costs. Under the new presentation, second-quarter fee revenues of $1,587 million less direct costs of $757 million and $22 million not attributable to BAM produced FRE of $808 million, a 54% margin at BAM's share, below 55% in the third quarter of 2025 and 58% in the fourth quarter[3]. Direct costs grow mainly with headcount and inflation and rose $74 million, or 13%, year over year in the second quarter under the old presentation[5], so margins can expand only when fee revenue growth outpaces that cost growth.

DE starts from FRE, subtracts cash taxes, adds net investment and other income, and is then divided by diluted shares to reach a per-share figure. In the second quarter, FRE of $808 million less $97 million of cash taxes, plus $23 million of equity-based compensation added back and minus $27 million of net investment and other income, produced DE of $707 million[5]; on 1,612.5 million diluted weighted average shares, DE per share was $0.44[3]. Carried interest is excluded from fee revenues and enters DE only when realized after fund exits; 66.7% of carry on new funds belongs to BAM and 33.3% to BN, and only $14 million was realized in the first half[5], so DE currently depends almost entirely on FRE.

Industry and Competitive Position

BAM sits among the leading global alternative asset managers alongside Blackstone, KKR and Apollo, and its difference lies in its background as a real-asset operator. The company describes the strategy behind its sixth infrastructure flagship as its largest closed-end strategy[9]; in 2025 it deployed $10.9 billion in infrastructure, $6.9 billion in renewable power and transition, $4.0 billion in private equity, $7.5 billion in real estate and $36.3 billion in credit[7]. That real-asset background lets BAM hold permanent capital through listed affiliates such as BIP, BEP and BBU, but it also ties part of its fees to those companies' share prices.

Credit is BAM's fastest-growing platform, and it reached scale through affiliated insurance capital. In its 2025 annual report the company calls itself one of the world's largest and most experienced credit managers, with $363 billion of credit AUM and $279 billion of credit FBC at year-end[7]. Credit FBC rose $34.6 billion that year, from $24.5 billion of deployment, $22.5 billion of BWS insurance inflows, $3.7 billion raised by partner managers and $2.3 billion of real estate and infrastructure debt fundraising, partly offset by $11.0 billion of redemptions and $10.9 billion of BWS-related outflows[7].

BAM is turning new themes and new channels into fundraising sources, but the available materials do not support a quantitative comparison with peers. In November 2025 Brookfield launched a $100 billion global AI infrastructure program with NVIDIA and the Kuwait Investment Authority, anchored by an AI infrastructure fund targeting $10 billion of equity commitments[7]; that strategy held its first close in the second quarter, bringing commitments to $5 billion[1]. The company says six private wealth funds are now in the market[8], and on September 8 it was selected by the UK Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF) to manage a long-term multi-asset mandate with an initial $1 billion commitment[11]. The company acknowledges in its annual report that its fundraising depends on the economic environment and on how many competing funds are raising at the same time[7], and because the disclosures cited here cover only BAM's own data, peers' fee rates, margins and fundraising pace cannot be compared item by item.

Core Debates

With two flagship funds expected to be their largest vintages still raising capital, will the third quarter show them turning into new management fees?

Flagship funds set BAM's management-fee base for years, so the timing of a first close matters more than any one quarter's fundraising. Infrastructure and private equity together contributed $1,843 million of fee revenues in 2025, or 33.6% of the total[7]; in its 2026 shareholder letter the company said both its infrastructure and private equity flagships could become the largest vintages it has raised in those strategies[8]. Because closed-end funds charge no fees before a first close and catch-up fees appear only in the quarter of a later close, quarterly fees in these two lines tend to stay flat and then jump.

By the second quarter, neither flagship had turned its commitments into meaningful new fees. Second-quarter fee revenues were $357 million in infrastructure and $145 million in private equity[5]; BIF VI raised $7.9 billion in the quarter for a cumulative $9.3 billion and is targeting a first close this year, while the seventh private equity flagship, BCP VII, has raised $6.7 billion[1], having completed its first close in the first quarter with $6 billion raised at that time[9]. Private equity FBC rose $5.5 billion, or 11%, in the second quarter to about $53.5 billion, with $3.1 billion of that from BCP VII fundraising[5]. An alternative reading is that first-half fee growth came mainly from $78 million of fees tied to higher listed-affiliate share prices, BWS insurance capital and partner managers, while realizations of older flagship funds cost $38 million of fees and fading catch-up fees from the fifth real estate flagship and second global transition flagship cost another $81 million[5], a gap the new flagships cannot fill before their first closes.

The financial transmission runs from commitments through closings, the fee-bearing base and management fees to FRE. Once closed, the $9.3 billion of BIF VI commitments and $6.7 billion of BCP VII commitments enter FBC on committed capital and start earning fees, with catch-up fees at later closes, lifting infrastructure and private equity base management fees, fee revenues and FRE. The opposing force is the realization of older BIF and BSREP funds, which shrinks the fee base and cost $19 million of fees in the second quarter[5]. The numeric baselines for this debate are $502 million of combined second-quarter fee revenues in the two lines, $9.3 billion raised by BIF VI with no first close as of June 30, and $6.7 billion raised by BCP VII.

Third-quarter results can test the pace, though they may not settle the question at once. Readers should look for three things: whether BIF VI announces its first close and how large it is, whether combined infrastructure and private equity fee revenues exceed the second quarter's $502 million, and whether BCP VII's cumulative fundraising and private equity FBC keep rising. If BIF VI's first close slips to 2027, infrastructure management fees will lack new-flagship support in the second half of 2026; if fee revenues in the two lines fall from the prior quarter, realizations are cutting fees faster than new fundraising adds them, which would weaken the case that the flagships are converting into management fees.

Insurance capital and Oaktree have made credit Brookfield’s largest fee business; under the new presentation, how much of third-quarter growth will be genuine net inflows?

The quality of credit growth determines how stable nearly half of BAM's fee base is. At June 30, credit FBC was $325.9 billion, or 48% of total FBC of $672.2 billion[5], and credit fee revenues of $1,726 million made it the largest fee line in 2025[7]. BWS insurance capital is as steady as long-term deposits but flows out as annuities mature, and those outflows reached $10.9 billion in 2025[7]. The third quarter also brings both the Oaktree consolidation and the new presentation, which adds assets on which partner managers earn servicing fees to FBC[3], so headline growth may be inflated.

First-half growth in credit FBC came mainly from a single large mandate from BWS. Credit FBC rose $46.5 billion, or 17%, in the first half to about $326 billion: inflows totaled $64.1 billion, including $48.6 billion of BWS insurance capital (inclusive of the Just Group mandate), $13.1 billion deployed in long-term private funds and perpetual and liquid credit strategies, and $2.4 billion raised by partner managers, plus $3.2 billion of market-value increases; outflows of $13.3 billion comprised $6.9 billion of BWS-related outflows and $6.4 billion of redemptions[5]. The Just Group mandate covers $40 billion of insurance capital, which the company says will initially generate about $100 million of annual base fee revenue[9]. Second-quarter credit fee revenues rose $110 million, or 28%, to $509 million, with long-term private funds up $62 million and perpetual strategies up $39 million on BWS inflows[5]. An alternative reading is that growth relies heavily on acquisition-driven mandates from a single related party, that third-party credit fundraising has not itself accelerated, and that the new presentation and Oaktree consolidation will make fee revenues jump without changing FRE.

Credit's financial transmission requires separating net inflows, consolidation and presentation changes. BWS inflows plus credit deployment, minus annuity maturities, redemptions and distributions, form credit FBC, which multiplied by fee rates yields credit base management fees that flow into fee revenues and FRE. Total consideration for the remaining Oaktree stake was about $3.0 billion[6], of which about $2.2 billion is attributable to BAM[5]; but the new presentation mainly changes how partner managers' revenues and expenses are shown[3], and FRE rises only if the share attributable to BAM increases. The baselines for this debate are credit FBC of $325.9 billion at June 30, first-half BWS net inflows of $41.7 billion ($48.6 billion in, $6.9 billion out), $6.4 billion of redemptions in liquid and perpetual credit strategies, and second-quarter credit fee revenues of $509 million[5].

The third quarter can partly separate the three sources of growth, though the presentation change makes comparisons harder. Readers should check whether credit FBC grows sequentially on a restated, comparable basis, the net of BWS inflows and annuity outflows along with the size of redemptions, and the year-over-year growth of credit fee revenues excluding the Oaktree consolidation along with any change in the amounts not attributable to BAM. If BWS outflows and redemptions exceed inflows and comparable credit FBC declines, or if credit fee growth excluding consolidation falls below 15%, the case that credit growth comes mainly from genuine net inflows would weaken.

How efficiently FRE turns into DE per share bears directly on dividend coverage. The $0.5025 quarterly dividend[1] already exceeds second-quarter DE per share of $0.44[3], and about $1.6 billion of first-half dividends also exceeds first-half DE of $1,409 million[5]. The third quarter combines the new presentation, the Oaktree consolidation and acquisition consideration paid partly in BAM shares[6], so FRE growth alone may overstate the improvement per share.

Under the new presentation, second-quarter FRE grew faster than DE, and the gap came from cash taxes and interest. On that basis, second-quarter 2026 fee revenues were $1,587 million, up about 17.5%; direct costs were $757 million, up about 15.4%; FRE was $808 million, up about 20%, with a 54% margin; and DE was $707 million, or $0.44 per share[3]. DE grew only 15% because cash taxes rose to $97 million and net investment and other income swung from +$14 million a year earlier to −$27 million, mainly on higher interest on corporate borrowings[5]. An alternative reading is that first-half FRE growth included $78 million of fees from higher listed-affiliate share prices[5], which is market-driven rather than operating improvement; if those share prices fall back, FRE growth would slow while costs keep rising.

Every step from fee revenues to the dividend has an observable number. New-presentation fee revenues of $1,587 million minus direct costs of $757 million and $22 million not attributable to BAM give FRE of $808 million; subtracting $97 million of cash taxes, adding −$27 million of net investment and other income and adding back $23 million of equity-based compensation gives DE of $707 million; dividing by 1,612.5 million shares gives $0.44 per share, set against the $0.5025 quarterly dividend[3][5]. The year-over-year base for the third quarter is the new-presentation third quarter of 2025: FRE of $754 million, a 55% margin, DE of $661 million ($0.41 per share) and net investment and other income of −$6 million[3].

The key in the third quarter is whether FRE, margin and DE improve together. Readers should check whether FRE reaches at least $867 million (15% year-over-year growth), whether the new-presentation FRE margin holds at 55%, and whether the gap between DE and FRE growth narrows and net investment and other income stays negative. If FRE growth falls below 15% while direct costs grow faster than fee revenues, or if DE growth drops below 10% as interest and cash taxes keep absorbing FRE growth, the case that FRE converts smoothly into DE per share would weaken.

Risks and Falsifiers

Carried interest realization and allocation is the first uncertainty for DE. On new funds, 66.7% of carried interest belongs to BAM and 33.3% to BN, and all carry on mature funds belongs to BN[7][5]; accrued carried interest was $2,413 million at June 30, 2026, up from $1,636 million at the start of the year, but only $14 million was realized in the first half[5], leaving DE almost entirely dependent on FRE. If meaningful realized carried interest appears in DE in the third or fourth quarter, the view that DE depends only on FRE would need revising.

The fundraising environment and peer competition directly affect FBC growth. The company notes in its annual report that third-party fundraising depends on economic conditions, stock market performance, investors' allocation rules and the number of competing funds raising at the same time[7]; BAM raised $163 billion over the past twelve months and FBC reached $672 billion[1], growth that depends on continued fundraising. If third-quarter fundraising stays above its level in the third quarter of 2025 and wealth-channel products keep drawing net inflows, the concern about a weakening fundraising environment would not hold.

A delayed or smaller-than-expected flagship first close would leave the two most important fee lines without new fee-bearing capital. Infrastructure and private equity fee revenues totaled $1,843 million in 2025, or 33.6% of all fee revenues[7], and BIF VI had raised $9.3 billion by the end of June without a first close[1]. If BIF VI completes its first close in 2026 with cumulative commitments above $9.3 billion, this risk would be largely falsified.

Related-party concentration and private credit redemptions could erode the credit fee base. Credit FBC of $325.9 billion makes up 48% of total FBC, second-quarter credit fee revenues were $509 million, and first-half BWS-related outflows were $6.9 billion with $6.4 billion of redemptions[5]; faster annuity maturities or a wave of redemptions in private credit products would shrink the fee base. If BWS net inflows are positive in the third quarter and quarterly redemptions stay below $3.2 billion (about half the first-half total), this risk did not materialize in the quarter.

Listed-affiliate share prices and interest costs act on fee revenues and DE at the same time. Fees from higher listed-affiliate share prices added $78 million in the first half[5], showing that the market capitalization of BIP, BEP and BBU directly changes part of the perpetual management fees; net investment and other income was −$27 million in the second quarter[3], and corporate bond interest and the Oaktree consideration will both keep pushing interest expense higher. If net investment and other income returns above zero in the third quarter and FRE growth is at least 15%, this risk did not show up in the quarter's results.

What to Watch Next

  • Flagship conversion: watch for a BIF VI first close and whether combined infrastructure and private equity fee revenues exceed the second quarter's $502 million. A first close this year with higher fees in both lines would confirm the case; a slip to 2027 or a sequential fee decline would falsify it.
  • Credit net inflows: watch restated credit FBC against the $325.9 billion baseline, first-half BWS net inflows of $41.7 billion and $6.4 billion of redemptions, plus credit fee growth excluding Oaktree. Comparable FBC growth with ex-consolidation fee growth of at least 15% would confirm; falling FBC or growth below 15% would falsify.
  • FRE-to-DE conversion: compare FRE, margin, DE and net investment and other income with the third quarter of 2025 ($754 million, 55%, $661 million and −$6 million). FRE of at least $867 million with DE growth of at least 10% would confirm; a miss on either would falsify.

Conclusion

BAM's business is driven by fundraising, deployment and fee-bearing capital, and its current financial position shows FRE accelerating while DE per share follows a step behind. Second-quarter 2026 FRE rose 20% to $808 million and FBC rose 19% to $672 billion[1], but DE per share was only $0.44, below the $0.5025 quarterly dividend[3]. The central unresolved relationship has three layers: whether BIF VI and BCP VII turn commitments into management fees after their first closes, how much genuine net inflow credit FBC still has after the large BWS mandate and the Oaktree consolidation, and whether interest and cash taxes keep widening the gap between FRE and DE.

Between the August 5, 2026 release of second-quarter results and October 30, the Drillr analyst report library held no independent research reports on BAM, so this period offers no outside interpretation that can be attributed, compared or tested against the core debates. The only external reference available to readers is the Drillr-compiled figures mentioned earlier, which summarize single metrics and explain none of the questions about flagship conversion, credit net inflows or DE conversion.

A combination of later observations would change the current understanding more than any single number. If BIF VI closes this year and infrastructure and private equity fee revenues return above $502 million, comparable credit FBC keeps growing with positive BWS net inflows, and FRE reaches at least $867 million with DE growth of at least 10%, the view that flagships and insurance capital are converting into distributable earnings would strengthen materially. Conversely, if BIF VI's first close slips, credit growth comes mainly from consolidation and presentation changes, and net investment and other income stays negative, FRE's acceleration would more likely remain a matter of presentation and do little to improve DE per share or dividend coverage.

Sources

[1] BAM Q2 2026 8-K filed 2026-08-06 · 2026-08-06 · 8-K · https://bam.brookfield.com/news-events/press-releases

[2] BAM earnings calendar updated 2026-10-29 · 2026-10-29 · Drillr earnings calendar

[3] BAM presentation recast 8-K filed 2026-09-28 · 2026-09-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001937926&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[4] Drillr analyst estimates BAM Q3 2026 retrieved 2026-10-29 · 2026-10-29 · Drillr analyst estimates · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[5] BAM Q2 2026 10-Q filed 2026-08-10 · 2026-08-10 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001937926&type=10-Q&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[6] BAM Oaktree acquisition closing 8-K filed 2026-08-03 · 2026-08-03 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001937926&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[7] BAM FY2025 10-K filed 2026-03-02 · 2026-03-02 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001937926&type=10-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[8] BAM 2026 shareholder letter 8-K filed 2026-04-02 · 2026-04-02 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001937926&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[9] BAM Q1 2026 8-K filed 2026-05-08 · 2026-05-08 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001937926&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[10] BAM Q1 2026 10-Q filed 2026-05-08 · 2026-05-08 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001937926&type=10-Q&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[11] BAM Nuclear Liabilities Fund mandate 8-K filed 2026-09-08 · 2026-09-08 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001937926&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

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