[APO] Apollo: Q3 2026 Earnings Test Athene's Spread Behind Fee Growth

Apollo is a global alternative asset manager built mainly around credit, and it also runs a retirement services business through its subsidiary Athene[1]. Third quarter 2026 (three months ended September 30, 2026) results are scheduled for 2026-11-03, so Apollo Q3 2026 earnings will be the first full read on the second half of the year[2]. In the latest disclosed quarter, the second quarter of 2026, Fee Related Earnings (FRE) were $785 million, up 25.2% year over year, Spread Related Earnings (SRE) were $877 million, up 6.8%, and Adjusted Net Income per share excluding notable items was $2.11[3], below the $2.16 consensus at the time[4]. Management maintained full-year 2026 guidance for FRE growth above 20%, about 100 basis points of FRE margin expansion and roughly 10% SRE growth assuming an 11% return on alternatives, along with Athene's $85 billion full-year inflow target[5]. On October 5 the company pre-announced third-quarter alternative net investment income of about $375 million pre-tax, equal to an annualized return of about 10%[6]. According to Drillr's compilation, the consensus of 13 analysts for third-quarter adjusted EPS is $2.20 (range $2.11 to $2.26), and the consensus of 6 analysts for segment revenues is $5.791 billion (range $5.704 billion to $5.877 billion)[4].

Three things matter most in this report. The first is whether FRE stays at or above $760 million with a margin of at least 57.6%: first-half FRE already grew 27.6%[3], but part of that came from about $65 billion of fee-generating assets added by Athora's acquisition of PIC and $42 billion from a fee basis adjustment at Redding Ridge[7], so the third quarter tests whether growth is shifting toward durable fees from third-party fundraising and closed originations. The second is whether Athene's fixed income spread, excluding alternatives, can break out of its plateau near $780 million: it was $781 million in the second quarter, almost unchanged from $780 million in the first[3][7], and with alternative income already pre-announced, the new results will show more directly whether funding costs are absorbing the gains from balance-sheet growth. The third is redemptions in the wealth channel, which reached $7.3 billion of total AUM in the second quarter, half of the $14.6 billion over the last twelve months[3]; management said redemption requests in early third quarter were lower than in the second[5], and the new report can confirm whether that pressure is easing or spreading.

Company Background and Business Structure

Apollo was founded in 1990, describes itself as a high-growth global alternative asset manager and retirement services provider, operates mainly in the U.S. and reports three segments: Asset Management, Retirement Services and Principal Investing[1]. Its business is dominated by credit: as of June 30, 2026, total AUM was $1.047 trillion and fee-generating AUM (FGAUM) was $858 billion, with about 60% of total AUM and 70% of FGAUM in perpetual capital[3]. On the same date Apollo managed or advised $415.7 billion of AUM for Athene and $120.9 billion for the affiliated insurer Athora, and the company had also broadened its fund lineup through the acquisition of Bridge[8]; Athora's acquisition of the U.K.'s Pension Insurance Corporation (PIC) added about $65 billion of fee-generating AUM for Apollo[7].

The Asset Management segment is Apollo's fee business, and it produced FRE of $2.528 billion in 2025[1]. That year management fees, charged on fee-generating assets, were $3.391 billion, capital solutions fees and other were $808 million, and fee-related performance fees were $266 million; FRE is what remained after $1.178 billion of fee-related compensation and $759 million of other operating expenses[1]. According to the company's 10-Q, capital solutions fees came mainly from transactions in opportunistic credit, direct origination, traditional private equity and hybrid value strategies[8], while growth in fee-related performance fees was driven mainly by global wealth products, Bridge funds and perpetual capital vehicles[9].

The Retirement Services segment is Athene, and it is Apollo's largest profit source. In 2025 Athene's SRE was $3.361 billion, built from $13.021 billion of fixed income and other net investment income, $1.299 billion of alternative net investment income and $131 million of strategic capital management fees, less $10.083 billion of cost of funds, $447 million of other operating expenses and $560 million of interest and other financing costs[1]. Athene raises funds through retail annuities, funding agreements and flow reinsurance, and its net invested assets were $314.09 billion on June 30, 2026[3]. Principal Investing Income (PII) was $338 million in 2025, coming from realized performance fees and realized investment income net of related compensation; the three segments together produced Segment Income of $6.227 billion, while GAAP net income attributable to the company was $3.395 billion the same year[1].

Financial History and Current Position

According to the 2025 annual report, Apollo's total Segment Income has grown for three straight years, from $4.959 billion in 2023 to $5.558 billion in 2024 and $6.227 billion in 2025[1]. Over the same period FRE rose from $1.768 billion to $2.063 billion and $2.528 billion, SRE rose from $3.108 billion to $3.224 billion and $3.361 billion, and PII rose from $83 million to $271 million and $338 million; GAAP net income attributable to the company fell from $5.001 billion in 2023 to $4.480 billion in 2024 and $3.395 billion in 2025[1]. These figures show that the fee business has been the fastest-growing part over three years, while GAAP profit, shaped by investment results and taxes, has moved in a different direction from the segment measures; at the end of 2025 FGAUM was $709.1 billion and Athene's net invested assets were $292.4 billion[1].

The 2026 quarterly data show the fee business still accelerating, while Athene's spread earnings lagged the prior year in the first half. First-half FRE was $1.513 billion, up 27.6%, with an FRE margin of 58.1%; SRE was $1.596 billion, down 1.8%; and Adjusted Net Income excluding notable items was $2.522 billion, or $4.05 per share[3]. In the second quarter alone, FRE was $785 million, SRE $877 million and PII $16 million, with Adjusted Net Income of $1.314 billion, or $2.11 per share[3], and total Segment Income of $1.678 billion; dry powder was $82 billion on June 30, compared with $73 billion at the end of 2025[8].

Quarterly GAAP profit can diverge sharply from the segment measures, so readers cannot use GAAP net income on its own to judge operating trends. In the first quarter of 2026, Apollo's GAAP income before taxes was only $283 million, and a $1.694 billion income tax provision produced a net loss attributable to the company of $1.930 billion[9]; GAAP pre-tax income recovered to $2.485 billion in the second quarter, for $2.768 billion over the first half[8]. The company's quarterly materials focus on segment earnings and asset levels, and operating cash flow, cash, debt and shareholder distributions have to be read from the full financial statements, so they are not estimated here.

Operating Model

Apollo's Segment Income comes from three drivers, each tied to an observable measure of scale. Fee-related revenues in asset management equal management fees (fee-generating assets times fee rates), capital solutions fees (closed origination and syndication volume times fee rates) and fee-related performance fees (net asset growth in perpetual and wealth products times incentive rates); Athene's net investment earnings equal net invested assets times the earned rate; and principal investing depends on realized performance fees[1]. In 2025 these drivers corresponded to $3.391 billion of management fees, $808 million of capital solutions fees and $266 million of performance fees, $13.021 billion of fixed income revenue and $1.299 billion of alternative income, and $1.198 billion of realized performance fees[1]. Because Apollo manages large balances for Athene and Athora[8], growth in insurance inflows also lifts the asset management segment's fee-generating assets and shows up as management fees in later quarters.

The two profit measures are built differently, which makes them sensitive to rates and markets in different ways. FRE equals fee-related revenues minus fee-related compensation and non-compensation expenses: in the second quarter of 2026 fee-related revenues were $1.343 billion, compensation was $343 million, or about 25.5%, non-compensation expenses were $215 million, and the FRE margin was 58.5%[3]. SRE equals fixed income earnings plus alternative income and strategic capital management fees, minus cost of funds, operating expenses and financing costs: in the second quarter the fixed income earned rate was 5.05% and the cost of funds was 3.83%[8], with a reported net spread of 1.14%[3]. The sum of the three segments, after holding-company interest and taxes, gives Adjusted Net Income, while GAAP profit also includes unrealized performance fees, Athene's investment gains and losses and changes in the fair value of liabilities, so the two frequently diverge by a wide margin.

Cash conversion also follows a different rhythm in each business. Management fees in asset management are collected quarterly and convert to cash at a high rate, while capital solutions fees are collected when transactions close; Athene's cash flow is driven by premiums, deposits and funding agreement inflows that are invested in long-dated assets, and surrenders are protected by surrender charges and market value adjustments, with about 86% of deferred annuity liabilities subject to a surrender penalty as of March 31, 2026[9]. Cash inside the insurance subsidiaries is constrained by regulatory capital and cannot be treated as cash available to the parent, whose discretionary cash comes mainly from FRE, dividends out of Athene's after-tax spread earnings and realized performance fees.

Industry and Competitive Position

The biggest difference between Apollo and other alternative asset managers is that it owns a large annuity insurer. Athene's insurance liabilities provide long-term funding for investment-grade private credit, and Apollo earns management fees on those assets, which is why perpetual capital accounts for 70% of fee-generating AUM[3]. Management said second-quarter origination reached $74 billion and first-half volume nearly $150 billion, with about another $50 billion of signed or announced originations, including the $35 billion Broadcom AI financing, set to close in later quarters[5].

Competition in the annuity market is changing Athene's pricing environment, but Apollo's relative position is hard to quantify. Management said some new entrants use non-reciprocal jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands to avoid posting required capital, which has already created spread pressure across the industry[5]. The available materials include no comparable peer data, so the competitive picture here rests only on the company's own description and disclosed figures, and Apollo's share and cost advantages against other alternative managers or annuity writers cannot be compared numerically.

Core Debates

With management fees and capital solutions fees both at records, can third-quarter Fee Related Earnings stay on pace for full-year growth above 20% without expansion spending eroding the margin?

FRE is Apollo's most stable earnings stream, and the third quarter tests the quality of its growth, not just the rate. FRE was $2.528 billion in 2025, about 40% of $6.227 billion in total Segment Income[1]; management guided to 2026 FRE growth above 20% and about 100 basis points of margin expansion[5], and first-half FRE already grew 27.6%[3]. The new report therefore mainly shows whether growth is moving away from acquisitions and affiliated balance-sheet expansion toward durable fees from third-party fundraising and closed originations.

The current evidence shows both fee streams at records. Second-quarter FRE was $785 million, above $728 million in the first quarter and $627 million a year earlier; management fees were $1.001 billion, up 22.7% (credit $722 million, equity $279 million), capital solutions fees were $277 million, up 28.2%, and the FRE margin was 58.5%[3]. Management said capital solutions fees topped $200 million for a fifth straight quarter and that $82 billion of dry powder carries about $400 million of annual management fees once deployed[5]; FGAUM was $858 billion on June 30, up about 34% from $638 billion a year earlier[3].

These revenues reach FRE through a clear chain, but a substantial share of the increments along that chain is inorganic. Third-party fundraising, inflows from Athene and Athora, and acquisitions lift FGAUM, FGAUM generates management fees, closed originations generate capital solutions fees, and FRE is what remains after $343 million of fee-related compensation and $215 million of non-compensation expenses[3]. The alternative reading is that Athora's acquisition of PIC added about $65 billion of FGAUM and the Redding Ridge fee basis adjustment added $42 billion[7], while second-quarter growth in management fees came mainly from a combined $140 million of fees earned from Bridge funds, Athene and Athora[8]; these factors enter the year-over-year base in 2027, and because capital solutions fees depend on when large deals close, a single-quarter peak may not repeat.

The third quarter offers three observations that can test this debate. First, whether FRE is at least $760 million and management fees keep rising sequentially; second, whether capital solutions fees stay above $200 million and how closings progress on the roughly $50 billion of signed originations; third, whether the FRE margin holds above 57.6% and whether compensation grows faster than revenue. If FRE falls below $760 million or management fees decline sequentially, full-year 20% growth would depend on a fourth-quarter catch-up; if capital solutions fees drop below $200 million, origination closings are slowing, and neither outcome has been ruled out.

With alternative income pre-announced at about $375 million, can Athene's Spread Related Earnings get back on track for 10% full-year growth, or are rising funding costs squeezing the spread?

Athene's spread earnings are Apollo's largest profit block and the only segment that lagged the prior year in the first half. SRE was $3.361 billion in 2025, about 54% of $6.227 billion in total Segment Income[1]; first-half 2026 SRE fell 1.8%, and the company disclosed that alternative income over that period fell $264 million short of the 11% long-term expectation[3], while management maintained roughly 10% full-year SRE growth guidance on the 11% assumption[5]. Because third-quarter alternative income has already been pre-announced at about $375 million[6], this report can show more directly whether the spread excluding alternatives is improving.

Second-quarter data show that the SRE rebound came mainly from alternative income rather than from the fixed income spread. SRE was $877 million, above $719 million in the first quarter and $821 million a year earlier; alternative net investment income was $348 million, an annualized return of about 9%, which was $76 million short of the 11% long-term expectation, and the reported net spread was 1.14%, compared with 0.97% in the first quarter and 1.22% a year earlier[3]. Management said that, adjusted to 11%, the net spread is consistent with the long-term target of 120 to 125 basis points[5]; but the fixed income spread excluding alternatives ($3.686 billion of fixed income and other net investment income plus $37 million of strategic capital management fees, minus $2.942 billion of cost of funds) was $781 million, flat with $780 million in the first quarter and compared with $741 million a year earlier[3][7], even as Athene's total gross inflows reached $22.069 billion in the quarter[3].

Inflows have expanded the asset base, but the spread on new assets has not yet shown up clearly in SRE. The financial transmission runs as follows: inflows from retail annuities, funding agreements and flow reinsurance expand net invested assets, fixed income earnings (a 5.05% earned rate in the second quarter) minus cost of funds (3.83%, versus 3.68% a year earlier) form the spread excluding alternatives[8], and adding alternative income and subtracting operating and financing costs gives SRE. The alternative reading is that spread pressure is not just a matter of alternative-income timing: the 10-Q said the fixed income earned rate was held back by lower floating rate income, later deployment into assets and run-off of higher-yielding assets[8], and management acknowledged that offshore entrants are pushing down annuity pricing[5]; if the fixed income spread still does not grow in the third quarter, roughly 10% full-year SRE growth would depend mainly on alternative returns recovering to 11%.

The third-quarter tests center on the fixed income spread and the pricing of inflows. Readers can watch whether reported SRE exceeds $877 million and, adjusted to 11%, approaches $918 million; whether the fixed income spread excluding alternatives rises above $780 million and whether the cost of funds keeps climbing; and whether total inflows are at least $21.6 billion and how retail annuities are priced. If the fixed income spread stays near $780 million for a third straight quarter, rising funding costs are offsetting balance-sheet growth; if alternative income comes in below the pre-announcement or the net spread falls back below 1.10%, spread pressure runs deeper than alternative-income timing, and the evidence has not yet ruled out either path.

Is redemption pressure on individual-investor products such as ADS easing, and can Apollo's institutional and flagship fundraising keep replenishing fee-generating assets?

Redemptions in the wealth channel are the first place outflows have appeared in Apollo's fee-generating asset growth. Global Wealth is one of Apollo's third-party fundraising channels and raised $3 billion in the second quarter, but redemptions in total AUM reached $7.3 billion in the same quarter, half of the $14.6 billion over the last twelve months, against an average of about $2.4 billion in the three prior quarters[3]. Redemptions do not immediately touch long-dated institutional capital, but they shrink perpetual products and fee-related performance fees and affect how the market judges the liquidity of private credit products.

The current evidence shows institutional fundraising still filling the gap, while pressure in the wealth channel shows only early signs of easing. Asset Management inflows were $38 billion in the second quarter, driven mainly by multi-asset securitization strategies, third-party institutional credit strategies and flagship private equity fundraising, with only $3 billion from Global Wealth; fee-related performance fees were $65 million, essentially flat with $64 million in the first quarter and $63 million a year earlier; and on an FGAUM basis, redemptions were $2.2 billion in the second quarter and $8.9 billion over the last twelve months[3]. Management said flagship private equity Fund XI had surpassed $12 billion of commitments by mid-July, and that ADS had been hit by industry-wide redemption pressure but redemption requests in early third quarter were lower than in the second[5].

Redemptions and fundraising affect fee-generating assets through two separate chains. Individual-investor sentiment and commentary about private credit drive redemption requests at non-traded products such as ADS, which show up as redemptions in total AUM; institutional and flagship fundraising creates Asset Management inflows and third-party FGAUM, which turn into management fees in the following quarter, while net asset growth in perpetual products determines fee-related performance fees, which were $266 million in 2025[1]. The alternative reading is that the decline in early-third-quarter redemption requests reflects only seasonality or gating limits, that the pressure persists, and that part of the institutional strength comes from a one-time flagship fund cycle that may not keep offsetting a slowdown in the wealth channel.

The third quarter can answer this debate partially rather than completely. Readers can watch whether total AUM redemptions fall back below $4.9 billion, whether Asset Management inflows stay above $30 billion and how much Global Wealth raises, and whether fee-related performance fees hold at $60 million. If redemptions rise instead of falling, pressure in the wealth channel is spreading; if Asset Management inflows drop below $30 billion, institutional fundraising is not enough to fill the gap; and because redemption data for ADS itself are not disclosed separately, the debate may still have gaps after the new report.

Risks and Falsifiers

The first risk is competition from offshore reinsurance and new entrants, which acts directly on Athene's cost of funds. Management said some new entrants use non-reciprocal jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands to avoid capital requirements and push down annuity pricing, which has already created spread pressure across the industry[5]; Athene's cost of funds was $2.942 billion in the second quarter[3], a rate of 3.83%[8], while SRE made up about 54% of Segment Income in 2025[1]. If the third-quarter fixed income spread excluding alternatives rises above $800 million while total inflows are at least $21.6 billion, Athene is not buying volume by giving up margin.

The second risk is a persistent gap between GAAP profit and the segment measures, which makes it hard for readers to check operating trends against statutory accounts. Athene's investment gains and losses, changes in the fair value of liabilities, unrealized performance fees and taxes can swing GAAP profit widely: in the first quarter of 2026 the income tax provision was $1.694 billion, GAAP pre-tax income was only $283 million and the net loss attributable to the company was $1.930 billion, while FRE, SRE and PII together totaled $1.522 billion[9]. If the gap between third-quarter GAAP pre-tax income and Segment Income narrows and no new large non-recurring tax items appear, this risk is fading.

The third risk is that capital solutions fees depend heavily on when large deals close, which exposes the most volatile revenue line in FRE. Capital solutions fees were $808 million in 2025[1] and $277 million in the second quarter of 2026, about 21% of that quarter's $1.343 billion of fee-related revenues[3]; the roughly $50 billion of signed originations management cited includes the $35 billion Broadcom AI financing[5], and if financings like that close later or market volatility disrupts syndication, quarterly fees could drop noticeably. If third-quarter capital solutions fees are at least $250 million and management confirms that signed originations have begun to close, this concern does not hold.

The fourth risk is that alternative returns stay below the 11% long-term assumption on which full-year SRE guidance rests. The company pre-announced first-quarter alternative income of about $205 million, an annualized return of about 6%[10], and the actual figure was $210 million[7]; it pre-announced about $350 million, or about 9% annualized, for the second quarter[11], and the actual figure was $348 million[3]; for the third quarter it pre-announced about $375 million, or about 10% annualized[6]. Working from second-quarter income of $348 million at an annualized return of about 9.04%[8], each percentage point of annualized return corresponds to about $38 million of alternative income per quarter, and first-half alternative income fell a cumulative $264 million short of the long-term expectation[3]; if third-quarter alternative income is no lower than the $375 million pre-announcement and the fourth-quarter pre-announcement returns to about 11% annualized, this risk is receding.

The fifth risk is that individual-investor redemption pressure on private credit products persists, forcing products to keep redemption limits in place and dragging on new fundraising, which would undercut the growth case for the wealth channel. The exposed financial lines are total AUM (second-quarter redemptions of $7.3 billion, and $14.6 billion over the last twelve months)[3] and fee-related performance fees, driven mainly by wealth and perpetual products, which were $266 million in 2025[1]. If third-quarter redemptions fall below $4.9 billion and Global Wealth raises at least $3 billion, the pressure is easing.

What to Watch Next

• FRE growth quality: whether quarterly FRE is at least $760 million (second quarter: $785 million) and management fees rise from $1.001 billion; a miss means full-year 20% growth relies on a fourth-quarter catch-up.
• Capital solutions fees: whether they stay above $200 million (second quarter: $277 million) as roughly $50 billion of signed originations close; a drop below $200 million signals slower closings.
• FRE margin: whether it holds above 57.6% (second quarter: 58.5%) and whether compensation outpaces revenue.
• Athene SRE: whether reported SRE exceeds $877 million and, adjusted to 11%, approaches $918 million; alternative income below the $375 million pre-announcement or a net spread under 1.10% points to deeper pressure.
• Fixed income spread excluding alternatives: whether it rises above $780 million (second quarter: $781 million); a third flat quarter means funding costs are offsetting growth, while more than $800 million alongside inflows of at least $21.6 billion (second quarter: $22.069 billion) means Athene is not trading margin for volume.
• Wealth redemptions: whether total AUM redemptions fall below $4.9 billion (second quarter: $7.3 billion); a rise means pressure is spreading.
• Asset Management inflows: whether they stay above $30 billion (second quarter: $38 billion, including $3 billion from Global Wealth), and whether fee-related performance fees hold at $60 million (second quarter: $65 million).

Conclusion

Apollo's earnings come from two engines, and in the first half of 2026 they moved in different directions. The asset management business earns fees on fee-generating assets and closed originations, and first-half FRE grew 27.6%; Athene earns a spread on net invested assets, and first-half SRE fell 1.8% year over year[3]. The key unresolved relationship is that while fee-generating AUM has grown to $858 billion and Athene's quarterly inflows have exceeded $22 billion, the fixed income spread excluding alternatives has stayed near $780 million for two straight quarters[3][7], and it is not yet proven that growth in scale is turning into growth in spread.

Since the second-quarter results, no independent analyst or media assessment of Apollo has been found, and the available web articles only restate reported figures, so there is no outside interpretation to synthesize here, and the absence of commentary should not be read as a market consensus. Judgments on the three debates can rest for now only on the company's disclosed numbers and management's statements, and those statements themselves, such as the claim that the net spread adjusted to 11% matches the long-term target and that redemption requests eased in early third quarter[5], still need to be tested by the new figures.

The combination that would materially strengthen the current understanding is FRE of at least $760 million with capital solutions fees above $200 million, a fixed income spread excluding alternatives above $800 million, total inflows of at least $21.6 billion and total AUM redemptions back below $4.9 billion. Conversely, if FRE and capital solutions fees both fall back, the fixed income spread stays near $780 million and redemptions do not decline, Apollo's growth would depend more on acquisitions and affiliated balance-sheet expansion, and Athene's spread would be getting eroded by funding costs.

Sources

[1] APO FY2025 10-K filed 2026-02-25 · 2026-02-25 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001858681&type=10-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[2] APO earnings calendar updated 2026-10-26 · 2026-10-26 · Drillr earnings calendar

[3] APO Q2 2026 8-K filed 2026-08-04 · 2026-08-04 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001858681/000185868126000036/agmearningsrelease2q2026.htm

[4] Drillr analyst estimates APO Q3 2026 retrieved 2026-10-26 · 2026-10-26 · Drillr analyst estimates · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[5] APO Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-04 · 2026-08-04 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[6] APO Q3 2026 alternative income 8-K filed 2026-10-05 · 2026-10-05 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001858681&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[7] APO Q1 2026 8-K filed 2026-05-06 · 2026-05-06 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001858681&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[8] APO Q2 2026 10-Q filed 2026-08-10 · 2026-08-10 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001858681&type=10-Q&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[9] APO Q1 2026 10-Q filed 2026-05-07 · 2026-05-07 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001858681&type=10-Q&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[10] APO Q1 2026 alternative income 8-K filed 2026-04-01 · 2026-04-01 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001858681&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[11] APO Q2 2026 alternative income 8-K filed 2026-07-01 · 2026-07-01 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001858681&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40