[MUFG] MUFG: first-half earnings preview on yen spread after BoJ hike

Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG) is one of Japan's largest bank holding groups, owning MUFG Bank, Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking, Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securities and Mitsubishi UFJ NICOS, with total assets of ¥425.58 trillion at March 31, 2026[1]. According to the Drillr earnings calendar, MUFG reports results for the six months ended September 30, 2026 on 2026-11-13, the first half of its fiscal year ending March 31, 2027, which contains the July–September second quarter[2]. In the latest disclosed period, the three months ended June 30, 2026, Japanese GAAP consolidated net interest income was ¥882.4 billion against ¥690.8 billion a year earlier, net fees and commissions were ¥558.2 billion against ¥461.6 billion, and profits attributable to owners of parent rose 48.2% to ¥809.4 billion[3]. MUFG gives only two numeric guideposts: a ¥2.7 trillion profits-attributable target for the fiscal year ending March 2027 and a ¥96 per-share dividend forecast (¥48 interim, ¥48 year-end)[4][5]. Vendor consensus compiled in the Drillr earnings calendar is USD 0.45 of earnings per ADS; for the first quarter, the actual figure was USD 0.45 against an estimate of USD 0.35[2].

Three things matter most in this MUFG first-half earnings preview. The first is the yen loan-deposit spread: the Bank of Japan raised its policy rate to 1.0% in June 2026[6], and the combined domestic spread of MUFG Bank and the trust bank had already widened to 1.14% in the first quarter from 0.89%[7], so the half-year figures will show whether loans kept repricing faster than deposit costs after the hike. The second is whether fees hold up: first-quarter net fees rose 20.9%, and net revenue in the Commercial Banking & Wealth Management and Japanese Corporate & Investment Banking groups grew 29.5% and 26.1%[8][9], so the second quarter tests whether that is durable client demand or a one-quarter high driven by equity markets and deal timing. The third is the makeup of profit: the first quarter delivered 30.0% of the full-year target, but equity-method income of ¥261.6 billion and net equity-security gains of ¥98.9 billion together equalled 44.5% of profits attributable[3][4], so whether the half passes the midpoint, and whether customer businesses or affiliates and cross-shareholding sales get it there, will shape how readers judge the ¥2.7 trillion target.

Company Background and Business Structure

MUFG is a financial group formed in 2005 from the merger of two bank holding companies, and it spans commercial banking, trust banking, securities, credit cards and consumer finance, and asset management. The merger of Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group and UFJ Holdings was completed on October 1, 2005, and the surviving company was renamed Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group; in October 2008 the group formed a global strategic alliance with Morgan Stanley and invested in it, and in the same month raised its stake in ACOM to about 40% through a tender offer[10]. As a holding company MUFG is regulated under Japan's Banking Act, and at March 31, 2026 it had about 2,000 business locations in more than 41 countries, the largest overseas network among Japanese banks, including Krungsri in Thailand and Bank Danamon in Indonesia[1].

The group is organised into six customer business groups plus a Global Markets group, and in the fiscal year ended March 2026 the business groups together produced ¥5,991.3 billion of net revenue and ¥2,365.4 billion of operating profit[11]. Among the three domestic groups, Retail & Digital earned ¥1,064.6 billion of net revenue, Commercial Banking & Wealth Management ¥866.9 billion and Japanese Corporate & Investment Banking ¥1,125.9 billion, together about 51.0% of business-group net revenue[11]. Retail & Digital covers NICOS and other consumer finance companies plus individual customers, Commercial Banking & Wealth Management serves small and mid-sized companies and wealthy clients, and Japanese Corporate & Investment Banking serves large Japanese companies; all three earn mainly loan and deposit interest, topped up respectively by card settlement, wealth management, and financing and M&A fees[12].

Overseas and markets businesses make up the other half of revenue, and the group also books equity-method income from affiliates outside the business groups. Global Commercial Banking, mainly Krungsri and Danamon, earned ¥904.2 billion of net revenue and Global Corporate & Investment Banking ¥1,081.5 billion, together about a third of business-group net revenue, while Asset Management & Investor Services earned ¥621.8 billion and Global Markets ¥306.9 billion[11]. Global Corporate & Investment Banking uses the overseas network to provide financing, investment banking, foreign exchange and derivatives to large non-Japanese companies and financial institutions, and Global Markets runs sales and trading and group asset-liability management[13]. At June 30, 2026, MUFG Bank and the trust bank together held ¥223.7 trillion of deposits and ¥121.5 trillion of loans, including ¥182.0 trillion of domestic deposits[14].

Financial History and Current Position

The US GAAP 20-F shows that MUFG's profit rose sharply in the fiscal year ended March 31, 2026, driven by growth in both interest and non-interest income. Net income attributable to the group rose 36.5% to ¥1,729.4 billion from ¥1,266.9 billion, net interest income rose 19.3% to ¥3,684.3 billion, and non-interest income rose 26.6% to ¥3,253.4 billion[15]. Over the same year non-interest expense rose 12.3% to ¥4,202.0 billion and the provision for credit losses rose 85.7% to ¥226.2 billion, showing that both costs and credit costs grew with the business[15].

On the Japanese GAAP management basis, business-group operating profit for that fiscal year was ¥2,365.4 billion on operating expenses of ¥3,625.9 billion, with Japanese Corporate & Investment Banking contributing ¥707.0 billion and Global Corporate & Investment Banking ¥580.3 billion, the two largest profit sources[11]. The business groups added ¥285.5 billion of fixed assets and recorded ¥182.8 billion of depreciation that year, the closest capital-expenditure measure for a banking group[11]. As a bank holding company, MUFG's cash capacity shows up mainly in capital and shareholder returns rather than in operating cash flow in the industrial sense.

The latest official quarterly data cover the three months ended June 30, 2026, and nearly every revenue and profit line was well above a year earlier. Under Japanese GAAP, gross profits were ¥1,736.1 billion against ¥1,358.4 billion, including net interest income of ¥882.4 billion, net fees and commissions of ¥558.2 billion and net trading profits of ¥132.7 billion, with net losses on debt securities of ¥35.0 billion[3]. General and administrative expenses rose 13.7% to ¥927.1 billion, total credit costs widened to ¥72.1 billion from ¥46.9 billion, equity-method income rose to ¥261.6 billion from ¥158.0 billion, ordinary profits rose to ¥1,117.9 billion from ¥708.5 billion, and profits attributable were ¥809.4 billion[3].

Capital and shareholder returns improved alongside earnings in the first quarter. At June 30, 2026 the Basel III Common Equity Tier 1 ratio was 10.43%, up from 10.06% at the end of March, on CET1 capital of ¥9,406.9 billion and risk-weighted assets of ¥90.14 trillion[16]. MUFG bought back about ¥250.0 billion of shares between November 2025 and February 2026 and about ¥100.0 billion more in May and June 2026[17]. The dividend forecast for the fiscal year ending March 2027 is ¥96 per share, against ¥86 (¥35 interim, ¥51 year-end) in the prior year[5].

Operating Model

MUFG's revenue can be written as a sum: Japanese GAAP gross profits equal net interest income plus trust fees, net fees and commissions, net trading profits and net other operating profits[3]. Net interest income depends on yen loans priced off short-term rates, deposit costs, overseas corporate and Asian retail lending, and securities holdings; in the first quarter the average domestic loan rate was 1.45%, the deposit rate 0.30% and the spread 1.14%[7]. A Bank of Japan hike lifts floating-rate loan yields first while deposit rates follow more slowly, so a wider spread usually reaches net interest income within one or two quarters of a hike[6][7].

Fees are the second revenue engine, and they flow from corporate M&A, financing, real estate deals and client asset levels into business-group fees and then into consolidated net fees and commissions. The 20-F attributes growth in Commercial Banking & Wealth Management in the fiscal year ended March 2026 to solutions income from asset management, M&A and other financing, and says explicitly that this happened in a rising equity market[12]. That makes fees sensitive to equity-market levels and to when large deals close, moving in the same direction as market sentiment, usually with a lag of no more than a quarter.

Profit follows a set path: net operating profits equal gross profits minus general and administrative expenses and the general allowance, and ordinary profit then adds or subtracts credit costs, equity-security gains and equity-method income[3]. In the first quarter, G&A was ¥927.1 billion, total credit costs ¥72.1 billion, net equity-security gains ¥98.9 billion and equity-method income ¥261.6 billion; equity-method income comes mainly from affiliates such as Morgan Stanley, but the citable material does not break out Morgan Stanley's share[3][10]. Profit therefore swings on four items: the yen spread, fee activity, overseas credit costs, and the affiliate and cross-shareholding sale lines that do not rest on customer business.

For a bank holding company, distributable cash depends on capital, and capital builds from retained profit. CET1 capital of ¥9,406.9 billion corresponds to a 10.43% ratio[16], and selling strategic shareholdings releases capital: MUFG plans to cut strategic equity holdings by ¥700.0 billion at acquisition cost in the three years to March 2027 and had sold about ¥442.0 billion by March 2026[18]. MUFG said a ¥100.0 billion buyback lowers its CET1 ratio by about 0.1 percentage point, which gives a rough conversion between capital and buybacks[17].

Industry and Competitive Position

Japanese banking is dominated by three megabank groups, which also face government lenders, regional banks, securities houses and internet banks. MUFG's 20-F lists its main domestic competitors as Mizuho Financial Group and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group; government institutions such as Japan Finance Corporation and Japan Post Bank; Resona Bank, SBI Shinsei Bank and regional banks; the Nomura and Daiwa groups; and internet-based banks and brokers[19]. The filing also says technologies such as artificial intelligence and blockchain have let non-financial companies enter financial services and changed the nature of competition[19].

MUFG stands out for the largest overseas network and its Morgan Stanley alliance. At March 31, 2026, loans in Japan were 53.6% of total loans, while Japan generated only 37.1% of interest and non-interest income, showing that overseas business contributes more to income than its share of loans[20]. At the same time, Japanese domestic assets were 59.9% of total assets and Japanese government and agency bonds 56.7% of investment securities, which leaves the group highly sensitive to Japanese rates and bond prices[20].

The available material supports only a limited peer comparison. The citable sources do not provide Mizuho's or Sumitomo Mitsui's spread, fee or capital figures for the same period, so it is not yet possible to say whether MUFG's spread is widening faster than its peers. The debates below should be read as changes in MUFG's own numbers over time, not as a relative ranking.

Core Debates

After the Bank of Japan lifted its policy rate to 1.0% in June 2026, did MUFG keep widening its yen loan-deposit spread through September, or did deposit costs and corporate deposit outflows absorb the hike?

This matters because the three domestic customer groups are about half of business-group net revenue, and management names rising yen rates as the main reason for their profit growth in the fiscal year ended March 2026[11][12]. First-quarter consolidated net interest income rose 27.7% to ¥882.4 billion as the domestic spread widened to 1.14% from 0.89%[3][7]. The chain runs from the Bank of Japan's 1.0% policy rate to floating-rate yen loans repricing first, deposit rates following later, a wider spread, and higher net interest income and net operating profits[6].

Current evidence shows loans repricing faster than deposits. In the three months to June 2026 the average domestic loan rate rose to 1.45% from 1.06% while the deposit rate rose to 0.30% from 0.17%; excluding loans to government bodies, the spread was 1.16%[7]. In the same quarter, however, domestic deposits fell to ¥182.0 trillion from ¥185.3 trillion at the end of March even as individual deposits rose to ¥94.84 trillion from ¥94.22 trillion, which points to outflows from corporate and other non-individual customers[14].

What remains open is whether deposit pricing catches up after the June hike. If deposit rates rise noticeably in the second quarter and companies keep moving funds, the spread could stall near 1.14% and net interest income would grow only through volume; if loans keep repricing faster, the spread still has room to widen. The half-year report is cumulative, so the second-quarter spread has to be inferred from the six-month and first-quarter figures.

Four numbers are worth watching: whether the six-month domestic spread is above the first quarter's 1.14%; how much deposit and loan rates move over the six months; whether domestic deposits hold ¥182.0 trillion at September 30; and whether six-month net interest income exceeds ¥1,764.8 billion, twice the first quarter[7][14][3]. If rising deposit costs and continued corporate outflows stop the spread from widening, the current reading that rate hikes widen the spread directly would weaken.

Is the first quarter's 20.9% jump in net fees a repeatable flow from corporate deals and wealth clients, or a one-quarter high tied to the equity market and deal timing?

Fees are MUFG's second profit engine after interest income. First-quarter consolidated net fees and commissions reached ¥558.2 billion, and combined operating profit in Commercial Banking & Wealth Management and Japanese Corporate & Investment Banking rose to ¥335.1 billion from ¥234.3 billion[3][8][9]. The chain runs from corporate M&A, financing, real estate deals and client assets in trusts and funds into these groups' fees, and then into consolidated net fees and gross profits.

Current evidence supports growth but also exposes market dependence. In the first quarter, Commercial Banking & Wealth Management net revenue rose 29.5% to ¥255.4 billion from ¥197.1 billion, Japanese Corporate & Investment Banking rose 26.1% to ¥309.1 billion from ¥245.1 billion, and Asset Management & Investor Services rose 13.5% to ¥157.5 billion from ¥138.8 billion[8][9]. The 20-F attributes these groups' growth in the fiscal year ended March 2026 to solutions income from asset management, M&A and financing, and specifically mentions "the rising equity market environment"[12].

The alternative reading is that growth depends on equity-market levels and on a few large deals closing in one quarter, so the second quarter could fall back even if client relationships are unchanged. The available material has no fee breakdown by product, so the separate contributions of M&A advisory, financing arrangement, trust and fund sales cannot be isolated, which makes it hard to extrapolate one quarter's growth rate.

Watch whether six-month net fees exceed ¥1,116.3 billion, twice the first quarter; whether second-quarter net revenue in Commercial Banking & Wealth Management and Japanese Corporate & Investment Banking at least matches the first quarter; and whether Asset Management & Investor Services moves with the equity market[3][8]. If fees fall back with the equity market or deal timing, the view that fees have become a durable second engine would not hold.

Can MUFG's overseas corporate banking keep growing after a 64.8% first-quarter profit jump without credit costs rising through September?

Overseas corporate and commercial banking is about a third of business-group net revenue and is what sets MUFG apart from its domestic peers[11]. First-quarter operating profit in Global Corporate & Investment Banking rose to ¥180.2 billion from ¥109.4 billion, while consolidated total credit costs widened to ¥72.1 billion from ¥46.9 billion[8][9][3]. The chain runs from project finance, corporate lending, transaction banking and Asian retail and commercial lending into the net revenue and operating profit of Global Corporate & Investment Banking and Global Commercial Banking, while loan losses reduce ordinary profit through total credit costs.

Current evidence shows growth and credit costs rising together. The 20-F attributes Global Corporate & Investment Banking's growth in the fiscal year ended March 2026 to balance-sheet optimisation, asset growth and project-finance fees[13], and under US GAAP the provision for credit losses rose 85.7% that year to ¥226.2 billion[15]. In the first quarter, specific provisions rose to ¥52.9 billion from ¥38.2 billion, and Global Commercial Banking operating profit rose 13.6% to ¥99.0 billion from ¥87.1 billion[3][8][9].

What remains open is whether faster overseas loan growth brings credit costs forward, partly offsetting Global Corporate & Investment Banking's profit growth below the operating line. The citable material does not disclose overseas credit costs by region, and business-group results are on a management basis that does not reconcile directly to consolidated credit costs, so it is not yet possible to tell how much of the rise in credit costs comes from abroad.

Watch whether six-month total credit costs stay at or below about ¥144.2 billion, twice the first quarter; whether second-quarter Global Corporate & Investment Banking operating profit holds ¥180.2 billion; and how specific provisions compare with the first quarter's ¥52.9 billion[3][8]. If credit costs rise clearly as overseas lending expands, the quality of overseas profit growth would need to be reassessed.

With 30% of the ¥2.7tn full-year profit target booked in the first quarter, will MUFG pass the halfway mark by September, and how much of it comes from equity-method income and equity sales?

The ¥2.7 trillion target is MUFG's only numeric earnings guidance, and the company says that because its businesses face various uncertainties it discloses a profit target instead of a performance forecast[4]. The half-year is also a capital decision point: in November 2025 MUFG adopted a ¥250.0 billion buyback programme[17]. First-quarter profits attributable were ¥809.4 billion, up 48.2% and equal to 30.0% of the full-year target[3][4].

Current evidence shows that a sizeable part of profit does not come from customer business. First-quarter equity-method income of ¥261.6 billion and net equity-security gains of ¥98.9 billion together equalled 44.5% of profits attributable[3]. MUFG had completed about ¥442.0 billion of its ¥700.0 billion strategic-equity reduction target by March 2026, and its CET1 ratio rose to 10.43% at the end of June[18][16]. The chain runs from net operating profits plus equity-method income and equity-sale gains, minus credit costs and tax, to profits attributable, which then build CET1 capital that supports dividends and buybacks.

The alternative reading is that the profit pace relies on affiliates and timed equity sales, and customer-business earnings alone would not keep the target on track. The reduction programme ends in March 2027, so room for equity-sale gains narrows as the remaining amount shrinks, and Morgan Stanley's specific contribution to equity-method income is not separately disclosed in the citable material.

Watch whether six-month profits attributable exceed ¥1,350.0 billion; what share of profit comes from equity-method income and equity gains; whether the target or the ¥96 dividend forecast changes; and the CET1 ratio at September 30 along with any new buyback[4][5][16]. If the half passes the midpoint mainly through affiliates and share sales while customer-business net operating profits fall in the second quarter, the reading that customer businesses can carry the target would weaken.

Risks and Falsifiers

Each of the six risks below maps to a financial line that can be checked in the half-year report and to an observation that would overturn the current understanding.

A sharp rise in Japanese government bond yields would reduce the value of the bond portfolio. At March 31, 2026, Japanese domestic assets were 59.9% of total assets and Japanese government and agency bonds 56.7% of investment securities[20]; first-quarter net losses on debt securities were ¥35.0 billion[3], and the 20-F notes that the 10-year JGB yield has fluctuated between around 2.3% and 2.8% since April 2026[6]. If six-month net losses on debt securities stay within twice the first quarter, ¥70.0 billion, and the CET1 ratio holds at or above 10.0%, this risk has not materialised in the period.

Competition for deposits and loans from Mizuho, Sumitomo Mitsui, Japan Post Bank and internet banks could force MUFG to pay more for deposits or price loans tighter[19]. The exposed lines are the 1.14% domestic spread and ¥182.0 trillion of domestic deposits[7][14]. If the six-month domestic spread is at or above 1.14% and domestic deposits stay at or above ¥180 trillion, competitive pressure has not yet eroded the spread.

After the June hike, deposit rates could catch up with loan rates while corporate deposits keep leaving, so the domestic spread stops widening. That would hit first-quarter consolidated net interest income of ¥882.4 billion and operating profit in the domestic customer groups[3]. The risk is falsified if the six-month domestic spread reaches at least 1.16% and domestic deposits stay at or above ¥180 trillion[7][14].

Fee growth may depend on equity-market levels and lumpy M&A and financing deals, so it could fall back when markets or deal flow cool. The exposed lines are first-quarter net fees and commissions of ¥558.2 billion and operating profit in Commercial Banking & Wealth Management and Japanese Corporate & Investment Banking[3][8]. If six-month net fees exceed ¥1,116.3 billion with year-on-year growth above 15%, the risk has not appeared.

Overseas loan growth and Asian consumer credit could bring higher credit costs that offset revenue growth in Global Corporate & Investment Banking and Global Commercial Banking[13][15]. The exposed lines are first-quarter total credit costs of ¥72.1 billion and ordinary profit[3]. If six-month total credit costs stay at or below about ¥144.2 billion, the risk has not yet materialised.

Profit growth relies on equity-method income and strategic equity-sale gains, and the latter will shrink as the reduction programme ends in March 2027[18]. The exposed lines are first-quarter profits attributable of ¥809.4 billion and the ¥2.7 trillion full-year target[3][4]. If six-month profits exceed ¥1,350.0 billion and second-quarter net operating profits are at or above the first quarter's ¥814.9 billion, concern over profit quality would ease[3].

What to Watch Next

• Yen spread: the six-month domestic loan-deposit spread against 1.14% in the first quarter (the risk falsifier line is 1.16%), the change in deposit rates, and domestic deposits at September 30 against ¥182.0 trillion; a spread at or above 1.14% with deposits at or above ¥180 trillion confirms the current reading, while a stalled spread with deposit outflows weakens it.
• Net interest income: six-month NII above ¥1,764.8 billion would show second-quarter growth continuing.
• Fees: six-month net fees above ¥1,116.3 billion with growth above 15%, plus second-quarter net revenue in the two domestic corporate groups.
• Overseas credit: six-month total credit costs at or below about ¥144.2 billion, specific provisions against ¥52.9 billion, and second-quarter Global Corporate & Investment Banking operating profit holding ¥180.2 billion.
• Profit target and capital: six-month profits attributable above ¥1,350.0 billion with second-quarter net operating profits at least matching the first quarter, the share from affiliates and equity gains, any change to the target or ¥96 dividend, the CET1 ratio at September 30 against 10.43%, and any new buyback.

Conclusion

MUFG's results rest on two sets of drivers: the domestic yen spread and corporate and wealth fees form the core of its customer businesses, while overseas corporate banking and affiliate income add further growth. In the three months to June 2026, net interest income grew 27.7%, net fees grew 20.9%, profits attributable of ¥809.4 billion covered 30.0% of the ¥2.7 trillion full-year target, and the CET1 ratio rose to 10.43%[3][4][16]. The central open relationship is whether the wider spread after the Bank of Japan's June hike can outrun deposit costs and corporate outflows, and how much of profit customer businesses can carry on their own, without affiliates and share sales.

After the first-quarter results on August 3, 2026, no independent outside assessment of MUFG's results was found; the visible coverage in that period consisted mainly of automated earnings snapshots and sector price moves that did not evaluate the company's operations. There is therefore no third-party view to set against the debates above, and those snapshots are not treated as the market's judgment on them. Once the half-year report is out, readers will need to test the four core debates against the company's own figures.

If the six-month domestic spread is above 1.14%, domestic deposits hold ¥180 trillion, net fees exceed ¥1,116.3 billion, total credit costs stay at or below about ¥144.2 billion, and profits attributable pass ¥1,350.0 billion with second-quarter net operating profits at least matching the first quarter, the current reading that rate hikes and customer businesses are jointly driving profit would be clearly strengthened. Conversely, if the spread stalls, corporate deposits keep leaving, fees fall back or credit costs rise, while the half passes the midpoint mainly on equity-method income and equity-sale gains, that reading would weaken.

Sources

[1] MUFG 20-F filed 2026-07-06 · business overview and scale · 2026-07-06 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/000162828026047095/0001628280-26-047095-index.htm

[2] Drillr earnings_calendar (last updated 2026-10-28) · MUFG 2026-11-13 estimates · 2026-10-28 · Drillr earnings_calendar (vendor consensus) · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[3] MUFG 6-K filed 2026-08-03 · consolidated results three months ended June 30, 2026 · 2026-08-03 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000067088&type=6-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[4] MUFG 6-K filed 2026-08-03 · earnings target fiscal year ending March 31, 2027 · 2026-08-03 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000067088&type=6-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[5] MUFG 6-K filed 2026-08-03 · dividend forecast fiscal year ending March 31, 2027 · 2026-08-03 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000067088&type=6-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[6] MUFG 20-F filed 2026-07-06 · interest rate environment · 2026-07-06 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/000162828026047095/0001628280-26-047095-index.htm

[7] MUFG 6-K filed 2026-08-03 · BK and TB domestic interest rate spread · 2026-08-03 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000067088&type=6-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[8] MUFG 6-K filed 2026-08-03 · segment results three months ended June 30, 2026 · 2026-08-03 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000067088&type=6-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[9] MUFG 6-K filed 2026-08-03 · segment results three months ended June 30, 2025 · 2026-08-03 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000067088&type=6-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[10] MUFG 20-F filed 2026-07-06 · history and 2005 merger · 2026-07-06 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/000162828026047095/0001628280-26-047095-index.htm

[11] MUFG 20-F filed 2026-07-06 · business segment analysis FY2026 · 2026-07-06 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/000162828026047095/0001628280-26-047095-index.htm

[12] MUFG 20-F filed 2026-07-06 · domestic business groups FY2026 vs FY2025 · 2026-07-06 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/000162828026047095/0001628280-26-047095-index.htm

[13] MUFG 20-F filed 2026-07-06 · global business groups FY2026 vs FY2025 · 2026-07-06 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/000162828026047095/0001628280-26-047095-index.htm

[14] MUFG 6-K filed 2026-08-03 · BK and TB deposits and loans · 2026-08-03 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000067088&type=6-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[15] MUFG 20-F filed 2026-07-06 · US GAAP results of operations FY2025-FY2026 · 2026-07-06 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/000162828026047095/0001628280-26-047095-index.htm

[16] MUFG 6-K filed 2026-08-14 · Basel 3 capital ratios June 30, 2026 · 2026-08-14 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000067088&type=6-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[17] MUFG 20-F filed 2026-07-06 · share repurchases and cancellation · 2026-07-06 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/000162828026047095/0001628280-26-047095-index.htm

[18] MUFG 20-F filed 2026-07-06 · strategic equity holdings reduction · 2026-07-06 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/000162828026047095/0001628280-26-047095-index.htm

[19] MUFG 20-F filed 2026-07-06 · competition · 2026-07-06 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/000162828026047095/0001628280-26-047095-index.htm

[20] MUFG 20-F filed 2026-07-06 · Japan exposure risk factor · 2026-07-06 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/000162828026047095/0001628280-26-047095-index.htm