[SBUX] Starbucks: Q4 2026 earnings preview, U.S. traffic and margins after tariff refunds

Starbucks runs company-operated and licensed coffeehouses worldwide and sells packaged coffee and ready-to-drink products through its Global Coffee Alliance with Nestlé[1]. For this Starbucks Q4 2026 earnings preview, the company is scheduled to hold its call on 2026-10-28 for the fourth quarter of fiscal 2026, ending September 27, 2026[2]. In the latest reported period, the third quarter ended June 28, 2026, consolidated net revenue fell 1% to $9.32 billion, mainly because about $776 million of China revenue left the consolidated accounts after China retail moved to a licensed joint venture[3]; over the same quarter, U.S. comparable store sales rose 7.9%, with transactions up 4.2% and average ticket up 3.6%, and the non-GAAP operating margin rose 430 basis points to 14.4%[4]. With its third-quarter results, the company guided fourth-quarter U.S. comparable sales growth of 6.5% or greater, and raised full-year guidance to a non-GAAP operating margin above 11% and non-GAAP EPS of $2.55 to $2.65[5]; subtracting the $1.91 of non-GAAP EPS earned in the first three quarters ($0.56, $0.50 and $0.85)[6][7][4], the full-year range implies roughly $0.64 to $0.74 for the fourth quarter. As of 2026-09-30, the fourth-quarter consensus compiled by Drillr stood at $0.71 of EPS from 18 analysts, $9.21 billion of revenue from 16 analysts and $1.25 billion of EBIT[8].

Three things matter most in the fourth-quarter report. First, whether U.S. comparable sales can reach 6.5% or more against a tougher comparison while still being led by transactions: management has flagged harder year-over-year traffic comparisons in the fourth quarter[9], and if growth shifts mainly to ticket, the roughly 340 basis points of North America sales leverage seen in the third quarter would be hard to repeat[10]. Second, how much margin expansion survives once tariff refunds disappear: refunds received in the third quarter largely offset tariffs paid across the first three quarters[11], and they lifted the Channel Development margin by about 1,370 basis points[12], so the fourth-quarter consolidated non-GAAP margin has to show that expansion comes from the stores rather than one-off items. Third, whether the International business holds up after the China joint venture: the segment's operating margin rose to 19.1% in the third quarter[13], but equity-method income was only $22.8 million[14], and the fourth quarter, the second quarter since the deal closed, can test whether that margin reflects better operations or simply a change in what is consolidated.

Company Background and Business Structure

Starbucks' core business is company-operated coffeehouses, which produced 83% of total net revenue in fiscal 2025[15]. The company buys and roasts coffee, sells coffee, tea, other beverages and food in its stores, and supplies coffee and equipment to licensed stores in exchange for product sales and royalties; at the end of fiscal 2025 it had 40,990 stores worldwide, including 21,514 company-operated and 19,476 licensed, with 16,860 in the U.S. and 8,009 in China[15]. The company announced its "Back to Starbucks" strategy in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2024 to bring customers back to its stores, return to growth, and improve the coffeehouse experience and operating efficiency[16]. By fiscal 2026, the strategy's main levers were the Green Apron Service standard, marketing and menu innovation, a redesigned Starbucks Rewards program and coffeehouse uplifts[17].

Starbucks reports three segments by geography and channel, and in fiscal 2025 North America, International and Channel Development contributed 74%, 21% and 5% of total net revenue[1]. North America, which covers the U.S. and Canada, earned $3.16 billion of operating income on $27.37 billion of revenue in fiscal 2025; International earned $950 million on $7.82 billion, a margin of about 12.1%; and Channel Development earned $885 million on $1.87 billion[18]. Most Channel Development revenue comes from product sales to, and royalties from, Nestlé through the Global Coffee Alliance, while the ready-to-drink business runs through partnerships with PepsiCo, Nestlé and others, and the segment's fiscal 2025 operating margin was 47.3%[19].

The way China is consolidated changed fundamentally in fiscal 2026. On March 30, 2026, funds managed by Boyu Capital acquired a 60% stake in Starbucks' China retail operations, while Starbucks kept 40% and continues to own and license the brand, and the 7,991 company-operated stores taken over by the joint venture moved to a licensed model[20]. Starbucks no longer consolidates those stores' revenue and costs and instead records its share of the joint venture's income under the equity method, which the company said would mean lower revenue and a higher operating margin[20]. After the transition, about 90% of the International store portfolio is managed through licensed structures[21].

Stored-value cards and loyalty bring Starbucks a large pool of prepaid cash, while its costs are dominated by store labor and ingredients. At the end of June 2026, the stored value card liability and current deferred revenue stood at $1.82 billion, with another $5.63 billion of long-term deferred revenue[22]. In fiscal 2025, product and distribution costs were $11.66 billion and store operating expenses were $17.06 billion, about 31% and 46% of revenue respectively[18]; the first covers coffee, dairy, food, packaging and tariffs, and the second is mainly store labor and rent.

Financial History and Current Position

Starbucks' profit was already declining before "Back to Starbucks," and the decline accelerated sharply in fiscal 2025. The company earned $5.87 billion of operating income on $35.98 billion of revenue in fiscal 2023 and $5.41 billion on $36.18 billion in fiscal 2024[23]; net earnings attributable to Starbucks were $4.12 billion and $3.76 billion in those two years, or diluted EPS of $3.58 and $3.31[24]. In fiscal 2025, revenue grew 3% to $37.18 billion, but comparable store sales fell 1% on a 2% decline in transactions[25]; operating income dropped to $2.94 billion, a margin of about 7.9% that absorbed $892 million of restructuring and impairments[18], and net earnings were $1.86 billion, or $1.63 per diluted share[24].

North America was the center of the fiscal 2025 decline, and cash flow tightened as a result. North America comparable sales fell 2% that year, with transactions down 4% and ticket up 2%, while the segment's operating income fell 41% to about $3.2 billion and its margin contracted 830 basis points to 11.5%[26]. Fiscal 2025 operating cash flow was $4.75 billion and capital expenditure was $2.31 billion, leaving free cash flow of about $2.44 billion, below the $2.77 billion paid in dividends, and the company issued about $1.75 billion of new long-term debt that year[27].

In the first three quarters of fiscal 2026, comparable sales improved quarter by quarter, but profit measures diverged widely between quarters. First-quarter revenue rose 6% to $9.9 billion, global comparable sales rose 4%, the non-GAAP operating margin was 10.1% and GAAP EPS was $0.26[6]; second-quarter revenue rose 9% to $9.5 billion, global comparable sales rose 6.2% and the non-GAAP operating margin was 9.4%[7]. Third-quarter revenue was $9.32 billion and GAAP operating income was $980 million, and the company also booked a $536 million net gain on the China divestiture, bringing net earnings attributable to Starbucks to $1.05 billion[28]; the GAAP operating margin was 10.5%, GAAP EPS was $0.91 and non-GAAP EPS was $0.85[4].

The balance sheet improved after the China transaction, but shareholders' equity remains negative. Operating cash flow in the first three quarters of fiscal 2026 was $3.60 billion and capital expenditure was $888 million, the China deal brought in $2.54 billion of net proceeds, and the company repaid about $2.8 billion of long-term debt without issuing any new debt this fiscal year[29]. At the end of June 2026, long-term debt stood at $11.78 billion, with another $1.50 billion due within a year, and shareholders' deficit was $7.67 billion[22]; the company paid $2.12 billion of dividends in the first three quarters and did not repurchase shares[29].

Operating Model

Starbucks' revenue is driven mainly by comparable sales at company-operated stores, which can be read as transactions multiplied by average ticket at comparable stores, plus the contribution from net new stores. In fiscal 2025, comparable sales fell 1% and revenue growth came mainly from net new stores[25]; in the first three quarters of fiscal 2026 comparable sales rose 5.9%, and from the third quarter the China stores moved to the licensed model, cutting company-operated revenue by about $776 million while lifting licensed revenue by about $53 million from the joint venture, so consolidated revenue fell 1%[3]. The company accordingly guided full-year revenue to be flat to slightly higher[5], while Channel Development revenue, helped by coffee price pass-through and new products, grew 22% in the third quarter[12].

Operating income is highly sensitive to traffic because store labor and rent are largely fixed in the short run. In fiscal 2025, the North America margin fell 830 basis points, with about 310 basis points from deleverage, about 240 basis points from store closures and support-organization restructuring, and about 180 basis points from investments mainly in store labor hours[26]. In the third quarter of fiscal 2026, the North America margin was 13.6%: sales leverage added about 340 basis points, lapping the Leadership Experience 2025 added about 120 basis points and lower inflation paired with tariff refunds added about 110 basis points, while restructuring costs subtracted about 240 basis points, labor investments about 190 basis points and product mix about 100 basis points[10]. The company also has a $2 billion gross cost savings plan that management said is on track to be fully realized by fiscal 2028[9], and third-quarter consolidated general and administrative expenses were $599 million, down from $677 million a year earlier[28].

Cash flow depends on net earnings, depreciation and working capital, coffee prices tie up cash through green coffee inventory, and the drivers work on different time lags. Inventories rose $408 million in fiscal 2025, weighing on operating cash flow[27]; at the end of fiscal 2025, the company had committed to buy $129 million of green coffee under fixed-price contracts and an estimated $1.1 billion under price-to-be-fixed contracts[30]. Capital expenditure in the first three quarters of fiscal 2026 was about $1.0 billion lower than a year earlier, mainly because of fewer new stores and renovations in North America and China[29], and about $200 million of the September closure program will be cash charges[31]. Traffic changes flow into revenue and sales leverage in the same quarter, but Green Apron Service launched only one year earlier[32], so from the fourth quarter that labor investment begins to be compared with a year that already included it, and the drag may narrow, although the size of any narrowing still has to be confirmed by reported results.

Industry and Competitive Position

Starbucks is the world's largest coffee chain by store count and revenue, and in the U.S. it covers the morning and afternoon dayparts through a mix of company-operated stores, drive-thrus and mobile ordering. Its main competitors include fast-food and beverage chains such as Dunkin', McDonald's McCafé and Dutch Bros, along with independent coffee shops; in China, local chains such as Luckin have expanded with low prices and dense store networks, which is the background to Starbucks' shift to a joint-venture model. Management said the morning daypart has been the biggest source of transaction growth so far, with the afternoon also growing steadily[33]. Starbucks' advantage shows up in brand strength and loyalty: four months after the new Starbucks Rewards launched, the program had 35.8 million 90-day active U.S. members, and brand affinity, consideration and purchase intent were at five-year highs[32].

Starbucks' weaknesses are just as clear: labor-intensive stores and price competition in China. When traffic falls, fixed labor and rent cause sharp deleverage, and in fiscal 2025 the North America margin fell from about 19.8% to 11.5%[26]. In China, comparable sales rose only 0.5% in the second quarter while average ticket fell 1.6%[7], showing that local price competition was already affecting per-store sales. Unionization and labor negotiations at U.S. stores also remain unresolved, which will affect the path of labor costs.

Core Debates

U.S. store traffic has grown for three straight quarters. Against a tougher comparison, can fourth-quarter comparable sales reach 6.5% on transactions rather than ticket?

U.S. traffic is the starting point of the whole recovery, because North America provides about three-quarters of revenue and U.S. company-operated stores are the main source of profit and cash[1]. In fiscal 2025, North America comparable sales fell 2%, transactions fell 4% and operating income fell 41%[26]; in the first three quarters of fiscal 2026, U.S. comparable sales rose 4%, 7.1% and 7.9% in turn[6][7][4]. When the company raised its full-year guidance with third-quarter results, it set fourth-quarter U.S. comparable sales growth at 6.5% or greater[5], so the fourth-quarter report can test whether the third quarter was only a seasonal high.

The evidence for a traffic recovery comes from both transaction data and store operations, but the evidence against it is also specific. U.S. transactions rose 3%, 4.3% and 4.2% in the first, second and third quarters[6][7][4]; two-thirds of North America company-operated stores were rated at 4+ performance levels, food availability was near 99%, and store leadership retention improved 7 percentage points year over year[32]; and in the first quarter, the 650 Green Apron pilot stores outperformed the fleet by about 200 basis points in comparable sales[34]. On the other hand, management flagged harder year-over-year traffic comparisons in the fourth quarter and variable consumer sentiment[9]; U.S. ticket growth rose from 1% in the first quarter to 3.6% in the third, driven mainly by delivery, food attach and beverage modifications[17], and that growth shows up as a product mix drag in the margin bridge[10]. An alternative explanation is that part of this year's growth comes from last year's weak base and the expansion of delivery rather than a return of in-store habits; if fourth-quarter transactions slow clearly and comparable sales are held up mainly by ticket, that explanation becomes more persuasive.

The numeric baseline for this debate is the third quarter: U.S. comparable sales rose 7.9%, with transactions up 4.2% and ticket up 3.6%[4], and North America segment revenue was $7.40 billion, up 7%[13]. The financial transmission runs as follows: the Green Apron Service standard, marketing and menu innovation, and the new Starbucks Rewards drive U.S. store transactions, transactions feed company-operated store revenue, and sales leverage carries that into the North America operating margin; delivery and add-ons raise ticket and also add revenue, but they pull the margin down through product mix[10]. Management reported no meaningful cannibalization of in-store visits from delivery so far, and no margin tradeoff from scaling the channel[33].

What remains unresolved is how much of the third quarter's transaction growth can continue against a higher base. The fourth-quarter report needs to show whether U.S. comparable sales are at least 6.5% and transactions at least 3%, whether ticket growth comes from delivery, add-ons or pricing, how North America revenue changes on a store base reduced by closures, and how management first describes fiscal 2027 traffic. If U.S. comparable sales fall below 6.5% and transaction growth falls below 2%, or if the company attributes growth mainly to price or delivery ticket, the case for a traffic recovery would be clearly weakened.

How much of the third-quarter margin expansion can last once tariff refunds disappear and labor investment starts lapping itself?

Margin is the key to turning the recovery into earnings, because fiscal 2025 operating income fell from $5.41 billion to $2.94 billion[23][18], mainly due to deleverage from falling traffic, restructuring and Green Apron labor investment[26]. In the third quarter of fiscal 2026, the consolidated non-GAAP operating margin recovered to 14.4%, up 430 basis points[4], and the company then raised full-year guidance to a non-GAAP operating margin above 11% and non-GAAP EPS of $2.55 to $2.65[5]. But the third quarter included one-off tariff refunds and a weak base from the prior year's leadership conference, so only the fourth-quarter margin can show whether the expansion comes from durable sales leverage.

The current evidence sends conflicting signals about the direction of margins. On the supportive side, North America sales leverage added about 340 basis points in the third quarter, and the labor investment drag narrowed from about 260 basis points in the second quarter to about 190 basis points[35][10]; on the call, management said the North America margin still expanded by more than 100 basis points excluding tariff refunds[21], and said coffee price impacts should be largely immaterial to year-over-year margin comparisons in the fourth quarter[9]. On the opposing side, product mix subtracted about 90 and 100 basis points in the second and third quarters[35][10], tariff impacts including refunds lifted the Channel Development margin by about 1,370 basis points in the third quarter[12], and September added about $300 million of closure charges[31]. An alternative explanation is that this year's margin recovery comes mainly from one-off tariff refunds, the China deconsolidation and cuts to general and administrative expenses, and that store-level labor costs have not been fully covered by sales leverage.

This debate has three numeric baselines: the third-quarter consolidated non-GAAP operating margin of 14.4%, up 430 basis points[4]; the North America GAAP operating margin of 13.6%, up only 30 basis points[13] because it absorbed about 240 basis points of restructuring costs; and a labor investment drag of about 190 basis points in the North America margin bridge[10]. The financial transmission runs as follows: transaction growth spreads fixed store costs through sales leverage; Green Apron labor investment affects the store operating expense ratio once it laps itself; coffee and tariff costs flow into product and distribution costs; and store closures and support-organization restructuring are booked as GAAP restructuring charges that the non-GAAP measure excludes, with these factors together setting the North America and consolidated operating margins.

The open question is whether sales leverage alone can cover the labor and product mix drags once tariff refunds and the weak base are gone. The fourth-quarter report needs to show whether the consolidated non-GAAP operating margin is at least about 10% and the full-year figure above 11%, the relative size of sales leverage, labor investment and mix in the North America bridge, whether coffee and tariffs become a drag again, and whether closure charges match the roughly $300 million announced. If the full-year non-GAAP operating margin falls below 11%, or if the labor investment drag does not narrow in the fourth quarter, the case for sustainable margin expansion would be weakened.

After handing China retail to a joint venture, International revenue fell by a third. Can the segment's margin and the joint-venture income hold in the fourth quarter?

China was once Starbucks' second-largest market, and the joint venture has completely changed how it affects the income statement, so the International business needs to be tested again. At the end of fiscal 2025 Starbucks had 8,009 stores in China[15]; after Boyu Capital took a 60% stake on March 30, 2026, Starbucks kept 40% and continues to license the brand[20], and the $2.54 billion of net proceeds from the deal went toward debt reduction[29]. Third-quarter International revenue fell 34% while the operating margin rose to 19.1%[13]. From here, China store performance reaches Starbucks' income statement only through royalties, product sales and 40% of the joint venture's earnings, and the fourth-quarter report is the second test.

The evidence shows a clear improvement in the International margin, but the joint venture's own profitability is still opaque. On the supportive side, the third-quarter International operating margin was 19.1%, up from 13.6% a year earlier[13], and it already absorbed about $41.1 million of restructuring charges[14]; comparable sales in the remaining company-operated markets rose 5.7%[4], International system-wide comparable sales were positive for the sixth straight quarter, and the segment added 189 net new stores in the quarter[21]; in September the company said International net openings were running above its earlier plan[31]. On the opposing side, the segment's equity-method income was only $22.8 million[14], and the company does not break out the China joint venture's earnings; in the second quarter, China comparable sales rose only 0.5% while ticket fell 1.6%[7], a sign of intense local price competition that could depress the joint venture's profit. An alternative explanation is that the third-quarter margin improvement comes mainly from an accounting change, namely no longer consolidating lower-margin company-operated China stores, and does not mean the International business itself became more profitable.

The numeric baseline for this debate is the third-quarter International segment: revenue of $1.32 billion, down 34%, operating income of $253 million and a 19.1% margin[13], with $22.8 million of equity-method income[14]. The financial transmission runs as follows: once China retail became a licensed joint venture, the consolidated accounts lost the company-operated revenue and costs and instead record product sales and royalties, so International revenue fell sharply while the margin rose[20]; 40% of the joint venture's profit or loss is booked as equity income within International operating income; and the net deal proceeds supported about $2.8 billion of long-term debt repayment[29].

What remains unresolved is whether the joint venture itself can stay profitable, and how much of the International margin comes from the change in consolidation. The fourth-quarter report needs to show whether the International operating margin is at least 19%, whether International equity income is positive and whether the company breaks out the China joint venture, whether comparable sales in the remaining company-operated markets are at least 4%, and whether full-year net new stores come in at about 440. If the International operating margin falls below 16%, or if International equity income turns negative, the case that International profit has stabilized under the joint-venture model would be weakened.

Risks and Falsifiers

The first risk is cash and capital structure: dividends absorb most free cash flow, shareholders' equity is negative and buybacks are paused. Fiscal 2025 dividends of $2.77 billion exceeded free cash flow of about $2.44 billion[27]; in the first three quarters of fiscal 2026, free cash flow was about $2.72 billion against $2.12 billion of dividends, with no share repurchases[29]; at the end of June, long-term debt was $11.78 billion plus $1.50 billion due within a year, and shareholders' deficit was $7.67 billion[22], while the September closure program adds about $200 million of cash costs[31]. This risk sits in operating cash flow, dividends and debt; if fourth-quarter and full-year free cash flow covers dividends and closure cash costs without new debt issuance, the concern would be falsified.

The second risk is that restructuring, impairments, transaction gains and tax items make reported profit volatile, so GAAP and non-GAAP results diverge sharply. Restructuring and impairments totaled $416 million in the first three quarters of fiscal 2026[28], and the September closure program will add about $300 million[31]; the third quarter included a $536 million gain on the China transaction[28] and about $148 million of related tax expense, and the first quarter carried $266 million of tax expense from releasing indefinite reinvestment assertions[11]. These items left GAAP EPS ($0.26 in the first quarter and $0.91 in the third) clearly different from non-GAAP EPS ($0.56 and $0.85)[6][4]; if fourth-quarter restructuring charges match the roughly $300 million announced and there are no new large impairments or tax adjustments, this risk would be falsified.

The third risk is that the traffic recovery slows against a higher base and comparable sales become driven mainly by ticket. North America revenue was $7.40 billion in the third quarter[13], so at that scale each 1 percentage point of U.S. comparable sales is worth about $70 million of quarterly revenue, and a shortfall would also weaken the roughly 340 basis points of sales leverage the company uses to explain the margin recovery[10], while management has already flagged a tougher fourth-quarter comparison[9]. If fourth-quarter U.S. comparable sales are at least 6.5% and transactions at least 3%, this risk would be falsified.

The fourth risk is that margin expansion depends on one-off factors while store costs keep rising. The third-quarter non-GAAP operating margin was 14.4%[4], but about 230 basis points of North America improvement came from factors that will not repeat in the fourth quarter, namely about 110 basis points from lower inflation and tariff refunds and about 120 basis points from lapping the leadership conference, while labor investment still subtracted about 190 basis points[10]; the tariff refunds largely offset tariffs paid in the first three quarters[11]. If the fourth-quarter non-GAAP operating margin expands by at least 100 basis points year over year without relying on tariff refunds, this risk would be falsified.

The fifth risk is that price competition in China erodes the joint venture's earnings and drags on International profit through equity income and royalties. Third-quarter International operating income was $253 million, including $22.8 million of equity income[14]; the equity investments on Starbucks' balance sheet rose from $466 million at the end of fiscal 2025 to $1.70 billion[22], and that investment could face impairment if the joint venture keeps losing money, while China ticket had already fallen 1.6% in the second quarter[7]. If fourth-quarter International equity income is positive and at least $22.8 million, and the International operating margin is at least 19%, this risk would be falsified.

What to Watch Next

These points condense the three core debates and the capital structure risk into checks that can be made directly against the fourth-quarter report.

• U.S. traffic: third-quarter U.S. comparable sales rose 7.9% on 4.2% transaction growth and 3.6% ticket growth[4]. Watch whether the fourth quarter reaches the 6.5% or greater the company set and whether ticket comes from delivery, add-ons or pricing. Comparable sales of at least 6.5% with transactions of at least 3% would confirm the recovery; comparable sales below 6.5% with transactions below 2% would falsify it.
• Store margins: the third-quarter consolidated non-GAAP operating margin was 14.4%, with a labor drag of about 190 basis points in North America[10]. Watch whether the fourth quarter is at least about 10%, whether the full year is above 11%, and whether closure charges are about $300 million. A full-year margin below 11% or a labor drag that does not narrow would falsify the current view.
• China joint venture and International licensing: the third-quarter International margin was 19.1%, with $22.8 million of equity income[14]. Watch whether the margin holds at 19% or above, whether the China joint venture is broken out, and whether full-year net new stores come in near 440. A margin below 16% or negative equity income would falsify the current view.
• Cash and capital structure: free cash flow in the first three quarters was about $2.72 billion against $2.12 billion of dividends[29]. Watch whether full-year free cash flow covers dividends and about $200 million of closure cash costs; coverage without new debt would confirm the current view.

Conclusion

Starbucks' business is driven by traffic at U.S. company-operated stores, and fixed labor and rent amplify any change in traffic into profit. After comparable sales fell 1% and operating income dropped to $2.94 billion in fiscal 2025[25][18], U.S. comparable sales rose 7.9% and the non-GAAP operating margin returned to 14.4% in the third quarter of fiscal 2026[4], while China retail has become a licensed joint venture in which Starbucks holds 40%[20]. The China proceeds helped repay about $2.8 billion of long-term debt, but dividends still absorb most free cash flow and shareholders' equity is negative[29][22]. The central unresolved relationship is whether transaction growth can continue against a higher base and, once tariff refunds and the weak base are gone, turn into sustainable store-level margin expansion.

Only one independent outside assessment published after the third-quarter results qualifies: a Reuters report of September 25, 2026 on the second round of closures, which quoted two strategists[36]. Lale Akoner of eToro called the second closure wave "a sensible but costly step in Starbucks' turnaround" and warned that "if sales and margin improvement stall, investor patience could fade quickly"; Brian Jacobsen of Annex Wealth Management said Niccol "has already shown progress" and that "the next proof point is converting that momentum into stronger margins"[36]. Both treat the sales recovery as largely demonstrated and shift the focus to margins, which matches the second core debate here; they differ in that Akoner stresses closure costs and the risk of a stall, while Jacobsen stresses the progress already made. These are outside interpretations rather than facts, they cover only two views relayed by one news report, and they do not address the China joint venture's earnings or whether cash flow covers the dividend.

If the fourth-quarter report shows at the same time U.S. comparable sales of at least 6.5% with transactions of at least 3%, non-GAAP operating margin expansion of at least 100 basis points without tariff refunds, positive International equity income with an International margin of at least 19%, and closure charges in line with about $300 million, the current understanding that the recovery is moving from traffic to margins would be materially strengthened. Conversely, if comparable sales are held up mainly by ticket with transaction growth below 2%, the full-year non-GAAP operating margin falls below 11%, or International equity income turns negative, that understanding would be weakened, and the pressure on free cash flow to cover the dividend would grow with it.

Sources

[1] SBUX 10-K filed 2025-11-14 · business, segments and revenue mix · 2025-11-14 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-K

[2] Drillr earnings calendar (updated 2026-09-30) · SBUX 2026-10-28 call · 2026-09-30 · Drillr earnings calendar

[3] SBUX 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · Q3 FY2026 consolidated revenue bridge · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-Q

[4] SBUX 8-K filed 2026-07-29 · Q3 FY2026 results highlights · 2026-07-29 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=8-K

[5] SBUX 8-K filed 2026-07-29 · FY2026 guidance raised · 2026-07-29 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=8-K

[6] SBUX 8-K filed 2026-01-28 · Q1 FY2026 results highlights · 2026-01-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=8-K

[7] SBUX 8-K filed 2026-04-28 · Q2 FY2026 results highlights · 2026-04-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=8-K

[8] Drillr analyst_financial_estimates (updated 2026-09-30) · SBUX quarter ending 2026-09-28 · 2026-09-30 · Drillr analyst_financial_estimates · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[9] SBUX Q3 FY2026 earnings call 2026-07-29 · guidance and stated risks · 2026-07-29 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[10] SBUX 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · Q3 FY2026 North America revenue and margin bridge · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-Q

[11] SBUX 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · IEEPA tariff refunds and China tax · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-Q

[12] SBUX 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · Q3 FY2026 Channel Development · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-Q

[13] SBUX 8-K filed 2026-07-29 · Q3 FY2026 North America and International segment tables · 2026-07-29 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=8-K

[14] SBUX 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · Q3 FY2026 segment statement of earnings · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-Q

[15] SBUX 10-K filed 2025-11-14 · FY2025 company-operated and licensed store counts · 2025-11-14 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-K

[16] SBUX 10-K filed 2025-11-14 · FY2025 restructuring and store closures · 2025-11-14 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-K

[17] SBUX 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · Q3 FY2026 overview · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-Q

[18] SBUX 10-K filed 2025-11-14 · FY2025 segment statement of earnings · 2025-11-14 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-K

[19] SBUX 10-K filed 2025-11-14 · FY2025 Channel Development · 2025-11-14 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-K

[20] SBUX 10-Q filed 2026-04-28 · China joint venture closing and accounting · 2026-04-28 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-Q

[21] SBUX Q3 FY2026 earnings call 2026-07-29 · segment performance · 2026-07-29 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[22] SBUX 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · June 28 2026 balance sheet and debt tender · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-Q

[23] SBUX 10-K filed 2025-11-14 · FY2024 and FY2023 segment statements of earnings · 2025-11-14 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-K

[24] SBUX 10-K filed 2025-11-14 · FY2025 net earnings and EPS · 2025-11-14 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-K

[25] SBUX 10-K filed 2025-11-14 · FY2025 consolidated revenue bridge · 2025-11-14 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-K

[26] SBUX 10-K filed 2025-11-14 · FY2025 North America revenue and margin · 2025-11-14 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-K

[27] SBUX 10-K filed 2025-11-14 · FY2025 cash flow statement · 2025-11-14 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-K

[28] SBUX 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · Q3 FY2026 consolidated statement of earnings · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-Q

[29] SBUX 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · Q3 FY2026 year-to-date cash flow · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-Q

[30] SBUX 10-K filed 2025-11-14 · green coffee purchasing and hedging · 2025-11-14 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-K

[31] SBUX 8-K filed 2026-09-24 · second North America closure wave and store-opening revision · 2026-09-24 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=8-K

[32] SBUX Q3 FY2026 earnings call 2026-07-29 · Green Apron, rewards, uplifts and cost plan · 2026-07-29 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[33] SBUX Q3 FY2026 earnings call 2026-07-29 · Q&A on momentum, dayparts, marketing and delivery · 2026-07-29 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[34] SBUX Q1 FY2026 earnings call 2026-01-28 · guidance and Q&A · 2026-01-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[35] SBUX 10-Q filed 2026-04-28 · Q2 FY2026 North America and International segments · 2026-04-28 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000829224&type=10-Q

[36] Reuters via ESM Magazine 2026-09-25 · Starbucks To Close 250 More Coffee Houses · 2026-09-25 · Reuters(ESM Magazine 转载) · https://www.esmmagazine.com/a-brands/starbucks-to-close-250-more-coffee-houses-322312