[BUD] AB InBev: Q3 2026 earnings preview, cost relief vs. World Cup marketing

AB InBev is the world's largest brewer by volume, with more than 400 beer brands including Budweiser, Corona, Stella Artois and Michelob Ultra, and operations in more than 40 countries[1]. Ahead of its Q3 2026 earnings, the company is scheduled to report results on 2026-10-29 for the third quarter of 2026, ending September 30, 2026[2]. In the latest disclosed period, the second quarter of 2026, revenue was $16.66 billion, up 11.0% as reported and 5.6% organically, with total volumes up 0.9% and revenue per hectoliter up 4.2%; normalized EBITDA was $5.938 billion, up 5.8% organically, with the margin roughly flat at 35.6%; and underlying EPS was $1.21, up 23.4%, or 12.9% in constant currency[3]. In its second-quarter release the company reiterated that 2026 EBITDA growth will be in line with its medium-term outlook of 4%-8%, and guided to net pension interest and accretion expenses of $190 million to $220 million per quarter, a normalized effective tax rate of 26%-28% and net capital expenditure of $3.5 billion to $4.0 billion; it gives no quarterly guidance[4]. The Drillr earnings calendar (FMP data, updated 2026-08-07) shows a third-quarter EPS estimate of $1.02, which corresponds to the company's underlying EPS measure[2]; Drillr's aggregated full-year 2026 consensus is EPS of $4.48 (nine analysts, range $4.00-$4.71) and revenue of $64.946 billion (16 analysts)[5].

Three things matter most in this report. The first is whether US share gains start turning into profit: AB InBev was the No. 1 share gainer in total US alcohol in both the first and second quarters, yet US EBITDA grew only 0.2% and 0.1% in those quarters as top-line gains were reinvested in marketing[6][7], and the third quarter is North America's peak volume season, which will show whether share gains stay in profit. The second is whether Brazil's recovery is only event-driven: after a 4.6% beer volume decline in 2025, Brazilian beer volumes rose 1.2% in the first quarter of 2026 and 5.0% in the second[8][9], but the first quarter had an Easter timing shift and the second had the World Cup, so the third quarter, Brazil's off-season without either event, is the cleanest test of a real consumer recovery versus a one-off lift. The third is whether cost relief outweighs World Cup marketing: growth in cost of sales per hectoliter slowed from 2.3% in the first quarter to 1.7% for the first half, and the CFO said cost pressure was concentrated in the first half[10][11][12], but management also said World Cup marketing would be spread roughly equally across the second and third quarters[13], so third-quarter group EBITDA growth and margin will show what is holding the 4%-8% full-year guidance in place.

Company Background and Business Structure

AB InBev is a global beer leader built through four large combinations. Interbrew and Ambev merged to form InBev in 2004, which combined with Anheuser-Busch in 2008, Mexico's Grupo Modelo in 2013 and SABMiller in 2016. The company's primary listing is on Euronext Brussels, with secondary listings in Mexico and South Africa and American Depositary Receipts trading on the NYSE as BUD, and it has about 137,000 employees[1]; Michel Doukeris is chief executive, and on June 16, 2026 the board selected Dirk Van de Put as chairman[14].

The company reports five regional operating segments, and its largest profit pool is Middle Americas rather than the US. In 2025 Middle Americas (Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and others) generated revenue of $17.376 billion and profit from operations of $7.382 billion, the largest profit contribution; North America had revenue of $14.207 billion, of which the US was $12.376 billion; South America had revenue of $11.954 billion, of which Brazil, run by the controlled subsidiary Ambev, was $8.766 billion; EMEA had revenue of $9.502 billion and Asia Pacific $5.693 billion[15][16]. By product, beer revenue was $53.050 billion and non-beer revenue from soft drinks, spirits-based beverages, energy drinks and similar products was $6.269 billion, so beer is roughly nine-tenths of the total[15]. About 70% of EBITDA comes from emerging and developing markets[17], and about 75% of revenue is earned in currencies other than the US dollar, including 15.0% in the Brazilian real, 12.7% in the Mexican peso and 6.4% in the Chinese yuan[18].

AB InBev's value chain runs from raw-material sourcing all the way to digital ordering at the retail outlet. The company buys barley and processes it in its own malting plants, and it also buys rice, corn, hops and packaging such as aluminum cans and glass bottles, hedging some commodity contracts on financial markets[19]. In the US, state law requires beer to move through a three-tier system from brewer to wholesaler to retailer, so the company usually relies on licensed third-party wholesalers to reach points of sale[20]; elsewhere it relies more on its own distribution and the BEES B2B digital platform, which as of June 30, 2026 was live in 30 markets and captured 72% of revenue through B2B digital platforms, with second-quarter platform GMV of $15.0 billion, up 16%[21].

Financial History and Current Position

The fiscal 2025 annual report shows flat revenue, with profit and cash flow held up by price and mix. Revenue in 2025 was $59.320 billion, down 0.8% from $59.768 billion in 2024; total volume fell 2.5% to 561.1 million hectoliters; gross profit was $33.179 billion, profit from operations $15.405 billion, and normalized EBITDA $21.223 billion, up 1.3% as reported[22]. Excluding currency and scope changes, revenue grew 2.0% organically and revenue per hectoliter rose 4.4%[16]. Currency translation that year reduced revenue by $1.336 billion and profit from operations by $337 million[18].

Cash flow in 2025 covered capital spending and most shareholder returns, but net debt did not fall. Cash flow from operating activities was $14.883 billion, net capital expenditure $3.552 billion and adjusted free cash flow $11.331 billion[23]. Year-end net debt was $60.9 billion, up $0.3 billion from the end of 2024, mainly because of interest and tax payments, share buybacks, dividend payments and a $2.8 billion currency effect[24]; the company describes its optimal capital structure as net debt to normalized EBITDA of around 2x[25], while the ratio stood at 2.87x at the end of 2025[3].

Both quarters of the first half of 2026 delivered mid-single-digit organic growth, and cash flow improved sharply year over year. First-quarter revenue was $15.267 billion, up 5.8% organically, EBITDA was $5.437 billion, up 5.3% organically, and underlying EPS was $0.97[26][27]. In the second quarter, gross margin was 57.5%, up 99 basis points, normalized EBIT was $4.604 billion, up 8.0%, and underlying profit was $2.390 billion[28]. First-half revenue was $31.927 billion, EBITDA $11.375 billion and free cash flow $3.881 billion, up $2.526 billion year over year; the company spent $2.9 billion in the first half to reacquire the 49.9% minority stake in its US metal container plants, which lifted net debt to $64.2 billion at the end of June, yet net debt to EBITDA fell to 2.86x from 3.27x a year earlier[3][29].

Operating Model

AB InBev's revenue equals volume times revenue per hectoliter across its markets, and recent growth has come mainly from revenue per hectoliter. Revenue is reported net of excise taxes and discounts, and revenue per hectoliter is driven by pricing in line with inflation, premiumization of brands such as Corona and Michelob Ultra, Beyond Beer (spirits-based and flavored ready-to-drink beverages) and pack mix[16][13]. In 2025, volumes fell 2.5% while revenue per hectoliter rose 4.4% organically, so revenue still grew 2.0% organically; in the second quarter of 2026, volumes rose 0.9% and revenue per hectoliter rose 4.2%, for organic revenue growth of 5.6%[16][3]. In the US, the company recognizes revenue on shipments to wholesalers (STWs), while end demand shows up in sales to retailers (STRs); management says the two tend to converge over a full year[6][30].

Profit depends on the gap between revenue per hectoliter and cost per hectoliter, minus marketing investment. Gross profit is what remains after raw materials, packaging, brewing and plant costs, and gross margin was 57.5% in the second quarter; EBITDA then deducts selling, general, administrative and marketing expenses and was $5.938 billion in the second quarter, a 35.6% margin[28]. First-half cost of sales per hectoliter rose 1.7%, below the second quarter's 4.2% growth in revenue per hectoliter, with the main pressure coming from transactional currency effects[11]: emerging-market operations bear dollar-denominated costs such as aluminum and barley in local currency, and the company locks in part of those prices through hedges, so cost changes lag currency moves[19]. Part of the gross-margin gain was absorbed by marketing, with sales and marketing investment of $4.1 billion in the first half, up 9%[21]. Regional margins differ widely: second-quarter EBITDA margin was 50.3% in Middle Americas, 34.9% in North America and 29.9% in both South America and Asia Pacific[31][32][33][34].

Cash flow is strongly seasonal, absorbing working capital in the first half and releasing it in the second. In the first half of 2026, the change in working capital was negative $2.355 billion, operating cash flow was $5.241 billion and net capital expenditure was $1.360 billion, so first-half free cash flow sits far below the full-year level[29]. Free cash flow goes mainly to dividends ($2.596 billion in the first half), share buybacks ($1.301 billion in the first half), purchases of minority stakes and debt reduction[29]; of the $6 billion buyback program announced in October 2025, $1.9 billion had been completed by July 24, 2026[35]. EBITDA growth also determines whether net debt to EBITDA can keep moving from 2.86x toward the target of around 2x[29].

Industry and Competitive Position

No brewer comes close to AB InBev's scale. According to IWSR data, the company's 2024 beer volume was 492.6 million hectoliters, against 241.1 million for second-ranked Heineken, followed by China Resources at 100.8 million, Carlsberg at 100.6 million, Tsingtao at 76.0 million and Molson Coors at 73.8 million, while Constellation Brands, which sells Mexican import beers in the US, was at 36.5 million[36]. According to Kantar BrandZ 2026, eight of the world's ten most valuable beer brands belong to the company, with Corona and Budweiser ranked first and second[21]; the company believes it maintained or gained share in about 70% of its markets in the second quarter[37].

The company's edge comes from scale, its brand portfolio and the BEES platform, but industry volumes are shrinking in its two large mature markets. The US industry remained soft in the second quarter of 2026, and the company's 1.9% STR decline was judged to have outperformed it[6]; Chinese industry volumes fell by a mid-single-digit rate in the second quarter, and the company's decline was steeper[38]. Emerging-market exposure is another constraint: about 70% of EBITDA comes from emerging and developing markets[17], so local consumption and currency swings affect volumes and reported profit at the same time. The available comparison relies mainly on the company's own share and industry-growth assessments and lacks independently verifiable country-level absolute volume and profit figures.

Core Debates

With the US beer industry still shrinking, can the share AB InBev is winning with Michelob Ultra, Busch Light and Cutwater finally turn into North American profit growth?

This question matters because the US is the company's largest single country market, and North American profit is still going backward. US revenue was $12.376 billion in 2025, and North American profit from operations fell from $4.350 billion in 2024 to $3.747 billion[15]; US STRs and STWs both declined 3.2% that year[39]. US revenue grew 1.9% in the first half of 2026, but North American EBITDA rose only 0.5% organically in the second quarter, with the margin contracting 74 basis points to 34.9%[6][32]. The third quarter is the US peak volume season, with 54% of North American annual volume falling in the second and third quarters[40], making it the best test of whether share gains begin to stay in profit.

The evidence that share can become profit centers on brands and pricing. The company was the No. 1 share gainer in total US alcohol in both the first and second quarters, Michelob Ultra, Busch Light and Busch Light Apple were the industry's top three volume share gainers in the second quarter, and US revenue per hectoliter rose 3.3%[6]; Cutwater grew revenue by triple digits, and management said Beyond Beer earns 20%-30% more absolute profit per unit than premium beer[6][41]. The counter-evidence is that the industry is still declining: STRs went from +0.3% in the first quarter back to -1.9% in the second, US EBITDA grew only 0.2% and 0.1% in those two quarters as top-line gains were reinvested in marketing[7][6], and World Cup marketing is concentrated in the second and third quarters[13].

The financial transmission is direct. End demand and share drive STRs, which convert into STWs through wholesaler restocking; STWs multiplied by revenue per hectoliter, lifted by pricing and the Beyond Beer and premium mix, produce US revenue, and only after marketing reinvestment does that reach North American EBITDA[32][6]. In the second quarter, North American revenue grew 2.6% organically and gross profit rose 4.2%, but SG&A grew 6.9% and EBITDA ended up only 0.5% higher[32], which shows the profit bottleneck is marketing spend rather than price.

What remains unresolved is whether revenue growth can leave profit behind without a cut in marketing, not whether the share gains themselves are real. In the third quarter, watch whether North American organic EBITDA growth moves clear of the near-zero 0.5% of the second quarter and catches up with revenue growth, whether US STRs hold at -1.9%, whether the gap between STWs and STRs starts to close, whether revenue per hectoliter stays above 3%, and whether Beyond Beer keeps growing fast. An organic decline in North American EBITDA, or an STR decline worse than the 3.2% of 2025, would show that share gains are not enough to offset the industry decline and marketing investment; US revenue per hectoliter growth below 2% would show that the price and mix tailwind is fading.

After a 4.6% beer volume decline in 2025, Brazil is growing again. Is this a real recovery or a one-off World Cup lift?

Brazil's recovery is pivotal because it has already become a major source of group profit growth. Brazil is the company's second-largest country market, with 2025 revenue of $8.766 billion[15]; Brazilian beer volumes fell 4.6% that year, and South American profit from operations fell from $3.012 billion to $2.909 billion[8][15]. In the second quarter of 2026, Brazil's EBITDA rose 16.1% with 230 basis points of margin expansion[9]. The third quarter is Brazil's off-season, since South American volumes are weighted toward the first and fourth quarters[40], and it has neither Easter nor the World Cup, so it tests whether the recovery depends on seasonal events.

The case for a real recovery is that volume, mix and price improved together. Brazilian beer volumes rose 1.2% in the first quarter and 5.0% in the second, outperforming an improving industry by the company's assessment[42][9]; in the second quarter, premium and super-premium beer volumes grew in the mid-twenties, mainstream beer volumes were roughly flat with estimated share gains, and revenue per hectoliter still rose 5.3%, so volume was not bought with price cuts[9]. The alternative is an event-driven lift: the first quarter benefited from the Easter timing shift, which management said contributed 30-50 basis points of growth[43], and the second quarter benefited from the World Cup, which management said usually adds 20-30 basis points to global annual volume, concentrated in June and July[13]; revenue per hectoliter growth also slowed from 8.6% in the first quarter to 5.3% in the second, and soft drink volumes still fell 4.4% in the second quarter[42][9].

Brazil's profit transmission starts with consumer conditions and weather. These drive Brazilian beer volumes, with premium and super-premium growing and mainstream flat; volume multiplied by revenue per hectoliter, lifted by revenue management and premiumization, yields Brazilian revenue, and after costs exposed to transactional currency effects and marketing investment it reaches South American EBITDA[9][33]. South American EBITDA rose 14.3% organically in the second quarter, with the margin rising from 27.4% to 29.9%[33], and for the first half Brazilian beer volumes rose 2.9% and EBITDA 13.1%[9].

What remains unresolved is whether third-quarter year-over-year data can separate a consumer recovery from an event lift, given that the company does not disclose Brazil's absolute volumes or industry figures. In the third quarter, watch whether Brazilian beer volumes stay positive and at or above the first half's 2.9%, whether revenue per hectoliter holds at 5%, whether Brazil's EBITDA growth stays above 10%, and whether South America's margin keeps expanding year over year. A negative turn in Brazilian beer volumes, or EBITDA growth below 4%, would show the recovery depends on events; revenue per hectoliter growth below 4% would show volume was bought with price concessions.

As Chinese beer drinking shifts from bars and restaurants to the home, can Budweiser stop its volume slide in the peak season?

China is the only major market clearly dragging on group profit. China is the company's largest market in Asia, and Chinese yuan revenue was 6.4% of group revenue, down from 7.3% in 2024[18]; Chinese volumes fell 8.6% in 2025[44], then fell another 9.7% in the second quarter of 2026, with EBITDA down 16.1%[38]. Asia Pacific profit from operations fell from $1.222 billion in 2024 to $1.011 billion in 2025[15]. The third quarter is China's peak volume season, with more Asia Pacific volume falling in the second and third quarters[40], and that is when operating leverage is magnified most.

The evidence for stabilization comes mainly from mix improvement. The company said its second-quarter share trend improved sequentially, its super-premium and core plus brands returned to growth, and revenue per hectoliter turned to growth of 1.0%; the industry's second-quarter decline was affected by adverse weather and contains a one-off element[38]. The counter-evidence is equally clear: the company underperformed the industry in both the first and second quarters, with volumes still down 1.5% in the first quarter while the industry grew slightly; expanding the in-home channel cut first-quarter revenue per hectoliter by 2.5%, and EBITDA fell 11.8%[45]; and weakness in the on-premise channel continued into the second quarter of 2026[38].

China's transmission starts with channel migration. As industry consumption moves from on-premise to the home, the company's in-home coverage and share determine Chinese volumes; volume multiplied by revenue per hectoliter yields Chinese revenue, with revenue per hectoliter caught between brand-mix improvement and in-home channel investment, and after fixed costs and marketing it reaches Asia Pacific EBITDA[38][34]. Asia Pacific revenue fell 2.8% organically in the second quarter, EBITDA fell 10.9%, and the margin contracted 269 basis points to 29.9%[34], which shows that volume declines are multiplied by fixed costs.

What remains unresolved is that the third quarter can only test whether peak-season volume and profit declines narrow; it cannot by itself prove a share recovery, because the company gives only qualitative estimates of its share trend. In the third quarter, watch whether China's volume decline narrows to within 5%, whether revenue per hectoliter stays positive, whether China's EBITDA decline is smaller than 10%, the company's assessment of industry growth and share trend, and the year-over-year change in Asia Pacific margin. A Chinese volume decline larger than 9.7%, or an EBITDA decline larger than 16.1%, would show the peak season is still deteriorating; revenue per hectoliter falling back below -2.5% would show the channel expansion is being paid for with price investment.

Will the currency-driven cost pressure of the first half ease as management expects, letting AB InBev keep EBITDA growth within 4%-8% while it spends more on World Cup marketing?

This debate tests the company's whole growth model. The company grows through modest volume growth plus roughly 4% growth in revenue per hectoliter, then uses cost and expense discipline to keep margins stable; second-quarter EBITDA rose 5.8%, but the margin improved only 4 basis points because marketing absorbed the gross-margin expansion[28][37]. The third quarter brings both cost relief and peak marketing, and EBITDA growth also decides whether net debt to EBITDA can keep moving from 2.86x toward the target of around 2x[29].

The case for cost relief comes from cost data and management commentary. Growth in cost of sales per hectoliter slowed from 2.3% in the first quarter to 1.7% for the first half[10][11], and the CFO said the biggest pressure was in the first half and would ease as the months went by[12]; second-quarter gross margin expanded 99 basis points, the company reiterated its 4%-8% full-year EBITDA growth guidance in the second-quarter release, and first-half free cash flow rose $2.5 billion to $3.881 billion[28][4][29]. The alternative is a double constraint from marketing and price: World Cup marketing is spread roughly equally across the second and third quarters[13], second-quarter SG&A grew 6.5%, faster than revenue growth of 5.6%[46]; the company prices with inflation, and management said it would need to adjust its plans if inflation accelerates[13]; and first-half net debt rose to $64.2 billion because of the minority-stake purchase[29].

The cost-side transmission chain is long. Dollar-denominated raw materials and packaging such as aluminum and barley, combined with emerging-market currency rates, become cost of sales per hectoliter after hedging; inflation-linked pricing and premiumization drive revenue per hectoliter; the gap between the two sets gross margin, and after World Cup sales and marketing investment concentrated in the second and third quarters it becomes EBITDA, which then flows through free cash flow to net debt to EBITDA[19][11][29]. In 2025, when cost of sales per hectoliter rose 2.6%, group EBITDA still grew 4.9% organically[47][22], which offers a reference point for second-half cost pressure.

What remains unresolved is whether cost relief or the marketing step-up is larger in the third quarter, and a single quarter cannot by itself prove a long-term margin gain. In the third quarter, watch where group organic EBITDA growth lands relative to the 4% bottom of guidance and the first half's 5.6%, whether nine-month cumulative growth in cost of sales per hectoliter stays at or below 1.7%, whether revenue per hectoliter holds at 4%, whether SG&A growth falls back below revenue growth, and whether net debt to EBITDA at the end of September is below 2.86x. Organic EBITDA growth below 4%, or cost per hectoliter growth above the first quarter's 2.3%, would show that cost relief has not arrived; net debt to EBITDA above the 2.87x of year-end 2025 would show that deleveraging has stalled.

Risks and Falsifiers

The first risk is currency translation losses from a stronger US dollar. About 75% of revenue is earned in currencies other than the dollar, and in 2025 translation reduced revenue by $1.336 billion and profit from operations by $337 million while adding $2.845 billion to net debt[18]. In the second quarter of 2026, reported revenue growth of 11.0% exceeded organic growth of 5.6%, so currency was a temporary tailwind[3]; if reported revenue growth again exceeds organic growth in the third quarter, the risk has not materialized.

The second risk is interest and refinancing cost on a heavy debt load. Net debt was $64.2 billion at the end of June, quarterly net interest expense was $583 million, the company guided to an average gross debt coupon of about 4% in 2026, and 98% of its bonds carry fixed rates[29][4][25][46]. If third-quarter net interest expense is no higher than in the second quarter and net debt to EBITDA keeps falling, interest-rate risk remains contained.

The third risk is a continued US industry volume decline, with marketing reinvestment absorbing top-line gains. North America earned profit from operations of $3.747 billion in 2025 and EBITDA of $1.408 billion in the second quarter of 2026; roughly flat North American EBITDA means that about 24% of group revenue is contributing no profit growth[15][32]. Third-quarter North American organic EBITDA growth at or above revenue growth, with STRs no worse than -1.9%, would falsify this concern[6].

The fourth risk is a renewed weakening of Brazilian consumer conditions or weather, sending beer volumes back into decline. Brazil accounts for 14.8% of group revenue, and when Brazilian beer volumes fell 4.6% in 2025, South American profit from operations dropped from $3.012 billion to $2.909 billion[8][15]. Positive third-quarter Brazilian beer volume growth with EBITDA growth of at least 10% would falsify this concern[9].

The fifth risk is a continued shrinking of China's on-premise channel without enough in-home expansion to compensate. Asia Pacific profit from operations was $1.011 billion in 2025, down from $1.222 billion in 2024, and Asia Pacific EBITDA fell 10.0% organically in the first half of 2026[15][34]. A third-quarter Chinese volume decline narrower than 5%, with an EBITDA decline smaller than 10%, would falsify this concern[38].

The sixth risk is emerging-market currency depreciation or higher commodity prices undoing the expected second-half cost relief. In 2025, when cost of sales per hectoliter rose 2.6%, group EBITDA grew 4.9% organically; the Mexican peso and Brazilian real together account for 27.7% of revenue[47][18]. Nine-month cumulative growth in cost of sales per hectoliter at or below 1.7%, with organic EBITDA growth of at least 4%, would falsify this concern[11][12].

What to Watch Next

• US share into profit: North American organic EBITDA growth, 0.5% in Q2 2026, should catch up with revenue growth, and an organic decline would falsify the thesis. US STRs, at -1.9%, should hold there; a decline worse than 3.2% would falsify it. US revenue per hectoliter, up 3.3%, should stay above 3%; below 2% would signal a fading tailwind.
• Brazil's recovery: beer volumes, up 5.0% in Q2, should stay at or above 2.9%, and a negative turn would point to an event-driven lift. Brazil EBITDA, up 16.1%, should stay above 10%; below 4% would point to an event-driven lift. Revenue per hectoliter, up 5.3%, should hold at 5%; below 4% would point to price concessions.
• China's channel reset: volumes, down 9.7% in Q2, should narrow to a decline within 5%; a decline beyond 9.7% would signal further deterioration. China EBITDA, down 16.1%, should decline less than 10%; a decline beyond 16.1% would signal deterioration. Revenue per hectoliter, up 1.0%, should stay positive; below -2.5% would signal price-funded channel expansion.
• Cost relief versus marketing: group organic EBITDA growth, 5.8% in Q2, should be read against 4% and 5.6%; below 4% would mean cost relief has not arrived. Cumulative cost of sales per hectoliter growth, 1.7% in H1 2026, should stay at or below 1.7% through nine months; above 2.3% would mean cost relief has not arrived. Net debt to EBITDA, 2.86x on 2026-06-30, should be below 2.86x at the end of September; above 2.87x would mean deleveraging has stalled.

Conclusion

AB InBev's operating core is turning modest volume growth plus roughly 4% growth in revenue per hectoliter into mid-single-digit profit growth, then using cash flow to reduce debt. In the first half of 2026 the model worked at group level: second-quarter revenue grew 5.6% organically and EBITDA 5.8% organically, first-half free cash flow rose to $3.881 billion, and net debt to EBITDA fell from 3.27x a year earlier to 2.86x[3][29]. But the sources of profit growth are uneven: Middle Americas and Brazil supplied most of the increase, US share gains have not yet turned into profit, and China is still dragging on Asia Pacific[31][9][6][38]. The central unresolved relationship is whether second-half cost relief can outweigh World Cup marketing, and whether the US and China can stop eroding group growth.

Independent third-party interpretation since the second-quarter results has been thin. In an August 14 article, Zacks Equity Research argued that the expansion of Michelob Ultra in the US and initiatives such as 27% growth in no-alcohol beer revenue could sustain the volume recovery, but that "the recovery remains uneven across markets," with China's 8.8% revenue decline a notable pressure point; the author concluded that management is shifting its focus from resetting the business toward accelerating growth, and that whether the recovery broadens depends on sustained execution in key markets[48]. That view maps directly onto the China and Brazil debates, but it is one outside interpretation, not a fact and not a market consensus; the other third-party content found over the same period was mostly results recaps and company news, so there are no differing views to set against it.

A combination of later observations will decide whether the current understanding is strengthened or weakened. If third-quarter North American EBITDA growth catches up with revenue growth, Brazilian beer volumes stay positive in the off-season, and China's volume decline narrows to within 5%, while nine-month cumulative growth in cost of sales per hectoliter stays at or below 1.7% and net debt to EBITDA keeps falling below 2.86x, then the share gains, the recovery and the cost relief are all landing. Conversely, if group organic EBITDA growth drops below 4%, North American EBITDA declines organically, or China's volume decline exceeds 9.7%, marketing investment and market weakness are overpowering cost relief, and the 4%-8% full-year guidance will come under greater pressure.

Sources

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[11] BUD 6-K filed 2026-07-30 (HY26 interim financial report) · HY26 cost of sales and operating expenses · 2026-07-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526326285/d175040dex992.htm

[12] BUD 1Q26 earnings call 2026-05-05 · CFO on COGS phasing and H2 marketing · 2026-05-05 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[13] BUD 1Q26 earnings call 2026-05-05 · World Cup volume and marketing phasing; pricing policy · 2026-05-05 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[14] BUD 6-K filed 2026-06-16 · chairman appointment · 2026-06-16 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526272577/d127875dex991.htm

[15] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · Note 5 segment reporting · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[16] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · FY2025 revenue by segment and organic revenue growth · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[17] BUD 1Q26 earnings call 2026-05-05 · footprint and emerging-market EBITDA share · 2026-05-05 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[18] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · revenue by currency and FX translation · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[19] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · raw materials and packaging · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[20] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · US three-tier distribution · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[21] BUD 6-K filed 2026-07-30 (2Q26 press release) · 2Q26 category, Beyond Beer and BEES · 2026-07-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526326285/d175040dex991.htm

[22] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · FY2025 condensed results of operations · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[23] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · FY2025 adjusted free cash flow · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[24] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · FY2025 net debt bridge · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[25] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · FY2025 net debt and capital structure · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[26] BUD 6-K filed 2026-05-05 (1Q26 press release) · Figure 1 consolidated performance 1Q26 · 2026-05-05 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526205213/d126873dex991.htm

[27] BUD 6-K filed 2026-05-05 (1Q26 press release) · 1Q26 headline results · 2026-05-05 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526205213/d126873dex991.htm

[28] BUD 6-K filed 2026-07-30 (2Q26 press release) · Figure 1 consolidated performance 2Q26 · 2026-07-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526326285/d175040dex991.htm

[29] BUD 6-K filed 2026-07-30 (2Q26 press release) · HY26 cash flow and net debt · 2026-07-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526326285/d175040dex991.htm

[30] BUD 1Q26 earnings call 2026-05-05 · US STR and STW convergence · 2026-05-05 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[31] BUD 6-K filed 2026-07-30 (2Q26 press release) · Annex 1 Middle Americas 2Q segment · 2026-07-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526326285/d175040dex991.htm

[32] BUD 6-K filed 2026-07-30 (2Q26 press release) · Annex 1 North America 2Q segment · 2026-07-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526326285/d175040dex991.htm

[33] BUD 6-K filed 2026-07-30 (2Q26 press release) · Annex 1 South America 2Q segment · 2026-07-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526326285/d175040dex991.htm

[34] BUD 6-K filed 2026-07-30 (2Q26 press release) · Annex 1 Asia Pacific 2Q segment · 2026-07-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526326285/d175040dex991.htm

[35] BUD 6-K filed 2026-07-30 (2Q26 press release) · optimize our business and buyback · 2026-07-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526326285/d175040dex991.htm

[36] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · world's largest brewers by volume · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[37] BUD 6-K filed 2026-07-30 (2Q26 press release) · 2Q26 management comments · 2026-07-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526326285/d175040dex991.htm

[38] BUD 6-K filed 2026-07-30 (2Q26 press release) · China 2Q26 · 2026-07-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526326285/d175040dex991.htm

[39] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · FY2025 North America volumes · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[40] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · weather and seasonality · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[41] BUD 1Q26 earnings call 2026-05-05 · Beyond Beer margins in the US · 2026-05-05 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[42] BUD 6-K filed 2026-05-05 (1Q26 press release) · Brazil 1Q26 · 2026-05-05 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526205213/d126873dex991.htm

[43] BUD 1Q26 earnings call 2026-05-05 · Easter phasing in 1Q26 volumes · 2026-05-05 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[44] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · FY2025 Asia Pacific and China volumes · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[45] BUD 6-K filed 2026-05-05 (1Q26 press release) · China 1Q26 · 2026-05-05 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526205213/d126873dex991.htm

[46] BUD 6-K filed 2026-07-30 (2Q26 press release) · Figure 3 consolidated income statement 2Q26 · 2026-07-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526326285/d175040dex991.htm

[47] BUD 20-F filed 2026-03-03 · FY2025 cost of sales · 2026-03-03 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1668717/000119312526088105/d65314d20f.htm

[48] Zacks Equity Research 2026-08-14 · AB InBev's Volumes Return to Growth: Is a Bigger Recovery Brewing? · 2026-08-14 · Zacks Equity Research · https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/ab-inbevs-volumes-return-growth-132200813.html