[NBIS] Nebius: Q3 2026 Earnings Preview on Capacity Ramp and GPU Pricing

Nebius (NBIS), an Amsterdam-based AI cloud company listed on Nasdaq, rents GPU compute to AI labs, AI-native companies and large technology firms, and adds storage, networking and an inference platform on top[1][2]. Ahead of its Q3 2026 earnings, the key question is whether new capacity turns into revenue on time; the company is scheduled to hold its earnings call on 2026-11-12 for the third quarter 2026, the three months ended September 30, 2026[3]. In the latest reported quarter, the second quarter of 2026, group revenue was $582.3 million, up 454% year over year, adjusted EBITDA was $236.2 million, and the GAAP net loss from continuing operations was $190.4 million[4]. The core Nebius AI cloud segment brought in $574.9 million, and annualized run-rate revenue (ARR) reached $3.0 billion at the end of June[5]. On the second-quarter call, management reaffirmed its full-year guidance: 2026 group revenue of $3.0 billion to $3.4 billion, year-end ARR of $7 billion to $9 billion, a group adjusted EBITDA margin of about 40% and capital expenditures of $20 billion to $25 billion[6]. Earlier, on the first-quarter call, management said the adjusted EBITDA margin would return to first-quarter levels in the third quarter before moving higher in the fourth[7]. The Drillr earnings calendar, updated on November 9, shows a consensus third-quarter revenue estimate of $907.2 million and a consensus EPS estimate of -$0.72. The same source carried an EPS estimate of roughly -$0.72 for the second quarter against a recorded actual of -$0.12, a gap suggesting that this EPS figure may not be on the same basis as the company's reported numbers, so the revenue estimate is the more reliable reference[3].

Three things matter most in these results. First, whether the capacity brought online at the end of the second quarter turns into third-quarter revenue: first-half group revenue was only $981.3 million, so reaching the $3.0 billion low end requires at least $2.019 billion in the second half, and management has said that capacity deployed late in the second quarter will begin contributing to revenue in the third[4][6]. Second, whether margins return to the first quarter's 32.5% or better, as management indicated: second-quarter deals averaged more than $20 million of annual contract value per megawatt, but most of them are tied to capacity arriving in late 2026, while new data halls coming online in the third quarter incur lease, power and depreciation costs first[8][9][10]. Third, how much of the build-out customer prepayments can still fund: first-half operating cash flow of $4.504 billion came almost entirely from prepayments, against first-half capital spending of $8.130 billion, and the full-year guide implies another $11.9 billion to $16.9 billion of capex in the second half, so third-quarter changes in deferred revenue and operating cash flow will show how large a gap outside financing has to fill[11][12].

Company Background and Business Structure

Nebius Group N.V. was formerly Yandex N.V.; after completing its divestment in July 2024, the company concentrated its capital on GPUs and data center hardware, turning from an internet holding company into a business built around AI infrastructure[13][14]. A family trust established by the founder and CEO holds about 52% of the voting power but only about an 11% economic interest, and the CEO, directors, employees and pre-IPO shareholders together hold about 59% of the voting power[15]. The company also holds a minority stake in the open-source database company ClickHouse; it remeasured that investment against market transactions in January 2026, which was an important reason first-quarter GAAP net income from continuing operations reached $621.2 million[8][16].

The company reports three segments, and Nebius AI cloud is almost the entire business. In the second quarter of 2026, AI cloud revenue was $574.9 million; Avride, the autonomous driving and delivery robot business, had $1.0 million of revenue and an adjusted EBITDA loss of $40.1 million; and TripleTen, the coding education business, had $10.0 million of revenue and a $9.4 million loss, leaving AI cloud at about 98% of total segment revenue of $585.9 million[16]. AI cloud sells GPU clusters, storage and networking, plus the Token Factory inference platform, which competes with inference services such as Fireworks AI and Together AI; in the first half the company also acquired Tavily, ClarifAI and Eigen AI to add software-layer capabilities[17][16]. Avride is still small but is making operational progress: its fleet passed 200 vehicles in May 2026, and it has completed more than 60,000 commercial rides on Uber in Dallas[18].

AI cloud customers fall into three tiers with different contract lengths and pricing. The core business is one-to-three-year mid-term contracts with AI labs and AI-native companies; the second tier is five-year dedicated-cluster contracts with investment-grade customers such as Microsoft and Meta; the third is short-term capacity contracts and a first capacity auction, which the company began trying in the third quarter[9]. Customer concentration is high: three unnamed customers accounted for 24%, 21% and 14% of second-quarter revenue, and two customers accounted for 25% and 15% of full-year 2025 revenue[19][20]. Data centers come in several forms: Finland and Missouri are owned greenfield sites, Vineland in New Jersey is a build-to-suit site, and Kansas City, the UK, Israel, France and Iceland are co-location sites; a substantial portion of revenue is collected on a prepaid basis[2][20].

Financial History and Current Position

Nebius has a short financial record, but growth has been extremely fast and comes almost entirely from AI cloud. Group revenue rose from $9.8 million in 2023 to $91.5 million in 2024 and $529.8 million in 2025, up 479% in 2025; the AI cloud segment grew from $68.3 million to $480.3 million, up 603%[13][21]. In 2025, AI cloud segment adjusted EBITDA turned positive for the first time at $59.0 million, while Avride lost $82.7 million and TripleTen lost $41.2 million, leaving a combined segment loss of $64.9 million[22]. On a GAAP basis, 2025 cost of revenues was $166.2 million, product development $177.3 million, sales, general and administrative expenses $380.1 million and depreciation and amortization $417.9 million, producing an operating loss of $611.7 million; the same year included a $598.9 million gain from revaluing equity investments[23].

The 2025 cash flows show how capital-intensive this business is. Full-year operating cash flow was $401.9 million and investing activities used a net $4.229 billion, including $4.066 billion of purchases of property, equipment and intangible assets, compared with $807.5 million in 2024; the gap was filled mainly by $5.126 billion of net financing inflows[24][14]. Deferred revenue rose by $1.561 billion that year, mainly from prepayments received under strategic customer agreements[25].

In the first half of 2026, revenue, margins and the balance sheet all expanded quickly. First-quarter revenue was $399.0 million with adjusted EBITDA of $129.5 million (a 32.5% margin), and second-quarter revenue was $582.3 million with adjusted EBITDA of $236.2 million (a 40.6% margin)[8][4]. Second-quarter depreciation and amortization of $259.7 million, plus $115.9 million of one-off share-based compensation and post-combination expense tied to the Eigen AI acquisition, produced an operating loss of $175.9 million; interest expense rose to $119.1 million, leaving a net loss from continuing operations of $190.4 million[26][27][4]. First-half operating cash flow was $4.504 billion and capital spending $8.130 billion; at the end of June, cash stood at $8.042 billion, net property and equipment had risen from $5.553 billion at the end of 2025 to $13.045 billion, deferred revenue was $5.975 billion, and remaining performance obligations (RPO) totaled $37.49 billion[11][28][29][30].

Operating Model

AI cloud revenue depends on three variables, capacity online, utilization and price, and in the short run the pace of bringing capacity online matters most. Roughly, quarterly revenue equals sellable capacity online times utilization times one quarter of annual contract value per megawatt, plus per-token inference revenue from Token Factory and asset-light partnership revenue. Management attributed second-quarter growth to capacity added in the first quarter, higher utilization, and high-margin revenue from the asset-light model, Token Factory and acquisitions, and said capacity sells out as fast as it comes online[31]. The delivery chain is long: after a data center is connected to power, the company still has to commission it, build the network and clusters, deploy the platform and onboard customers before billing starts, which takes a few months[32]. At the end of 2025 the company had about 170 MW of active power serving revenue, and its year-end connected power guidance is 800 MW to 1 GW[33][34].

The core of the profit model is whether revenue grows faster than data center leases, power and staff costs, while depreciation determines how far GAAP profit sits from the adjusted measure. Adjusted EBITDA equals revenue minus cost of revenues and the cash portion of R&D and selling and administrative expenses, excluding depreciation, share-based compensation and acquisition costs. In the second quarter, cost of revenues fell from 29% of revenue a year earlier to 23%, and depreciation and amortization fell from 72% of revenue to 45%[26][35]. Starting in 2026, the company extended the useful life of servers and network equipment from four years to five, which lowers quarterly depreciation but also stretches the assumed economic life of its GPUs by a year[36][35]. New capacity carries lease and depreciation costs before it fills up, so quarterly margins do not move in a straight line, a point management flagged in the first quarter[7].

The defining feature of the cash model is that customer prepayments push operating cash flow far above profit. First-half operating cash flow of $4.504 billion came mainly from a $4.395 billion increase in deferred revenue driven by customer advance payments[12], and the company anticipates more than $9 billion of prepayments for full-year 2026[37]. Capital spending goes mainly to GPUs and data centers: $8.130 billion in the first half against full-year guidance of $20 billion to $25 billion[11][6]. The difference between prepayments and capex is covered by outside financing: first-half net financing inflows were $9.160 billion, including $4.3375 billion of convertible notes, $2.8467 billion from treasury share sales and a $2 billion pre-funded warrant bought by NVIDIA[38].

Industry and Competitive Position

Nebius is one of the newer AI-focused cloud providers, competing directly with similar specialists and indirectly with far larger general-purpose cloud platforms. In its annual report, the company names CoreWeave, Crusoe and Lambda as the main competitors for its core AI infrastructure business, alongside AWS, Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure and Oracle; its Token Factory inference platform also faces inference-as-a-service companies such as Fireworks AI and Together AI[39][17]. Against these rivals, the company emphasizes its in-house-designed server racks, self-designed data centers and full-stack AI cloud platform, but it relies entirely on NVIDIA for GPUs, so the timing and volume of supply depend on NVIDIA's capacity and its commitments to other customers[33][2][1][40]. In March 2026, NVIDIA paid about $2 billion for a pre-funded warrant exercisable into 21,065,936 Class A shares, making the supplier a shareholder as well[41].

The evidence for Nebius's competitive edge comes from large-customer endorsements and power reserves, but these comparisons have clear limits. Microsoft committed to pay up to about $17.393 billion over five-year service terms at the Vineland site, including about $6.958 billion of upfront payments, regardless of actual utilization[42]; Meta signed an agreement in March 2026 with a total contract value of up to about $27 billion, of which $12 billion covers dedicated-cluster orders and a further order commits Meta to buy certain unsold capacity[43]. In September, Palantir named Nebius its preferred sovereign AI infrastructure partner[44]. On power, contracted capacity grew from more than 2 GW in February 2026 to more than 3.5 GW in May, with owned capacity above 75%; in the second quarter the company raised its year-end target from more than 4 GW to 5 GW and said it plans to deploy more than 1 GW a year starting in 2027[33][45][46]. These are company figures or contract maximums, not recognized revenue, and neither the annual nor the quarterly filings provide capacity, utilization or pricing data comparable with CoreWeave or other rivals, so the disclosures cannot show whether Nebius's unit economics lead the peer group.

Core Debates

Will capacity brought online at the end of Q2 turn into revenue in Q3 and keep Nebius's $3.0-3.4 billion full-year revenue guidance intact?

This debate decides whether the full-year guidance is credible, because second-half revenue has to be more than double the first half. First-half group revenue was $981.3 million against full-year guidance of $3.0 billion to $3.4 billion, which means the second half needs $2.019 billion to $2.419 billion[4][6]. The company said in the first quarter that it would significantly increase its capacity in place in the third quarter, so the third quarter is the first test of whether the invest, bring online, then bill sequence turns on schedule[34].

Current evidence shows strong demand but a lag in delivering capacity. Second-quarter AI cloud revenue of $574.9 million was about 48% above the first quarter's $389.7 million, and ARR reached $3.0 billion at the end of June, up from $1.9 billion at the end of March and $1.25 billion at the end of 2025[16][5][47]. On the second-quarter call, management said capacity deployed late in the second quarter should begin contributing to revenue in the third, held its year-end connected power guidance of 800 MW to 1 GW, and confirmed that Vineland is part of 2026 capacity[6][32]. Because ARR is the last month of the quarter's AI cloud revenue multiplied by 12, June-end ARR of $3.0 billion equals an exit rate of about $750 million a quarter; year-end ARR guidance of $7 billion to $9 billion implies December revenue roughly 1.3 to 2 times higher than June[5][6].

The financial transmission runs from power connected to the data center, through cluster build-out, platform deployment and customer onboarding, to billing on sold capacity, and finally into AI cloud revenue, ARR and group revenue[32]. What remains unresolved is the speed of that chain. An alternative explanation is that if site commissioning or cluster deployment slips, third-quarter revenue could come mainly from the June exit rate of about $750 million a quarter, pushing growth into the fourth quarter and leaving the full-year target more dependent on the final weeks of the year; most of the large deals signed in the second quarter are tied to capacity arriving in late 2026 and will contribute primarily to 2027 revenue, so they do not help the third quarter[10]. The Drillr earnings calendar's consensus third-quarter revenue estimate of $907.2 million sits about $160 million above that $750 million exit rate[3].

The things to watch are where third-quarter revenue lands relative to two lines and whether management reaffirms guidance. If third-quarter group revenue reaches about $808 million, or 40% of the second-half low end, the fourth quarter still needs about $1.211 billion; revenue below $750 million would mean new capacity was not billed on time and would falsify the current reading[4][6]. Equally important are whether September-end ARR is clearly above $3.0 billion, whether the $3.0 billion to $3.4 billion revenue guidance and the $7 billion to $9 billion year-end ARR guidance hold, and whether the connected power guidance or Vineland's progress changes; a cut to either full-year revenue or connected power guidance would directly falsify the current understanding[5][32].

Can higher GPU pricing offset the cost of bringing a wave of new capacity online, so that Q3 margins hold where management promised?

This debate decides how much of the price increase actually stays with the company. Full-year guidance for an adjusted EBITDA margin of about 40% is the core test of whether Nebius can make money while expanding at scale[6]. The AI cloud segment margin already reached 49.7% in the second quarter, but new capacity comes online in a wave in the third quarter, and data center leases, power and depreciation arrive before the revenue does[48][7].

The pricing evidence is strong, but its direct effect on the third quarter is limited. Second-quarter deals averaged more than $20 million of annual contract value per megawatt, and the four landmark deals averaged more than $1 billion of total contract value each at $20 million to $25 million per megawatt, compared with a 2026 base of about $12 million; the first short-term capacity deals in the third quarter came in above $40 million per megawatt[9][49]. Pricing on older-generation GPUs was also more than 30% higher than in the first quarter[50]. The group margin rose from 32.5% in the first quarter to 40.6% in the second, and cost of revenues fell from about 26% of revenue in the first quarter to 23%[8][4][26]. However, management said these higher-priced second-quarter deals will start coming online from late in the fourth quarter and can serve as the pricing baseline for early 2027, and that capacity from the company's own data centers will begin improving margins only in the second half of 2027[51][52].

The financial transmission runs from tight GPU supply to higher prices on new deals and older-generation GPUs, then to revenue growing faster than lease, power and staff costs, lifting the AI cloud segment margin and group adjusted EBITDA; new capacity bears costs before it fills up, which temporarily depresses margins. What remains unresolved is where the second-quarter margin gain came from. An alternative explanation is that part of the improvement came from high-margin revenue in the asset-light model, Token Factory and acquired businesses rather than from repricing existing GPU contracts, and that start-up costs for new third-quarter capacity could pull margins back toward first-quarter levels[31]. The first-quarter AI cloud segment margin was about 44.6%, calculated as first-half segment adjusted EBITDA of $459.7 million minus the second quarter's $285.7 million, divided by first-quarter segment revenue of $389.7 million[16].

The thing to watch is whether margins hold the floor management set for itself. A third-quarter group adjusted EBITDA margin of at least 32.5% and an AI cloud segment margin above 44.6% would support the view that pricing can cover start-up costs; a group margin below 32.5% would falsify management's statement that margins return to first-quarter levels[7][16]. Also watch whether cost of revenues and depreciation rise back above 23% and 45% of revenue, and whether annual contract value per megawatt on new third-quarter deals stays above $20 million; a fall below that level would show that second-quarter pricing was not a durable condition[26][9].

How much of the $12-17 billion of second-half capital spending can customer prepayments carry, and how will Nebius fund the rest?

This debate decides whether the pace of expansion can continue and how much interest and dilution shareholders will bear. Nebius buys GPUs and builds data centers before it sells compute, so capital spending far exceeds revenue: first-half operating cash flow of $4.504 billion came almost entirely from prepayments, capex was $8.130 billion, and the difference was covered by convertible notes, the NVIDIA warrant and at-the-market (ATM) share sales[11][12][38]. Full-year guidance of $20 billion to $25 billion implies second-half capex of roughly $11.87 billion to $16.87 billion, or about $5.9 billion to $8.4 billion a quarter on average[6].

Cash reserves and contract backlog are both large, but the durability of prepayments has not yet been demonstrated. At the end of June, cash was $8.042 billion and deferred revenue $5.975 billion; deferred revenue rose $1.1971 billion in the second quarter, and RPO stood at $37.49 billion, 36% of which is expected to be recognized within 24 months[28][29][30]. About 70% of second-quarter deals included prepayments covering 50% to 60% of the associated capex, and the expected payback period on that capex and related operating costs shortened from two to three years to one year and ten months[9]. Since July, the company has closed a first secured debt facility of about $775 million (SOFR plus 2.50%, maturing October 31, 2030, backed by deployed GPUs and contracted cash flows from an investment-grade customer), $5.75 billion of convertible notes (alongside privately negotiated exchanges of $400 million each of its 2029 and 2031 convertible notes) and a $3.5 billion secured facility from Citi[1][53][54].

The financial transmission runs from new contracts with prepayments to higher operating cash flow and deferred revenue, which cover 50% to 60% of GPU and data center capex, with the rest filled by secured loans, convertible notes and ATM sales, ending in the cash balance, interest expense and share dilution[37]. What remains unresolved is the size of second-half prepayments. The company anticipates more than $9 billion of prepayments in 2026; after the roughly $4.395 billion deferred revenue increase in the first half, the second half needs about $2.3 billion a quarter on average[37][12]. An alternative explanation is that most first-half prepayments came from one-off milestones in a few large contracts such as Microsoft and Meta, that mid-term contracts carry smaller prepayments, and that second-half operating cash flow could be well below the first half's, making capex more dependent on convertibles and share sales; through June 30 the ATM program had sold 12.7 million shares at a weighted average of $223.6, raising about $2.8 billion, with 12.3 million shares still available[55].

The thing to watch is the relative pace of prepayments and capex in the third-quarter cash flow statement. A third-quarter deferred revenue increase of about $2.3 billion and operating cash flow of about $2.2 billion would support the view that prepayments can carry a meaningful share of the expansion; an increase below $2.3 billion would show prepayment inflows slowing[29][11]. Also watch whether third-quarter capex lands in the $5.9 billion to $8.4 billion range, and whether new financing is mainly debt secured by contract cash flows or shifts toward convertibles and equity; a shift to equity with heavier dilution would weaken the current understanding of the funding structure[1][54].

Risks and Falsifiers

Customer concentration and contract delivery terms are the first risk to revenue and cash flow. Three customers accounted for 24%, 21% and 14% of second-quarter revenue, so a slowdown at any one of them would noticeably affect AI cloud revenue and prepayment cash flow[19]. The Microsoft contract is worth up to about $17.393 billion, but it gives Microsoft the right to service credits or to terminate individual tranches after specified delivery delays or repeated failures to meet availability requirements; the Meta agreement is worth up to about $27 billion[42][43]. If the largest customer's share falls in later quarters and no service credits or tranche terminations are disclosed, this risk would carry less weight.

Founder control limits minority shareholders' influence over capital allocation. Class B shares held by the CEO's family trust carry about 52% of the voting power but only about an 11% economic interest, so financing and capital allocation decisions such as ATM sales, convertible issuance and acquisitions do not need minority shareholder approval[15]. If the governance structure changes, or conversions of Class B shares into Class A shares bring the trust's voting power below 50%, this assessment would need revising.

Site and power delivery delays would directly push back revenue recognition. Capacity takes a few months to move from connected power to billing, and on the second-quarter call a Morgan Stanley analyst specifically asked about the Vineland, New Jersey site, where a public hearing had taken place without a vote[32][56]. The company's annual report also warns that poor execution on long-term contracts could lead to cost overruns, underutilized capacity, reduced margins and delays in revenue recognition[57]. Second-half group revenue must reach at least $2.019 billion to hit the low end of guidance, and any site delay would push revenue from signed contracts later; third-quarter revenue of at least about $808 million with unchanged year-end connected power guidance would falsify this concern.

Falling GPU rental prices, or new chip generations that erode the value of existing GPUs, are a risk to margins and asset payback. Nebius depends on NVIDIA for supply and competes with CoreWeave, Crusoe, Lambda and the large cloud providers, so once supply and demand loosen, both new-deal pricing and older-generation GPU pricing would fall[40][39]. The exposure is AI cloud adjusted EBITDA ($285.7 million in the second quarter) and the payback period on GPU assets depreciated over five years[48][36]. Annual contract value per megawatt on new third-quarter deals holding above $20 million, with the segment margin at or above 44.6%, would falsify the concern that prices are already falling.

Financing costs and dilution are already showing up in the income statement. As the convertible note balance grew, second-quarter interest expense rose to $119.1 million, bringing the first-half total to $182.8 million[4]; if prepayments slow, expansion would lean more on convertibles and ATM sales, and the NVIDIA warrant covers another roughly 21.07 million shares[41]. The exposure is interest expense, net income and earnings per share. Third-quarter operating cash flow no lower than the second quarter's $2.2461 billion, with new financing mainly debt secured by contract cash flows, would falsify the concern that dilution is accelerating[11].

What to Watch Next

• Capacity to revenue, group quarterly revenue: $582.3 million in the second quarter, with a June exit rate of about $750 million a quarter[4][5]. Watch whether the third quarter reaches about $808 million; anything below $750 million would falsify the current reading.
• Capacity to revenue, quarter-end ARR: $3.0 billion at the end of June ($1.9 billion at the end of March)[5][47]. Watch whether September-end ARR is clearly above $3.0 billion; a cut to the $7 billion to $9 billion year-end guidance would falsify.
• Capacity to revenue, full-year guidance and connected power: revenue of $3.0 billion to $3.4 billion and 800 MW to 1 GW by year-end[6][32]. Watch for reaffirmation and whether Vineland advances as 2026 capacity; a cut to either guide would falsify.
• Pricing and margins, group adjusted EBITDA margin: 40.6% in the second quarter, 32.5% in the first[4][8]. Watch whether the third quarter is at least 32.5%; a drop below that would falsify.
• Pricing and margins, AI cloud segment margin: 49.7% in the second quarter, about 44.6% in the first[48][16]. A reading below 44.6% would be a warning.
• Pricing and margins, annual contract value per megawatt on new deals: above $20 million in the second quarter against a 2026 base of about $12 million[49]. A fall below $20 million on third-quarter deals would falsify.
• Prepayments and funding, quarterly increase in deferred revenue: $1.1971 billion in the second quarter, with a June-end balance of $5.975 billion[29]. An increase below about $2.3 billion in the third quarter would show prepayments slowing.
• Prepayments and funding, operating cash flow and capex: $2.2461 billion and $5.6574 billion in the second quarter[11]. Watch for operating cash flow near $2.2 billion and capex of $5.9 billion to $8.4 billion; a capex gap filled mainly with equity would falsify.

Conclusion

Nebius buys GPUs and builds or leases data centers first, then sells compute to AI companies by the megawatt; its revenue depends on capacity online, utilization and price, and its cash comes mainly from customer prepayments. In the second quarter of 2026, group revenue was $582.3 million with a 40.6% adjusted EBITDA margin, yet the company still lost $190.4 million on a GAAP basis; at the end of June it held $8.042 billion of cash, $5.975 billion of deferred revenue and $37.49 billion of RPO, against full-year capex guidance of $20 billion to $25 billion[4][28][29][30][6]. The central unresolved relationship is whether new capacity can move from connected power to billing on time to deliver at least $2.019 billion of second-half revenue, whether the margin lift from higher-priced new deals can offset the start-up costs of a wave of new capacity, and whether prepayments can fund enough of the capex to keep financing from shifting further toward equity.

Between the second-quarter results and November 10, the public material available consisted mostly of recaps of the results, ranking lists and unsigned summaries; two potentially relevant analyses, one on capex and prepayments and one on margins, could not be retrieved in full, so their authors and arguments could not be verified, and this article cites no outside interpretation. As a result, the three debates above can currently be tested only against the company's own disclosures and guidance, not cross-checked against independent analysis; the revenue consensus in the earnings calendar is only an aggregate figure and cannot substitute for specific judgments about capacity, pricing and funding.

Over the next few quarters, one combination of observations would materially strengthen the current reading: third-quarter revenue of about $808 million or more, September-end ARR clearly above $3.0 billion, a group adjusted EBITDA margin of at least 32.5%, new-deal value per megawatt holding above $20 million, deferred revenue rising by about $2.3 billion a quarter, and new financing led by debt secured on contract cash flows. Conversely, if third-quarter revenue falls below $750 million, margins drop below first-quarter levels, prepayment inflows slow, and the capex gap leans increasingly on convertibles and ATM sales, then at least one of the pace of capacity delivery, the durability of pricing or the scale of prepayments has been overestimated[5][9][37].

Sources

[1] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-07-17 ($775 million secured facility) · 2026-07-17 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926084452/tm2620683d1_ex99-1.htm

[2] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · business overview · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[3] NBIS earnings calendar updated 2026-11-09 · 2026-11-09 · Drillr 财报日历一致预期 · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[4] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 earnings release) · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-1.htm

[5] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 shareholder letter) · AI cloud revenue, ARR and margin · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-2.htm

[6] NBIS Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-12 · 2026 guidance reaffirmed · 2026-08-12 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[7] NBIS Q1 2026 earnings call 2026-05-13 · quarterly margin path · 2026-05-13 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[8] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-05-13 (Q1 2026 earnings release) · 2026-05-13 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926059872/tm2614392d1_ex99-1.htm

[9] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 shareholder letter) · Q2 deal economics · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-2.htm

[10] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 shareholder letter) · timing of new deals · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-2.htm

[11] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 earnings release) · cash flow and capital expenditures · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-1.htm

[12] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 operating and financial review) · operating cash flow · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094844/nbis-20260812xex99d1.htm

[13] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[14] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · capital expenditures 2023-2025 · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[15] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · founder voting control · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[16] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 interim financial statements) · segment revenue and adjusted EBITDA · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094844/nbis-20260812xex99d2.htm

[17] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · competitors · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[18] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 shareholder letter) · Avride and TripleTen · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-2.htm

[19] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 interim financial statements) · customer concentration · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094844/nbis-20260812xex99d2.htm

[20] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · significant customers 2025 · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[21] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · revenue by segment · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[22] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · segment revenue and adjusted EBITDA 2023-2025 · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[23] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · consolidated statement of operations 2025 · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[24] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · cash flows and capital expenditures 2025 · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[25] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · deferred revenue 2025 · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[26] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 earnings release) · operating expenses · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-1.htm

[27] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 shareholder letter) · Eigen AI one-off expense · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-2.htm

[28] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 earnings release) · balance sheet · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-1.htm

[29] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 interim financial statements) · deferred revenue · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094844/nbis-20260812xex99d2.htm

[30] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 interim financial statements) · remaining performance obligations · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094844/nbis-20260812xex99d2.htm

[31] NBIS Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-12 · Q2 revenue drivers and margin · 2026-08-12 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[32] NBIS Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-12 · connected power and lag to revenue · 2026-08-12 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[33] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · data center footprint and power definitions · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[34] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-05-13 (Q1 2026 shareholder letter) · contracted and connected power · 2026-05-13 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926059872/tm2614392d1_ex99-2.htm

[35] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 shareholder letter) · cost of revenue and depreciation · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-2.htm

[36] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · server useful life extended to five years · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[37] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 shareholder letter) · funding sources · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-2.htm

[38] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 operating and financial review) · financing activities · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094844/nbis-20260812xex99d1.htm

[39] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · risk factors: competition · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[40] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · supplier concentration on NVIDIA · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[41] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · NVIDIA pre-funded warrant · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[42] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · Microsoft agreement · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[43] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · Meta agreement · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm

[44] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-09-08 (Palantir partnership) · 2026-09-08 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926105749/tm2624958d1_ex99-1.htm

[45] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-05-13 (Q1 2026 shareholder letter) · owned capacity share · 2026-05-13 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926059872/tm2614392d1_ex99-2.htm

[46] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 shareholder letter) · contracted power target raised to 5 GW · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-2.htm

[47] NBIS Q1 2026 earnings call 2026-05-13 · Q1 AI cloud revenue and ARR · 2026-05-13 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[48] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 shareholder letter) · adjusted EBITDA by business · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-2.htm

[49] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 shareholder letter) · ACV per MW versus 2026 base · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-2.htm

[50] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 shareholder letter) · older-generation GPU repricing · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-2.htm

[51] NBIS Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-12 · pricing baseline for 2027 · 2026-08-12 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[52] NBIS Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-12 · own data centers improve margins from 2H27 · 2026-08-12 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[53] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-24 (convertible notes closing) · 2026-08-24 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926100347/tm2623863d1_ex99-1.htm

[54] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-10-22 ($3.5 billion Citi facility) · 2026-10-22 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926117978/tm2628078d1_ex99-1.htm

[55] NBIS 6-K filed 2026-08-12 (Q2 2026 shareholder letter) · ATM share sales · 2026-08-12 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926094568/tm2622968d1_ex99-2.htm

[56] NBIS Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-12 · Vineland site question · 2026-08-12 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[57] NBIS 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · risks of long-term contracts · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926052948/nbis-20251231x20f.htm