[CMCSA] Comcast: Q3 2026 Earnings Preview on Broadband ARPU, Free Wireless Lines and Peacock

Comcast (CMCSA), the most widely deployed US cable broadband operator and the parent of NBC, Universal Pictures and the Universal theme parks, has confirmed that it will report results for the third quarter of 2026, ending September 30, 2026, on 2026-10-22 with a call at 8:30 a.m. ET[1]. This Comcast Q3 2026 earnings preview starts from the latest disclosed period, the second quarter of 2026: revenue was $29.94 billion, down 1.2% as reported and up 4.7% on a pro forma basis that excludes the separated Versant networks and the sold Sky Germany business; Adjusted EBITDA was $8.90 billion, down 5.3% pro forma; adjusted EPS was $1.04 and free cash flow was $4.60 billion[2]. Operationally, domestic residential broadband lost 167,000 customers, 34,000 fewer than a year earlier, and wireless added a record 448,000 lines to pass 10 million, yet broadband ARPU fell 3.8% and residential-segment Adjusted EBITDA fell 8.0%[3][4][5]. Comcast gives no numeric guidance; on the call, management said broadband ARPU and Connectivity & Platforms EBITDA trends should show "modest improvements starting in the third quarter" as early go-to-market spending enters the base and free wireless lines convert into paying relationships in greater volumes[4]. On September 9 the CFO added at a Goldman Sachs conference that third-quarter broadband losses would not improve year over year (the prior-year quarter lost 91,000), that full-year losses still would improve, and that ARPU should improve sequentially in the third quarter[6]. Management has also said Peacock profitability improves on an annual basis but varies by quarter[7], that Orlando attendance softness has continued into the third quarter[8], and that share repurchases have been paused since July 1 until the separation is complete[9]. On sell-side expectations, the Zacks consensus for third-quarter adjusted EPS is $0.99, below $1.12 a year earlier[10]; the Drillr earnings calendar carries EPS of $0.988 and revenue of $29.49 billion, against a second-quarter actual of $1.04 versus an estimated $0.973[11].

Three things in the third-quarter disclosure deserve the closest attention. First is whether the combination of worse subscriber losses and stabilizing ARPU actually holds: domestic broadband revenue was $6.28 billion in the second quarter, down 5.5%, ARPU fell 3.8%, and management has already flagged worse third-quarter losses, so the real test is whether the ARPU decline narrows from 3.8% to within 3% and the residential EBITDA decline narrows from 8% to within 6%[5][4][6]. Second is whether the free wireless lines really convert into paid revenue when they roll off: wireless service revenue was $1.007 billion, up 14.2%, but roughly half of new residential postpaid phone connects came from free lines while direct product costs rose 8.9%, so whether third-quarter service revenue growth accelerates above 16% and outruns cost growth is the only place the "significant majority converting" statement can be checked with numbers[5][12][13][14]. Third is what Peacock and the theme parks look like without the second quarter's events and new-park effect: Peacock earned $189 million of Adjusted EBITDA on 48 million paid subscribers, but that quarter included $440 million of incremental FIFA World Cup revenue, and Peacock lost $217 million in the third quarter of 2025[15][16][17]; theme-park revenue grew only 2.7% while EBITDA fell 5.1%, and the third quarter must answer against the first full Epic Universe summer and a $940 million EBITDA comparison[18][17]. These three outcomes will show whether the "give up price now, repair later" logic is confirmed, weakened, or left waiting another quarter.

Company Background and Business Structure

Comcast was founded in Philadelphia in 1963 and today describes itself as a global media and technology company with two primary businesses, Connectivity & Platforms and Content & Experiences[19]. It reports five segments: Residential Connectivity & Platforms (residential broadband, wireless, video, advertising and voice under the Xfinity and Sky brands), Business Services Connectivity (Comcast Business), Media (NBC, Telemundo, Bravo, NBC Sports, Peacock and international sports networks), Studios (Universal Pictures and television production) and Theme Parks (the Universal parks in Orlando, Hollywood, Osaka and Beijing)[19][20][21]. Revenue in 2025 was $123.71 billion, essentially flat with 2024, of which the connectivity business contributed $80.94 billion and the content business $45.56 billion[22][23][24].

The company's perimeter changed three times between the second half of 2025 and 2026. In June 2025 Comcast sold its Hulu interest and recognized a $9.4 billion pre-tax gain, and on January 2, 2026 it completed the separation of its cable networks business, Versant[25]; on May 31 it sold its Sky operations in Germany for $59 million of net pre-tax cash proceeds[26]; and on June 29 it announced a plan to separate NBCUniversal and Sky into an independent public company through a tax-free spin-off in approximately one year, subject to final board approval, tax opinions, regulatory approvals and financing, with Comcast retaining up to a 19.9% stake in NBCUniversal for up to a year after the spin and monetizing it in a tax-efficient manner over time[27]. After the separation Mike Cavanagh will be CEO of NBCUniversal, and former CFO Michael Angelakis will return as CEO of Comcast, joining as a strategic advisor in the interim[28]. The 10-Q puts completion in mid-2027[29].

The core asset of the connectivity business is its own hybrid fiber-coaxial (HFC) network. At the end of 2025 the network passed about 64.98 million homes and businesses with broadband penetration of 47.6%[30], multigigabit downstream speeds were available to about 60% of residential customers, and the company is deploying DOCSIS 4.0 to deliver symmetrical multigigabit speeds in some markets[31]. Wireless service rides on Verizon's network plus Comcast's own Wi-Fi hotspots and is initially sold only as part of a bundle to qualifying broadband customers[32]; in 2025 the company simplified broadband pricing and began offering a free wireless line for one year to new and existing broadband customers, which the 10-K says should improve retention and competitiveness but will negatively affect broadband ARPU[23]. At the end of the second quarter of 2026 Comcast had 28.486 million domestic residential broadband customers, 10.187 million wireless lines and 10.668 million video customers[3]. The largest costs are video programming (which falls as video customers leave), MVNO access and device costs that rise with wireless lines, technical support and customer service, and network capital expenditure, which was $8.72 billion for the connectivity business in 2025[5][33][34].

The Business Services segment sells broadband, wireline voice and wireless to small businesses under the Comcast Business brand and enterprise solutions to medium-sized and larger multi-site customers[20], and in 2026 it added a T-Mobile MVNO to extend its business mobile capabilities[35]. Within the content business, Media runs television and streaming as one combined operation, monetizing NBC, Telemundo and Peacock content through advertising and distribution fees (including Peacock subscriptions), with costs dominated by sports rights and programming amortization[21][36]; Studios monetizes through content licensing (including internal licensing to Media, eliminated on consolidation), theatrical release and home entertainment, with 2025 revenue of $11.29 billion[37]; and Theme Parks monetizes through tickets and in-park food, beverage and merchandise, with annual passes recognized on a straight-line basis, generating $9.84 billion of 2025 revenue[38][24]. Universal Beijing Resort is a consolidated variable interest entity that carried $3.7 billion of its own debt at June 30, 2026[39].

Financial History and Current Position

The annual record shows three years of essentially flat revenue and profits distorted by one-time items. Revenue in 2025 was $123.71 billion versus $123.73 billion in 2024; operating income was $20.67 billion, down 11.3%; Adjusted EBITDA was $37.38 billion, down 1.8%; net income attributable to Comcast was $20.00 billion, up 23.5%, including the $9.4 billion pre-tax gain on Hulu, and diluted EPS was $5.39[22][25]. By segment, the connectivity business generated $80.94 billion of 2025 revenue and $32.38 billion of Adjusted EBITDA[23]; within the residential segment, domestic broadband revenue was $25.84 billion (+0.7%), domestic wireless $4.97 billion (+16.3%) and video $26.39 billion (−5.1%)[40]; and Business Services generated $10.24 billion of revenue and $5.73 billion of Adjusted EBITDA[41]. The content business generated $45.56 billion of revenue and $6.47 billion of Adjusted EBITDA, including theme-park revenue of $9.84 billion and EBITDA of $3.08 billion[24]; recast to the 2026 segment definitions, Media's 2025 Adjusted EBITDA was only $164 million and Peacock lost $1.085 billion[17], on Peacock revenue of $5.4 billion, costs of $6.5 billion and 44 million paid subscribers at year-end[42].

Cash generation in 2025 remained strong. Operating cash flow was $33.6 billion and free cash flow $19.24 billion[43][44]; capital expenditure was $8.72 billion in the connectivity business and $2.89 billion in the content business[45]; the company repurchased 205 million shares for $6.8 billion, paid $4.9 billion of dividends at an annualized $1.32 per share, and had $8.9 billion of repurchase authorization remaining at year-end[25][46]; year-end cash was $9.5 billion and debt $98.9 billion[43]. Customer counts kept shrinking: in 2025 domestic broadband customers fell by 711,000 to 31.255 million, wireless lines rose by 1.479 million to 9.305 million, and video customers fell by 1.253 million to 11.270 million[30]; on the recast basis, residential broadband lost 654,000 customers for the year, with quarterly losses of 183,000, 201,000, 91,000 and 178,000[47].

The first half of 2026 is the new post-Versant basis. First-quarter revenue was $31.46 billion, up 10.9% pro forma, Adjusted EBITDA was $7.93 billion, down 8.8% pro forma, and adjusted EPS was $0.79[48], with the quarter including $1.42 billion of Milan Cortina Olympics revenue and $758 million from the Super Bowl[16]. Second-quarter revenue was $29.94 billion, down 1.2% on a GAAP basis and up 4.7% pro forma; Adjusted EBITDA was $8.90 billion, down 5.3% pro forma; adjusted EPS was $1.04, operating cash flow $8.09 billion and free cash flow $4.60 billion[2]. Second-quarter Adjusted EBITDA by segment was $6.448 billion for residential (−8.0%, a 37.7% margin, down 160 basis points)[5], $1.516 billion for Business Services (+5.0%, a 56.7% margin)[49], $708 million for Media (+3.7%), $202 million for Studios and $609 million for Theme Parks (−5.1%)[50].

First-half cash went mainly to debt reduction. Operating cash flow was $14.98 billion, capital expenditure $5.25 billion and free cash flow $8.51 billion[51][52]; debt repayments were $7.34 billion, including the early purchase of $4.1 billion of notes maturing between January 2027 and June 2029[53][54]; repurchases were $2.51 billion, dividends $2.43 billion and net cash transferred to Versant $750 million[51]. At June 30 cash was $7.66 billion and book debt $90.38 billion ($6.12 billion current and $84.26 billion noncurrent)[55]. Because of the planned NBCUniversal spin-off, repurchases have been suspended since the start of the third quarter of 2026 while the $1.32 annualized dividend is maintained[56]; in July the company also agreed to acquire the ITV Media & Entertainment business for total consideration of up to £1.6 billion, including £1.2 billion in cash, with closing expected in the second half of 2027[53].

Operating Model

The revenue drivers can be written out by segment. In the connectivity business, residential revenue = domestic broadband (customers × ARPU) + domestic wireless (paid lines × monthly rate + device sales) + international connectivity + video (customers × rate) + advertising and other, and Business Services revenue = small-business connectivity + enterprise solutions[40][20]. In the content business, Media revenue = domestic advertising + domestic distribution (distributor rates × subscribers + Peacock subscriptions) + international networks and other, Studios revenue = content licensing + theatrical + other, and theme-park revenue = attendance × per-capita spending[21][37][38]. Customer acquisition is seasonal: the second quarter typically shows net customer-relationship losses because of factors such as college students leaving, while advertising moves with sports events and political cycles[57].

The key to profit is that most residential-segment costs are fixed in the short run. Residential expenses are dominated by video programming ($3.698 billion in the second quarter, down 7.5%, falling with video customers), direct product costs ($7.576 billion in 2025, up 14.7%, rising with wireless lines), marketing and customer service, so nearly every dollar of change in broadband revenue falls through to segment Adjusted EBITDA[5][33][13]; the Business Services margin is about 56%[49]. Media's costs are dominated by sports rights and programming amortization, and NBA rights are amortized on the game schedule, with the first quarter carrying roughly 50% of the games and therefore the peak cost, so quarterly Media and Peacock profit mostly reflects the calendar rather than the trend[58][36]; Peacock lost $1.085 billion in 2025 and earned $189 million in the second quarter of 2026[17][15]. Theme-park costs are mainly labor and maintenance, largely fixed within a quarter, so revenue changes enter EBITDA in amplified proportion[18]. At the consolidated level, depreciation and amortization, interest and tax are deducted to reach net income, and 2025 diluted EPS was $5.39[22].

The cash equation is free cash flow = operating cash flow − capital expenditure − capitalized software and intangibles; in the second quarter of 2026 those were $8.09 billion, $2.90 billion and $587 million, leaving free cash flow of $4.60 billion[52]. Capital expenditure is concentrated in the connectivity business on scalable infrastructure, line extensions and customer premise equipment, and in 2026 it will continue to fund capacity and the symmetrical multigigabit upgrade[34]. The priority order for cash is debt repayment, capital expenditure, investment opportunities and shareholder returns: on the first-quarter call management reported net leverage of 2.3 times, said leverage would tick up as Versant exits the trailing calculation, and reiterated the intention to return to 2.3 times[59]; repurchases are paused through the separation so that both companies can carry favorable investment-grade balance sheets[9]. Working capital is affected by deferred revenue from events such as the Olympics and by the timing of sports-rights payments, with about 36% of programming and production obligations due after five years[36].

Industry and Competitive Position

US residential broadband is a market under attack from three sides. Comcast faces fiber builds by telecom companies such as AT&T and Verizon, 5G fixed wireless from AT&T, T-Mobile and Verizon, and emerging satellite broadband[60][61]; management estimated that fiber overlaps about 55% of its footprint[62], and in September said overbuild had accelerated from 2%-3% a year to 4%-5%, with some fiber rivals selling a gigabit for $30-40 a month at prices the CFO called "irrational"[6]. The 10-Q acknowledges that customer-relationship additions continue to be negatively affected by an increasingly competitive environment[63]. The company's response is network and product positioning: about 60% of residential customers can get multigigabit downstream speeds and DOCSIS 4.0 is bringing symmetrical multigigabit[31], second-quarter downstream traffic grew about 10% while upstream grew two and a half times as fast[64]; wireless offloads about 90% of traffic to Wi-Fi and is sold into the existing base at lower acquisition cost[65], supported by both the Verizon and T-Mobile MVNOs[35]. Convergence ARPA is roughly $85, which management says is about half the level reported by telecom competitors[66][12].

In business services, media and experiences the company's position differs by business. In Business Services, advanced solutions attached to each dollar of connectivity sold have risen from about 20 cents three years ago to about 70 cents, with growth led by larger customers' complex connectivity, security and managed-services needs, while competition in the small-business market remains elevated[35]. In media, the company owns the NBC and Telemundo broadcast networks and multiyear sports rights for the NBA, the NFL, the Olympics and the English Premier League[36]; Peacock had 48 million paid subscribers at June 30, 2026, up from 41 million a year earlier[67], but the 10-K states plainly that linear network subscribers and ratings will keep declining and that the company aims to mitigate this over time through Peacock subscriber and advertising growth[24]. In film, second-quarter theatrical revenue rose on releases including The Super Mario Galaxy Movie[68]; in theme parks, the May 2025 opening of Epic Universe lifted Orlando revenue while Hollywood revenue fell[69]. The limits of these comparisons are that the company does not disclose broadband ARPU, convergence ARPA, free-line conversion rates or theme-park attendance in tables, so those figures come only from spoken remarks on earnings calls; and the segments were recast from 2026, moving Xumo into the residential segment and the regional sports networks out of Media, so prior-year quarterly bases come from the March 2026 recast schedule[70][71].

Core Debates

One year into the broadband pivot, does the third quarter deliver the promised stabilization in ARPU and margin even as subscriber losses worsen?

This debate matters because domestic broadband is the profit and cash pillar that stays with Comcast after the separation. Domestic broadband revenue was $25.84 billion in 2025[40]; in mid-2025 the company deliberately skipped a rate increase, migrated customers to lower simplified price points and gave away a free wireless line for one year[23], at the cost of second-quarter 2026 domestic broadband revenue of $6.28 billion, down 5.5%, and residential Adjusted EBITDA of $6.448 billion, down 8.0%[5], with broadband ARPU down 3.8% and Connectivity & Platforms EBITDA down 5.8%[4]. Management's position is that trends show "modest improvements starting in the third quarter" as the early go-to-market spending enters the base and free lines convert to paid in greater volumes[4], so the third quarter is the first test of that commitment and will decide whether the market accepts the "give up price now, repair later" logic.

The evidence for improvement comes from customers and product mix. Residential broadband lost 167,000 customers in the second quarter, 34,000 fewer than a year earlier[3][12]; the first quarter lost 65,000, an improvement of 117,000 year over year and the first such improvement since the fourth quarter of 2020[48]; about 45% of the base is now on gigabit-plus tiers and net promoter score improved again year over year[4]; and management says a "significant majority" of the early roll-off cohort has converted from free to paid[14]. The evidence against is just as specific: on September 9 the CFO said third-quarter losses would not improve year over year because "irrational" fiber pricing that appeared in the second quarter has continued into the third and overbuild has accelerated to 4%-5% a year[6], and the prior-year quarter's 91,000 loss was the best quarter of 2025, so the comparison is not easy[47]. The optimistic reading holds that the narrowing ARPU and EBITDA declines are structural and the worse losses are seasonal and competitive noise; the cautious reading worries that the company must keep giving up price to hold customers, pushing ARPU improvement into 2027.

The financial transmission is direct: broadband customers and ARPU determine domestic broadband revenue, while network, customer service and support costs are fixed in the short run and marketing and customer-experience spending is a cost the company chose to add for the pivot (marketing and promotion was $1.311 billion in the second quarter, up 5.0%), so changes in broadband revenue fall almost entirely through to residential Adjusted EBITDA[5][13]. What to watch in the third quarter: whether net losses stay within 120,000 and management maintains the "full-year improvement" statement; whether the ARPU decline narrows from −3.8% to within −3% and domestic broadband revenue stops falling sequentially from $6.28 billion; whether the residential EBITDA decline narrows from −8% to within −6% and the margin holds 37.5%; and whether management puts a dollar amount and timeline on the "cost transformation" program[5][6]. The falsifiers are an ARPU decline widening beyond 4% or the improvement being pushed to 2027, or losses above 150,000 accompanied by another price cut or an extended free-line offer.

Do the free wireless lines actually convert into paid revenue when they roll off?

Wireless is the other half of the broadband pivot, and it decides whether the segment's EBITDA repair has a growth engine. In the second quarter of 2026 wireless added a record 448,000 lines for a total of 10.187 million[3], but roughly half of residential postpaid phone connects came from free lines, wireless service revenue was $1.007 billion, up only 14.2%, convergence revenue was $7.287 billion, still down 3.2%, and convergence ARPA fell 1.5%[5][12]. Management says a "significant majority" of the early roll-off cohort has converted to paid[14] and that free lines should convert into paying relationships in greater volumes[4], so the third quarter is the first period in which that claim can be checked against revenue.

The supporting evidence is the quality of line growth. The first and second quarters delivered back-to-back record net additions of 435,000 and 448,000 lines[48][3]; about one-third of second-quarter connects came from existing mobile customers adding a line, and premium plans exceeded 30% of sell-in[14]; and about 90% of traffic is offloaded to Wi-Fi, which keeps the MVNO cost structure manageable[65]. The doubting evidence sits in costs and disclosure: the company does not split paid from free lines or give a numeric conversion rate; direct product costs rose 14.7% in 2025[33] and were $1.992 billion in the second quarter, still up 8.9%, which shows that every new line brings cost first[13]; and although convergence ARPA of roughly $85 is only half the telecom peers' level, that "headroom" can only be realized through paid conversion[66].

The transmission equation is wireless service revenue = paid lines × monthly rate per line; free lines converting to paid raise service revenue and convergence ARPA directly, while line growth brings MVNO access and device costs into the segment's direct product costs, so incremental EBITDA depends on the paid conversion rate and Wi-Fi offload[13][65]. What to watch in the third quarter: whether wireless service revenue growth accelerates from 14.2% to above 16%; whether the convergence revenue decline narrows from −3.2% to within −2.5% and convergence ARPA turns positive year over year; whether net line additions hold above 400,000 and management discloses a specific conversion rate; and whether direct product cost growth runs below service revenue growth[5][13]. The falsifiers are heavy churn of expiring free lines with net additions falling below 300,000, or service revenue growth still below 10% during the roll-off peak.

Is Peacock's first profitable quarter a durable inflection after six years of investment, or a one-quarter artifact of the World Cup and NBA playoffs?

The Media segment is the profit core of the post-separation NBCUniversal, and Peacock is the only variable that can turn Media from linear decline to growth. Peacock generated $5.4 billion of revenue against $6.5 billion of costs in 2025[42] and lost $1.085 billion for the year on the recast basis[17]; in the second quarter of 2026 it produced $1.9 billion of revenue and $189 million of Adjusted EBITDA on 48 million paid subscribers, versus $1.2 billion of revenue and a $101 million loss a year earlier[15]. Management has stated that profitability will keep improving annually but will vary quarter by quarter[7]. The third quarter is the NBA off-season and holds only the World Cup final; if Peacock stays profitable and Media EBITDA rises well above the $247 million of the third quarter of 2025[17], scale is covering content costs, and if not, the market will read the second quarter as an event windfall.

The supporting evidence is the speed of scaling. Second-quarter Peacock revenue grew 54%, distribution revenue grew more than 50%, paid subscribers rose 7 million year over year and 2 million sequentially, and advertising revenue grew nearly 70%[72]; excluding the Olympics, the Super Bowl and the World Cup, Media revenue was $5.25 billion, still up 15.6%[16]; and on the first-quarter call management explained that NBA costs peaked in the first quarter, with pressure easing in later quarters[58]. The doubting evidence sits in events and comparisons: the second quarter included $440 million of incremental World Cup revenue and the NBA playoffs[16][72], neither of which is largely present in the third; Peacock lost $217 million in the third quarter of 2025, so base profitability in a quarter without events is unproven[17]; and the 10-K states plainly that linear subscribers and ratings will keep declining, with Peacock the only mitigation[24].

In transmission terms, Peacock subscriber and advertising revenue converts almost entirely into Media EBITDA because content costs such as sports rights are amortized on the schedule and fixed within the quarter[36][58]; the third quarter has the lowest NBA amortization but no World Cup uplift, so the year-over-year change in Media EBITDA mainly reflects Peacock's subscriber and advertising scale. What to watch in the third quarter: whether Peacock Adjusted EBITDA stays positive and paid subscribers hold 47 million; whether Media Adjusted EBITDA rises from $247 million in the third quarter of 2025 to above $400 million[17]; whether domestic advertising growth excluding events stays in double digits and how much the NFL season start and political advertising contribute; and whether there is new language on the post-separation NBCUniversal capital structure and Peacock content investment[27]. The falsifiers are Peacock returning to a loss in a quarter without major events, or subscribers falling below 46 million.

A year after Epic Universe opened, is Orlando's softness a temporary consumer wobble or the peak of the new-park effect?

Theme parks are the highest-margin and most capital-intensive business inside the post-separation NBCUniversal, with 2025 revenue of $9.84 billion and Adjusted EBITDA of $3.08 billion[24]. After Epic Universe opened in May 2025[69], segment EBITDA surged to $940 million in the third quarter of 2025[17]; but in the second quarter of 2026 revenue was $2.413 billion, up only 2.7%, operating expenses were $1.805 billion, up 5.7%, and Adjusted EBITDA was $609 million, down 5.1%[18], and management said Orlando attendance softened from June and remained pressured into the third quarter, while Hollywood will not see a more meaningful improvement until the new Fast & Furious roller coaster opens[8]. The third quarter is both peak summer and the first year-over-year comparison against a full Epic summer, and the result will shape how the market views the return cadence of this long-cycle investment.

Management explains the softness as temporary: the Orlando issue is essentially weaker attendance, driven by softer consumer sentiment and higher travel costs weighing on demand[73], and the second-quarter EBITDA decline came mainly from the Osaka park under China-related travel restrictions while the US parks still grew[8]. The counter-evidence is in costs: second-quarter operating expenses grew 5.7%, faster than the 2.7% revenue growth, which shows that costs have already entered the base of a fully operating Epic[18], and quarterly segment operating expenses in 2025 rose from $1.463 billion to $1.874 billion across the year[74]; first-quarter revenue of $2.331 billion, up 24.2%, and EBITDA of $551 million, up 33.3%, show that the deceleration happened within a single quarter[75]. Two readings follow: if third-quarter revenue is flat year over year and EBITDA holds above $850 million, the softness is a consumer wobble; if EBITDA falls below $800 million and management stops describing it as temporary, the Epic uplift should be treated as fully reflected.

The transmission equation is revenue = attendance × per-capita spending, with operating expenses mainly labor and maintenance that are largely fixed within a quarter, so year-over-year revenue changes enter segment Adjusted EBITDA in amplified proportion, and second-quarter revenue of +2.7% against expenses of +5.7% already produced EBITDA of −5.1%[18][38]. What to watch in the third quarter: whether segment revenue holds flat year over year and EBITDA holds $850 million; whether management confirms that Orlando attendance stabilized from August and whether pressure at Osaka and Beijing widens; whether operating expense growth falls back below revenue growth; and the opening date of the Hollywood Fast & Furious coaster[8][17]. The falsifiers are segment EBITDA below $800 million with management reframing the weakness as structural, or international park revenue declines widening to double digits.

Risks and Falsifiers

The first risk is separation execution. The tax-free spin-off of NBCUniversal and Sky is expected to complete in mid-2027 and requires final board approval, tax opinions, regulatory approvals and financing arrangements[29][27], and the 10-Q risk factor states that unmet conditions and external factors such as equity and debt market conditions could delay the spin-off or prevent it from occurring at all[76]. The exposed lines are shareholder returns and the balance sheet: the company repurchased $6.8 billion of stock in 2025[25] and $2.51 billion in the first half of 2026[51], and repurchases have been suspended since the third quarter[56]; first-half debt repayments were $7.34 billion[51], book debt at June 30 was $90.38 billion[55], and management's priority is for both companies to hold favorable investment-grade ratings[9]. The falsifier is the company publishing the separation's capital structure and dividend policy framework in the third quarter with the timeline still at mid-2027.

The second risk is a Business Services slowdown. Business Services is the only steadily growing segment left in the post-separation Comcast, with 2025 revenue of $10.24 billion, Adjusted EBITDA of $5.73 billion and a margin of about 56%[41]; but the second quarter's 3.7% revenue growth and 5.0% EBITDA growth included a non-recurring benefit from a long-term fiber lease renewal, underlying growth was just under 3%, and small-business competition remains elevated[35][49]. Each percentage point of lower growth is worth roughly $100 million of annual revenue, and if enterprise solutions slow, the retained Comcast's growth story is left with wireless alone. The falsifier is third-quarter segment revenue growth of at least 3% with an EBITDA margin of at least 56%.

The third risk is a fiber price war that extends the discounting cycle. Fiber rivals are selling a gigabit for $30-40 a month and overbuild is entering the footprint at 4%-5% a year[6], and on the second-quarter call management already called some promotional behavior "irrational" and said it assumes the market will become increasingly competitive[61]. The exposed line is broadband ARPU: on roughly $6.3 billion of quarterly broadband revenue, each extra percentage point of ARPU decline is worth about $63 million of revenue and nearly the same amount of segment EBITDA[5], against full-year 2025 broadband revenue of $25.84 billion[40]. The falsifier is a third-quarter ARPU decline narrowing to within 3% with management no longer describing promotions as "irrational".

The fourth risk is free-line conversion falling short of the description. If the roll-off conversion rate is lower than management describes[14], the company may extend offers or cut plan prices to retain customers, slowing wireless service revenue while MVNO access fees are still paid[12]. The exposed lines are wireless service revenue (about $1 billion a quarter, where each 5 points of lower growth is worth about $50 million)[5] and direct product costs (about $2 billion a quarter, tied to line count rather than paid status)[13]. The falsifier is third-quarter wireless service revenue growth of at least 16% with direct product cost growth below service revenue growth.

The fifth risk is linear decline outrunning Peacock's scaling. Multiyear sports rights for the NBA, the NFL, the Olympics and the English Premier League make up the substantial majority of programming and production obligations and cannot be cut, with about 36% of payments due after five years[36], while linear subscribers and ratings keep declining[24], so Media EBITDA repeatedly turns negative in event-heavy quarters: on the recast basis it was only $164 million for all of 2025, with a $872 million loss in the fourth quarter[17]. The falsifier is third-quarter Media Adjusted EBITDA of at least $400 million with Peacock remaining profitable.

The sixth risk is theme parks continuing to slide against a high base. If consumer sentiment and travel-cost pressure persist and Orlando attendance keeps weakening against a high base[73], and the external constraints at Osaka and Beijing do not lift[8], theme-park EBITDA falls in amplified proportion under fixed costs: segment EBITDA was $940 million in the third quarter of 2025[17], so each 5% of revenue decline (about $136 million) falls almost fully through to EBITDA when costs are fixed, and the Beijing park carries a further $3.7 billion of consolidated debt[39]. The falsifier is third-quarter segment revenue at least flat year over year with EBITDA of at least $850 million.

What to Watch Next

The following list compresses the four core debates and two cross-cutting risks into items that can be checked one by one on October 22; every baseline is a disclosed figure from the second quarter of 2026 or the third quarter of 2025.

• Broadband pivot, domestic residential broadband net adds: baseline is a 167,000 loss in Q2 2026 and a 91,000 loss in Q3 2025; watch the size of the third-quarter loss and whether the "full-year improvement" statement holds; a loss within 120,000 confirms, above 150,000 with another price concession falsifies.
• Broadband pivot, broadband ARPU and domestic broadband revenue: baseline is ARPU −3.8% and revenue of $6.28 billion; watch whether the ARPU decline narrows and revenue stops falling sequentially; narrowing to within 3% confirms, widening beyond 4% or improvement deferred to 2027 falsifies.
• Broadband pivot, residential Adjusted EBITDA: baseline is $6.448 billion, −8.0%, at a 37.7% margin; watch the decline, the margin and the size and timeline of the "cost transformation" program; narrowing to within 6% with the margin holding 37.5% confirms.
• Wireless conversion, wireless service and convergence revenue: baseline is $1.007 billion (+14.2%) and $7.287 billion (−3.2%); watch whether service growth accelerates and convergence ARPA turns positive year over year; growth above 16% and above direct product cost growth confirms, growth still below 10% at the roll-off peak falsifies.
• Wireless conversion, net line additions: baseline is 448,000; watch whether additions hold above 400,000 and whether a conversion rate is disclosed; a fall below 300,000 falsifies.
• Peacock, Peacock Adjusted EBITDA and paid subscribers: baseline is $189 million and 48 million; watch whether it stays profitable in a quarter without major events; profit with subscribers at 47 million or more confirms, a return to loss or subscribers below 46 million falsifies.
• Peacock, Media segment Adjusted EBITDA: baseline is $708 million in Q2 2026 and $247 million in Q3 2025; watch the year-over-year gain and advertising growth excluding events; $400 million or more confirms.
• Theme parks, segment revenue, operating expenses and Adjusted EBITDA: baseline is $2.413 billion, $1.805 billion and $609 million, with Q3 2025 EBITDA of $940 million; watch whether revenue holds flat, expense growth falls below revenue growth and Orlando stabilizes from August; EBITDA of $850 million or more confirms, below $800 million with a structural reframing falsifies.
• Separation and capital allocation, capital structure, dividend policy and buybacks: baseline is repurchases paused since July 1 and June-end debt of $90.38 billion; watch whether a capital-structure framework for the two companies is published; a published framework with the timeline still at mid-2027 confirms.
• Business Services, segment revenue growth and margin: baseline is +3.7% (just under 3% excluding the one-time item) and a 56.7% margin; watch underlying growth excluding the one-time item; revenue growth of 3% or more with a margin of 56% or more confirms.

Conclusion

Comcast's business is driven by two very different curves: the connectivity business earns its profit from broadband customers multiplied by ARPU plus paid wireless lines, while the content business relies on Peacock scaling to offset linear decline and on theme-park attendance amplifying profit over fixed costs. The current financial position is flat revenue with still-abundant cash: 2025 revenue was $123.71 billion[22] and free cash flow $19.24 billion[44], first-half 2026 free cash flow was $8.51 billion[52] and debt repayment $7.34 billion[51], but second-quarter domestic broadband revenue fell 5.5% and residential EBITDA fell 8.0%[5]. The central unresolved relationship is "give up price now, repair later": the company has traded ARPU and margin for narrower subscriber losses and wireless line growth, the third quarter is the first test of management's promised "modest improvements"[4], and the CFO has already signaled that the losses themselves will not improve year over year[6].

Outside interpretations published after the results center on this relationship and disagree with one another. Broadband Breakfast's September 9 report on the Goldman Sachs conference relayed two analyst judgments: KeyBanc's Brandon Nispel wrote that if losses keep worsening, Comcast would have to hold off on rate hikes or offer lower prices, and investors fear a spiral of falling ARPU and falling subscribers; Goldman's Michael Ng agreed that the company can sell mobile bundles to more of its broadband subscribers, with converged-account ARPA of about $85 leaving room to raise rates[6]. TheStreet's September 12 article quoted MoffettNathanson's Craig Moffett from a July note: broadband subscriber trends clearly need to improve, but the improvement cannot come solely from cutting prices, the goal is not to "lose less," and certainly not to "lose less" when the cost of the price reductions exceeds the benefit to net additions; still, turnarounds must start somewhere, and a little optimism is not unreasonable[77]. Where the three overlap is in moving the yardstick from "did losses improve" to "is the cost of the ARPU concession smaller than the retention benefit," which is exactly why the broadband debate uses ARPU year over year, sequential broadband revenue and segment EBITDA year over year as its main tests; where they differ, Nispel stresses the downside spiral, Ng stresses the wireless upside, and Moffett offers conditional, cautious optimism rather than an endorsement. These are outside interpretations, not facts and not a vote.

The combination that would materially strengthen the current understanding is a third-quarter ARPU decline within 3% and a residential EBITDA decline within 6%, together with wireless service revenue growth above 16% and above direct product cost growth, Peacock staying profitable in a quarter without major events with Media EBITDA above $400 million, theme-park EBITDA holding $850 million, and the company publishing the separation's capital-structure framework. The combination that would materially weaken it is losses above 150,000 with another price concession, an ARPU decline widening beyond 4% or improvement pushed to 2027, wireless service revenue growth still below 10% at the roll-off peak, Peacock returning to a loss, and theme-park EBITDA falling below $800 million with management reframing the weakness as structural. Anything in between would defer the verdict on "give up price now, repair later" by another quarter rather than deliver it.

Sources

[1] Drillr earnings calendar · CMCSA earnings call scheduled 2026-10-22 (calendar last updated 2026-09-22); Comcast press release 2026-09-15 confirms the third-quarter call on Thursday, October 22, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. ET · 2026-09-22 · Drillr earnings calendar / Comcast press release

[2] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-07-23 · 2Q26 consolidated results and highlights · 2026-07-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049274/ex991-6302026.htm

[3] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-07-23 · 2Q26 Connectivity & Platforms segment results and customer metrics · 2026-07-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049274/ex991-6302026.htm

[4] CMCSA 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · CFO on ARPU, EBITDA and third-quarter improvement · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[5] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-07-23 · 2Q26 Residential Connectivity & Platforms detail · 2026-07-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049274/ex991-6302026.htm

[6] Broadband Breakfast 2026-09-09 · Comcast Expecting More Broadband Losses Than Last Year for Q3 · 2026-09-09 · Broadband Breakfast · https://broadbandbreakfast.com/comcast-expecting-more-broadband-losses-than-last-year-for-q3/

[7] CMCSA 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · Peacock profitability will vary by quarter · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[8] CMCSA 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · theme parks softness in Orlando, Osaka and Hollywood · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[9] CMCSA 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · separation timing, balance sheet and buyback pause · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[10] Zacks CMCSA earnings calendar (accessed 2026-09-22) · Sep 2026 quarter consensus EPS · 2026-09-22 · Zacks Investment Research · https://www.zacks.com/stock/research/CMCSA/earnings-calendar

[11] Drillr earnings calendar (updated 2026-09-22) · CMCSA 2026-10-22 call and 3Q26 estimates · 2026-09-22 · Drillr earning_call_calendar · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[12] CMCSA 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · convergence ARPA, wireless mix and free-line conversion · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[13] CMCSA 10-Q filed 2026-07-23 · 2Q26 Connectivity & Platforms cost lines · 2026-07-23 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049360/cmcsa-20260630.htm

[14] CMCSA 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · wireless lifecycle, premium sell-in and free-line roll-off · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[15] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-07-23 · 2Q26 Media detail and Peacock profitability · 2026-07-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049274/ex991-6302026.htm

[16] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-07-23 · Media revenue excluding Olympics, Super Bowl and FIFA World Cup · 2026-07-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049274/ex991-6302026.htm

[17] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-03-16 · recast 2024-2025 quarterly Adjusted EBITDA by segment · 2026-03-16 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026017950/trendingscheduleasrevisedo.htm

[18] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-07-23 · 2Q26 Theme Parks results · 2026-07-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049274/ex991-6302026.htm

[19] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · business overview and segments · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[20] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · Business Services Connectivity description · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[21] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · Media segment composition · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[22] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · FY2025 consolidated operating results · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[23] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · FY2025 Connectivity & Platforms results and outlook · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[24] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · FY2025 Content & Experiences results and Media outlook · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[25] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · 2025 capital returns, Hulu sale and Versant separation · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[26] CMCSA 10-Q filed 2026-07-23 · Versant separation mechanics and Sky Germany sale · 2026-07-23 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049360/cmcsa-20260630.htm

[27] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-06-29 · announcement of NBCUniversal and Sky spin-off · 2026-06-29 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000095010326009591/dp249094_ex9901.htm

[28] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-06-29 · leadership of the two companies · 2026-06-29 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000095010326009591/dp249094_ex9901.htm

[29] CMCSA 10-Q filed 2026-07-23 · overview, Versant, Sky Germany and NBCUniversal spin-off timing · 2026-07-23 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049360/cmcsa-20260630.htm

[30] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · FY2025 customer metrics and penetration · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[31] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · network evolution and DOCSIS 4.0 · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[32] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · residential broadband and wireless offerings · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[33] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · FY2025 Connectivity & Platforms cost structure · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[34] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · FY2025 capital expenditures and 2026 focus · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[35] CMCSA 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · business services one-time item and enterprise mix · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[36] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · debt maturity profile and sports-rights obligations · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[37] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · FY2025 Studios results · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[38] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · Theme Parks revenue recognition · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[39] CMCSA 10-Q filed 2026-07-23 · Universal Beijing Resort consolidated VIE and debt · 2026-07-23 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049360/cmcsa-20260630.htm

[40] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · FY2025 Residential Connectivity & Platforms revenue lines · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[41] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · FY2025 Business Services Connectivity results · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[42] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · FY2025 Peacock revenue, costs and subscribers · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[43] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · FY2025 cash flow, cash and debt · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[44] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-03-16 · 2024-2025 quarterly free cash flow, capital returns and Adjusted EPS · 2026-03-16 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026017950/trendingscheduleasrevisedo.htm

[45] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-03-16 · 2024-2025 quarterly capital expenditures · 2026-03-16 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026017950/trendingscheduleasrevisedo.htm

[46] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · share repurchase authorization and dividend · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[47] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-03-16 · recast 2024-2025 quarterly customer metrics · 2026-03-16 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026017950/trendingscheduleasrevisedo.htm

[48] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-04-23 · 1Q26 consolidated results and highlights · 2026-04-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026026685/ex991-3312026.htm

[49] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-07-23 · 2Q26 Business Services Connectivity results · 2026-07-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049274/ex991-6302026.htm

[50] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-07-23 · 2Q26 Content & Experiences segment results · 2026-07-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049274/ex991-6302026.htm

[51] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-07-23 · 1H26 cash flow statement · 2026-07-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049274/ex991-6302026.htm

[52] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-07-23 · 2Q26 Adjusted EBITDA and free cash flow reconciliation · 2026-07-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049274/ex991-6302026.htm

[53] CMCSA 10-Q filed 2026-07-23 · 1H26 liquidity, debt repayments and ITV agreement · 2026-07-23 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049360/cmcsa-20260630.htm

[54] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-06-03 · results of senior-note tender offers · 2026-06-03 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000095010326008429/dp247907_ex9901.htm

[55] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-07-23 · 2Q26 condensed balance sheet · 2026-07-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049274/ex991-6302026.htm

[56] CMCSA 10-Q filed 2026-07-23 · buyback suspension and dividend · 2026-07-23 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049360/cmcsa-20260630.htm

[57] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · seasonality of customer additions and advertising · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[58] CMCSA 1Q26 earnings call 2026-04-23 · NBA amortization seasonality and Peacock path · 2026-04-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[59] CMCSA 1Q26 earnings call 2026-04-23 · leverage target and capital returns · 2026-04-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[60] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · broadband competition · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[61] CMCSA 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · competitive environment and Starlink · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[62] CMCSA 1Q26 earnings call 2026-04-23 · fiber overlap of the footprint · 2026-04-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[63] CMCSA 10-Q filed 2026-07-23 · Connectivity & Platforms operating priorities · 2026-07-23 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049360/cmcsa-20260630.htm

[64] CMCSA 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · broadband traffic growth and network roadmap · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[65] CMCSA 1Q26 earnings call 2026-04-23 · wireless economics, Wi-Fi offload and premium mix · 2026-04-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[66] CMCSA 1Q26 earnings call 2026-04-23 · convergence ARPA framing · 2026-04-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[67] CMCSA 10-Q filed 2026-07-23 · Peacock revenue, costs and paid subscribers · 2026-07-23 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049360/cmcsa-20260630.htm

[68] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-07-23 · 2Q26 Studios detail · 2026-07-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049274/ex991-6302026.htm

[69] CMCSA 10-K filed 2026-02-03 · FY2025 Theme Parks results and revenue model · 2026-02-03 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm

[70] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-07-23 · pro forma basis and 2026 segment recast notes · 2026-07-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049274/ex991-6302026.htm

[71] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-03-16 · recast 2024-2025 quarterly revenue by segment (pro forma ex-Versant) · 2026-03-16 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026017950/trendingscheduleasrevisedo.htm

[72] CMCSA 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · Peacock profitability drivers · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[73] CMCSA 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · management on Orlando attendance softness · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[74] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-03-16 · recast 2024-2025 quarterly costs by segment · 2026-03-16 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026017950/trendingscheduleasrevisedo.htm

[75] CMCSA 8-K filed 2026-04-23 · 1Q26 Theme Parks results · 2026-04-23 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026026685/ex991-3312026.htm

[76] CMCSA 10-Q filed 2026-07-23 · risk factor on the NBCUniversal spin-off · 2026-07-23 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026049360/cmcsa-20260630.htm

[77] TheStreet via Yahoo Finance 2026-09-12 · Comcast CFO warns of a rising threat as internet customers depart · 2026-09-12 · TheStreet (via Yahoo Finance) · https://finance.yahoo.com/technology/articles/comcast-cfo-sends-stern-warning-193700479.html