[UAL] United Airlines: Q3 2026 earnings preview, can fares recapture jet fuel costs

United Airlines, one of the three large US network carriers flying passengers and cargo through hubs such as Chicago, Denver, Houston, Newark and San Francisco, will hold its earnings call on 2026-10-21 to report results for the third quarter of 2026, ending September 30, 2026[1]. The Q3 2026 earnings preview starts from a second quarter in which total revenue rose 16.0% to $17.67 billion and total revenue per available seat mile (TRASM) rose 12.1%, while the average fuel price climbed to $4.19 a gallon and adjusted diluted EPS came in at only $1.99[2]; fuel expense jumped 84.1% to $5.11 billion[3], and adjusted EPS a year earlier had been $3.87[4]. On July 15 the company guided third-quarter adjusted diluted EPS to $2.50-$3.50 and full-year adjusted diluted EPS to $9.00-$11.00, a range built on an all-in fuel price of about $3.69 a gallon taken from the Gulf Coast jet forward curve as of July 14, and it said it would recover 80% to 90% of the fuel increase in the third quarter[5]. The consensus field in the Drillr earnings calendar, updated September 24, shows third-quarter EPS of $2.837 and revenue of $17.752 billion without stating whether the EPS figure is adjusted; the same source had a second-quarter estimate of $1.915 against the $1.99 in adjusted EPS the company actually reported[1].

Three things matter most in the coming report. The first is fuel recapture: the company recovered only about half of its fuel increase in the second quarter[2], and Fortune reported on September 18 that jet fuel was about $4.71 a gallon, well above the $3.69 used in guidance[6], so whether EPS lands in the range depends first on fuel, while a recapture rate of 80% to 90% is the direct test of fare pass-through. The second is where unit revenue comes from: the company said third-quarter TRASM growth would exceed the second quarter's 12.1%[5], but second-quarter premium revenue growth of 16%[2] no longer outpaced passenger revenue growth of 16.4%[3], so the third-quarter cabin breakdown will show whether growth is structural or a fuel-driven increase across every cabin. The third is unit cost and cash: second-quarter unit cost excluding fuel and special items (CASM-ex) rose 6.1%[7], free cash flow was only $322 million and net leverage rose from 2.0x to 2.2x[4], and with the company cutting flights while still taking new aircraft, third-quarter cost and cash figures will show whether its deleveraging plan is on track.

Company Background and Business Structure

United Airlines is a full-service carrier built around a hub network, and its holding company, United Airlines Holdings, Inc., is based in Chicago; it was formerly United Continental Holdings and changed its name in 2019. The company operates across six continents through United mainline and regional partner carriers, with hubs at Chicago O'Hare, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Newark, San Francisco, Washington Dulles and Guam, and it is a member of Star Alliance, the world's largest airline alliance[8]. In 2025 it carried 181 million passengers and ended the year with 113,200 employees[9].

United reports a single operating segment, earns almost all of its revenue from passengers and relies on its loyalty program as the second major source. Its chief operating decision maker assesses performance and allocates resources on consolidated net income[8]; in 2025 passenger revenue was $53.438 billion, about 90% of total revenue of $59.070 billion, with cargo revenue of $1.779 billion and other operating revenue of $3.853 billion[10]. Most other operating revenue comes from selling MileagePlus miles to partners such as Chase, which contributed $3.2 billion in 2025; members redeemed about 10.9 million award tickets that year, roughly 10.3% of United's revenue passenger miles[11].

Passenger revenue is split by region and cabin, with the domestic market the largest and international flying divided among the Atlantic, Pacific and Latin America. In the second quarter of 2026 domestic passenger revenue rose 20.3% to $9.506 billion and international passenger revenue rose 11.2% to $6.594 billion, including $3.424 billion from the Atlantic, $1.788 billion from the Pacific and $1.382 billion from Latin America[7]. Travelers pay before they fly, so the company first books advance ticket sales and recognizes revenue at travel; advance ticket sales increased by $570 million in 2025[12]. The regional network depends on partner carriers, and at the end of the second quarter United had 175 50-seat regional aircraft and 1,122 mainline aircraft[13].

Financial History and Current Position

United's revenue grew from 2023 to 2025, but operating income fell back in 2025. Total revenue rose from $53.717 billion in 2023 to $57.063 billion in 2024 and $59.070 billion in 2025; operating income rose from $4.211 billion to $5.096 billion and then fell to $4.713 billion, while 2025 net income was $3.353 billion and diluted EPS was $10.20, up from $9.45 in 2024[10]. Available seat miles (ASMs) grew 6.1% in 2025 while passenger revenue per available seat mile (PRASM) fell 2.9%[14], and the weaker unit revenue was offset mainly by a lower fuel price of $2.44 a gallon, down from $2.65 in 2024[9].

Cash flow in 2025 covered aircraft investment and some debt reduction, although operating cash flow fell from 2024. Operating cash flow was $8.431 billion in 2025, below $9.445 billion in 2024, and capital expenditures were $5.874 billion; the company paid $4.8 billion of debt, finance leases and other financial liabilities during the year, including a $1.52 billion prepayment of its MileagePlus senior secured notes[12]. Labor and fuel are the two largest costs, at $17.647 billion and $11.396 billion in 2025[10], with fuel equal to 21% of total operating expense[15].

In the first quarter of 2026 higher fuel prices had not yet overwhelmed revenue growth, and profit improved year over year. First-quarter revenue was $14.608 billion, up from $13.213 billion a year earlier, fuel expense rose from $2.701 billion to $3.041 billion, operating income was $997 million, net income was $699 million and diluted EPS was $2.14; operating cash flow was $4.799 billion, capital expenditures were $1.672 billion, and unrestricted cash and short-term investments reached $14.2 billion at March 31, up from $12.2 billion at the end of 2025[16]. PRASM rose 7.4% in the quarter[17].

In the second quarter of 2026 the rise in fuel cost exceeded the revenue gain, and operating income fell year over year. Revenue rose 16.0% to $17.672 billion, fuel expense rose from $2.775 billion to $5.110 billion, operating income fell 17.3% from $1.325 billion to $1.096 billion, and net income was $805 million, or $2.46 per diluted share, including a $145 million special credit[3]. Excluding special items, adjusted pre-tax income was $843 million, for a 4.8% margin against 11.0% a year earlier, and adjusted EPS was $1.99; at June 30 debt, finance leases and other financial liabilities totaled $26.464 billion, cash was $10.166 billion and short-term investments were $6.471 billion, adjusted net debt was $18.105 billion and net leverage was 2.2x[4], with available liquidity of $19.6 billion[2].

Operating Model

United's revenue can be broken into capacity times unit revenue, and unit revenue depends on fares, cabin mix and stage length. In the second quarter ASMs were 87.279 billion, up 3.5%, TRASM was 20.25 cents, up 12.1%, yield rose 12.1%, the load factor was 83.4% and the average stage length was 3.2% shorter[7]. Higher fares and a larger premium share lift yield and passenger revenue in the same quarter, while shorter stage length mechanically raises revenue per seat mile, which is part of the unit-revenue improvement. Fare changes lag because of booking lead times: Fortune reported the CFO saying 35% of fourth-quarter tickets were already sold, and those fares cannot be raised retroactively[6].

Operating income equals revenue minus fuel and non-fuel costs, and fuel hits the income statement in full in the same period while fare pass-through takes several quarters. The company does not hedge fuel, and its annual report says a one-dollar change in the price of a barrel of jet fuel would change 2026 fuel expense by about $116 million[15]; second-quarter fuel expense rose $2.335 billion while total revenue rose only $2.436 billion, so operating income fell from $1.325 billion to $1.096 billion[3]. On the first-quarter call in April, management laid out a recapture path of 40% to 50% of the fuel increase in the second quarter, 70% to 80% in the third and 85% to 100% by the fourth[18]; in July it raised the third-quarter target to 80% to 90%, set the fourth-quarter target at 100% and said it would accrue $135 million to $220 million of profit sharing in the third quarter[5]. Non-fuel costs are mainly labor, airport fees, maintenance, regional capacity purchase and distribution, and when capacity growth slows, fixed costs are spread over fewer seat miles and CASM-ex rises.

Cash flow is driven by advance ticket sales, mileage sales and capital spending that is mostly aircraft deliveries. Bookings build up advance ticket sales in the first half and release them as passengers fly in the second half; in the first half of 2026 operating cash flow was $6.409 billion, GAAP capital expenditures were $3.015 billion and second-quarter free cash flow on the company's definition was $322 million[4]. The company guided 2026 adjusted total capital expenditures to about $7.5 billion[5], and management targets free cash flow conversion of 50% through the mid-2020s rising to 75% by the end of the decade, with net leverage below 2x by 2027[19].

Industry and Competitive Position

United and Delta form the margin-leading "brand-loyal" group built on premium cabins and loyalty programs, and management argues that the fuel shock will widen their lead over weaker rivals. The company says the second quarter was its 14th consecutive quarter flying the most available seat miles among large US carriers and that its local market share in seven hubs has risen 7 percentage points since 2019. On the second-quarter call CEO Scott Kirby said four of the eight publicly traded US commercial airlines would probably lose money this year[20], and he attributed about 90% of recent fare increases to industry-wide cost resets in labor, maintenance and airport fees and only 10% to capacity adjustments[19]; that is management's judgment, not a verified industry fact.

Competitive limits come from other network carriers, low-cost carriers and hub capacity caps, and the available material does not support a systematic peer financial comparison. The FAA has extended flight caps at Chicago O'Hare and Newark through 2027 and runway construction is restricting San Francisco, which holds back domestic capacity growth at high-demand hubs; corporate travel is still 5 percentage points below its pre-COVID share of load factor[19]. In mid-September American Airlines, United and Southwest all said they were cutting their least profitable marginal routes[6], which suggests industry capacity may shrink together under high fuel prices, but peer unit-cost and margin data fall outside this comparison.

Core Debates

Can fare increases outrun jet fuel in the third quarter, lifting fuel-cost recapture from about half in the second quarter to the promised 80%–90%?

This debate decides whether third-quarter profit can recover, because fuel is United's second-largest cost and it is completely unhedged. Fuel expense was $11.396 billion in 2025, or 21% of total operating expense, and the company's strategy is not to hedge fuel[15]; the second-quarter 2026 average price of $4.19 a gallon was up 79.4% year over year[7], and fuel expense rose 84.1%[3]. At July 14 prices the company said full-year fuel expense would be nearly $6 billion above its expectation at the start of the year[2], so the recovery of profit depends on how fast fares catch up.

Current evidence shows pass-through is accelerating, but there are two explanations for why. First-quarter PRASM rose only 7.4%[17], second-quarter TRASM and yield both rose 12.1%[7], the company said TRASM growth in both the third and fourth quarters would exceed the second quarter's[5], and management said fourth-quarter yield was currently tracking 19% higher year over year[19]. The alternative explanation is that part of the unit-revenue gain comes from cutting flights and a 3.2% shorter average stage length, so fares could give back gains once fuel falls and the industry restores capacity; Kirby's claim that 90% comes from cost resets is management's position and has not been verified by data.

The numeric baselines for this debate are the second quarter's $4.19-a-gallon fuel price, 12.1% TRASM growth, fuel recapture of about 50% and adjusted EPS of $1.99. The transmission runs from jet fuel prices into fuel expense in full and in the same period, from fares and cabin mix into yield and TRASM, from capacity cuts into firmer fares but higher unit costs, and from revenue gains minus fuel increases into the recapture rate, which finally sets adjusted pre-tax income and EPS. The company disclosed that fuel increases since the start of July had already added $575 million of third-quarter cost, or $1.12 of adjusted EPS[5], and Fortune reported fuel at about $4.71 a gallon in mid-September[6], so whether third-quarter EPS lands in the guided range is first a question of whether the fuel assumption holds.

What remains unresolved is whether fare increases hold when fuel falls. The third-quarter report needs to show the gap between the actual fuel price and the $3.69 assumption, whether TRASM growth exceeds 12.1% along with domestic and international PRASM, the disclosed third-quarter recapture rate and fourth-quarter guidance, and whether third-quarter ASM growth stays within the flat to roughly 2% plan given on the first-quarter call[18]. If fuel stays above the assumption, the judgment should rest on the recapture rate rather than on EPS; if TRASM growth slows while capacity does not grow, pricing momentum is fading, which would weaken the current pass-through view.

Can premium-cabin and MileagePlus revenue again outgrow total passenger revenue, showing that growth is structural rather than a fuel-driven across-the-board fare increase?

This debate bears on how much of the fare increase survives once fuel falls, because management treats premium and loyalty revenue as its stabilizers through the cycle. The company positions itself as a "brand-loyal airline" on the grounds that these two revenue streams hold up better when the industry is volatile; mileage partner revenue was $3.2 billion in 2025, up from $2.9 billion in 2024[11]. If these streams again lead total passenger revenue, the risk of fares giving back gains after fuel falls is smaller.

Every revenue line grew in the second quarter, but premium revenue no longer led, and growth looked more like an across-the-board fare increase. Premium revenue rose 16%, Basic Economy 11%, loyalty 11%, cargo 23% and contracted business revenue 27%, and economy-cabin unit revenue rose 12%[2]; new co-brand card accounts rose 22% and card spend rose 14%[19]. Passenger revenue grew 16.4% in the same quarter[3], essentially matching premium revenue, whereas in the first quarter premium revenue rose 13.6% on 4.4% more capacity and loyalty revenue rose 13%[18]. The alternative explanation is that the structural advantage remains but is temporarily masked by fuel-driven fare increases in every cabin, and the third-quarter cabin breakdown can separate the two explanations.

The numeric baselines for this debate are second-quarter premium revenue growth of 16% and loyalty revenue growth of 11% (more than 13% excluding a one-time out-of-period adjustment)[19], plus other operating revenue of $1.045 billion, up 7.7%[3]. The transmission runs from new 787 and A321XLR cabins, which add premium seats, together with business travel into premium revenue and PRASM; from co-brand card sign-ups and spending into mileage sales, which are deferred and then recognized in other operating revenue; and from a larger premium and loyalty share into lower sensitivity of revenue to the fare cycle and narrower margin swings. The fleet plan shows 787s rising from 88 at the end of the second quarter to 100 at year-end and A321neo/XLR aircraft rising from 71 to 88[13].

What remains unresolved is how large the structural part of growth is, and when and on what terms the Chase co-brand agreement will be renewed. The third-quarter report needs to show the gap between premium and passenger revenue growth, loyalty revenue growth and any further one-time adjustments, other operating revenue growth, and the timing and terms of a card renewal; management said the current contract is in its sunset phase but gave no renewal timeline[19]. Weaker renewal terms would hit other operating revenue directly, and because corporate travel remains 5 percentage points below pre-COVID levels, slower growth would hurt high-fare demand first; either outcome would weaken the structural-growth view.

Can United cut flying, keep taking new aircraft and still deleverage, or will unit costs, free cash flow and leverage keep deteriorating in the third quarter?

This debate decides whether the company's medium-term margin and credit-rating goals hold, because fleet renewal needs sustained capital spending while fuel squeezes cash headroom. Management reaffirmed double-digit pre-tax margins for 2027 and mid-teens pre-tax margins over the long term, and said it expects to reach an investment-grade credit rating by the end of 2026[19]. With fuel depressing trailing-twelve-month EBITDAR, room on leverage and cash flow has narrowed, so whether the rating goal arrives on time depends on third-quarter cash performance.

Unit costs, cash flow and leverage all weakened in the second quarter, and the company used new financing as a buffer. Second-quarter CASM-ex rose 6.1%[7], labor costs rose 6.2% and distribution expense rose 32.3%[3]; operating cash flow was $1.609 billion, $608 million less than the $2.217 billion a year earlier, adjusted capital expenditures were $1.448 billion, free cash flow on the company's definition was $322 million and net leverage was 2.2x against 2.0x a year earlier[4]. During the quarter United raised $3.7 billion of new liquidity in private bank transactions, prepaid about $1 billion of higher-cost debt since the start of the second quarter and ended with $19.6 billion of available liquidity[2]. The alternative explanation is that higher leverage is mainly a temporary result of fuel depressing EBITDAR, so cash flow will repair itself once fuel recapture reaches 100% and the delivery schedule is not itself the problem.

The numeric baselines for this debate are second-quarter CASM-ex growth of 6.1%, 1,122 mainline aircraft, quarterly free cash flow of $322 million and net leverage of 2.2x. The fleet plan shows mainline aircraft rising to 1,145 by the end of the third quarter and 1,173 by year-end[13], and free cash flow for the twelve months to June 30 was $2.493 billion against $4.333 billion a year earlier[4]. At the end of 2025 the company held firm orders including 150 787s and 167 737 MAX 10s[21], and by the end of March 2026 it had 78 remaining firm 737 MAX 9 orders, 55 of them expected in the last nine months of 2026[22]. The transmission runs from slower capacity into weaker fixed-cost absorption, higher CASM-ex and lower operating income; from aircraft deliveries into higher capital spending and thinner free cash flow; from fuel-depressed EBITDAR plus new financing into higher net leverage; and from new-aircraft seats and fuel efficiency into lower unit costs in later quarters.

What remains unresolved is whether the cost benefits of new aircraft arrive before the leverage target. The third-quarter report needs to show CASM-ex growth alongside capacity growth, operating cash flow, capital spending and free cash flow, the mainline fleet count at quarter-end and any updated year-end plan, and net leverage and rating agency actions; management guided 2027 CASM-ex growth of 2% to 3%[19]. Delivery delays would postpone the cost gains from new aircraft, and if high fuel turns free cash flow negative the investment-grade goal would slip; either outcome would weaken the current view.

Risks and Falsifiers

Hub capacity limits and operational disruption hold back United's capacity growth in high-demand markets. The FAA has extended flight caps at O'Hare and Newark through 2027 and runway construction at San Francisco reduces arrival rates until October 2026[19], all at domestic hubs located in large business and population centers[8]; disruptions such as air traffic control equipment failures also bring cancellations and compensation costs, exposing passenger revenue and operating expense. This risk would be falsified if the FAA eased the O'Hare or Newark caps and third-quarter cancellation rates stayed at the second quarter's historically low level.

Unfinished labor negotiations are the main upside risk to non-fuel unit costs. Labor cost $17.647 billion in 2025 and is the company's largest expense[10]; at the end of 2025 the IAM-represented fleet service (16,789 employees) and passenger service (11,493 employees) contracts had become amendable in May 2025, and the contract for 10,599 IBT-represented technicians had become amendable in December 2024[23]. Flight attendants ratified a new agreement in May 2026 whose costs are included in full-year guidance[19], and raises in the remaining new contracts will enter CASM-ex in the quarter they take effect. This risk would be falsified if the remaining union contracts were signed at cost levels already in guidance and third-quarter CASM-ex growth did not exceed 6.1%.

Fuel staying above the guidance assumption while fare pass-through lags is the most direct risk to third-quarter profit. The company does not hedge, a one-dollar change in the price of a barrel of jet fuel changes 2026 fuel expense by about $116 million[15], and full-year fuel expense is already nearly $6 billion above the start-of-year expectation[2], exposing fuel expense and adjusted pre-tax income. This risk would be falsified if the third-quarter report showed fuel recapture of 80% to 90% and adjusted EPS within the $2.50-$3.50 range[5].

Uncertain renewal terms for the Chase co-brand agreement threaten the company's most stable revenue source through the fuel cycle. Mileage partner revenue was $3.2 billion in 2025, recorded mainly in other operating revenue[11]; management said the current contract is in its sunset phase but gave no renewal timeline[19]. This risk would be falsified if the company disclosed a renewal with economics no worse than the current contract, or if third-quarter loyalty revenue growth stayed above 13%.

Aircraft delivery delays would disrupt fleet renewal and postpone unit-cost improvement. The company guided 2026 adjusted total capital expenditures to about $7.5 billion[5], the first 737 MAX 10 delivery has slipped to mid-to-late 2027, and United plans to retire at least 80 older, less fuel-efficient aircraft in 2027[19], exposing capital spending, maintenance cost and CASM-ex. This risk would be falsified if the mainline fleet reached 1,145 aircraft at the end of the third quarter and the 1,173 year-end plan stayed unchanged[13].

What to Watch Next

• Fuel pass-through, recapture and fuel price: the second quarter recovered about 50% of the fuel increase at $4.19 a gallon[2]. Watch the actual third-quarter fuel price against the $3.69 assumption and the disclosed recapture rate; recapture of 80% to 90% confirms the view, while recapture below 80% with fuel above the assumption weakens it.
• Fuel pass-through, TRASM and capacity: second-quarter TRASM rose 12.1% on 3.5% more ASMs[7]. Watch TRASM growth, domestic and international PRASM and whether ASM growth stays within flat to about 2%; TRASM growth above 12.1% confirms the view, while slowing TRASM without added capacity falsifies it.
• Premium and loyalty, growth gap: second-quarter premium revenue rose 16% against 16.4% for passenger revenue[3]. Watch the cabin breakdown, loyalty revenue growth and other operating revenue; premium and loyalty leading again confirms the view, while matching or trailing passenger revenue weakens it.
• Premium and loyalty, Chase renewal: mileage partner revenue was $3.2 billion in 2025[11]. Watch the renewal timing and economics; terms no worse than the current contract confirm the view, while weaker terms falsify it.
• Fleet, cost and cash, CASM-ex, free cash flow and leverage: second-quarter CASM-ex rose 6.1%, free cash flow was $322 million and net leverage was 2.2x[4]. CASM-ex growth no higher than 6.1% with falling leverage confirms the view, while negative free cash flow weakens it.
• Fleet, cost and cash, mainline fleet count: 1,122 aircraft at the end of the second quarter, with 1,145 planned for the end of the third[13]. Reaching 1,145 with the 1,173 year-end plan unchanged confirms the view, while further delays weaken it.

Conclusion

United's profit now depends first on how fast fares catch up with jet fuel, and only then on its premium and loyalty mix and the pace of fleet investment. Second-quarter revenue rose 16.0% and TRASM rose 12.1%, but fuel expense rose 84.1%, operating income fell 17.3% and the adjusted pre-tax margin dropped from 11.0% to 4.8%[3][4]; at the same time the company is funding about $7.5 billion of adjusted capital spending in 2026 with $19.6 billion of available liquidity and 2.2x net leverage[2][5]. The central unresolved relationship is whether higher fares are a cost reset that can hold after fuel falls, or a temporary effect that depends on shrinking capacity.

Two outside analyses published after the second-quarter results both focus on fuel pass-through but stress different things. Wiltone Asuncion of TIKR argued that the midpoint of third-quarter EPS guidance sat below the Street mainly because it used a single day's forward curve from July 14, while realized second-quarter fuel averaged $4.19; he treated Kirby's 90%/10% split as management's case, and said the test for the third quarter is whether recapture reaches 80% to 90% and unit revenue growth exceeds 12.1%[20]. Mia Osmonbekov of Fortune reported on September 18 that jet fuel had climbed to about $4.71 a gallon, that United CFO Mike Leskinen said the airline would fly fewer flights in December and could cut further next year if costs stay high, that 35% of fourth-quarter tickets were already booked, and that Bureau of Labor Statistics data showed August airfares up 23.4% year over year[6]. Both accept that fares are rising but differ on the source: TIKR warns the increase may owe more to capacity cuts, while the route cuts Fortune documents show the company relying on both fewer flights and higher fares, which bears on the fuel pass-through debate and, because slower capacity lifts CASM-ex, on the fleet and cash debate as well. These are outside interpretations, not facts, and they are not a vote on the outcome.

The combination that would materially strengthen the current understanding is third-quarter fuel recapture of 80% to 90% and TRASM growth above 12.1%, together with premium and loyalty revenue again outgrowing passenger revenue, CASM-ex growth no higher than 6.1% and falling net leverage. Conversely, if recapture misses while TRASM slows, premium revenue keeps pace with every other cabin rather than leading, and free cash flow turns negative under high fuel, the current reading of a structural fare reset and on-schedule deleveraging would be clearly weakened.

Sources

[1] Drillr earnings calendar (updated 2026-09-24) · UAL 2026-10-21 call and 3Q26 estimates · 2026-09-24 · Drillr earning_call_calendar · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[2] UAL 8-K filed 2026-07-15 · 2Q26 earnings release highlights · 2026-07-15 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100517/000010051726000135/ual_erx06302026xex991.htm

[3] UAL 8-K filed 2026-07-15 · 2Q26 statement of operations · 2026-07-15 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100517/000010051726000135/ual_erx06302026xex991.htm

[4] UAL 8-K filed 2026-07-15 · 2Q26 non-GAAP earnings, capex, free cash flow and leverage · 2026-07-15 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100517/000010051726000135/ual_erx06302026xex991.htm

[5] UAL 8-K filed 2026-07-15 · Investor Update 3Q26 and FY2026 guidance · 2026-07-15 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100517/000010051726000135/ual_erx06302026xex992.htm

[6] Fortune 2026-09-18 · American, United and Southwest are all cutting 'marginal routes' as jet fuel prices spike · 2026-09-18 · Fortune · https://fortune.com/2026/09/18/airlines-cut-least-profitable-flights-jet-fuel/

[7] UAL 8-K filed 2026-07-15 · 2Q26 passenger revenue by region and operating statistics · 2026-07-15 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100517/000010051726000135/ual_erx06302026xex991.htm

[8] UAL 10-K filed 2026-02-12 · hubs, alliances and single operating segment · 2026-02-12 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000100517&type=10-K

[9] UAL 10-K filed 2026-02-12 · FY2025 operating statistics · 2026-02-12 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000100517&type=10-K

[10] UAL 10-K filed 2026-02-12 · FY2025 statement of consolidated operations · 2026-02-12 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000100517&type=10-K

[11] UAL 10-K filed 2026-02-12 · MileagePlus and Chase co-brand revenue · 2026-02-12 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000100517&type=10-K

[12] UAL 10-K filed 2026-02-12 · FY2025 cash flows and debt repayment · 2026-02-12 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000100517&type=10-K

[13] UAL 8-K filed 2026-07-15 · Investor Update fleet plan · 2026-07-15 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100517/000010051726000135/ual_erx06302026xex992.htm

[14] UAL 10-K filed 2026-02-12 · FY2025 passenger revenue by region · 2026-02-12 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000100517&type=10-K

[15] UAL 10-K filed 2026-02-12 · fuel purchasing, no hedging and price sensitivity · 2026-02-12 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000100517&type=10-K

[16] UAL 10-Q filed 2026-04-22 · 1Q26 statement of operations and cash flow · 2026-04-22 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000100517&type=10-Q

[17] UAL 10-Q filed 2026-04-22 · 1Q26 passenger revenue by region · 2026-04-22 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000100517&type=10-Q

[18] UAL 1Q26 earnings call 2026-04-22 · Drillr structured summary · 2026-04-22 · earnings-call · https://ir.united.com/

[19] UAL 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-16 · Drillr structured summary · 2026-07-16 · earnings-call · https://ir.united.com/

[20] TIKR 2026-07-24 · United Airlines Guided Q3 Below the Street. The Fuel Price Behind It Came From One Day's Curve · 2026-07-24 · TIKR · https://www.tikr.com/blog/united-airlines-guided-q3-below-the-street-the-fuel-price-behind-it-came-from-one-days-curve

[21] UAL 10-K filed 2026-02-12 · firm aircraft commitments · 2026-02-12 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000100517&type=10-K

[22] UAL 10-Q filed 2026-04-22 · aircraft commitments as of March 31, 2026 · 2026-04-22 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000100517&type=10-Q

[23] UAL 10-K filed 2026-02-12 · represented employee groups and amendable dates · 2026-02-12 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000100517&type=10-K