[ARGX] argenx: Q3 2026 Earnings Test for VYVGART Growth in Seronegative gMG

argenx is an antibody-engineering immunology company whose entire product revenue comes from VYVGART, a neonatal Fc receptor (FcRn) blocker for generalized myasthenia gravis (gMG) and chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy (CIDP)[1]. The company is scheduled to report the third quarter of 2026, ending September 30, 2026, on 2026-10-22[2], and this argenx Q3 2026 earnings preview centers on whether VYVGART growth holds. In the latest disclosed quarter, the second quarter of 2026, product net sales were $1.516 billion, up 60% year over year and 17% sequentially, with operating profit of $494 million and diluted EPS of $7.32[3]. Management gave no numeric guidance; on the July 23 call it said the rest of 2026 should follow a consistent quarterly growth trajectory in line with prior years, and that net pricing per patient should stay stable, with the rising share of the pre-filled syringe (PFS) lifting gross-to-net only slightly and gradually, offset by higher treatment adherence[4]. Drillr's earnings calendar, updated July 29, lists a third-quarter consensus of $7.27 in EPS and $1.861 billion in revenue, but the same calendar put second-quarter revenue at $1.630 billion, so its revenue field may be defined differently from the company's $1.516 billion of product net sales; the basis of the $1.861 billion figure cannot be verified and should be read with caution[5].

Three things matter most in the third-quarter report. The first is whether global and U.S. sales keep growing sequentially: part of the second quarter's 17% sequential gain came from a seasonally low first-quarter base of $1.298 billion[6], while the third quarter is the first full selling quarter after the seronegative gMG approval, so whether global sales reach at least $1.668 billion (up 10% sequentially) will show whether the new indication and the PFS are adding patients or only restoring a seasonal dip. The second is underlying growth outside the U.S.: $25 million of Japan's $102 million in second-quarter sales was a one-time benefit from a distribution model change[7], so Japan's reported figure may fall sequentially in the third quarter, and only a comparison with the roughly $77 million underlying level shows whether markets outside the U.S. are still reducing dependence on a single market. The third is margin and cash after the acquisition: argenx agreed to buy Forte Biosciences for $77 per share in cash, a total equity value of about $2.2 billion[8], and closed the deal on August 27[9], while R&D spending is still accelerating behind the second quarter's 32.6% operating margin; whether third-quarter operating profit stays above $540 million and cash plus current financial assets at the end of September stay at or above $3.3 billion determines whether margin expansion and room for further deals can coexist.

Company Background and Business Structure

argenx is an immunology company that has grown from a research company into a single-product commercial company built on antibody engineering. Founded in 2008, it is headquartered in Amsterdam, runs most of its research and operations in Belgium, and is dual-listed on Euronext Brussels and Nasdaq; its first marketed drug, efgartigimod, is the first approved FcRn blocker and treats autoimmune disease by lowering pathogenic IgG autoantibodies in the blood[1]. Under its Vision 2030, the company aims to treat 50,000 patients globally, and in 2025 it treated about 19,000 patients across three indications and three product presentations[10]; the call also reiterated goals of 10 labeled indications and 5 late-stage pipeline molecules by 2030[11].

The company reports a single operating segment, and all product revenue comes from the VYVGART franchise: intravenous VYVGART and subcutaneous VYVGART Hytrulo[1]. The subcutaneous form uses Halozyme's ENHANZE hyaluronidase technology under an exclusive license for the FcRn target[12]; a pre-filled syringe for patient self-injection has been available in the U.S. since April 2025[10], and an autoinjector presentation is scheduled for a 2027 launch[4]. Approved indications are gMG (covering all serotypes in the U.S. since May 2026)[13], CIDP, and immune thrombocytopenia (ITP) in Japan under the VYVDURA brand[1]. In the U.S., argenx's own sales force promotes to neurologists and supplies product through specialty distributors and specialty pharmacies; in China, partner Zai Lab commercializes the drug and argenx recognizes only its product supply revenue.

The U.S. is by far the main market, and both manufacturing and the pipeline revolve around the same molecule. Of 2025 product net sales of $4.151 billion, the U.S. contributed $3.534 billion, or about 85%, Japan $207 million, the rest of the world $343 million, and supply to China $68 million[14]. argenx owns no plants: Lonza produces drug substance at sites in the U.K., the U.S., Singapore and Switzerland, Fujifilm does so in Denmark and in 2025 expanded the partnership to North Carolina, and contract manufacturers also handle fill, packaging and distribution[15]. In the pipeline, efgartigimod's Phase 3 study in ocular myasthenia gravis (oMG) met its primary endpoint[16], the ALKIVIA Phase 3 study in myositis met its primary endpoint in August 2026[17], the registrational study of complement C2 antibody empasiprubart in multifocal motor neuropathy (MMN) is due to read out in the fourth quarter of 2026[18], and the Forte acquisition completed in August added the anti-CD122 antibody FB102[8].

Financial History and Current Position

Over the past three years argenx has turned from a loss-making research company into a profitable commercial one. Product net sales rose from $1.191 billion in 2023 to $2.186 billion in 2024 and $4.151 billion in 2025[14], a 90% increase in 2025[19]; in the third quarter of 2025, VYVGART sales passed $1 billion in a single quarter for the first time[10]. Operating results swung from a $21.65 million loss in 2024 to a $1.054 billion profit in 2025, with 2025 net profit of $1.292 billion and diluted EPS of $19.57; that year, cost of sales was $451 million, R&D $1.364 billion and SG&A $1.367 billion[19].

The first two quarters of 2026 kept growth high, and margins rose with scale. First-quarter product net sales were $1.298 billion, up 64% year over year, with operating profit of $394 million and net profit of $366 million[6]; second-quarter product net sales were $1.516 billion, up 60% year over year and 17% sequentially, with cost of sales of $145 million, R&D of $486 million, SG&A of $417 million, operating profit of $494 million (32.6% of product net sales) and net profit of $472 million[3]. For the half year ended June 30, product net sales were $2.813 billion, including $2.380 billion in the U.S., $169 million in Japan, $17 million in China and $247 million in the rest of the world[20].

Cash flow lags profit, but the balance sheet is strong enough to fund both expansion and acquisitions. Operating cash flow was $685 million in 2025, year-end cash and cash equivalents were $3.5 billion, and trade receivables rose from $904 million to $1.647 billion[21]; with current financial assets, the total was $4.4 billion[2]. In the first half of 2026, operating cash flow was $651 million against operating profit of $887 million[22], and cash, cash equivalents and current financial assets rose to $5.2 billion at June 30[2]; in the third quarter, the company used cash on hand to complete the Forte acquisition, valued at about $2.2 billion in equity[8]. At the end of 2025 argenx had 1,863 employees, 1,090 in SG&A and 773 in R&D[23].

Operating Model

argenx's revenue can be written as patients on treatment times dose per patient times net price per unit. Neurologists prescribe the drug, U.S. supply runs through specialty distributors and specialty pharmacies, and revenue is recognized when control passes to the customer; net price equals gross price minus rebates to government and commercial payers, chargebacks, distributor fees, co-pay assistance and returns, all accrued as estimates[24]. New patient starts and adherence therefore push product net sales in the same direction with almost no lag, while a higher gross-to-net pushes net price per patient the other way; because the company does not disclose its gross-to-net rate, that effect can only be inferred from net sales growth and management commentary[4]. Other operating income, mainly R&D tax incentives, was $26 million in the second quarter and is not product revenue[3].

Operating profit is driven mainly by two expense lines rather than by production costs. Operating profit equals product net sales plus other operating income, minus cost of sales, R&D and SG&A; cost of sales covers purchases of drug substance and drug product from contract manufacturers plus royalties to Halozyme, and it was 10.9% of product net sales in 2025[19] and 9.6% in the second quarter of 2026[3]. R&D rises as Phase 3 trials run and new molecules enter the clinic, SG&A rises with new-indication launches and global commercialization, and the annual report states plainly that both will keep increasing[25]. As long as revenue grows faster than expenses, operating margin expands, which is how it rose from 25.4% for full-year 2025 to 32.6% in the second quarter of 2026.

Operating cash flow lags operating profit, mostly because of working capital. As revenue grows, receivables and prepayments rise with it: in the first half of 2026, receivables increased by $377 million, prepaid expenses by $244 million and income taxes paid were $127 million, so $887 million of operating profit became only $651 million of operating cash flow[22]. Because manufacturing is outsourced, capital spending is small; the company carries no interest-bearing debt, and cash goes mainly to R&D, business development deals and milestone payments, with the Forte acquisition, which had no financing condition and was funded entirely from cash on hand, the largest such use[8].

Several limits of this model need to stay in view. The company reports one operating segment and does not split revenue between gMG and CIDP[7], nor does it disclose quarterly patient counts; country sales appear only in half-year and annual reports, quarterly U.S., Japan and rest-of-world figures come from the earnings call, the second-quarter U.S. figure of about $1.273 billion is derived from the half-year country data and the call's regional figures, and first-quarter regional figures are derived by subtracting the second quarter from the half year[20]. For the third quarter of 2025, the record only confirms that quarterly sales first passed $1 billion, with no exact figure, so a year-over-year base for the third quarter is not usable; sequential change is the main test, adjusted for the seasonally weak first quarter[10]. The accounting treatment of Forte and the actual net payment after shares argenx already held before closing have not yet been disclosed.

Industry and Competitive Position

argenx created the FcRn blocker class and still leads the gMG biologics market. Management says that despite several competitors entering, 4 of 5 physicians rank VYVGART as their first-choice biologic, and the seronegative approval produced a halo effect that lifted prescribing in seropositive patients as well[26]. In CIDP, Phase 4 data showed that 87% of patients successfully switched from intravenous immunoglobulin (IVIG), the long-standing standard of care, to VYVGART[11]; management also acknowledged that changing physicians' habit of choosing IVIG first in CIDP and winning payer coverage for earlier use in treatment-naive patients is a gradual process[26].

argenx's advantages come from being first, from the breadth of its label and from its delivery options, while the limit is that competitive data cannot be tracked quarterly. The annual report confirms that several FcRn inhibitors are marketed or in clinical development and that competing launches could erode future sales of existing products[27]; complement inhibitors also compete in gMG, and IVIG is the main rival in CIDP. argenx differentiates by being first to market, being the only therapy approved across all gMG serotypes[13], offering intravenous, subcutaneous and pre-filled syringe forms, and holding the exclusive ENHANZE license from Halozyme for the FcRn target, which keeps rivals from using the same technology for a subcutaneous FcRn product[12]. Public data do not show competitors' quarterly share in gMG or CIDP, so competitive erosion can only be inferred from VYVGART's own growth and from management commentary.

Core Debates

Can new patients from the pre-filled syringe and the May approval in seronegative gMG keep VYVGART's sequential growth going in the third quarter without erosion from competition and gross-to-net?

This debate decides most of argenx's third-quarter revenue direction, because VYVGART is the only commercial product, the U.S. contributes about 85% of sales[14], and MG provides most of the revenue and profit. Second-quarter global product net sales were $1.516 billion[3], of which the U.S. accounted for about $1.273 billion, derived by subtracting Japan, the rest of the world and supply to China from the global total[20]; on the call, U.S. sales were described as about $1.3 billion, up 15% sequentially[7]. The third quarter is the first full selling quarter for the seronegative indication and the next test of whether the PFS keeps bringing in new patients, while the company offers only a qualitative growth trajectory consistent with prior years[4].

The evidence for continued growth comes from patient mix and payer coverage. The second quarter was VYVGART's 18th consecutive quarter of growth, about 80% of U.S. PFS patients were new to VYVGART, the seronegative gMG approval added about 11,000 addressable U.S. patients, and commercial coverage reached 55% within 10 weeks of approval[11]; management said it is on track for 90% within 3 to 6 months and that most payers have dropped serology testing requirements[26]. The other reading is that the second quarter's 17% sequential growth partly reflects the seasonally low first-quarter base of $1.298 billion[6] and includes Japan's one-time $25 million benefit[7]; a larger PFS share will gradually raise gross-to-net, and other marketed FcRn inhibitors are competing for new patients[27].

The financial chain here is long but the lag is short. The PFS lowers the barrier to self-injection, so patients start earlier in their treatment; the seronegative approval widens the addressable population, and broader commercial coverage turns into new prescriptions; patients on treatment times net price per patient becomes U.S. product net sales, which feeds global product net sales and operating profit[24]. What remains unresolved is the price side: the company does not disclose its gross-to-net rate and management says only that net price per patient is stable[4], so whether U.S. sales growth keeps pace with patient additions is the only indirect evidence of erosion from discounts or competition.

The third-quarter report should be read for five signals: whether global product net sales reach at least $1.668 billion, a 10% sequential increase; whether U.S. sales disclosed on the call reach at least $1.400 billion; whether commercial coverage for seronegative gMG reaches 90%; whether the FDA accepts the oMG supplemental application and a PDUFA target action date is announced, after the Phase 3 ADAPT OCULUS study met its primary endpoint (p=0.012)[16]; and whether management changes how it describes competition and net price per patient. If global or U.S. sales grow less than 5% sequentially, coverage stalls below 75%, or management acknowledges an effect from competition or discounts, any one of these would weaken the case that growth can continue and would suggest the second-quarter jump came mainly from a seasonal rebound rather than patient additions from the new indication and the PFS.

Excluding Japan's one-time $25 million benefit, can markets outside the U.S. keep adding growth and reduce argenx's dependence on the U.S.?

Growth outside the U.S. determines whether argenx can spread its pricing and competitive risk beyond one market. The U.S. accounts for about 85% of VYVGART sales[14], and in the second quarter a one-time gain in Japan plus lower supply to Zai Lab made the non-U.S. total hard to read directly[7]. Non-U.S. sales totaled $243 million in the second quarter, 16.0% of the global figure and above the 14.9% share for full-year 2025; the third quarter is the first clean quarter to test that underlying base.

The supporting evidence is that underlying growth in the rest of the world and Japan remains strong. Rest-of-world sales more than doubled in 2025, from $161 million to $343 million[14], and rose 78% year over year in the first half of 2026 ($247 million versus $139 million)[20]; Japan grew 131% in 2025, and its second-quarter reported figure of $102 million falls to about $77 million after removing the $25 million one-time benefit, still above roughly $67 million in the first quarter[7]. The other reading is that Japan's sequential jump came mainly from the distribution change and that underlying growth may be much smaller than reported; supply to Zai Lab was only $17 million in the first half, about half of the $33 million a year earlier, which indicates a shrinking revenue contribution from China[20].

Non-U.S. revenue reaches global sales through three independent channels. Once countries finish pricing and reimbursement talks, new country launches and the PFS rollout add rest-of-world patients; the Japan distribution change produced a one-time gain and may change how revenue is recognized afterward; and Zai Lab's purchasing rhythm directly sets supply revenue from China[7]. What remains unresolved is where Japan's quarterly revenue base now sits after the distribution change, and whether lower Zai Lab supply reflects ordering patterns or demand, which current disclosures cannot separate.

The third-quarter report should be read for four figures: whether Japan sales are at least $77 million with no new one-time items, whether rest-of-world sales reach at least $145 million, whether supply to Zai Lab recovers above $10 million, and whether the non-U.S. share stays above 15%. Japan's reported figure may fall sequentially as the one-time gain drops out, so it should be compared with the adjusted base rather than the $102 million reported figure[7]. If Japan comes in below $77 million, rest-of-world sales decline sequentially, or the non-U.S. share falls below 14%, the non-U.S. growth came mainly from one-time items.

After stepping up Phase 3 spending and paying about $2.2 billion in cash for Forte, can argenx keep expanding its operating margin?

Whether operating margin keeps expanding decides whether argenx can sustain its pace of reinvesting revenue into the pipeline and acquisitions. The company posted its first full-year operating profit in 2025 at a 25.4% margin[19], lifted the margin to 30.4% in the first quarter of 2026[6], and reached $494 million of operating profit at a 32.6% margin in the second quarter[3]. Expense growth and the accounting for Forte decide whether margin can keep widening, and the cash balance sets the room for the next business development deal[8].

The supporting evidence is that revenue is still growing clearly faster than expenses. In the second quarter, product net sales rose 60% year over year, R&D rose 47% ($486 million versus $330 million), SG&A rose 28% ($417 million versus $325 million), and operating profit grew from $201 million to $494 million[3]; first-half operating cash flow was $651 million[22], and cash plus current financial assets rose from $4.4 billion to $5.2 billion[2]. The other reading is that R&D growth is accelerating, up about 10% sequentially from $443 million in the first quarter[6], and that FB102 development after Forte and possible acquisition accounting will weigh on third-quarter margin; operating cash flow was only 73% of operating profit as receivables and prepayments kept absorbing cash[22].

The financial chain in this debate runs from gross profit all the way to ending cash. Product net sales minus cost of sales of about 9.6% gives gross profit, and subtracting R&D and SG&A gives operating profit[3]; operating profit minus increases in receivables and prepayments and minus income taxes gives operating cash flow[22]; operating cash flow minus the Forte payment gives ending cash and current financial assets[9]. What remains unresolved is whether Forte will be capitalized or expensed in the period and how far shares held before closing reduce the actual net payment below $2.2 billion; the third-quarter cash balance will drop sharply because of the deal, which is capital deployment rather than operating deterioration, but it narrows room for further acquisitions.

The third-quarter report should be read for four signals: whether operating profit is at least $540 million with a margin of at least 32%; whether R&D stays below $560 million and Forte-related items are shown separately; whether SG&A grows no faster than product net sales; and whether cash plus current financial assets at the end of September are at least $3.3 billion. If operating profit falls sequentially without a Forte one-time item to explain it, or cash plus current financial assets drop below $3.0 billion, expenses and capital deployment are running ahead of revenue.

Risks and Falsifiers

Single-asset concentration combined with U.S. drug pricing policy is the widest exposure. All product revenue comes from VYVGART, and of $4.151 billion in 2025 product net sales, $3.534 billion came from the U.S.[14]; the annual report concedes that current indications alone cannot assure sustained profitability[25]. Under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), price negotiations for Medicare Part B drugs begin in 2026 and take effect in 2028, and the orphan drug exclusion expanded in July 2025 protects only drugs indicated solely for orphan conditions, so the protection period would shorten if VYVGART wins a non-orphan indication[28]. If the third-quarter business update and risk factors add no material statement on drug pricing policy or payer restrictions, this risk shows no sign of near-term escalation.

Clinical readout risk does not touch third-quarter revenue but shapes growth after 2027. The ALKIVIA Phase 3 myositis study met its primary endpoint in the combined immune-mediated necrotizing myopathy (IMNM) and dermatomyositis (DM) population (p=0.0011), but the DM subgroup alone did not reach statistical significance (p=0.1093)[17], and the regulatory filing path has not been disclosed; the empasiprubart MMN registrational readout is scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2026[18]. Both belong to the next wave of the company's goal of 10 indications by 2030 and affect R&D spending and future revenue sources. If the third-quarter update sets out a myositis filing plan covering both IMNM and DM and keeps the MMN readout in the fourth quarter of 2026, this risk has not grown.

Competition and gross-to-net could leave U.S. sales growing more slowly than patient numbers, and that gap cannot be observed directly. Management said new competitor launches in MG could affect market share but that it has not yet seen a meaningful impact[26]; the annual report also warns that competing launches may erode sales[27], and the company does not disclose its gross-to-net rate[24]. U.S. sales were about $1.273 billion in the second quarter, so if sequential growth slowed from 15% to below 5%, the quarter would add roughly $130 million less revenue[7]. If third-quarter U.S. sales grow at least 10% sequentially and management reaffirms stable net price per patient[4], this risk has not materialized.

Japan's one-time gain and Zai Lab's supply timing could distort non-U.S. quarterly figures and invite misreading. Of Japan's $102 million in second-quarter sales, $25 million was a one-time benefit[7], and supply to Zai Lab was $17 million in the first half, $16 million less than a year earlier[20]; Japan's reported third-quarter figure may fall sequentially once the one-time item drops out, which could look like slowing demand. If Japan's third-quarter sales are at least $77 million with no new one-time item, that misreading can be ruled out.

The Forte acquisition and a continued step-up in Phase 3 trials could let expense growth catch up with revenue growth. Second-quarter R&D was $486 million and SG&A $417 million[3], and the roughly $2.2 billion purchase price[8] equals about 42% of the $5.2 billion in cash and current financial assets at the end of the second quarter[2]; if the acquisition accounting is expensed in the period, third-quarter operating profit would show a one-time drop. If third-quarter operating profit is at least $540 million, Forte-related costs are disclosed separately and cash plus current financial assets at the end of September are at least $3.3 billion, this risk has not materialized.

What to Watch Next

• Global product net sales: $1.516 billion in the second quarter of 2026[3]; watch for at least $1.668 billion (up 10% sequentially). Sequential growth below 5% would weaken the growth case.
• U.S. product net sales: about $1.273 billion derived, about $1.3 billion on the call[7]; watch for at least $1.400 billion. Growth below 5% sequentially, or management acknowledging competitive or discount effects, would weaken it.
• Seronegative gMG commercial coverage: 55% within 10 weeks of approval[11]; watch for 90%. Stalling below 75% would weaken the case.
• oMG supplemental application: Phase 3 met its primary endpoint (p=0.012)[16]; watch for FDA acceptance and a PDUFA date, which would confirm progress.
• Japan product net sales: $102 million in the second quarter, about $77 million excluding the one-time gain[7]; below $77 million would mean growth came from one-time items.
• Rest-of-world sales and Zai Lab supply: $136 million and $5 million in the second quarter[7]; watch for at least $145 million and supply back above $10 million. A sequential decline in rest-of-world sales would weaken the case.
• Non-U.S. share: 16.0% in the second quarter; watch for a share above 15%. A drop below 14% would weaken the case.
• Operating profit and margin: $494 million and 32.6% in the second quarter[3]; watch for at least $540 million and 32%. A sequential decline without a Forte one-time explanation would weaken the case.
• R&D and SG&A: $486 million and $417 million in the second quarter[3]; watch for R&D below $560 million and SG&A growing no faster than sales.
• Cash and current financial assets: $5.2 billion at June 30[2]; watch for at least $3.3 billion at September 30. Below $3.0 billion would weaken the case.

Conclusion

argenx's business is driven by one variable: the continued growth of U.S. gMG and CIDP patients on VYVGART. Second-quarter product net sales were $1.516 billion at a 32.6% operating margin[3], and cash plus current financial assets were $5.2 billion at June 30[2], so the company has become a high-margin, cash-rich single-product commercial business. The central unresolved relationship is whether new patients from the seronegative approval and the PFS keep turning into sequential U.S. sales growth despite a slightly rising gross-to-net and competition for patients, while expense growth and the Forte deal do not absorb the margin expansion.

Two outside assessments published after the second-quarter results address these debates from different angles. In an August 18 note, Sasha Jovanovic of Simply Wall St argued that the myositis Phase 3 win adds a potential new indication to the near-term growth story but does not remove two key risks, concentration in a single asset and pricing pressure from rising gross-to-net discounts[29]; that view sits in direct contrast with management's claim of stable net price per patient and maps onto the U.S. gMG growth debate. Abigail Beaney of Clinical Trials Arena, writing on August 17, described ALKIVIA as a clinically meaningful win, citing a 15.4-point greater improvement in Total Improvement Score than placebo at 52 weeks and an 8.9% share-price rise on the day, and quoted investigators saying IMNM is the most refractory form of the disease and that meaningful improvement is genuinely difficult to achieve[30]. Both pieces view the myositis result positively and differ in emphasis: the first stresses that structural risks are unchanged, the second stresses a new growth source from expansion into rheumatology; the growth the second describes, however, only becomes revenue after approval and has no direct bearing on third-quarter sales or margin, and the company's release shows the DM subgroup alone did not reach statistical significance, leaving the regulatory path for the company to clarify[17].

The combination that would materially strengthen the current understanding is third-quarter global sales up at least 10% sequentially, U.S. sales of at least $1.400 billion, seronegative gMG commercial coverage at 90%, management reaffirming stable net price per patient, and operating profit of at least $540 million. Conversely, U.S. sales growing less than 5% sequentially, management acknowledging an effect from competition or discounts, Japan below $77 million excluding one-time items, or a sequential fall in operating profit that a Forte one-time item cannot explain would clearly weaken it.

Sources

[1] ARGX 20-F filed 2026-03-19 · approved medicines and presentations · 2026-03-19 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=20-F

[2] ARGX 6-K filed 2026-07-23 · cash position and financial calendar · 2026-07-23 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[3] ARGX 6-K filed 2026-07-23 · 2Q26 consolidated results · 2026-07-23 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[4] ARGX 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · Drillr structured summary of guidance · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[5] Drillr earnings calendar (updated 2026-07-29) · ARGX 2026-10-22 call and 3Q26 estimates · 2026-07-29 · Drillr earning_call_calendar · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[6] ARGX 6-K filed 2026-05-07 · 1Q26 consolidated results · 2026-05-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[7] ARGX 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · Drillr structured summary of product sales by region · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[8] ARGX 6-K filed 2026-07-27 · Forte Biosciences acquisition terms · 2026-07-27 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[9] ARGX 6-K filed 2026-08-27 · Forte acquisition completed · 2026-08-27 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[10] ARGX 20-F filed 2026-03-19 · 2025 overview, patients and PFS launch · 2026-03-19 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=20-F

[11] ARGX 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · Drillr structured summary of commercial highlights · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[12] ARGX 20-F filed 2026-03-19 · Halozyme ENHANZE license · 2026-03-19 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=20-F

[13] ARGX 6-K filed 2026-05-11 · FDA approval in seronegative gMG · 2026-05-11 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[14] ARGX 20-F filed 2026-03-19 · product net sales by country of sales FY2025 · 2026-03-19 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=20-F

[15] ARGX 20-F filed 2026-03-19 · manufacturing and supply through CMOs · 2026-03-19 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=20-F

[16] ARGX 6-K filed 2026-04-20 · ADAPT OCULUS results and planned oMG sBLA · 2026-04-20 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[17] ARGX 6-K filed 2026-08-17 · ALKIVIA Phase 3 topline in autoimmune myositis · 2026-08-17 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[18] ARGX 6-K filed 2026-07-23 · half year 2026 press release highlights · 2026-07-23 · 6-K · https://argenx.com/news/2026/press-release-3331862

[19] ARGX 20-F filed 2026-03-19 · consolidated statement of profit or loss FY2025 · 2026-03-19 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=20-F

[20] ARGX 6-K filed 2026-07-23 · H1 2026 product net sales by country · 2026-07-23 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[21] ARGX 20-F filed 2026-03-19 · FY2025 cash flow and cash position · 2026-03-19 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=20-F

[22] ARGX 6-K filed 2026-07-23 · H1 2026 cash flow statement · 2026-07-23 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[23] ARGX 20-F filed 2026-03-19 · employees by function · 2026-03-19 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=20-F

[24] ARGX 20-F filed 2026-03-19 · product net sales variable consideration · 2026-03-19 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=20-F

[25] ARGX 20-F filed 2026-03-19 · operating and capital expenditure requirements · 2026-03-19 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=20-F

[26] ARGX 2Q26 earnings call 2026-07-23 · Drillr structured summary of Q&A and risks · 2026-07-23 · earnings-call · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=6-K

[27] ARGX 20-F filed 2026-03-19 · competitive position · 2026-03-19 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=20-F

[28] ARGX 20-F filed 2026-03-19 · IRA negotiation and orphan drug exclusion · 2026-03-19 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001697862&type=20-F

[29] Simply Wall St via Yahoo Finance 2026-08-18 · Why argenx Is Up 11.5% After Positive Autoimmune Myositis Phase 3 Data · 2026-08-18 · Simply Wall St via Yahoo Finance · https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/why-argenx-enxtbr-argx-11-061056940.html

[30] Clinical Trials Arena 2026-08-17 · Argenx's stock rises on Phase III autoimmune myositis victory · 2026-08-17 · Clinical Trials Arena · https://www.clinicaltrialsarena.com/news/argenxs-stock-rises-on-phase-iii-autoimmune-myositis-victory/