[STX] Seagate: HDD Pricing vs. Exabyte Growth in Q1 Fiscal 2027

Seagate is a hard drive maker that earned 80% of fiscal 2026 revenue from high-capacity nearline drives sold to cloud providers, OEMs and enterprises[1]. It is scheduled to hold its earnings call on 2026-10-28 to report the first quarter of fiscal 2027, ending October 2, 2026[2]. In the latest disclosed quarter, the fiscal fourth quarter of 2026 (April to June 2026), revenue was about $3.629 billion against a $3.498 billion consensus, and EPS was $5.71 against a $5.10 consensus[2]; revenue grew about 48% year over year, with data center revenue of $2.9 billion, up 57%, and Edge IoT revenue of $697 million, up 20%[3]. On July 28, 2026, the company guided first-quarter revenue of $4.0 billion to $4.2 billion (midpoint $4.1 billion, about 56% growth) and non-GAAP EPS of $7.30 ± $0.20, with a non-GAAP operating margin of about 50% at the revenue midpoint[3]. As of September 28, 2026, the Drillr revenue consensus from 11 analysts was $4.119 billion, broadly in line with the guidance midpoint, and the non-GAAP EPS consensus from 12 analysts was $7.37, slightly above the $7.30 midpoint[4].

Three things matter most in this report. First, investors will see whether growth comes from HDD pricing or from more capacity shipped: dividing revenue by capacity shipped, average revenue per exabyte (EB) rose only about 1% in fiscal 2026[5], yet management acknowledged that first-quarter guidance implies a per-EB price increase well above its earlier mid-to-high single-digit target[3], so first-quarter revenue and shipment data can test whether pricing is actually reaching revenue per EB. Second, the report will show whether gross margin reaches the roughly 57% implied by guidance: gross margin already rose from 35.2% to 45.6% in fiscal 2026[6], and whether cost savings from the new HAMR platform can carry the part of the margin that price does not explain depends on first-quarter gross margin and the HAMR share of shipments. Third, the numbers will reveal whether the margin jump turns into cash and further debt reduction: free cash flow was about $3.105 billion in fiscal 2026[7], but accounts receivable rose from $959 million to $1.534 billion, faster than revenue[8], and first-quarter free cash flow margin and period-end debt will show whether cash kept pace with profit.

Company Background and Business Structure

Seagate is a storage company built around hard drives, with heavily vertically integrated production. It designs and manufactures hard drives and data storage solutions, with principal manufacturing facilities in China, Malaysia, Northern Ireland, Singapore, Thailand and the United States, and it integrates key components such as heads and media, expanding shipped capacity by raising areal density rather than the number of drives[9]. Fiscal 2026 had 53 weeks and ended on July 3, 2026, while fiscal 2025 and 2024 each had 52 weeks, a difference to keep in mind in year-over-year comparisons[10].

The company has a single reportable segment, but since fiscal 2026 it has disclosed revenue by two end markets, and data center now accounts for 80%. Data center, 80% of revenue (75% a year earlier), consists mainly of high-capacity nearline drives and systems sold to cloud providers, OEMs and enterprises; Edge IoT, 20% (25% a year earlier), covers consumer and client products, network-attached storage, mission-critical drives and SSDs[1]. By channel, OEMs took 81%, distributors 13% and retail 6%; by region, the Americas took 50%, Asia Pacific 40% and EMEA 10%[1]. In the fiscal fourth quarter of 2026, data center took 195 EB of the quarter's 218 EB shipped, so almost all of the company's capacity is going to data centers[3].

Seagate's customer concentration is rising, and its delivery terms increasingly resemble long-term contracts. One customer accounted for about 14% of revenue in fiscal 2026 and about 10% in fiscal 2025, while no customer exceeded 10% in fiscal 2024[11]. OEMs and hyperscale cloud operators buy under master purchase agreements, with deliveries scheduled from purchase orders and demand forecasts; for high-capacity nearline drives, the company sets longer-term demand forecasts and supply commitments with key customers, some with cancellation charges, while distributors have limited return rights and price protection[11].

Financial History and Current Position

Seagate's revenue has grown rapidly for two straight years after bottoming in fiscal 2024. Revenue rose from $6.551 billion in fiscal 2024 to $9.097 billion in fiscal 2025 and reached $12.195 billion in fiscal 2026, up about 34%[5]. Over the same year, cost of revenue rose only from $5.897 billion to $6.637 billion, gross profit climbed from $3.200 billion to $5.558 billion and gross margin rose from 35% to 46%, which the company attributed mainly to pricing actions and a shift to higher-capacity products[6].

Operating profit grew far faster than revenue, although several one-time and structural items sit below it. In fiscal 2026 product development expense was $755 million and marketing and administrative expense $577 million, plus a $105 million legal settlement charge[12]; operating income was $4.094 billion, an operating margin of about 34%, compared with about 21% in fiscal 2025[5]. Interest expense was $284 million, the loss on debt transactions was $151 million and the tax provision rose from $44 million to $506 million[5], lifting the effective tax rate from 2.91% to 13.73%, including a $422 million qualified domestic minimum top-up tax under the Pillar Two global minimum tax[13]. Net income for the year was $3.184 billion, or $13.90 per diluted share on 229 million diluted shares[5].

Cash flow and the balance sheet improved just as sharply. Operating cash flow was $3.674 billion in fiscal 2026, up from $1.083 billion; capital spending was $569 million, leaving free cash flow of about $3.105 billion, while the rise in receivables absorbed $575 million of cash[7]. Year-end cash was $1.704 billion, receivables $1.534 billion (versus $959 million), inventory $1.571 billion, and shareholders' equity swung from a deficit of $453 million to $2.167 billion[8]. The company cut debt by $1.4 billion during the year[14], ended with $3.6 billion of principal outstanding, and redeemed another $1 billion of senior notes on July 15, 2026[15].

Capital returns are increasing, and the latest quarter grew faster than the full year. Seagate paid $634 million in dividends and repurchased $176 million of shares in fiscal 2026[7]; on July 28, 2026, the board declared a quarterly dividend of $0.74 per share, and $4.8 billion of repurchase authorization remained at fiscal year-end[16]. The annual report does not break out quarters; the latest disclosed quarter, the fiscal fourth quarter of 2026 (April to June 2026), brought revenue of about $3.629 billion[2], up about 48% year over year[3].

Operating Model

Seagate's data center revenue roughly equals nearline exabytes shipped multiplied by average price per EB. Cloud providers and OEMs take delivery against forecasts under master purchase agreements and long-term supply commitments, so volumes and delivery arrangements are set by contract before production[11]. The company keeps drive units roughly flat and adds exabytes by raising areal density with heat-assisted magnetic recording (HAMR), so the ceiling on shipments is set by the pace of the technology transition, while price is set by the supply-demand gap and contract negotiations[9]. In fiscal 2026 nearline shipments rose from 497 EB to 695 EB, up 40%, while revenue rose 34%, and estimated average revenue per EB moved only from about $15.29 million to about $15.46 million[1], which shows that full-year growth came mainly from volume and that price changes reach revenue gradually as contracts renew.

Edge IoT is the second revenue component, and it depends on consumer demand and flash prices. These products are sold through OEMs, distributors and retailers, with distributors holding price protection and limited return rights[11]; Edge IoT revenue grew 20% year over year in the fiscal fourth quarter of 2026, partly on NAND flash shortages, which means this demand could reverse if flash prices fall[3].

On the profit side, the key is that cost per EB falls as areal density rises while operating expenses are largely fixed. Gross profit equals revenue minus cost of revenue for heads, media, electronics, assembly and depreciation; dividing cost of revenue by total exabytes, cost per EB was about $8.41 million in fiscal 2026, down about 15% from about $9.91 million a year earlier[5]. Operating expenses were $1.464 billion in fiscal 2026, including the one-time $105 million settlement charge[12], so most incremental revenue falls to operating profit: operating margin has already risen from about 21% to about 34%, and first-quarter guidance calls for non-GAAP operating expenses of about $300 million and an operating margin of about 50%[3]. Below operating profit, interest expense declines as debt falls, while Pillar Two lifted the effective tax rate to 13.73%[13].

Free cash flow equals operating cash flow minus capital spending, and operating cash flow is absorbed by growth in receivables and inventory. In fiscal 2026, $3.674 billion of operating cash flow less $569 million of capital spending (4.7% of revenue) left about $3.105 billion, used mainly to retire $1.442 billion of debt, pay $634 million in dividends and repurchase $176 million of shares[7]. The company targets capital spending of 4%-6% of revenue and says fiscal 2027 free cash flow will grow each quarter; it guided first-quarter other expense to about $45 million, down from $58 million in the fourth quarter, because continued debt reduction lowers interest expense[3].

Industry and Competitive Position

The hard drive industry has only three suppliers, and it also competes with flash. The 10-K lists global competitors including Western Digital and Toshiba, along with NAND flash suppliers that enable alternative storage technologies and storage systems vendors; customers choose among them on capacity, performance, reliability, total cost of ownership, energy efficiency and supply continuity[9].

Seagate differentiates itself through HAMR technology and vertically integrated manufacturing. Its Mozaic platform uses the company's own implementation of HAMR to raise areal density and drive capacity in a capital-efficient way[9]. On its July 2026 call, the company said HAMR made up about 40% of nearline exabytes at the end of fiscal 2026, that Mozaic 4 drives of up to 44TB were ramping at two major cloud customers, that it targets Mozaic 4 at half of HAMR exabytes by the end of calendar 2026, and that Mozaic 5 is planned to sample by the end of 2027[3].

Pricing discipline is Seagate's other competitive tool, but customer concentration and the industry cycle set its limits. The company practices value-based pricing and supply discipline, says most nearline exabytes are already allocated through calendar 2028, and targets nearline exabyte growth of roughly 25% a year over the medium to long term[3]. The 10-K also warns that customer consolidation or industry supply exceeding demand can restore customer bargaining power and erode prices[17]; the available material does not provide competitors' share or pricing data, so this competitive comparison rests only on the company's own disclosures.

Core Debates

Seagate guided September-quarter revenue up about 56% year over year; how much of that growth comes from higher prices rather than more exabytes shipped?

This question determines how much profit is embedded in first-quarter growth. Fiscal 2026 revenue was $12.195 billion, up 34%, which the company attributed to higher nearline exabyte shipments and favorable pricing actions[6]. Price increases fall almost entirely to gross profit, while shipment growth is constrained by areal density and capacity, so the same roughly 56% revenue growth means something very different for margins depending on whether price or volume drives it.

Evidence for price-led growth comes from the annual report and the earnings call, but alternative explanations exist. The 10-K says the 11-point gross margin increase came mainly from pricing actions and a shift to higher-capacity products[6], and the company has long-term demand forecasts and supply commitments with major customers, some with cancellation charges[11]; the call said the supply-demand gap is wider than a few quarters ago and acknowledged that first-quarter guidance implies a per-EB price increase well above the earlier mid-to-high single-digit target[3]. On the other side, the prior-year first quarter had 14 weeks, which mechanically depresses year-over-year exabyte growth[10]; Edge IoT's 20% growth in the fourth quarter came partly from substitution demand during NAND shortages and could reverse if flash prices fall, and revenue per EB is an estimate that is also affected by the mix of nearline and non-nearline drives.

The current baseline shows that full-year growth was mainly volume-driven. Nearline shipments were 695 EB in fiscal 2026, up 40% from 497 EB, and data center revenue was 80% of the total, up from 75%[1]; dividing $12.195 billion of revenue by 789 EB gives average revenue of about $15.46 million per EB, versus about $15.29 million a year earlier, an increase of only about 1%[5]. The transmission runs from cloud and enterprise customers taking delivery against forecasts under long-term supply contracts, to nearline exabytes shipped (constrained by HAMR areal density with units roughly flat) multiplied by value-based price per EB, to data center revenue and then total revenue.

The first-quarter report can partly answer this question, but it may not provide a complete split. The points to watch are whether revenue is at least the $4.1 billion guidance midpoint, whether nearline exabyte growth is at least 20%, whether revenue per EB rises by 20% year over year, whether data center revenue stays above 80% of the total, and what management says about new contract pricing and 2027-2028 allocation. Revenue below $4.0 billion, or growth in revenue per EB below 10%, would weaken the view that pricing leads growth; because the company stopped disclosing price per terabyte in fiscal 2026, the price contribution still has to be estimated.

Can cost savings from Seagate's HAMR platform lift September-quarter gross margin toward the 57%-60% range implied by guidance?

Whether gross margin can stay high depends on how much comes from price and how much from cost. Gross margin rose from 35.2% in fiscal 2025 to 45.6% in fiscal 2026, which the company attributed to pricing actions and a shift to higher-capacity products[6]; first-quarter guidance implies a non-GAAP gross margin of about 57%, and management said it is approaching 60%[3]. Price can fall back with the cycle, while HAMR's lower cost per EB is more durable, so the balance between them decides whether margins last.

Full-year data show that lower costs played an important role, but the first-quarter jump could still come mainly from price. Dividing cost of revenue by exabytes, cost per EB was about $8.41 million in fiscal 2026, down about 15% from $9.91 million in fiscal 2025, while revenue per EB rose only about 1%[5]. The call said HAMR was about 40% of nearline exabytes at year-end and that HAMR products carry incremental gross margins well above 60%[3]. The alternative explanation is that the first-quarter margin jump comes mainly from pricing on new capacity rather than lower cost, and the 10-K lists longer HAMR qualification or production cycles as a risk that could cost sales and share[17].

The gross margin baseline is clear, but the HAMR share exists only as a spoken figure. GAAP gross margin was 45.6% in fiscal 2026, or $5.558 billion of gross profit on $12.195 billion of revenue[5]; the annual report does not disclose HAMR's share of nearline exabytes, which the company gave only orally on the call as about 40%[3]. The transmission runs from a rising HAMR share of nearline exabytes and better Mozaic 4 yields, to higher capacity per platter, to lower material and manufacturing cost per EB, allowing gross margin to keep expanding while prices rise[9].

In the first quarter, the question is whether gross margin reaches the level implied by guidance and whether costs keep falling. That means watching whether non-GAAP gross margin is at least 57%, whether cost of revenue per EB falls more than 10% year over year, whether HAMR exceeds 40% of nearline exabytes, and whether Mozaic 4 completes qualification at more cloud customers. A non-GAAP gross margin below 55%, or a Mozaic 4 delay, would weaken the view that cost supports margins; company guidance is non-GAAP while the annual report is GAAP, so comparisons should rely on the quarterly reconciliation.

As Seagate's margins jump, will cash conversion keep pace in the September quarter and fund further debt reduction?

Cash conversion decides how much room remains for debt reduction and shareholder returns. Operating cash flow rose from $1.083 billion to $3.674 billion in fiscal 2026, and the company used cash to retire $1.442 billion of debt, pay $634 million in dividends and repurchase $176 million of shares[7], while shareholders' equity turned positive[8]. Yet revenue is concentrated in a few large customers, receivables grew about 60%, faster than revenue's 34%, HAMR expansion needs equipment spending, and exchangeable notes settle in shares at high share prices, all of which affect cash and per-share measures.

Current evidence shows healthy cash flow overall, but several cash outflows are growing. Free cash flow margin was about 25.5% in fiscal 2026 and capital spending was 4.7% of revenue, within the company's 4%-6% target[7]; after the balance sheet date the company redeemed another $1 billion of senior notes[15], and on September 8, 2026, it delivered 1,647,862 ordinary shares to settle $150.51 million of exchangeable notes due 2028[18]. On the negative side, receivable days rose from about 38 to about 46[8], $150 million of the $225 million accrued for legal settlements is due within a year[15], and Pillar Two raised the effective tax rate from 2.91% to 13.73%, so cash taxes may rise as well[13].

The baseline for this debate covers cash, debt and share count. Free cash flow was about $3.105 billion in fiscal 2026, or $3.674 billion of operating cash flow minus $569 million of capital spending[7]; debt principal was $3.6 billion at year-end[15], diluted shares were 229 million versus 217 million a year earlier[5], and $4.8 billion of repurchase authorization remained at fiscal year-end[16]. The transmission runs from operating profit, less increases in receivables and inventory, to operating cash flow; minus capital spending, that yields free cash flow for debt repayment, dividends and buybacks, which then affect EPS through lower interest expense and changes in share count.

In the first quarter, the items to watch are free cash flow margin, capital spending, receivable days, and period-end debt and share count. Specifically, investors can check whether free cash flow margin is at least 30%, whether capital spending is within 4%-6% of revenue, whether receivable days exceed 50, what period-end debt principal and diluted shares look like, and how legal settlement payments affect operating cash flow. A free cash flow margin below 25%, or capital spending above 6% of revenue, would weaken the view that cash conversion keeps pace; the annual report does not disclose quarterly figures, so quarterly comparisons depend on the first-quarter report.

Risks and Falsifiers

The first risk is customer concentration and the timing of cloud capital spending. One customer accounted for about 14% of fiscal 2026 revenue, up from about 10% a year earlier[11], or about $1.7 billion on full-year revenue, and data center revenue is 80% of the total[1], so a large customer delaying deliveries would hit revenue, receivables and capacity utilization at once. If data center revenue stays above 80% in the first quarter and management reiterates that nearline exabytes are allocated through 2028, this risk has not materialized.

The second risk is industry supply and substitute technology. Capacity expansion at Western Digital or Toshiba, or lower flash prices that shift some edge and data center demand to SSDs, would restore customer bargaining power[9], and the 10-K notes that customers can push prices down when supply exceeds demand[17]. Edge IoT was 20% of fiscal 2026 revenue, and at fiscal 2026 scale each 1-point drop in gross margin removes about $120 million of gross profit. If Edge IoT and data center revenue both grow in the first quarter and management signals no price concessions, this risk has not appeared.

The third risk is that price increases rest mainly on a short-term supply-demand gap. If competitors add capacity or cloud customers slow deliveries, price increases will narrow when contracts renew[17]. In fiscal 2026, 789 EB corresponded to about $12.2 billion of revenue[14], so each 1% change in price per EB moves about $120 million of revenue at full-year scale, most of it falling directly to gross profit. If revenue per EB rises at least 20% year over year in the first quarter and the company confirms 2027 contract prices are locked in, this risk is refuted.

The fourth risk is a slower-than-planned HAMR ramp. If Mozaic 4 yields or customer qualifications lag the plan, cost reduction would stall and shipments would be constrained[17]. At the $4.1 billion first-quarter revenue midpoint, each 1-point gross margin shortfall removes about $41 million of gross profit, and constrained exabyte shipments would also hold back revenue. If HAMR's share of nearline exabytes keeps rising and the company confirms the year-end Mozaic 4 target, this risk has not materialized[3].

The fifth risk is cash tied up in working capital and taxes. Customer concentration has pushed receivables up faster than revenue, and the rise in receivables absorbed $575 million of cash in fiscal 2026[7]; $150 million of settlement payments is due within a year[15], and the fiscal 2026 qualified domestic minimum top-up tax was $422 million[13]. If first-quarter free cash flow margin is at least 30% and receivable days do not exceed 46, this risk has not affected cash conversion.

What to Watch Next

• Price versus volume: watch quarterly revenue, nearline exabytes, revenue per EB and the data center share against fiscal 2026 revenue of $12.195 billion, 695 EB of nearline shipments, about $15.46 million per EB (+1%) and an 80% data center share. Revenue per EB up 20% or more confirms price-led growth; revenue below $4.0 billion or revenue-per-EB growth below 10% refutes it.
• HAMR cost and gross margin: watch non-GAAP gross margin, cost of revenue per EB, the HAMR share and Mozaic 4 qualifications against 45.6% GAAP gross margin, about $8.41 million of cost per EB (-15%) and a HAMR share of about 40% of nearline exabytes. Gross margin of at least 57% with falling unit costs confirms; gross margin below 55% or a Mozaic 4 delay refutes.
• Cash conversion and deleveraging: watch free cash flow margin, capital spending, receivable days, period-end debt and share count against free cash flow of about $3.105 billion (25.5%), capital spending at 4.7% of revenue, receivable days of about 46, $3.6 billion of debt principal and 229 million diluted shares. Free cash flow margin of at least 30% confirms; below 25%, or capital spending above 6% of revenue, refutes.

Conclusion

Seagate's business is driven by nearline drives, and its finances have moved from heavy leverage to high profitability and rapid debt reduction. Data center was 80% of fiscal 2026 revenue[1], full-year revenue was $12.195 billion and operating income $4.094 billion[5], free cash flow was about $3.105 billion[7], and year-end debt principal had fallen to $3.6 billion[15]. Full-year growth came mainly from volume, with average revenue per EB up only about 1%, while first-quarter guidance for about 56% revenue growth and a gross margin of about 57% means price and lower HAMR costs are now doing more of the work[3]. The central unresolved relationship is how much of the margin jump comes from price that can fall back with the cycle, how much comes from more durable reductions in cost per EB, and whether profit turns into cash at the same pace.

Two independent commentaries published after the annual report both accept that demand depends heavily on a few cloud customers, but they disagree on the nature of the risk. In a September 17, 2026 article published by Yahoo Finance, TIKR author Wiltone Asuncion noted that Seagate's gross margin reached 52.7% last quarter and argued its pricing power has some durability: at Goldman Sachs' Communacopia conference on September 10, the CFO said hard drives are only a low-to-mid single-digit share of cloud customers' capital spending, so double-digit price increases per EB are small relative to the value; the author also conceded that the durability case is not airtight, and that the risk lies in the timing of customers delaying deliveries because of power or permitting delays, while Seagate has already contracted much of its near-term demand[19]. In a September 14, 2026 article, Alex Sirois of 24/7 Wall St. put more weight on concentration: management said the vast majority of HAMR supply is allocated to cloud and hyperscale customers and nearline products are close to 90% of exabyte shipments, a tailwind while demand is strong that would be amplified if a few large customers pause capital spending or diversify suppliers[20]. TIKR's view bears on the price-volume and gross margin debates and frames the risk as delivery timing; the 24/7 Wall St. view bears on customer concentration risk and on receivables growth within cash conversion, and treats it as structural; both are outside interpretations only.

What would materially strengthen the current understanding is a set of observations holding at the same time. First-quarter revenue of at least $4.1 billion, revenue per EB up more than 20% year over year, non-GAAP gross margin of at least 57% with cost per EB down more than 10%, free cash flow margin of at least 30% and receivable days no higher than 46 would show that both the price and cost paths are working and that profit is turning into cash. Conversely, revenue below $4.0 billion, revenue-per-EB growth below 10%, gross margin below 55%, or free cash flow margin below 25% with receivables stretching further would show that the price-driven margin is more fragile and that cash conversion has not kept pace with profit.

Sources

[1] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · revenue by channel, geography, market and exabytes · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[2] Drillr earnings calendar (updated 2026-09-28) · STX 2026-10-28 call · 2026-09-28 · Drillr earnings calendar · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[3] STX Q4 FY2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · Q1 FY2027 guidance · 2026-07-28 · Seagate · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[4] Drillr analyst_financial_estimates (updated 2026-09-28) · STX quarter ending 2026-10-03 · 2026-09-28 · Drillr analyst_financial_estimates · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[5] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · FY2026 statements of operations · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[6] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · revenue and gross margin drivers · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[7] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · FY2026 cash flow statement · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[8] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · balance sheet July 3 2026 · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[9] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · competition and HAMR areal-density roadmap · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[10] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · 53-week fiscal year · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[11] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · customers, purchase agreements and concentration · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[12] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · operating expenses and legal settlement · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[13] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · income taxes and Pillar Two · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[14] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · overview of fiscal year 2026 · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[15] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · debt obligations and post-year-end redemptions · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[16] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · dividends and share repurchase authorization · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[17] STX 10-K filed 2026-08-04 · HAMR transition and pricing risk factors · 2026-08-04 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137789/000113778926000159/

[18] STX 8-K filed 2026-09-09 · 2028 Notes exchange settlement · 2026-09-09 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001137789&type=8-K

[19] Yahoo Finance (TIKR) 2026-09-17 · Seagate's Gross Margin Hit 52.7% Last Quarter. Here's Why the CFO Says It Holds · 2026-09-17 · Yahoo Finance (TIKR) · https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/seagate-gross-margin-hit-52-141744773.html

[20] 24/7 Wall St. 2026-09-14 · Seagate Has Real Upside Left. That Does Not Mean It Deserves Your Money Right Now. · 2026-09-14 · 24/7 Wall St. · https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/seagate-real-upside-left-does-135539153.html