[LLY] Eli Lilly: Q3 2026 Earnings Preview, Can Volume Outrun Price Cuts?

Eli Lilly, the U.S. drugmaker whose business now centers on the diabetes and obesity drug tirzepatide, is scheduled to hold its earnings call on 2026-10-29 to report results for the third quarter of 2026, ending September 30, 2026 [1]. Heading into Eli Lilly's Q3 2026 earnings, the latest disclosed quarter, Q2 2026, brought revenue of $22.97 billion, up 48% year over year, as worldwide volume added 60 percentage points and realized prices subtracted 13; reported EPS was $7.94 and non-GAAP EPS was $8.38, both including $3.03 of acquired in-process R&D (IPR&D) charges [2][3]. The company then raised full-year 2026 revenue guidance to $85.0 billion to $87.0 billion and set non-GAAP EPS guidance at $35.50 to $36.50 [2], with a non-GAAP performance margin of 49% to 50.5%, but it does not give quarterly guidance [4]. Analyst consensus compiled by Drillr puts third-quarter revenue at $22.31 billion and EPS at $9.92 (9 to 10 analysts) [5], about 2.9% below second-quarter actual revenue and consistent with the European vacation seasonality the company flagged for the third quarter [4]; full-year revenue consensus of $88.52 billion (20 analysts) already sits above the top of company guidance [6].

Three things matter most in the coming report. First, whether U.S. revenue keeps growing strongly in the first full quarter of the Medicare Bridge obesity-drug coverage program: U.S. revenue rose 33% in Q2, but excluding rebate-estimate adjustments U.S. price fell about 9%, so the balance between volume and price will set U.S. growth [3]. Second, whether Mounjaro outside the U.S. holds up through the seasonally weak quarter: its international revenue reached $5.15 billion in Q2, about 2.7 times the $1.90 billion a year earlier, yet the international price contribution was already -36 percentage points [7][8]. Third, whether the second-half margin steps down as guidance implies: the Q2 non-GAAP performance margin was 54.8%, while full-year guidance of 49% to 50.5% implies roughly 45.5% to 48.6% for the second half, and the company said the first half benefited from sales-based milestones and rebate-estimate adjustments [4][9]. What these three results confirm, weaken or leave open is the central question about the quality of Lilly's growth.

Company Background and Business Structure

Lilly is a 150-year-old human pharmaceutical company that reports a single operating segment. Colonel Eli Lilly founded the business in Indianapolis in 1876, it was incorporated in Indiana in 1901, and it now manufactures in the U.S. (including Puerto Rico), Europe and Asia and sells products in about 90 countries [10]. Tirzepatide, launched in 2022 and sold as Mounjaro for diabetes and Zepbound for obesity, lifted revenue from $34.12 billion in 2023 to $65.18 billion in 2025 [11]; in Q2 2026 the company also launched the oral obesity pill Foundayo (orforglipron) in the U.S. [12].

Revenue is heavily concentrated in cardiometabolic health, and above all in tirzepatide. Of Q2 2026 revenue of $22.97 billion, cardiometabolic health contributed $18.35 billion (Mounjaro $9.94 billion, Zepbound $4.93 billion, Jardiance $1.23 billion, Trulicity $1.22 billion), oncology $2.57 billion (including Verzenio at $1.47 billion), immunology $1.42 billion (including Taltz at $856 million), neuroscience $429 million and other products $205 million [7]; within neuroscience, the Alzheimer's drug Kisunla brought in $167 million [13]. Mounjaro and Zepbound together made up 65% of first-half revenue, up from 56% for full-year 2025 [12][14]. By geography, Q2 U.S. revenue was $14.41 billion, or 62.7% of the total, and revenue outside the U.S. was $8.56 billion [7].

Lilly's customers are concentrated in three U.S. wholesalers, while payers negotiate its prices. McKesson, Cencora and Cardinal Health each accounted for 16% to 24% of consolidated revenue and pass the drugs on to pharmacies, physicians and hospitals; Lilly recognizes revenue at net price after rebates and discounts, books rebates in the period of sale and has payment terms of 30 to 70 days in most major markets [15]. The direct-to-patient platform LillyDirect became a growing share of the business in 2025 and delivers select Lilly medicines [16]; Jardiance is a product of Lilly's collaboration with Boehringer Ingelheim [17]. In the first half of 2026, Lilly acquired Centessa, Kelonia, Orna, Ventyx and Ajax, among others, paying $13.3 billion for business development [18], and in Q2 it committed another $4.5 billion to expand its Indiana manufacturing sites [2].

Financial History and Current Position

2025 was the year tirzepatide scaled across the business. Full-year revenue was $65.18 billion, up 45% from $45.04 billion in 2024, with volume contributing 50 percentage points, price -6 and currency +1 [19]; Mounjaro revenue was $22.97 billion and Zepbound revenue $13.54 billion [14]. GAAP gross margin was $54.13 billion, or 83.0% of revenue (81.3% in 2024), R&D expense was $13.34 billion, marketing, selling and administrative expense $11.09 billion, acquired IPR&D $2.91 billion and net income $20.64 billion [11]. Operating cash flow rose from $8.8 billion in 2024 to $16.8 billion, and capital expenditures were $7.8 billion [20].

Revenue kept growing at roughly 50% in the first half of 2026, but the price drag deepened. Q1 revenue was $19.80 billion, up 56%, with price contributions of -7 in the U.S. and -25 outside the U.S. [21]. Q2 revenue was $22.97 billion, up 48%, including $14.41 billion in the U.S. (+33%) and $8.56 billion outside the U.S. (+80%) [3]; the GAAP gross margin was 85.8%, R&D expense was $3.82 billion (+14%), marketing, selling and administrative expense $3.43 billion (+25%) and acquired IPR&D $2.78 billion [22]. Q2 reported EPS was $7.94 and non-GAAP EPS $8.38 [2], and the non-GAAP performance margin was 54.8%, 9 percentage points higher than a year earlier [4].

First-half cash flow was strong, but acquisitions and capacity expansion pushed debt higher. First-half operating cash flow was $16.02 billion (versus $4.75 billion a year earlier), capital expenditures $5.26 billion, cash paid for acquisitions $9.81 billion, IPR&D purchases $3.49 billion, dividends $3.09 billion and share repurchases $3.96 billion, while short-term borrowings rose by a net $5.28 billion [23]. Lilly issued $9.0 billion of long-term debt in May and held $8.95 billion of cash and equivalents at the end of June [18][23]; earlier, at the end of March, total debt stood at $43.4 billion, $0.9 billion more than the $42.5 billion at the end of 2025 [24].

Operating Model

Lilly's revenue is essentially the sum of prescription volume times net price for each product, and tirzepatide drives most of that equation. U.S. net price equals list price minus PBM and commercial insurance rebates, statutory Medicaid and 340B discounts, Medicare-related discounts (the Bridge discounted price and IRA government-set prices) and cash-pay price cuts; each quarter the company splits U.S. and international revenue growth into volume, price and currency [8]. In Q2 2026, U.S. volume added 37 points and price subtracted 3 (about 9 excluding rebate-estimate adjustments), while outside the U.S. volume added 113, price subtracted 36 and currency added 4 [3]. Prescription growth reaches revenue in the same quarter, but price changes lag coverage decisions: management has said Zepbound net price will decline over coming quarters as full formulary access is restored [25].

On the profit side, gross margin and expense growth together set the performance margin. Lilly's non-GAAP performance profit roughly equals gross margin minus R&D and marketing and administrative expense; gross margin moves between 82% and 86% depending on production cost, tirzepatide mix, net price and one-time revenue, such as the $250 million sales-based milestone included in Q2 Jardiance revenue outside the U.S. [3]. R&D runs at about 17% of revenue, marketing and administrative expense is climbing quickly with launch promotion, and acquired IPR&D is not excluded from non-GAAP results, so an acquisition directly lowers EPS in the quarter it closes, by $3.03 in Q2 [22][2].

On the cash side, operating cash flow after capital spending has to fund capacity, acquisitions and shareholder returns at the same time. In 2025 operating cash flow was $16.8 billion and capital expenditures $7.8 billion [20]; in the first half of 2026 the two were $16.02 billion and $5.26 billion, leaving about $10.76 billion, less than combined acquisition, dividend and buyback spending, with the gap filled by bonds and commercial paper [23][18]. Cash is collected through the three large wholesalers on 30- to 70-day terms, and rebates are accrued at the time of sale and paid later, so rebate-estimate adjustments affect both current revenue and working capital [15].

Industry and Competitive Position

Lilly and Novo Nordisk form a duopoly in GLP-1 obesity and diabetes drugs, and Lilly currently holds the larger U.S. share. According to the Q2 call, Lilly holds 60% of total prescriptions and 70% of injectable prescriptions in the U.S. incretin obesity market, more than 60% of the U.S. type 2 diabetes incretin market and about 55% of the international incretin market, a gain of almost 2 percentage points since Q1 [26]. TheStreet wrote that Lilly held about 61% of the combined U.S. obesity and diabetes drug market in Q2, against roughly 39% for Novo Nordisk [27]. These shares come from management's spoken remarks and media reports rather than audited data.

Competitive and policy pressures arrive together, and both act mainly on price. Competition comes from Novo Nordisk's injectable and oral semaglutide, from generic versions of competing GLP-1 drugs already launched in India and Brazil [25], and from compounded and counterfeit incretins in the U.S., which the company lists as a risk of diverted sales and net price erosion [28]. On policy, Jardiance already carries an IRA government-set price (a 66% discount to its 2023 list price), and Trulicity and Verzenio will move to government-set prices in 2028 [17]; Lilly's pricing agreements with the U.S. government secured Medicare Bridge coverage but also committed it to lower Medicaid and certain other prices [29]. The available comparison stops at market share and lacks a product-level net price comparison between Lilly and Novo Nordisk, which limits any judgment of competitive strength.

Core Debates

Now that Medicare covers obesity drugs, can Lilly's U.S. volume growth outrun falling net prices?

This debate sets the growth rate of Lilly's largest revenue pool. The U.S. accounted for 62.7% of Q2 revenue, and Mounjaro and Zepbound together made up 65% of first-half revenue [7][12]. U.S. revenue grew 33% in Q2, with volume contributing 37 percentage points and reported price only -3, but excluding rebate-estimate adjustments U.S. price fell about 9% [8][3]; Zepbound's Q2 U.S. revenue was $4.87 billion [7].

The current evidence supports both sides. On the volume side, Q2 U.S. revenue grew 45% for Mounjaro and 44% for Zepbound [30], Medicare Bridge has covered about 20 million eligible beneficiaries since July 1, and the call said 60% to 70% of Bridge patients had not previously used obesity medication [31]. On the price side, U.S. price moved from -7 in Q1 to about -9 in Q2 excluding adjustments, while the volume contribution slowed from +49 to +37 [21][8]; management has also warned that as formulary access is restored, fewer high-priced "medical exception" prescriptions will be written and Zepbound net price will decline over coming quarters [25]. Another reading is that part of Q2's 33% growth came from one-time rebate-estimate adjustments rather than a sustainable price level [9].

The direction of the financial transmission is clear, but its size is not. Medicare Bridge, restored PBM coverage and the LillyDirect cash-pay channel lift U.S. prescription volume, while the discounted prices in those same channels and Zepbound's shift from medical exceptions to formulary pricing pull down the U.S. price contribution; the net of the two is U.S. revenue growth, and it passes almost directly to gross profit [8]. The unresolved piece is how many new patients Bridge adds, and the company wrote in its Q2 10-Q that uptake from this expanded access is unknown [12].

The third-quarter report offers three checks on this debate: whether U.S. revenue growth stays at or above 25%, along with the reported and adjusted price contributions; whether Zepbound U.S. revenue in Bridge's first full quarter exceeds Q2's $4.87 billion; and whether management quantifies Bridge new patients or revenue [7]. If the price contribution is worse than -10 percentage points while volume contributes less than 35 points, or if Zepbound U.S. revenue falls sequentially, the case that volume is outrunning price would weaken.

After China's reimbursement price cut, can Mounjaro's international surge hold up through the seasonally weak third quarter?

International markets have become Lilly's second growth leg, and their durability determines how dependent the company is on the U.S. alone. Revenue outside the U.S. rose 80% in Q2 and reached 37.3% of the total; Mounjaro's international revenue grew from $1.90 billion a year earlier to $5.15 billion [7]. Nearly all of that growth came from volume (+113 percentage points), while price contributed -36, mainly because Mounjaro was added to China's National Reimbursement Drug List (NRDL) [8].

The evidence again points both ways. The company says its share of the international incretin market is about 55%, almost 2 percentage points higher than in Q1 [26]. Yet it also flagged European vacation seasonality in the third quarter [4], generic versions of competing GLP-1 drugs have launched in India and Brazil [25], and the international price contribution widened from -25 in Q1 to -36 in Q2 [21][8]. Another reading is that part of Q2's strong growth reflected one-time channel stocking after China's reimbursement listing.

Along the transmission chain, patient starts raise volume, reimbursement and competitive pricing lower price, and currency adds or subtracts. China's NRDL listing and patient starts in self-pay markets drive international volume, reimbursement and competitive pricing push price down, and currency added 4 percentage points in Q2; together they produce international revenue, and lower per-dose prices also thin the gross margin on that revenue [8]. What remains unclear is how much of Q2's volume was one-time stocking and how much was ongoing therapy.

The third-quarter report should be read against two anchors: where international Mounjaro revenue lands relative to $5.15 billion in Q2 and $4.43 billion in Q1, and whether the international price contribution stays worse than -36 percentage points [32]. If international Mounjaro revenue falls more than 10% sequentially and the company attributes the drop to price or competition, the case that overseas volume can offset U.S. price cuts would weaken.

Can the prescription inflection for Lilly's oral obesity pill Foundayo show up as visible revenue in the third quarter?

Foundayo is Lilly's next mass-market obesity drug after tirzepatide, and whether its revenue keeps pace with prescriptions shows whether the pill expands the patient pool or cannibalizes injectables. Foundayo generated $98 million in Q2 revenue [13], including $67 million in the U.S. and $31 million in the UAE [26]. The third quarter is its first full quarter with coverage from all three major U.S. PBMs and an important reference point ahead of the 2027 global rollout [31].

The supporting evidence is that prescriptions have already inflected. The call said all three major PBMs were covering the drug by June, full direct-to-consumer advertising had launched, an inflection came in late July with volume nearly doubling in a month, roughly 1 in 4 new oral GLP-1 patients was starting Foundayo, and about 20% of Bridge patients were choosing the oral option [31]. The opposing evidence is that Q2 revenue was small and lower doses carry lower prices, and Lilly pays Chugai tiered royalties from the mid single digits to the low teens on worldwide net sales, booked as cost of sales, so the pill's gross margin is below tirzepatide's [33]. Another reading is that the pill mainly attracts patients who would otherwise have used injectables, so the revenue gain would be smaller than the prescription gain.

The financial transmission runs from prescriptions to revenue and then through royalties to gross profit. PBM coverage, direct-to-consumer marketing and Medicare Bridge raise Foundayo prescriptions, prescriptions times net price produce revenue, and royalties booked in cost of sales determine gross profit [33]; Lilly has filed for the type 2 diabetes indication, with a regulatory decision expected by the end of 2026, and approval would broaden the label in 2027 [31]. The unresolved question is the ratio between prescription growth and revenue growth, which depends on net price and dose mix.

The third-quarter test is fairly clear: whether Foundayo revenue reaches at least $196 million, double the Q2 level, and whether the company updates its share of new oral GLP-1 patients and the status of the type 2 diabetes review [13]. If Foundayo revenue comes in below $200 million and the company stops disclosing prescription share, or if the type 2 diabetes review is delayed, the case that the prescription inflection is turning into revenue would weaken.

Lilly's full-year guidance implies a lower second-half margin. Will the third quarter show that step-down?

The size of the second-half margin step-down decides whether a revenue beat becomes a profit beat. The Q2 non-GAAP performance margin was 54.8%, 9 percentage points above a year earlier [4], and the GAAP gross margin was 85.8% [22]. The company said the first half benefited from sales-based milestones and rebate-estimate adjustments [9], and backing out first-half results from full-year guidance of 49% to 50.5% implies roughly 45.5% to 48.6% for the second half [4].

The evidence for a steady margin comes from costs. Gross margin rose 1.5 percentage points in Q2, which the company attributed to better production costs and favorable product mix, and R&D grew only 14%, slower than revenue [22]; in Q2 the company also raised both ends of its full-year performance margin guidance by 2 percentage points, which can be read as conservative guidance [4]. The evidence for a step-down comes from price and spending: U.S. price fell about 9% excluding adjustments, international price fell 36%, Q2 revenue included a $250 million Jardiance milestone [3], and marketing and administrative expense rose 25% as the company promotes several launches [22].

In the financial transmission, price and fading one-time revenue lower gross margin, capacity and product mix raise it, and expense growth then sets the performance margin. Lower net prices and the disappearance of one-time milestones and rebate adjustments reduce gross margin, new capacity that lowers unit cost and a rising tirzepatide mix lift it, and launch promotion plus R&D on programs such as retatrutide set marketing and R&D growth, which flows through to operating profit and cash flow [9][22]. The net effect of these forces is unresolved, and the implied second-half range is an approximation from GAAP gross margin minus R&D and marketing and administrative expense, which differs slightly from the company's non-GAAP basis.

The third-quarter report has three checkpoints: whether the non-GAAP performance margin lands below 47% or above 52%, whether gross margin moves because of production cost, product mix or one-time revenue, and whether full-year performance margin guidance changes again [4]. If the performance margin falls below 47% and gross margin drops back under 83%, the second-half step-down has arrived; if the performance margin holds at 52% or more and full-year guidance rises, the concern about a step-down would be falsified.

Risks and Falsifiers

U.S. pricing policy can erode revenue from mature products before exclusivity expires. Jardiance already carries an IRA government-set price 66% below its 2023 list price; Trulicity and Verzenio move to government-set prices in 2028, and the company believes more of its significant products will be selected in future years [17]. Trulicity and Verzenio together generated $2.69 billion of Q2 revenue, the directly exposed revenue line [7], and the pricing agreements with the U.S. government and negotiations over long-term Medicare coverage could push net prices lower still [29]. This risk would be falsified if long-term Medicare obesity coverage lands at a price no lower than Bridge and no new core product is selected for government pricing.

Acquisitions and capacity spending are rising together, reducing cash-flow coverage and adding debt. In the first half Lilly spent $13.3 billion on business development and $5.26 billion on capital expenditures and issued $9.0 billion of new long-term debt [18], while short-term borrowings rose by a net $5.28 billion [23], with further deals such as AtaiBeckley to follow. First-half operating cash flow minus capital spending was about $10.76 billion, less than the combined total of acquisitions, $3.09 billion of dividends and $3.96 billion of buybacks; total debt had already reached $43.4 billion at the end of Q1 [24], and acquired IPR&D charges reduce EPS directly, by $3.03 in Q2 [2]. This risk would be falsified if third-quarter operating cash flow again covers capital spending, dividends and buybacks with no new large IPR&D charge.

Volume growth through low-price channels could consume U.S. net price. The Bridge discounted price, Zepbound formulary pricing and cash-pay price cuts could together push the U.S. price contribution to a double-digit negative [30][29]. Q2 U.S. revenue was $14.41 billion; measured against prior-year U.S. revenue of $10.81 billion, each additional percentage point of price decline removes about $110 million of quarterly revenue, nearly all of it from gross profit [8]. This risk would be falsified if the third-quarter U.S. price contribution is no worse than -9 percentage points while U.S. revenue grows at least 30%.

International price competition and generics could let price cuts outrun volume. Generic versions of competing GLP-1 drugs have launched in India and Brazil [25], and together with reimbursement negotiations they left the Q2 international price contribution at -36 percentage points [8]. Q2 international revenue was $8.56 billion; measured against prior-year revenue of $4.74 billion, each additional percentage point of price decline removes about $47 million of quarterly revenue. This risk would be falsified if the third-quarter international price contribution is no worse than -36 and international Mounjaro revenue is at least $5.15 billion.

Revenue from the oral drug could lag prescription growth for a long time. Low prices on low doses, competing oral drugs and substitution within Lilly's own injectables could all slow the revenue ramp, and the Chugai royalty leaves Foundayo with a lower gross margin than tirzepatide [33]. Foundayo's Q2 revenue of $98 million was about 0.4% of total revenue, so its effect on third-quarter revenue is small, but it sets the revenue starting point for the 2027 global launch [13]. This risk would be falsified if third-quarter Foundayo revenue reaches at least $300 million and its share of new oral patients rises.

The margin could fall faster than revenue grows. Price cuts, the loss of one-time revenue and launch promotion costs could hit the performance margin at the same time [9]. On Q2 revenue of $22.97 billion, each percentage point of performance margin equals about $230 million of quarterly profit [4]. This risk would be falsified if the third-quarter performance margin holds at 52% or more and full-year guidance is raised.

What to Watch Next

• U.S. volume versus price: watch whether U.S. revenue growth stays at or above 25% against Q2's 33%, and the price contribution on both the reported (-3) and adjusted (about -9) bases [3]; a price contribution worse than -10 with volume below +35 would weaken the case.
• Zepbound in the U.S.: watch whether Bridge's first full quarter lifts U.S. revenue above Q2's $4.87 billion [7]; a sequential decline would weaken the case.
• International Mounjaro: watch revenue against the Q2 anchor of $5.15 billion and the Q1 anchor of $4.43 billion, and whether price stays worse than -36 [32]; a sequential drop of more than 10% blamed on price or competition would weaken the case.
• Oral Foundayo: watch whether revenue reaches $196 million from Q2's $98 million and whether roughly 1 in 4 new oral patients is sustained, along with the type 2 diabetes review [13][31]; revenue below $200 million with share disclosure dropped, or a delayed review, would weaken the case.
• Second-half margin: watch whether the non-GAAP performance margin lands below 47% or above 52% against Q2's 54.8% and an 85.8% GAAP gross margin, and whether guidance changes [4][22]; below 47% with gross margin under 83% would confirm the step-down.

Conclusion

Lilly's business now turns almost entirely on the number of tirzepatide patients and the net price in each channel, and the company is in a phase of surging volume and falling price. Q2 revenue was $22.97 billion, with worldwide volume contributing +60 and price -13 [3], and the non-GAAP performance margin was 54.8% [4]; first-half operating cash flow was $16.02 billion, but spending on acquisitions, capacity and shareholder returns exceeded cash flow after capital expenditures, and short-term borrowings rose [23]. The central open question is whether new patients from Medicare Bridge, international reimbursement and the oral drug can offset, in the second half, the drag that falling net prices and fading one-time gains put on revenue and margin.

Two independent commentaries published after the Q2 report both treat price as the key variable, with different emphases. Abdul Rahman of Insider Monkey argues that Foundayo's prescription growth is lifting expectations for Lilly's revenue, with about 47,500 prescriptions in the week through September 11 and more than 30% of new U.S. oral obesity patients, but that the key is whether prescription growth brings enough additional revenue to offset pricing pressure [34]; the piece bears on both the Foundayo and U.S. volume-versus-price debates and supplies prescription data more recent than the call. Peace Longe of TheStreet relays Lilly's CEO saying 700,000 seniors have started GLP-1 treatment since Medicare coverage began in July, with 7 in 10 choosing a Lilly drug, while noting that Bridge runs only through the end of 2027 and that a million users would strain the federal budget and push the government to demand lower prices [27]. Both accept that the volume gain is real and differ on time horizon: the first focuses on whether near-term prescriptions convert into revenue, while the second warns that the more successful the uptake, the greater the pressure on long-term Medicare pricing after 2028; both are outside interpretations, not facts, and they do not amount to a majority view.

A specific set of later observations would clearly strengthen or weaken the current understanding. If third-quarter U.S. revenue grows at least 30% with a price contribution no worse than -9, international Mounjaro revenue holds at $5.15 billion, Foundayo revenue reaches at least $196 million and the performance margin stays at 52% or more, the case that volume is outrunning price would strengthen. Conversely, if the U.S. price contribution is worse than -10 while volume contributes less than 35 points, international Mounjaro falls more than 10% sequentially, and the performance margin drops below 47% with gross margin back under 83%, the current understanding of Lilly's growth quality would need revision.

Sources

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[21] LLY 10-Q filed 2026-04-30 · Q1 2026 revenue bridge · 2026-04-30 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000059478/000005947826000045/lly-20260331.htm

[22] LLY 10-Q filed 2026-08-05 · Q2 2026 gross margin and expenses · 2026-08-05 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59478/000005947826000081/lly-20260630.htm

[23] LLY 10-Q filed 2026-08-05 · H1 2026 cash flows · 2026-08-05 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59478/000005947826000081/lly-20260630.htm

[24] LLY 10-Q filed 2026-04-30 · liquidity and debt March 31 2026 · 2026-04-30 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000059478/000005947826000045/lly-20260331.htm

[25] LLY Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-05 · stated risks · 2026-08-05 · earnings-call · https://investor.lilly.com/news-releases/news-release-details/lilly-reports-second-quarter-2026-financial-results-raises-full

[26] LLY Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-05 · market share and Foundayo revenue · 2026-08-05 · earnings-call · https://investor.lilly.com/news-releases/news-release-details/lilly-reports-second-quarter-2026-financial-results-raises-full

[27] TheStreet 2026-09-24 · Medicare just handed Eli Lilly a massive weight-loss win · 2026-09-24 · TheStreet · https://finance.yahoo.com/healthcare/articles/medicare-just-handed-eli-lilly-193700964.html

[28] LLY 10-K filed 2026-02-12 · compounded and counterfeit incretins · 2026-02-12 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59478/000005947826000013/lly-20251231.htm

[29] LLY 10-K filed 2026-02-12 · U.S. government pricing agreements · 2026-02-12 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59478/000005947826000013/lly-20251231.htm

[30] LLY 10-Q filed 2026-08-05 · Q2 2026 Mounjaro and Zepbound commentary · 2026-08-05 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59478/000005947826000081/lly-20260630.htm

[31] LLY Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-05 · Foundayo launch and Medicare Bridge uptake · 2026-08-05 · earnings-call · https://investor.lilly.com/news-releases/news-release-details/lilly-reports-second-quarter-2026-financial-results-raises-full

[32] LLY 10-Q filed 2026-08-05 · H1 2026 revenue by product and region · 2026-08-05 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59478/000005947826000081/lly-20260630.htm

[33] LLY 10-Q filed 2026-08-05 · Foundayo Chugai royalty · 2026-08-05 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59478/000005947826000081/lly-20260630.htm

[34] Insider Monkey 2026-09-26 · Foundayo's Early Growth Is Raising Lilly (LLY)'s Revenue Expectations. But Can It Outrun Pricing Pressure? · 2026-09-26 · Insider Monkey · https://finance.yahoo.com/healthcare/articles/foundayo-early-growth-raising-lilly-194505676.html