[BIDU] Baidu: Q3 2026 Earnings Test Whether AI Cloud Can Offset Falling Search Ads

Baidu operates Baidu App, a leading search-plus-feed app in China[1], and earns revenue from search and feed advertising, AI computing and model services through Baidu AI Cloud, and the long-form video platform iQIYI[2][3]. Baidu will release results for the Third quarter 2026 (three months ended September 30, 2026) on 2026-11-16, after the Hong Kong market closes and before the U.S. market opens, and will hold its earnings call at 8:30 p.m. Beijing time that evening[4]. The latest disclosed quarter is the second quarter of 2026: group revenue was RMB31.33 billion, down 4% year over year, operating income was RMB3.02 billion for a 10% margin, net income attributable to Baidu was RMB2.32 billion, and non-GAAP diluted earnings per ADS were RMB7.22[5]. Within that, online marketing revenue was RMB13.1 billion, down 19%[6], while AI Cloud Infra revenue was RMB7.3 billion, up 50%[7]. Baidu does not give numeric quarterly guidance; on the second-quarter call management said only that AI Cloud Infra should keep growing strongly in the second half, with potential for further acceleration, while online marketing revenue would remain under pressure from the AI search transformation and delayed monetization[8]. A Drillr compilation of 11 analysts dated November 10, 2026 puts third-quarter group revenue at RMB30.86 billion (range RMB30.79 billion to RMB30.92 billion), below the RMB31.17 billion reported a year earlier[9]; Zacks, on October 29, put the third-quarter consensus for earnings per ADS at $0.85[10].

Three things matter most in the Baidu Q3 2026 earnings report on AI cloud and search ads. The first is whether online marketing stops falling: the second-quarter RMB13.1 billion was up 4% from the first quarter's RMB12.6 billion, but still about RMB3.1 billion lower than a year earlier[6], and the Legacy business, which is mostly traditional advertising, fell 23% year over year[7], so this line shows how fast Baidu's most profitable revenue is still eroding. The second is whether AI Cloud Infra grows again: after jumping to RMB8.8 billion in the first quarter, it fell 17% sequentially to RMB7.3 billion in the second[7], so the third-quarter figure will test management's statement that second-half growth could accelerate[8] and help show whether the first quarter contained concentrated project deliveries or whether computing supply limited rentable capacity. The third is capital spending and cash flow: in the second quarter, Baidu excluding iQIYI spent RMB11.37 billion on capital expenditures, about three times the RMB3.78 billion of a year earlier, and free cash flow was negative RMB8.27 billion[11]; whether that spending turns into returns alongside cloud revenue will decide whether the 15% non-GAAP operating margin of Baidu General Business holds[12].

Company Background and Business Structure

Baidu reports two segments, Baidu General Business and iQIYI, and General Business carries most of the revenue and profit. General Business, renamed from "Baidu Core" starting in the fourth quarter of 2025, had 2025 revenue of RMB102.49 billion, down 2% from RMB104.71 billion in 2024, while iQIYI revenue was RMB27.29 billion, down 7%[13]. The core of General Business is search and feed advertising in Baidu App: advertisers open accounts through third-party agents or the direct sales team, bid for sponsored-link placement on the pay-for-performance (P4P) platform, and revenue is generally recognized when a user clicks[14]. iQIYI is an online entertainment video service in China whose revenue comes mainly from memberships and advertising[3].

In its 2025 annual report, Baidu introduced an "AI-powered business" management view that cuts across its traditional business lines to show the structure of General Business[3]. Under that view, of the RMB25.2 billion of General Business revenue in the second quarter, AI-powered business contributed RMB12.5 billion, or 50%, made up of AI Cloud Infra at RMB7.3 billion, AI Applications at RMB2.5 billion and AI-native Marketing Services at RMB2.6 billion; the Legacy business, mostly traditional advertising, contributed RMB10.4 billion, and Others RMB2.3 billion[7]. AI Cloud Infra provides computing and platform services for training and inference to enterprises and the public sector, with the Qianfan MaaS platform charging external customers by token usage, while AI Applications include mostly subscription products such as Baidu Wenku, Baidu Drive and Digital Employee[3][15]. These categories are unaudited management figures, and GPU Cloud and MaaS are disclosed only as growth rates, not amounts[7].

The two main businesses have very different cost structures, which determines how a shift in revenue mix affects profit. According to the 20-F, General Business costs consist mainly of personnel, traffic acquisition, marketing and promotion, depreciation, server custody fees and bandwidth, and cloud expansion has mainly pushed up the last three[16]. Baidu had about 33,500 full-time employees at the end of 2025, about 6,300 fewer than the 39,800 at the end of 2023[1]. On capital structure, each American depositary share represents 8 Class A ordinary shares[17]; on the second-quarter call, management said the conversion of its Hong Kong listing to dual primary status is expected to take effect in 2026, subject to shareholder and Hong Kong Stock Exchange approval[8].

Financial History and Current Position

Baidu's group revenue has fallen for two straight years, with advertising shrinking and cloud and membership revenue growing. According to the 20-F, group revenue fell from RMB134.60 billion in 2023 to RMB133.13 billion in 2024 and to RMB129.08 billion in 2025, a 3% decline in 2025[2][18]. Online marketing services revenue fell over the same period from RMB81.20 billion to RMB78.56 billion and then to RMB67.84 billion, while other revenue, mainly cloud services and iQIYI memberships, rose from RMB53.40 billion to RMB61.24 billion[2]. In 2025, online marketing still made up 52.6% of group revenue, but it was about RMB13.4 billion lower than in 2023[2].

Profit in 2025 was squeezed by both rising costs and a one-time impairment. General Business cost of revenues rose 15% to RMB51.5 billion because of higher bandwidth, depreciation and server custody fees[16], and in the third quarter of 2025 Baidu recorded a RMB16.2 billion impairment on its Core asset group, citing factors including the rapid iteration of AI technology[19]. Group costs and expenses for the year were RMB134.9 billion, above revenue of RMB129.1 billion, for an operating loss of about RMB5.8 billion; excluding the impairment, operating income was about RMB10.4 billion[18]. Capital expenditures were RMB11.2 billion, RMB8.1 billion and RMB12.1 billion in 2023 through 2025, or 8%, 6% and 9% of revenue[20].

Second-quarter 2026 figures show revenue still declining while cash outflows widened sharply. Group revenue was RMB31.33 billion, down 4%, and operating income was RMB3.02 billion, a 10% margin[5]; net income attributable to Baidu fell to RMB2.32 billion from RMB7.32 billion a year earlier, mainly because of lower fair-value gains on long-term investments and a larger net foreign exchange loss, which was RMB1.16 billion in the quarter[5][17]. General Business revenue was RMB25.18 billion, down 4%, with non-GAAP operating income of RMB3.82 billion and a 15% margin, compared with 17% a year earlier[12]. For Baidu excluding iQIYI, second-quarter operating cash flow was RMB3.10 billion, capital expenditures were RMB11.37 billion and free cash flow was negative RMB8.27 billion[11]; at the end of June, short-term loans were RMB26.31 billion and long-term loans RMB20.78 billion, compared with RMB7.63 billion and RMB3.37 billion at the end of 2025[21], and total cash and investments were RMB283.1 billion[5].

Operating Model

General Business revenue can be broken into four drivers: online marketing, AI Cloud Infra, AI Applications and Others. Online marketing depends on clicks and price per click, or equivalently the number of advertisers and their budgets, and includes both Legacy advertising and AI-native marketing such as agents and digital humans[14][3]; AI Cloud Infra depends on sellable computing capacity, utilization and price, plus MaaS token usage and project delivery; AI Applications are mainly subscription revenue, and Others includes businesses such as Apollo Go. In the second quarter, online marketing was RMB13.1 billion, or 52% of General Business, and other revenue was RMB12.1 billion, or 48%[6]. Baidu does not disclose ad clicks, prices or advertiser counts, so how much of the advertising decline comes from price versus volume cannot be observed.

The shift in revenue mix from advertising to computing is the direct cause of the lower General Business gross margin. Advertising carries almost no incremental cost, while cloud requires buying servers first, and depreciation, bandwidth and custody fees are incurred whatever revenue turns out to be[16]. General Business gross margin therefore fell from 49.7% in the second quarter of 2025 to 44.5% in the second quarter of 2026, with cost of revenue of RMB13.98 billion against revenue of RMB25.18 billion[12]. Group selling, general and administrative expenses fell 23% year over year in the second quarter on lower credit losses and channel spending, and research and development expenses fell 10% on lower personnel costs[5], which kept the General Business non-GAAP operating margin at 15%[12].

The cash-flow chain is longer than the profit chain: capital spending comes first and depreciation follows. Cloud first buys servers, network equipment and other hardware through capital expenditures, and that equipment enters cost of revenue as depreciation once it is in service; Baidu says in its 20-F that it plans to fund these outlays with existing cash, short-term investments, loans and operating cash flow[20]. Operating cash flow for Baidu excluding iQIYI was negative RMB0.86 billion in the second quarter of 2025 and recovered to RMB2.48 billion and RMB3.10 billion in the first and second quarters of 2026, but capital expenditures of RMB5.84 billion and RMB11.37 billion in those quarters far exceeded operating cash flow[11]. Falling ad revenue reduces operating cash flow quickly because that revenue is collected on short cycles, while cloud revenue is collected under contract terms and public-sector and enterprise projects pay relatively slowly.

Industry and Competitive Position

In search and advertising, Baidu faces well-funded Chinese internet companies that own both user traffic and foundation models. The 20-F names Alibaba, Tencent, ByteDance and Xiaomi as primary competitors that vie with Baidu for user traffic, user time, advertising budgets and enterprise customers, and all of them are launching AI-native applications built on foundation models[22]. The 20-F also warns that AI search engines and virtual assistants answer queries directly in conversation, so users may have less need to click traditional search results or sponsored links[23]. Baidu App monthly active users fell from 679 million in December 2025 to 644 million in June 2026[1][24].

In AI cloud, Baidu competes with large rivals through its full-stack capabilities and is currently growing faster than the industry. The 20-F lists Alibaba Cloud, Volcano Engine, Huawei and Kingsoft Cloud as cloud competitors and notes that telecom providers are expanding their cloud businesses[22]. Management cites its full stack, from self-developed chips and frameworks to models and applications, as one source of long-term margin improvement[8], and said AI Cloud Infra grew faster than the industry for a fourth consecutive quarter, with second-quarter GPU Cloud revenue up 283% year over year and Qianfan MaaS revenue from external customer token usage up more than ninefold[15].

Baidu's competitive position is also clearly limited by supply and by comparable data. Since 2022, the United States has steadily tightened export controls on advanced semiconductors to China, limiting access to high-end GPUs bought from outside[25]; on the first-quarter call management acknowledged that domestic AI chip manufacturing capacity and supply chains are not keeping up with demand growth[26], and in the second quarter it said global AI computing supply remains constrained[27]. Apollo Go delivered about 1 million fully driverless rides in the second quarter, and cumulative public rides exceeded 23 million as of June[15], but these figures cover only Baidu and cannot be compared directly with like-for-like rival data.

Core Debates

With search being rebuilt around AI answers, can Baidu's ad revenue stop falling in the third quarter?

Online marketing is still Baidu's largest source of revenue and profit, and its direction directly sets General Business profit. In 2025, online marketing services revenue was RMB67.8 billion including iQIYI advertising, or 52.6% of group revenue, about RMB13.4 billion less than the RMB81.2 billion of 2023[2]. In the second quarter of 2026, General Business online marketing revenue was RMB13.1 billion, about RMB3.1 billion lower than a year earlier[6]. Advertising carries far higher gross margin than renting out computing, so each RMB100 million of lost ad revenue reduces operating profit by almost the same amount, which is one of the main reasons the General Business non-GAAP operating margin fell from 17% to 15%[12].

The second-quarter mix shows traditional advertising still eroding quickly while growth in the new AI marketing products has stalled. Online marketing was RMB13.1 billion, down 19% year over year and up 4% sequentially[6]; within it, the Legacy business was RMB10.4 billion, down 23%, and AI-native Marketing Services were RMB2.6 billion, flat year over year[7], after growing 36% in the first quarter[28]. Baidu App had 644 million monthly active users in June, below 679 million in December 2025[24][1]; Ernie Assistant daily active users grew 83% year over year in June, and management said Baidu deliberately delayed near-term monetization of AI search to put answer quality and user experience first[15].

The financial chain starts with user behavior and ends in high-margin advertising profit. AI search redesigns and conversational answers reduce result pages and clicks that carry sponsored links, advertisers then spend less on Baidu or shift to other platforms, Legacy revenue falls, AI-native marketing only partly offsets it, and General Business revenue and ad profit decline as a result[23]. An alternative explanation holds that the narrower second-quarter decline mostly reflects seasonality and a low base: in its third-quarter 2025 results announcement, Baidu reported that online marketing had already fallen 18% year over year in that quarter, so the third-quarter year-over-year comparison will naturally look better without meaning advertising has found a new growth driver; if so, the year-over-year rate will improve but the absolute amount will not exceed RMB13.1 billion. Management's qualitative second-half guidance is still that online marketing will remain under pressure[8].

Four third-quarter figures can test this debate. The first is whether online marketing revenue holds at RMB13.1 billion and whether the year-over-year decline narrows to within 15%; the second is whether the Legacy business falls below the first quarter's RMB10.2 billion[28]; the third is whether AI-native marketing returns to year-over-year growth and absorbs budgets leaving traditional ads; the fourth is whether Baidu App monthly active users in September return above 655 million and whether Baidu gives a timetable for monetizing AI search. If online marketing revenue is below RMB12.6 billion, AI-native marketing declines sequentially, or monthly active users keep falling, it would show that AI search is replacing advertising faster, the new products are not catching the budgets, and conversational apps are pulling users away from the search entry point.

After AI Cloud Infra revenue slipped in the second quarter, can it grow again in the third?

AI Cloud Infra is Baidu's main business for offsetting the advertising decline, but its cost structure is completely different from advertising. Second-quarter revenue in this line was RMB7.3 billion, up 50% year over year and 29% of General Business revenue[7]. Cloud must buy servers first and then charge by usage, and depreciation, bandwidth and custody fees do not fall when revenue falls; that is why General Business cost of revenues rose 15% to RMB51.5 billion in 2025[16], and General Business gross margin was 44.5% in the second quarter of 2026 versus 49.7% a year earlier[12].

Growth in the AI cloud sub-lines is still accelerating, but the total fell sequentially in the second quarter without explanation. AI Cloud Infra revenue was RMB5.8 billion in the fourth quarter of 2025, jumped to RMB8.8 billion in the first quarter of 2026, up 79% year over year[28], and slipped to RMB7.3 billion in the second quarter, up 50% year over year and down 17% sequentially, while GPU Cloud growth accelerated from 184% to 283% year over year[7]. Qianfan MaaS revenue from external customer token usage grew more than ninefold, and revenue from embodied AI customers grew about sixfold[15]. Management guided for strong second-half growth with potential for further acceleration[8], but also acknowledged that global AI computing supply remains constrained[27], and on the first-quarter call it said domestic chip manufacturing capacity and supply chains were not keeping up with demand[26]; Baidu has not explained the second-quarter sequential decline.

The financial chain starts with enterprise training and inference demand and reaches gross margin through capital spending and depreciation. Computing demand from internet, embodied AI, autonomous driving, smartphone and financial customers turns into rental of GPU and self-developed chip capacity and Qianfan model calls, which form AI Cloud Infra revenue and are booked in the "Others" revenue of General Business[15][6]; new capacity is first bought as servers through capital expenditures and then enters cost of revenue as depreciation, bandwidth and custody fees[16]. There are two explanations for the second-quarter decline: one is that the first quarter's RMB8.8 billion included project revenue from concentrated customer acceptances, in which case strong GPU Cloud growth continues and the total recovers with new projects; the other is that computing supply limited rentable capacity, in which case the total recovers only after new servers come online.

The third-quarter test is whether AI Cloud Infra returns above RMB8.8 billion, or at least does not fall below RMB7.3 billion[7]. The next questions are whether GPU Cloud keeps triple-digit growth, whether Baidu explains the second-quarter sequential decline, whether General Business gross margin holds at 44.5%, and what management now says about computing supply and production capacity for its self-developed Kunlun chips. Two consecutive sequential declines in AI Cloud Infra would show that the first quarter included one-time revenue; chip supply limits that leave too little rentable capacity, or a cloud price war that compresses gross margin, would also weaken this business's ability to offset the advertising decline.

With capital spending tripled, can Baidu's cash flow and margins hold up?

Baidu is paying for AI computing with its cash reserves and new borrowing, and the scale of spending now clearly exceeds operating cash flow. Second-quarter capital expenditures for Baidu excluding iQIYI were RMB11.37 billion, compared with RMB3.78 billion a year earlier[11], already close to the RMB12.1 billion spent in all of 2025[20], and free cash flow was negative RMB8.27 billion[11]. At the end of June, short-term loans were RMB26.3 billion and long-term loans RMB20.8 billion, versus RMB7.6 billion and RMB3.4 billion at the end of 2025[21]; total cash and investments of RMB283.1 billion are still enough to support several years of investment[5]. This equipment will turn into depreciation over the following quarters, and General Business depreciation and amortization has already risen to RMB2.32 billion from RMB2.01 billion a year earlier[29].

Management stresses that clear demand backs the investment, but cash and margin data do not yet show a payback. Management said Baidu remains in an active AI investment cycle, but most investments are driven by clear customer and internal demand, are put to work quickly and contribute to revenue relatively soon, and better supply chain management is improving capital efficiency[30]. Second-quarter operating cash flow of RMB3.10 billion fell far short of covering capital expenditures[11]. In 2025, Baidu recorded a RMB16.2 billion impairment on its Core asset group, citing the rapid iteration of AI technology, which shows that older equipment can lose value as technology changes[19]; the General Business non-GAAP operating margin was 15% in both the first and second quarters, below 17% a year earlier[12].

The key financial link is whether computing revenue keeps pace with rising depreciation. Buying GPU servers and network equipment and building data centers first drains cash as capital expenditures, and the equipment becomes depreciation one to two quarters after it goes into service, raising General Business cost of revenue[20][29]. If the matching computing revenue grows in step, gross profit rises and operating cash flow improves; if revenue lags, margins fall, cash reserves and borrowing are steadily consumed, and Baidu could eventually record another asset impairment as it did in 2025[19]. An alternative explanation is that second-quarter capital spending reflected a concentrated arrival of equipment rather than a new normal; if third-quarter capital spending drops noticeably, free cash flow will improve on its own, but that would only show a change in spending pace, not that the investment has started to pay back.

In the third quarter, the questions are whether capital expenditures stay above RMB10 billion, whether free cash flow remains deeply negative, and whether operating cash flow improves meaningfully with cloud revenue. Equally important are the growth in General Business depreciation and amortization, whether the non-GAAP operating margin holds at 15%, whether borrowing keeps rising, and whether buyback and dividend policies change. If capital spending keeps expanding while cloud revenue does not grow, the cash gap widens; if depreciation grows faster than revenue, the margin falls below 15%; and technology changes could also bring a new round of asset impairments.

Risks and Falsifiers

Apollo Go's regulatory risk already turned into lower ride volume in the second quarter. Some domestic cities paused service because of regulation-related operational adjustments, Apollo Go fully driverless rides fell to about 1 million in the quarter, operations in those cities resumed only in August, and differing regulatory requirements across markets also constrain overseas expansion[27]. Baidu does not separately disclose Apollo Go revenue or losses; the business is still expanding, and management lists reaching unit economic break-even in more markets among its second-half priorities[8]. Lower ride volume delays break-even, while continued fleet and overseas spending dilutes General Business profit. If third-quarter ride volume recovers to more than 3 million per quarter and Baidu reports no new city suspensions, this risk would be falsified.

AI search replacing ad clicks is the risk with the most direct effect on profit. Generative answers respond to questions directly, so users click sponsored links less often[23], conversational apps built on foundation models by large internet companies are also pulling users away from the search entry point[22], and Baidu itself has deliberately delayed AI search monetization[15]. Online marketing still makes up half of General Business revenue at RMB13.1 billion in the second quarter, and the 19% year-over-year decline amounts to about RMB3.1 billion less revenue in one quarter; because advertising carries high gross margin, almost all of the decline falls through to operating profit[6]. If third-quarter online marketing revenue is not below RMB13.1 billion, the year-over-year decline narrows to within 15%, and Baidu App monthly active users stop falling, this risk assessment would be falsified.

Computing supply and price competition constrain both cloud revenue and cloud gross margin. U.S. export controls on high-end chips to China limit GPU purchases[25], production of self-developed chips is not keeping up with demand[26], and rivals such as Alibaba Cloud, Volcano Engine and Huawei compete in the same market for enterprise customers and on model-call pricing[22]. AI Cloud Infra revenue of RMB7.3 billion in the second quarter is the main growth source for General Business[7]; too little computing capacity would limit revenue, and price cuts would compress gross margin, which for General Business has already fallen from 49.7% to 44.5%[12]. If AI Cloud Infra revenue returns above RMB8.8 billion and General Business gross margin is not below 44.5%, this risk would be falsified.

The return on capital spending remains uncertain, and borrowing is rising quickly. Second-quarter capital expenditures were RMB11.37 billion, three times the year-earlier level, and free cash flow was negative RMB8.27 billion[11]; short-term loans rose from RMB7.6 billion at the end of 2025 to RMB26.3 billion, and long-term loans from RMB3.4 billion to RMB20.8 billion[21]; and in 2025 Baidu already recorded a RMB16.2 billion impairment, citing the rapid iteration of AI technology[19]. Simply annualizing the second-quarter pace gives more than RMB40 billion of capital spending a year, which would turn into depreciation over the following years; if revenue lags, another impairment could follow, and the RMB283.1 billion of cash and investments would be steadily drawn down[5]. If third-quarter free cash flow is better than the first quarter's negative RMB3.36 billion without a clear cut in capital spending, or if AI Cloud Infra revenue grows in step with capital spending, this risk would be falsified[11].

What to Watch Next

• Search ads: whether General Business online marketing revenue holds at the second-quarter level of RMB13.1 billion (down 19%); a decline narrowed to within 15% would signal stabilization, while a figure below RMB12.6 billion would show faster substitution by AI search.
• Search ads: whether Legacy revenue (RMB10.4 billion, versus RMB10.2 billion in the first quarter) breaks below RMB10.2 billion and whether AI-native marketing (RMB2.6 billion, flat) returns to growth; a sequential decline in AI-native marketing would show the new products are not catching the budgets.
• Search ads: whether Baidu App monthly active users (644 million in June 2026, 679 million in December 2025) return above 655 million in September, and whether Baidu gives a timetable for monetizing AI search.
• AI cloud: whether AI Cloud Infra revenue (RMB7.3 billion in the second quarter, RMB8.8 billion in the first) returns above RMB8.8 billion and GPU Cloud keeps triple-digit growth; two straight sequential declines would point to one-time first-quarter revenue.
• AI cloud: whether General Business gross margin (44.5%, versus 49.7% a year earlier) holds, and what management says about computing supply, chip capacity and pricing.
• Cash flow and margins: whether capital expenditures excluding iQIYI (RMB11.37 billion) stay above RMB10 billion and whether free cash flow (negative RMB8.27 billion) improves to better than negative RMB3.36 billion without a clear cut in spending.
• Cash flow and margins: whether the General Business non-GAAP operating margin (15%, versus 17%) and depreciation and amortization (RMB2.32 billion) stay in balance, along with changes in borrowing, buybacks and dividends; a margin below 15% or a new impairment would weaken the case.

Conclusion

Baidu's business is now driven by two forces pulling in opposite directions: its most profitable line, online marketing, keeps shrinking under the AI search transformation, falling 19% year over year to RMB13.1 billion in the second quarter[6], while its fastest-growing line, AI Cloud Infra, rose 50% to RMB7.3 billion but slipped sequentially from the first quarter's RMB8.8 billion[7]. To support cloud, Baidu raised second-quarter capital expenditures to RMB11.37 billion and free cash flow was negative RMB8.27 billion[11], while the General Business non-GAAP operating margin held at 15%[12]. The central unresolved relationship is whether cloud revenue can grow fast enough to offset lost advertising profit and start paying back the heavy capital spending before depreciation rises.

After the August 18 results, the only independent commentary found with specific data and a clear judgment was an August 20 piece by the Robot Belt editorial team[31]. It argued that Baidu's second quarter had the same cash-flow profile as Tencent's: revenue down 4% year over year, attributable net profit down 68%, capital expenditures of RMB11.39 billion, roughly three times the prior-year level, and a free cash outflow of RMB7.954 billion; it read the spending as defensive, aimed at protecting Baidu's AI cloud and Ernie model position, and treated RMB283.1 billion of cash and investments as the buffer for continued spending[31]. That reading maps directly onto the capital-spending debate, and its RMB11.39 billion and negative RMB7.954 billion are group figures including iQIYI, slightly different from the RMB11.37 billion and negative RMB8.27 billion excluding iQIYI used above[11]. Because it is the only independent piece, it represents one outside perspective rather than a shared market view; other coverage in the period consisted mainly of share-price news, buyback announcements and law-firm notices.

If the third quarter shows the following combination together, it would indicate that cloud is starting to absorb the advertising decline: online marketing holding at RMB13.1 billion with the year-over-year decline narrowed to within 15%, AI Cloud Infra back above RMB8.8 billion, General Business gross margin not below 44.5%, and operating cash flow improving with cloud revenue. Conversely, if online marketing falls below RMB12.6 billion and AI Cloud Infra declines sequentially for a second quarter while capital spending stays above RMB10 billion and the non-GAAP operating margin falls below 15%, the defensive spending Robot Belt described would look more like an outlay with an unclear return[31].

Sources

[1] BIDU 20-F filed 2026-03-17 employees and app · 2026-03-17 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526109289/d38065d20f.htm

[2] BIDU 20-F filed 2026-03-17 revenue by type · 2026-03-17 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526109289/d38065d20f.htm

[3] BIDU 20-F filed 2026-03-17 AI-powered business · 2026-03-17 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526109289/d38065d20f.htm

[4] BIDU 6-K filed 2026-10-27 Q3 2026 results date · 2026-10-27 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526432580/d179452dex991.htm

[5] BIDU 6-K filed 2026-08-18 Q2 2026 results · 2026-08-18 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526355431/d112854dex991.htm

[6] BIDU 6-K filed 2026-08-18 Q2 2026 online marketing · 2026-08-18 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526355431/d112854dex991.htm

[7] BIDU 6-K filed 2026-08-18 Q2 2026 AI-powered business · 2026-08-18 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526355431/d112854dex991.htm

[8] BIDU Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-18 guidance · 2026-08-18 · earnings-call · https://ir.baidu.com

[9] Drillr analyst estimates 2026-11-10 BIDU Q3 2026 · 2026-11-10 · Drillr 分析师预期汇总 · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[10] Zacks via Yahoo Finance 2026-10-29 BIDU Q3 2026 estimates · 2026-10-29 · Zacks · https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/baidu-inc-bidu-sees-more-204503932.html

[11] BIDU 6-K filed 2026-08-18 Q2 2026 cash flow · 2026-08-18 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526355431/d112854dex991.htm

[12] BIDU 6-K filed 2026-08-18 Q2 2026 segment table · 2026-08-18 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526355431/d112854dex991.htm

[13] BIDU 20-F filed 2026-03-17 segment results · 2026-03-17 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526109289/d38065d20f.htm

[14] BIDU 20-F filed 2026-03-17 P4P and sales channels · 2026-03-17 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526109289/d38065d20f.htm

[15] BIDU Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-18 AI search and cloud · 2026-08-18 · earnings-call · https://ir.baidu.com

[16] BIDU 20-F filed 2026-03-17 general business costs · 2026-03-17 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526109289/d38065d20f.htm

[17] BIDU 6-K filed 2026-08-18 Q2 2026 income statement · 2026-08-18 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526355431/d112854dex991.htm

[18] BIDU 20-F filed 2026-03-17 · 2026-03-17 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526109289/d38065d20f.htm

[19] BIDU 20-F filed 2026-03-17 impairment · 2026-03-17 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526109289/d38065d20f.htm

[20] BIDU 20-F filed 2026-03-17 capital expenditures · 2026-03-17 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526109289/d38065d20f.htm

[21] BIDU 6-K filed 2026-08-18 Q2 2026 borrowings · 2026-08-18 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526355431/d112854dex991.htm

[22] BIDU 20-F filed 2026-03-17 competition · 2026-03-17 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526109289/d38065d20f.htm

[23] BIDU 20-F filed 2026-03-17 online marketing risk · 2026-03-17 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526109289/d38065d20f.htm

[24] BIDU 6-K filed 2026-08-18 Q2 2026 marketing and app users · 2026-08-18 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526355431/d112854dex991.htm

[25] BIDU 20-F filed 2026-03-17 export controls · 2026-03-17 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526109289/d38065d20f.htm

[26] BIDU Q1 2026 earnings call 2026-05-18 · 2026-05-18 · earnings-call · https://ir.baidu.com

[27] BIDU Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-18 risks and Apollo Go · 2026-08-18 · earnings-call · https://ir.baidu.com

[28] BIDU 6-K filed 2026-05-18 Q1 2026 AI-powered business · 2026-05-18 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526228123/d156481dex991.htm

[29] BIDU 6-K filed 2026-08-18 Q2 2026 depreciation · 2026-08-18 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000119312526355431/d112854dex991.htm

[30] BIDU Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-18 investment and margins · 2026-08-18 · earnings-call · https://ir.baidu.com

[31] Robot Belt 2026-08-20 Baidu Q2 capex triples · 2026-08-20 · Robot Belt · https://robotbelt.com/baidu-q2-capital-spend-triples-ai-first-tier/