[ITUB] Itaú Unibanco: Q3 2026 earnings preview on loan growth and cost of credit
Summary
Itaú Unibanco earned R$12.4 billion in 2Q26 with loans up 9.6% and cost of credit at 2.7%; Q3 tests whether near-10% growth keeps that ratio flat.
Itaú Unibanco, Brazil's largest bank by total assets, lends to individuals and companies and runs credit cards, merchant acquiring, asset management and insurance; in this Q3 2026 earnings preview, the bank reports 3Q26, the three months ended September 30, 2026, on 2026-11-03[1]. In the latest disclosed quarter, 2Q26, recurring managerial result was R$12.407 billion, up 1.0% from the prior quarter and 7.8% from a year earlier, with an annualized recurring ROE of 24.3%; the credit portfolio reached R$1.5224 trillion at the end of June, up 9.6% year over year, and the 90-day nonperforming loan ratio held at 1.9% for the sixth straight quarter[2], while cost of credit stayed at 2.7% of the average portfolio[3]. The bank gives full-year guidance only. On August 4 it cut its 2026 growth range for commissions, fees and insurance results from 5.0%-9.0% to 2.0%-5.0%, citing more capital-market volatility than it had assumed at the start of the year, and kept every other line unchanged[4]: credit portfolio growth of 5.5%-9.5%, growth in financial margin with clients of 5.0%-9.0%, cost of credit of R$38.5-43.5 billion, non-interest expense growth of 1.5%-5.5% and an effective tax rate of 29.5%-32.5%[5]. The Drillr earnings calendar, updated October 21, shows a 3Q26 consensus of $0.22 of earnings per ADS and $9.585 billion of revenue; the same source had expected $0.22 and $9.293 billion for 2Q26, against actual figures of $0.21 and $9.073 billion, and its revenue is a dollar figure on the data provider's basis that cannot be converted directly into the bank's managerial operating revenues in reais[1].
Three things matter most in the 3Q26 results. The first is whether cost of credit can stay at 2.7% while the portfolio keeps growing close to 10%: growth is concentrated in mortgages and private-sector payroll loans, yet the 90-day NPL ratio for very small, small and middle-market companies in Brazil has risen from 1.6% in March 2025 to 2.0%[6], and the third quarter will show whether the lower risk of secured products still outweighs that normalization. The second is whether margin with clients can get back in line with full-year guidance: it rose only 4.8% year over year in the first half, below the bottom of the 5.0%-9.0% range[7], while its annualized rate fell from 9.4% to 9.1% over a year[8], so the quarter will show whether balance growth or spread dilution is winning. The third is whether the reduced fee guidance holds: commissions, fees and insurance results rose 3.6% year over year in 2Q26, with current-account revenue from individuals down 21.2% and payments and collections down 7.5%, while asset management, brokerage and insurance filled the gap[9]; the third quarter carries no performance fees, which gives a cleaner read on whether that offset can last.
Company Background and Business Structure
Itaú Unibanco is Brazil's largest bank by assets and its largest private-sector bank, holding 15.0% of banking-system assets with R$2.742 trillion of total assets at the end of 2025[10]. The company is listed in Brazil, and its preferred shares trade on the New York Stock Exchange as ADRs under the ticker ITUB. At the end of June 2026 the group had R$3.227 trillion of total assets and 90,429 employees[11], and it ran 2,210 branches and client service points in Brazil, down from 2,738 a year earlier[12]. Itaú acquired control of Avenue in January 2026, and Avenue's results have been consolidated into the managerial income statement from 2026[13].
The bank manages three segments, and the retail and wholesale businesses generate most of its profit. The retail business serves individuals (the Retail, Uniclass and Personnalité client tiers) and very small and small companies, offering credit cards, personal loans, payroll loans, mortgages, vehicle loans, merchant acquiring, investments, insurance, pension plans and premium bonds[14]; in 2Q26 it produced R$30.243 billion of operating revenues, R$5.491 billion of recurring managerial result and a 27.4% return on allocated capital, with a R$613.9 billion loan book[15]. The wholesale business comprises Itaú BBA, which handles large companies and investment banking, the units abroad, private banking, and middle-market and institutional clients[16]; in 2Q26 it posted R$15.225 billion of operating revenues and R$5.614 billion of recurring managerial result, while Activities with the Market + Corporation, which carries the capital surplus, the margin with the market and treasury costs, earned R$1.302 billion[15]. Under Brazilian accounting for full-year 2025, net income was R$19.130 billion for retail, R$23.006 billion for wholesale and R$4.694 billion for market and corporation[17].
Profit is heavily concentrated in Brazil, and the Latin American operations are smaller and earn lower returns. In 2Q26, operations in Brazil, including units abroad outside Latin America, generated 94.6% of recurring managerial result, while the Latin American operations in countries such as Chile and Colombia earned an ROE of 12.3%[18], against 25.7% in Brazil[11]; at the end of June the Brazilian credit portfolio stood at R$1.2694 trillion and the Latin American portfolio at R$253.0 billion[7]. The business chain is straightforward: the bank gathers demand, savings and time deposits and issues financial bills, lends to individuals and companies, and earns the margin with clients after funding costs; it charges fees for cards, accounts, acquiring, asset management, brokerage and investment banking, and its insurance subsidiaries collect premiums. After cost of credit, claims, non-interest expenses and taxes, the remaining profit builds Common Equity Tier 1 capital, most of which is paid out as dividends and interest on capital.
Financial History and Current Position
Under IFRS, Itaú's 2025 profit growth came from interest income and lower credit losses, while non-interest income fell sharply. Operating revenues were R$167.780 billion, down 0.2% from R$168.050 billion in 2024; within that, net interest income rose 8.5% to R$112.724 billion and non-interest income fell 14.2% to R$55.056 billion, while expected credit loss on financial assets fell 10.8% to R$28.833 billion[19]. Net income attributable to owners of the parent rose 9.2% to R$44.857 billion from R$41.085 billion[20], with a 21.6% return on average equity; the managerial efficiency ratio for the year was 38.8% (36.9% in Brazil), and gross dividends and interest on capital totaled R$33.7 billion, a 72.0% payout[21]. Loan and lease operations ended the year at R$1.0838 trillion, up 5.7%, including R$473.2 billion of loans to individuals, with mortgages up 13.0% and credit cards up 7.3%[22]; the CET1 ratio fell from 13.7% at the end of 2024 to 12.3%, on risk-weighted assets of R$1.505 trillion[23].
First-half 2026 managerial figures show profit growing faster than revenue. Recurring managerial result for the half was R$24.689 billion, up 9.1%, and recurring ROE was 24.5%, up 1.7 percentage points[2]; operating revenues rose 4.6% to R$94.807 billion, margin with clients rose 4.8% to R$64.062 billion, cost of credit rose 5.9% to R$20.091 billion and non-interest expenses rose 3.9% to R$32.915 billion[7], while commissions, fees and insurance results rose 4.4% to R$28.116 billion[9]. From 2026 the bank reclassified some managerial lines and consolidated Avenue, so the 2025 base behind the guidance is an adjusted figure[13], and first-half growth rates can only be compared with the full-year ranges approximately.
The second quarter shows stable earnings and a stable balance sheet, but sequential profit growth has slowed. 2Q26 operating revenues were R$47.985 billion, margin with clients R$32.557 billion, cost of credit R$10.139 billion and non-interest expenses R$16.728 billion, and recurring managerial result of R$12.407 billion was up only 1.0% from the first quarter[7]; the efficiency ratio was 37.4%[11], or 35.5% in Brazil[4]. At the end of June the CET1 ratio was 12.3%, the liquidity coverage ratio 202.0% and stockholders' equity R$208.5 billion, and dividends and interest on capital declared for the quarter came to R$3.787 billion net of taxes[11].
Operating Model
About two-thirds of Itaú's revenue comes from margin with clients, which is the product of average balances, the annualized rate and the number of days. Managerial operating revenues are the sum of margin with clients, margin with the market, commissions and fees, and insurance revenues before claims: the R$47.985 billion in 2Q26 consisted of R$32.557 billion, R$0.931 billion, R$11.028 billion and R$3.469 billion[7], so margin with clients made up about 67.8%. Margin with clients is roughly average balance times the annualized rate: in 2Q26 the average balance was R$1.477 trillion at a 9.1% rate, including spread-sensitive operations with a R$1.340 trillion average balance at 8.8%, contributing R$28.625 billion, and own working capital of R$137.4 billion at 12.0%, contributing R$3.931 billion[8]. Within fees, card issuance brought in R$3.279 billion, asset management R$1.997 billion, payments and collections R$1.956 billion and advisory and brokerage R$1.259 billion[9]; balance growth lifts the margin in the same quarter, while changes in product mix and funding cost show up in the rate over the following quarters.
Profit is what remains after cost of credit, claims, non-interest expenses and taxes, and cost of credit is the line that reacts most slowly and most unevenly to new lending. In 2Q26, R$47.985 billion of operating revenues less R$10.139 billion of cost of credit, R$0.408 billion of claims, R$16.728 billion of non-interest expenses and R$2.883 billion of ISS, PIS, COFINS and other taxes left R$17.828 billion of pre-tax income; after R$5.044 billion of income tax and R$0.377 billion of minority interests, recurring managerial result was R$12.407 billion[7]. The efficiency ratio divides non-interest expenses by the sum of managerial financial margin, fees, insurance results and tax expenses, and it was 37.4% in 2Q26[11]. New loans draw expected-loss provisions in the quarter they are booked, but delinquency takes several quarters to emerge, so loan growth adds to the margin quickly while the pressure on cost of credit arrives with a lag.
As a bank, Itaú is constrained by its funding structure and capital ratios rather than by operating cash flow. At the end of June, funding from clients was R$1.500 trillion, including R$127.7 billion of demand deposits, R$172.2 billion of savings deposits, R$823.0 billion of time deposits and R$377.4 billion of financial bills and repurchase agreements, and total funding including other sources was R$1.718 trillion[24]; the loan-to-funding ratio was 80.3% and the net stable funding ratio 122.1%[11]. On the capital side, profit builds CET1 capital while loan growth consumes risk-weighted assets: in 2Q26 risk-weighted assets rose R$21.1 billion to R$1.582 trillion, CET1 capital was R$194.742 billion and the CET1 ratio recovered from 12.0% to 12.3%[25]. In September the bank issued R$5.0 billion of Tier 2 subordinated financial bills, which it estimated would add about 30 basis points to the Tier 2 ratio[26], and decided to repurchase, on September 21 and October 21, R$11 billion of Tier 2 bills issued in 2021, with an estimated impact of about 70 basis points[27].
Industry and Competitive Position
Brazilian banking is dominated by a few large private and state-owned banks, and Itaú ranks first by assets. At the end of 2025 Itaú held 15.0% of system assets, followed by state-owned Banco do Brasil (13.4%) and Caixa Econômica Federal (12.0%) and private-sector Bradesco (10.6%) and Santander Brasil (7.0%); Itaú, Bradesco and Santander together held 32.5% of system assets, and the three state-owned institutions, Banco do Brasil, Caixa and BNDES, held 30.7%[10].
Itaú leads in retail lending and credit cards, but digital competitors are squeezing it. According to the Central Bank, Itaú had a 10.7% share of loans to individuals at the end of 2025, the largest among private-sector banks, and a 21.4% share of credit card balances, still first in the market but lower than at the end of 2024[28]. The annual report says digital competitors such as Nubank, Mercado Pago and Banco Inter have intensified competition in credit cards in recent years[28], and Nubank has entered Brazil's top ten banks by assets with 1.4% of the system[10].
Itaú's advantage shows up in returns and efficiency, but that advantage is sensitive to the interest-rate cycle, credit quality among individuals and price competition in payments. Its recurring ROE was 24.5% in the first half of 2026[2], and its efficiency ratio in Brazil was 35.5% in 2Q26[4], which the bank attributes to productivity gains from technology investment over the past few years. The available comparison covers peers' asset size only, without same-period peer returns or fee data, so these advantages can be measured only against Itaú's own history rather than line by line against competitors.
Core Debates
Can growth led by mortgages and private-sector payroll loans keep the cost of credit at 2.7% of the portfolio while the book grows close to 10%?
Cost of credit is the largest deduction on Itaú's income statement after non-interest expenses, and whether it stays stable decides how much loan growth turns into profit. First-half 2026 cost of credit was R$20.091 billion[7], roughly 31% of margin with clients over the same period, and the bank's full-year guidance of R$38.5-43.5 billion is a wide range[5]. On a portfolio of about R$1.5 trillion, each 0.1 percentage point rise in the cost-of-credit ratio adds about R$1.5 billion of annualized losses, around 3% of the R$12.4 billion recurring result in 2Q26. Cost of credit was R$10.139 billion in 2Q26, R$9.952 billion in 1Q26 and R$9.443 billion in 2Q25[7]; summing the segment data gives about R$9.448 billion for 3Q25 and R$9.710 billion for 4Q25, and the ratio has held at 2.7% for five consecutive quarters[29].
The evidence shows stable loss rates, but there are two explanations for that stability. Management attributes it to several years of changes in portfolio mix and credit-granting models[2]: in 2Q26 mortgages reached R$152.2 billion, up 3.9% in the quarter and 13.3% over the year, payroll loans R$81.3 billion, up 3.5%, and credit cards R$150.4 billion, up only 0.1%, while personal loans and vehicle loans shrank 0.6% and 1.7% in the quarter[7]; within payroll loans, the private sector accounted for about R$11.1 billion, up 14.3% in the quarter, with about R$47.9 billion from INSS pensioners and R$22.2 billion from the public sector[30]. The other explanation is that stable delinquency partly reflects the denominator effect of a fast-growing book and portfolio sales: in 2Q26 the bank sold R$2.2 billion of written-off loans and R$606.9 million of performing loans[29]; the 90-day NPL ratio for very small, small and middle-market companies in Brazil has climbed each quarter from 1.6% in March 2025 to 2.0%, the ratio for individuals in Brazil rose to 3.7% after five quarters at 3.6%[6], and private-sector payroll loans have not yet been through a full delinquency cycle.
The debate reaches profit through two paths, balances and losses. Expansion in mortgages and private-sector payroll loans lifted the credit portfolio 9.6% year over year, or 10.3% excluding currency effects[7], and higher average balances raise margin with clients; at the same time, new loans and the end of grace periods on government programs for smaller companies push up 15-90 day delinquency and NPL creation first, and then expected-loss expenses and cost of credit. The 15-90 day NPL ratio was 1.8% in 2Q26, compared with 2.0% in September 2025[6]; NPL creation was R$10.657 billion, or 0.8% of the portfolio, up 0.1 percentage point from the prior quarter, and renegotiated loans totaled R$36.3 billion, or 2.6% of the portfolio[31]. What remains unresolved is when the normalization among new client groups and smaller companies will fully reach 90-day delinquency and cost of credit.
In 3Q26, investors should watch whether the cost-of-credit ratio stays at 2.7% and whether year-over-year portfolio growth stays at or above the 5.5% bottom of the guidance range[5], along with the 15-90 day NPL ratio against 2.0% a year earlier, whether the smaller-company 90-day ratio keeps rising 0.1 percentage point a quarter, and whether private-sector payroll loans keep growing at double digits sequentially. If the cost-of-credit ratio rises above 2.8% or the total 90-day NPL ratio reaches 2.0%, the lower risk of secured products has been offset by normalization among smaller companies and new client groups; if portfolio growth drops below 5.5%, the stable loss rate may simply reflect a lower appetite for risk.
With first-half margin with clients up only 4.8%, can balance growth outrun the dilution from lower-spread products and time deposits and bring the year back into the 5%-9% guidance?
Margin with clients is Itaú's largest source of revenue, and its growth rate decides whether the full-year revenue plan still works after the fee guidance cut. In 2Q26 margin with clients was R$32.557 billion, about two-thirds of operating revenues; for the first half it totaled R$64.062 billion, up 4.8% year over year[7], below the bottom of the unchanged 5.0%-9.0% full-year growth guidance[5]. Because the 2025 base behind the guidance has been adjusted for reclassifications and the Avenue consolidation, including moving discounts on loans up to 90 days overdue from margin with clients to cost of credit and moving the net margin on acquiring receivables discounting to commissions[13], first-half growth and the guidance range can only be compared approximately.
The second quarter improved sequentially while the rate has drifted down over the year, and both explanations have support. Margin with clients rose 3.3% from 1Q26, which the bank attributes to higher average balances, one more calendar day and higher revenue from structured operations in wholesale; it rose 5.1% from a year earlier because of portfolio growth, a higher liabilities' margin and a better product mix[8]. But the annualized rate fell from 9.4% in 2Q25 to 9.2% in 3Q25 and has stayed at 9.1% for the three quarters since, while the rate on spread-sensitive operations slipped from 8.9% in 1Q26 to 8.8%[8]; funding growth came mainly from time deposits, up 15.0% year over year, while demand deposits grew only 3.4% and savings deposits fell 0.6%[24]. Management argues that balance growth and the liabilities' margin are enough to support revenue; the other explanation is that secured products with better credit quality naturally carry lower spreads, so the faster they grow, the more the rate is diluted, leaving revenue growth near the bottom of the guidance range.
The mechanism is balances multiplied by the rate and the number of days. In 2Q26 the average balance was R$1.477 trillion at a 9.1% annualized rate[8], and the third quarter has 92 days, one more than the second; the rate is shaped at the same time by product mix, the liabilities' margin and the policy rate, and the yield on own working capital rose from 11.3% in 1Q26 to 12.0% in 2Q26[8]. Time deposits reached R$823.0 billion in 2Q26, up 4.3% in the quarter, while savings deposits were flat at R$172.2 billion[24], which means new liabilities cost more. What remains unresolved is how much further the rate will fall while balances grow close to 10%; the risk-adjusted rate rose from 6.1% in 1Q26 to 6.2%[8], which suggests the better credit quality of low-spread products is still offsetting part of the dilution.
In 3Q26, investors should watch whether margin with clients grows more than 5.2% year over year and whether the annualized rate holds at 9.1%, as well as sequential growth in the average balance of spread-sensitive operations and whether demand and savings deposits stay flat. If year-over-year growth in the third quarter is below 5%, reaching the bottom of the full-year range would require a clear acceleration in the fourth quarter; if the rate falls below 9.1% while balances keep growing quickly, the growth mix is trading spread for credit quality.
After the fee guidance was cut to 2%-5%, can asset management, brokerage and insurance offset lower account-package fees and shrinking payments revenue?
Commissions, fees and insurance results make up about 30% of Itaú's operating revenues and were the only 2026 guidance line the bank lowered. The line was R$14.089 billion in 2Q26[9], and in August the bank cut its full-year growth guidance from 5.0%-9.0% to 2.0%-5.0%, attributing the change to more capital-market volatility than it had assumed at the start of the year[4]. The bank is also deliberately lowering account-package prices in exchange for deeper client relationships[2]; whether that strategy works depends on whether investment products, brokerage and insurance can fill the revenue gap left by the price cuts.
Growth in both the quarter and the half fell inside the reduced range, but the components moved in opposite directions. Commissions, fees and insurance results rose 3.6% year over year in 2Q26 and 4.4% in the first half; the declines were concentrated in current-account revenue from individuals (R$501 million, down 21.2%) and payments and collections (R$1.956 billion, down 7.5%), even though acquiring transaction volume still rose 23.5% to R$298.7 billion[9]. The bank attributes the declines to deliberately better package terms for clients[32], fee waivers under the Mais Vantagens program for business clients, and higher funding costs and a changed transaction mix in acquiring[9]. The growth came from asset management (R$1.997 billion, up 7.3%), advisory and brokerage (R$1.259 billion, up 32.5%) and insurance results (R$3.061 billion, up 8.7%)[9]. Management attributes the guidance cut to the cyclical factor of capital-market volatility; the other explanation is that instant payments and digital-bank competition are pushing account and payment pricing down for the long term, and capital-market businesses are only masking that temporarily.
The debate works through two sets of forces that offset each other. Fee waivers on individual and business account packages, the Pix instant-payment system and higher acquiring funding costs reduce current-account and payments revenue; fund balances, investment-banking underwriting, brokerage activity among individuals and premium growth lift asset management, advisory and brokerage, and insurance results[9]. What remains unresolved is how durable the capital-market revenue is: performance fees on fund management are recognized only in the second and fourth quarters[32], so the third quarter will carry none, and whether asset management and brokerage can sustain year-over-year growth will reflect the underlying business more directly.
In 3Q26, investors should watch whether commissions, fees and insurance results grow at least 2% year over year, whether the decline in payments and collections narrows, how much current-account revenue from individuals falls from the prior quarter, whether asset management and brokerage keep growing year over year without performance fees, and how fast insurance results grow. If year-over-year growth in the third quarter is below 2%, even the reduced guidance is at risk; if the decline in payments and collections widens while acquiring volume keeps growing quickly, the pricing pressure is structural rather than a product of capital-market volatility.
Risks and Falsifiers
If non-interest expenses outgrow revenue, the efficiency ratio will stop improving. Non-interest expenses rose 3.9% year over year in the first half of 2026 and were R$16.728 billion in 2Q26, up 3.3% from the prior quarter, with personnel costs pushed up by the 5.68% collective wage adjustment that took effect in September 2025[12]; full-year guidance calls for growth of 1.5%-5.5%[5]. If this year's collective wage adjustment also takes effect in September while fee guidance has already been cut, expenses growing at the first-half pace would make it hard for the 37.4% efficiency ratio of 2Q26 to keep falling. The observation that would falsify this risk is non-interest expense growth of no more than 5.5% year over year in 3Q26 together with a quarterly efficiency ratio no higher than the 38.8% of 3Q25[12].
Fast loan growth keeps consuming the capital buffer and the capacity to pay dividends. The CET1 ratio was 12.3% at the end of June, down from 13.1% a year earlier[11], and risk-weighted assets rose R$21.1 billion in 2Q26[25]; the 2025 payout was 72.0%, or R$33.7 billion[21]. The R$5.0 billion Tier 2 issue in September was estimated to add about 30 basis points[26], while the repurchase of R$11 billion of older bills was estimated to subtract about 70 basis points[27], a net reduction of about 40 basis points in the total capital ratio; the BIS ratio was 15.4% at the end of June, 3.8 percentage points above the minimum including buffers[25]. Management calculated a 2Q26 ROE of 25.1% on a CET1 of 11.5%[3]. The observation that would falsify this risk is a CET1 ratio of at least 12.3% at the end of September.
Normalizing delinquency among smaller companies and a new client group in private-sector payroll loans could push loss rates up at the same time. The 90-day NPL ratio for very small, small and middle-market companies in Brazil rose from 1.6% in March 2025 to 2.0% in June 2026, and their 15-90 day ratio was 1.5%[6]; private-sector payroll loans total about R$11.1 billion, grew 14.3% in a single quarter and have no full delinquency cycle behind them[30]. This risk hits cost of credit (R$10.139 billion in 2Q26, against full-year guidance of R$38.5-43.5 billion)[5], where each 0.1 percentage point rise in the ratio equals about R$1.5 billion a year. The observation that would falsify this risk is a 3Q26 cost-of-credit ratio no higher than 2.7% and a smaller-company 90-day NPL ratio no higher than 2.1%.
If lower-spread products and time deposits keep leading growth, margin with clients could stay below the bottom of full-year guidance. Margin with clients rose 4.8% year over year in the first half[7], the annualized rate fell 0.3 percentage point over a year[8], and time deposits grew 15.0% year over year while demand and savings deposits were roughly flat[24]. This risk hits margin with clients, about two-thirds of operating revenues, and first-half growth sits about 0.2 percentage point below the bottom of the guidance range. The observation that would falsify this risk is year-over-year growth in margin with clients of at least 5.2% in 3Q26 with an annualized rate of at least 9.1%.
Account and payment pricing may be in structural decline rather than a cyclical dip. Current-account revenue from individuals fell 21.2% year over year and payments and collections fell 7.5%, while acquiring volume rose 23.5%, which means both unit prices and funding costs are compressing revenue[9]; the annual report says digital competitors have intensified credit card competition, and Itaú's share of card balances is 21.4%[28]. This risk hits commissions, fees and insurance results (R$14.089 billion in 2Q26), including R$1.956 billion from payments and collections and R$501 million from current accounts for individuals[9]. The observation that would falsify this risk is a year-over-year decline in payments and collections of less than 5% in 3Q26 together with growth of at least 2% in commissions, fees and insurance results.
What to Watch Next
- Secured lending and cost of credit: the cost-of-credit ratio was 2.7% in 2Q26 and the portfolio grew 9.6% year over year. A ratio no higher than 2.7% with growth of at least 7.5% would confirm the current reading; a ratio above 2.8% or growth below 5.5% would contradict it.
- Delinquency: the 15-90 day NPL ratio was 1.8% (2.0% in September 2025) and the smaller-company 90-day ratio was 2.0%. A smaller-company ratio no higher than 2.1% would confirm; a total 90-day ratio of 2.0% would contradict.
- Margin with clients: growth was 5.1% year over year in 2Q26 and 4.8% in the first half, at a 9.1% rate. Growth of at least 5.2% with the rate at or above 9.1% would confirm; growth below 5% or a rate below 9.1% would contradict.
- Fees and insurance: the line grew 3.6% in 2Q26 and payments and collections fell 7.5%. Growth of at least 2% with the payments decline narrowing to within 5% would confirm; growth below 2% would contradict.
- Expenses and capital: the 2Q26 efficiency ratio was 37.4% and CET1 was 12.3%. Expense growth no higher than 5.5%, an efficiency ratio no higher than 38.8% and CET1 of at least 12.3% would confirm.
Conclusion
Three forces drive Itaú's results: loan growth led by mortgages and payroll loans lifts margin with clients, the cost-of-credit ratio decides how much of that growth stays as profit, and the fee and insurance business balances lower account and payment pricing against growth in capital markets and insurance. In 2Q26 the bank earned R$12.407 billion of recurring managerial result at a 24.3% ROE, grew its portfolio 9.6% year over year, and held cost of credit at 2.7% and the 90-day NPL ratio at 1.9%[2], with a CET1 ratio of 12.3%[11]. The central open question is whether close to 10% portfolio growth can preserve both a 2.7% loss rate and a 9.1% rate, and still deliver the full-year revenue plan after the fee guidance cut.
Between the 2Q26 release on August 4 and October 22, the public material available consisted mainly of restatements of the results, brief broker notes and data aggregation pages; it contained no signed, reasoned independent assessment that addressed these three debates directly. The analysis here therefore rests only on the bank's own disclosures and the Drillr earnings calendar, and readers cannot use it to see how market participants weigh cost of credit, spread dilution and fee repricing against one another.
The combination that would materially strengthen the current understanding is a 3Q26 cost-of-credit ratio still at 2.7% with portfolio growth of at least 7.5%, margin with clients growing more than 5.2% year over year at a rate of at least 9.1%, commissions, fees and insurance results up at least 2%, and a CET1 ratio of at least 12.3% at the end of September. Conversely, a cost-of-credit ratio above 2.8% with smaller-company delinquency still climbing, margin with clients growing less than 5% with the rate below 9.1%, or a widening decline in payments and collections while acquiring volume keeps growing quickly would show that Itaú's high returns rely on a lower appetite for risk or on trading spread for quality, rather than on a sustainable growth mix.
Sources
[1] Drillr earnings calendar (updated 2026-10-21) · ITUB 2026-11-03 3Q26 estimates · 2026-10-21 · Drillr earnings calendar
[2] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-05 · 2Q26 results press release highlights · 2026-08-05 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000215/eng_pressreleasex2t26.htm
[3] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · management commentary 2Q26 · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[4] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-05 · 2Q26 results press release · 2026-08-05 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000215/eng_pressreleasex2t26.htm
[5] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · 2026 forecast · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[6] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · NPL ratios · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[7] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · income statement and credit portfolio 2Q26 · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[8] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · financial margin with clients · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[9] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · commissions, fees and insurance · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[10] ITUB 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · competition and ten largest banks · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000132/itub-20251231.htm
[11] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · managerial income summary · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[12] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · non-interest expenses and efficiency · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[13] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-10-05 (2025 Reference Form) · 2026 guidance basis and Avenue consolidation · 2026-10-05 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000240/pdfcvm-englishversion.htm
[14] ITUB 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · Retail Business 2025 · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000132/itub-20251231.htm
[15] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · retail and wholesale segments · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[16] ITUB 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · Wholesale Business 2025 · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000132/itub-20251231.htm
[17] ITUB 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · 2025 results by business segment · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000132/itub-20251231.htm
[18] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · results by region · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[19] ITUB 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · 2025 summarized consolidated income statement · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000132/itub-20251231.htm
[20] ITUB 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · 2025 net income drivers · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000132/itub-20251231.htm
[21] ITUB 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · 2025 main accomplishments · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000132/itub-20251231.htm
[22] ITUB 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · 2025 loan and lease operations by type · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000132/itub-20251231.htm
[23] ITUB 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · 2025 capital adequacy · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000132/itub-20251231.htm
[24] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · funding · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[25] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · capital ratios · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[26] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-09-11 · Tier 2 subordinated financial bills issuance · 2026-09-11 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000230/
[27] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-09-18 · repurchase of Tier 2 subordinated financial bills · 2026-09-18 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000234/
[28] ITUB 20-F filed 2026-04-30 · individuals loans and credit card market share · 2026-04-30 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000132/itub-20251231.htm
[29] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · cost of credit · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[30] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · credit portfolio detail · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[31] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · renegotiated loans and NPL creation · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm
[32] ITUB 6-K filed 2026-08-07 (2Q26 MD&A) · current account fees and fund management · 2026-08-07 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132597/000113259726000223/managementdiscussionanal.htm