[BSBR] Santander Brasil: Q3 2026 earnings preview on credit costs and client spread

Santander Brasil, the Brazilian commercial bank controlled by Spain's Banco Santander, lends to individuals, small and medium-sized companies and large corporates and sells credit cards, auto consumer finance, current accounts, asset management and insurance; in this Q3 2026 earnings preview, the Drillr earnings calendar shows the bank reporting 3Q26 (quarter ended 2026-09-30) on 2026-10-28[1]. In the latest disclosed quarter, 2Q26, recurring managerial net profit was R$3.014 billion, down 20.4% from the prior quarter and 17.6% from a year earlier, and recurring ROAE fell to 12.5% from 16.4% a year before[2]. In the same quarter client net interest income (NII) was R$16.058 billion, down 0.4% year over year, and the result from loan losses was R$7.654 billion, up 20.6% from the prior quarter[3], while the expanded loan portfolio reached R$714.769 billion at the end of June, up 5.8% year over year[4]. The bank publishes no numeric annual guidance in the materials reviewed. The Drillr earnings calendar, updated October 22, shows a 3Q26 consensus of $0.178 of earnings per ADS and $4.188 billion of revenue; the same source had expected $0.1954 and $4.174 billion for 2Q26, against actual figures of $0.1577 and $4.024 billion, and its revenue is a dollar figure on the data vendor's basis that cannot be converted directly into the bank's managerial revenue in reais[1].

Three things matter most in the 3Q26 results. The first is whether loan-loss expense comes down from its 2Q26 peak: NPL formation held steady at 1.00% of the portfolio in 2Q26, but write-offs rose 27.3% from the prior quarter under revised recoverability criteria[5], and cost of risk climbed back to 3.81%[6], so the third quarter can separate a one-off front-loading from methodology from continued stress among low-income and agribusiness borrowers. The second is whether the client spread keeps falling: after the bank deliberately shrank its mass-market book, the spread fell to 10.03% from 10.55% a year earlier[7], and the quarter will show whether balance growth in cards, mortgages and auto finance can hold up client NII, which is about three-quarters of revenue. The third is whether fees and costs can stop the efficiency ratio from rising further: fees grew only 2.5% year over year in 2Q26 and the efficiency ratio rose 2.4 percentage points to 39.3%[2], so the quarter tests whether card and asset-management revenue can offset current-account fee waivers and weaker credit-linked insurance.

Company Background and Business Structure

Santander Brasil is the Santander Group's core subsidiary in Brazil; it describes itself as the third largest privately owned bank in Brazil and the only international bank operating countrywide[8]. Under the group model each major unit is self-sufficient in capital and liquidity, but Santander Brasil can draw on the group's global network, products and risk-management practices and uses them to reduce technology development costs[8]. Banco Santander owns about 90% of the share capital and minority shareholders hold roughly 10%; the bank's units and ADSs trade on Brazil's B3 exchange and the New York Stock Exchange[9]. At the end of 2Q26 it had 76.2 million customers, up 6% year over year, and 34.4 million active customers, up 3%[6].

The bank reports two segments: Commercial Banking serves individuals, SMEs and companies other than global corporate clients, and Global Wholesale Banking provides tailor-made financial services and structured solutions to large local and multinational corporations[10]. Global Wholesale Banking earned operating income before tax of R$7.791 billion in 2025, up 15.8%, mainly on better treasury and market results and growth in demand deposits[11]. On the managerial basis, the R$714.769 billion expanded portfolio at June 2026 comprised individuals at R$263.424 billion, consumer finance at R$100.766 billion, SMEs at R$95.957 billion and large corporates at R$254.623 billion[12]; within individuals, credit cards were R$65.198 billion, mortgages R$77.214 billion, payroll loans R$56.131 billion, personal loans and other R$34.293 billion and agricultural loans R$8.377 billion[12].

Consumer finance is mostly vehicle lending, built on strategic partnerships with 6 of Brazil's 10 largest automakers, and gives the bank about a 20% share of the individuals vehicle-finance market[13]. Including both consumer finance and the bank's own channels, the individuals vehicle portfolio was R$83.819 billion at the end of June, with a portfolio loan-to-value ratio of 57.3%[14]. On the liability side, client funding was R$688.514 billion, up 6.9% year over year, with individuals accounting for 51%[4]. The bank earns a spread by lending out client deposits and other funding, collects fees from credit cards, current accounts, asset management and consórcios (Brazil's pooled purchase plans), insurance brokerage and capital markets, and turns that into profit after loan losses, personnel and technology costs.

Financial History and Current Position

On the annual IFRS basis, consolidated net income was R$12.9 billion in 2025, down 3.3% from 2024, and adjusted ROAE excluding goodwill was 13.7%; at the end of 2025 total assets were R$1.270 trillion, shareholders' equity R$125.174 billion and the Basel capital ratio 15.4%, while gross loans to customers were R$602.040 billion, only 0.4% higher than a year earlier[15]. The IFRS interim statements for the first half of 2026 show net profit of R$6.244 billion, above R$5.140 billion in the first half of 2025; second-quarter profit was R$2.963 billion versus R$1.988 billion a year earlier, and first-half impairment losses on financial assets were R$14.459 billion against R$17.388 billion a year before[16].

The managerial quarterly trend is weaker than the IFRS figures suggest. Recurring managerial net profit rose from R$3.659 billion in 2Q25 to R$4.009 billion in 3Q25 and R$4.086 billion in 4Q25, then fell to R$3.788 billion in 1Q26 and R$3.014 billion in 2Q26, with ROAE of 16.4%, 17.5%, 17.6%, 16.0% and 12.5% over the same quarters[3]. In 1Q26 net profit was R$3.8 billion, down 7.3% from the prior quarter, and the expanded portfolio stood at R$705.582 billion[17]. For the first half of 2026 recurring managerial net profit was R$6.8 billion, down 9.6% year over year; total revenue was R$41.9 billion, up 0.6%, client NII R$32.6 billion, up 2.2%, fees R$10.8 billion, up 4.1%, loan losses R$14.0 billion, up 5.6%, and expenses R$13.2 billion, up 1.7%[18].

The 2Q26 managerial income statement shows why profit fell. Total revenue was R$20.675 billion, made up of client NII of R$16.058 billion, a market NII loss of R$718 million and fees of R$5.334 billion; provisions were R$8.260 billion and recoveries of written-off loans R$607 million, leaving a net result from loan losses of R$7.654 billion, up 11.5% year over year, while general expenses were R$6.578 billion, up 2.6%[3]. At the end of June the over-90-day NPL ratio was 3.3%, up 0.7 percentage points year over year, and coverage of the stage 3 portfolio was 65.0%[2]; risk-weighted assets were R$773.911 billion, the CET1 ratio 11.2% and the Basel ratio 15.3%[19]. As a bank, Santander Brasil does not present operating cash flow or capital expenditure as management metrics in the materials reviewed; capital retention shows up as changes in CET1.

Operating Model

Total managerial revenue equals client NII plus market NII plus fees. Client NII is roughly average client balances multiplied by the client spread: in 2Q26 average balances were R$627.032 billion, up 4.6% year over year, and the annualized spread was 10.03%, down 0.53 percentage points[20]. When balances and spread move together revenue is amplified, and when they diverge they offset each other, which is the current situation: cards, mortgages and auto finance are adding balances while the shrinking mass-market payroll and personal loan books pull the spread down, and that mix effect reaches the income statement over roughly one to several quarters as loans reprice and mature.

Profit equals total revenue minus loan losses, general expenses and taxes, plus or minus other operating income and expenses. Loan losses are the most volatile line: in 2Q26 they equaled about 37% of total revenue, and cost of risk fell from 3.86% in 3Q25 to 3.73% in 1Q26 before rising back to 3.81% in 2Q26[21]. Migration from 15-90 days past due to over 90 days usually takes one to two quarters, so early delinquency and NPL formation lead loan-loss expense; on costs, headcount fell to 47,327 from 53,918 a year earlier and stores and points of sale fell to 1,589 from 1,946[22], but higher technology investment partly offset those savings[23]. Other operating income and expenses were a net expense of R$2.534 billion in 2Q26, up 31.4% year over year, mainly on card-related expenses and provisions for contingencies[22].

For a bank, the cash model is a capital-generation model. Retained profit adds to CET1 capital and risk-weighted asset growth consumes it: in 2Q26 CET1 capital was R$86.475 billion and risk-weighted assets R$773.911 billion, up 7.5% year over year[19], so capital ratios come under pressure when loans grow faster than profit. On funding, client funding of R$688.514 billion grew 6.9% year over year[4], faster than the 5.8% growth in the loan portfolio, which shows the current expansion is funded by deposits rather than wholesale borrowing.

Industry and Competitive Position

Brazilian banking is dominated by public banks and large private banks, and Santander Brasil positions itself as the third largest private bank and the only international bank operating nationwide[8]. Its annual report also warns that neobanks and non-traditional providers such as e-commerce companies, mobile operators and search engines are entering the market; they are not subject to banking regulation and may compete with more aggressive prices and rates and spend more on technology[24]. That competition shows up mainly in account and payment fees: current-account service revenue fell 12.2% year over year in 2Q26, which management attributed to a higher share of fee waivers for individuals and SMEs to win primary-bank relationships[21].

The bank's documented advantages lie in auto finance and credit cards. Partnerships with 6 large automakers and about a 20% share of individuals vehicle finance lifted the consumer finance portfolio 15.3% year over year[13]; card revenue grew 10.5% and management said average revenue per active customer had risen 49% over two years[20]. The comparison is limited because the materials reviewed give no competitor spreads, cost of risk or efficiency ratios for the same period and the bank does not disclose spreads by product or credit costs by client segment, so it is not possible to tell how much of Santander Brasil's spread compression and rising credit cost is industry-wide.

Core Debates

After deliberately shrinking mass-market payroll and personal loans, will the client spread keep falling, and can growth in cards, mortgages and auto consumer finance hold client net interest income?

This debate decides whether the bank's largest revenue source stops shrinking. Client NII is about three-quarters of managerial revenue; it was R$16.058 billion in 2Q26, down 3.2% from the prior quarter and 0.4% year over year, and management attributed the decline mainly to a mix effect from a lower share of low-income customers[7]. The spread series fell from 10.63% in 3Q25 to 10.46%, 10.41% and then 10.03% in 2Q26, while client NII moved from R$16.556 billion to R$16.058 billion[7].

The current evidence shows two forces offsetting each other. Payroll loans fell 14.7% year over year to R$56.131 billion, mainly through lower INSS (Brazilian social-security pension) payroll lending, and personal loans and other fell 8.6%[14]; over the same period consumer finance grew 15.3%, credit cards 13.0% and mortgages 10.6%[12]. The alternative reading is that spread compression is not only about mix: management also cited higher deferred fees paid to banking correspondents and a lower funding result as rates fell, and said that excluding these effects the quarterly spread decline would have been smaller, at 0.30 percentage points[25]. The transmission runs from fewer high-spread mass-market balances to a structurally lower client spread and lower client NII, only partly offset by balance growth in cards, mortgages, consumer finance and SMEs.

What remains unresolved is when the run-off bottoms out and whether lower-risk lending earns a higher risk-adjusted return. In 3Q26 the points to watch are the client spread against 10.03%, client NII against R$16.556 billion in 3Q25[7], the pace of payroll and personal-loan run-off, and whether consumer finance can sustain growth near 15.3% year over year[12]. If mix compression persists while credit cost does not fall, lower-risk lending will not have lifted risk-adjusted margin and the current understanding weakens.

Was the 20.6% quarter-on-quarter jump in 2Q26 loan-loss expense a one-off from write-off methodology and agribusiness/low-income stress, or will cost of risk stay above 3.8%?

Loan losses are the swing factor in earnings, so this debate directly decides whether ROAE can recover. The 2Q26 result from loan losses was R$7.654 billion while total revenue was nearly flat, and recurring net profit fell 17.6% year over year to R$3.014 billion with ROAE at 12.5%[3]. In 3Q25 the result from loan losses was R$6.524 billion and cost of risk 3.86%; in 2Q26 cost of risk was 3.81%[21].

The evidence points both ways. On one side, NPL formation was R$7.022 billion, or 1.00% of the portfolio, stable from both the prior quarter and the prior year, while write-offs of R$7.009 billion rose 27.3% from the prior quarter because a review in 2025 brought write-off criteria closer to expected recoverability[5]; that supports the view that 2Q26 front-loaded losses and 3Q26 provisions could fall back. On the other side, the individuals over-90-day NPL ratio rose 1.1 percentage points year over year to 5.1%, and management said low-income and agribusiness customers were under more pressure amid high indebtedness and high rates[26]; the individuals 15-90 day ratio was 5.3%, with pressure in agribusiness and the lower-income card segment[27]. First-half loan losses were R$14.0 billion, up 5.6%, which management attributed to an elevated-rate environment requiring more provisioning[18].

The chain runs from household indebtedness and high rates to defaults among low-income and agribusiness individuals and smaller SMEs, then to NPL formation and provisions, and finally to lower recurring net profit. In 3Q26 the points to watch are loan losses against R$6.524 billion in 3Q25 and cost of risk against 3.81%[21], whether NPL formation holds at 1.00%[5], and whether the individuals over-90-day NPL ratio stabilizes at or below 5.1%[27]. If delinquency among low-income and agribusiness customers keeps rising, the reading that cost of risk stays above 3.8% gains the upper hand.

Can growth in card, asset-management and consórcio fees offset current-account fee waivers and weaker credit-linked insurance, and stop the efficiency ratio rising above 39.3%?

With client NII held back by mix, fees and cost control are the other two levers on profit. Fees were R$5.334 billion in 2Q26, up only 2.5% year over year[28], and the efficiency ratio rose 2.4 percentage points year over year to 39.3%[2], compared with 37.5% in 3Q25[23].

Fees are diverging sharply by line. Card revenue grew 10.5% year over year to R$1.638 billion[20] and asset-management revenue grew 26.4% to R$581 million, with consórcios up 23.8%; but current-account revenue fell 12.2% to R$825 million, insurance fees fell 4.8% from the prior quarter as credit-linked insurance was originated more selectively, and credit-operation fees fell 2.3% year over year[21]. On costs, general expenses rose 2.6% year over year, below inflation, and management said branch and workforce optimization partly offset higher technology investment and that the efficiency ratio rose because the revenue base was under pressure[23]. The alternative reading is that the efficiency deterioration is purely a revenue-side effect of the mix shift that will reverse only if NII recovers, and that fees alone cannot turn it.

The transmission runs from card turnover and investment and consórcio sales to fee growth, from fee waivers and selective origination to lower account and credit-linked fees, and from headcount and branch cuts set against technology spending to general expenses, which together set the efficiency ratio. In 3Q26 the points to watch are total fees against R$5.334 billion in 2Q26 and the year-earlier quarter[28], whether card revenue sustains growth near 10.5% year over year[20], and whether the efficiency ratio falls back below 39.3%[23]. If fee waivers and selective origination keep eroding service and credit-linked revenue, the efficiency ratio will struggle to improve.

Risks and Falsifiers

The first risk comes from the controlling shareholder's exchange offer, and it affects the listing status of the ADS rather than the bank's income statement. Banco Santander announced an offer of 0.4056 newly issued Banco Santander shares per unit or ADS for the roughly 10% minority stake, a 15% premium at announcement; the offer is voluntary and has no minimum acceptance condition, but depending on the outcome the ADSs may be removed from New York Stock Exchange listing and SEC registration[9]. On September 22 Banco Santander filed registration requests with Brazil's CVM and B3 and filed a Form F-4 registration statement with the SEC, which had not yet been declared effective[29]. If the offer lapses or acceptances are too low to change the listing, leaving the ADS listed and registered, this risk is falsified.

The second risk is persistently negative market NII. It was a loss of R$718 million in 2Q26 and R$1.486 billion in 4Q25, and it was a loss in every quarter from 2Q25 through 2Q26[7]; management attributed it to negative sensitivity to rising interest rates and lower treasury results[18]. The risk directly lowers net interest income and total revenue; if market NII returns to break-even or turns positive, the concern is falsified.

The third risk is that leaving the mass market lowers revenue faster than it lowers credit losses. That would hit both client NII (R$16.058 billion in 2Q26) and the result from loan losses (R$7.654 billion in 2Q26)[3]. If cost of risk falls below the 1Q26 level of 3.73% while the client spread holds near 10%[6], this risk is falsified.

The fourth risk is that credit deterioration among lower-income individuals, agribusiness and smaller SMEs extends beyond 2Q26. It is exposed through loan losses and recurring net profit (R$3.014 billion in 2Q26); the SME over-90-day NPL ratio rose 1.1 percentage points year over year, driven by smaller companies[26]. If the individuals over-90-day NPL ratio stabilizes at or below 5.1% and NPL formation stays at or below 1.00%[5], this risk is falsified.

The fifth risk is that fee waivers used to win primary-bank relationships and tighter credit origination drag on fees while technology spending rises. It is exposed through fees (R$5.334 billion in 2Q26) and general expenses (R$6.578 billion in 2Q26)[3]. If fees grow at least 2.5% year over year and the efficiency ratio falls below 39.3%[23], this risk is falsified.

What to Watch Next

• Mass-market run-off and client spread: the spread was 10.03% in 2Q26 (10.63% in 3Q25) and client NII was R$16.058 billion (R$16.556 billion in 3Q25). A spread holding near 10% with client NII stabilizing would confirm the current reading; a further spread decline without lower credit cost would contradict it.
• The 2Q26 loan-loss jump: loan losses were R$7.654 billion, cost of risk 3.81% and NPL formation 1.00% (R$6.524 billion and 3.86% in 3Q25). Cost of risk below 3.73% with the individuals over-90-day ratio at or below 5.1% would confirm; rising low-income and agribusiness delinquency would contradict.
• Fees and efficiency: fees were R$5.334 billion, up 2.5% year over year, card revenue grew 10.5% and the efficiency ratio was 39.3% (37.5% in 3Q25). Fee growth of at least 2.5% with an efficiency ratio below 39.3% would confirm; a further rise in the ratio would contradict.
• Capital and listing status: CET1 was 11.2% and the Form F-4 was not yet effective. CET1 of at least 11.2% would confirm; an ADS delisting would change its listing status and liquidity.

Conclusion

Three forces drive Santander Brasil's results: balance growth in cards, mortgages and auto finance supports client NII, the deliberate exit from high-spread mass-market lending compresses the client spread, and credit cost decides how much of the expansion stays as profit. In 2Q26 the bank earned R$3.014 billion of recurring managerial net profit at a 12.5% ROAE, with loan losses up 20.6% from the prior quarter to R$7.654 billion[3], an efficiency ratio of 39.3%[2] and a CET1 ratio of 11.2%[19]. The central open question is whether, after tilting the book toward lower-risk products, credit cost can fall faster than the spread compresses and lift ROAE back above 12.5%.

Only one independent outside report was found. Reuters reported that 2Q26 net profit fell 17.6% to R$3.01 billion, missing analyst estimates of R$3.9 billion[30], which suggests the market had not anticipated the size of the loan-loss jump and spread compression and raises the bar for credit costs to normalize in 3Q26. Management's account does not fully line up with that reading: it stressed that NPL formation held at 1.00% and that higher write-offs came from a methodology change[5], and framed the profit decline against a backdrop of high indebtedness and high rates[18]; the Reuters report recorded only the gap between results and market estimates and did not assess whether the shock would fade in the next quarter. The materials reviewed contain no independent analyst evaluation of the 2Q26 results or the exchange offer, which is a coverage gap.

The combination that would materially strengthen the current understanding is cost of risk falling below 3.73%, the individuals over-90-day NPL ratio at or below 5.1%, the client spread holding near 10%, fee growth of at least 2.5% year over year and the efficiency ratio back below 39.3%. Conversely, if loan losses stay above the R$6.524 billion of 3Q25, low-income and agribusiness delinquency keeps rising and neither the client spread nor market NII improves, 2Q26 would look less like a one-off shock and more like the start of a lower profitability range.

Sources

[1] Drillr earnings_calendar (last updated 2026-10-22) · BSBR 2026-10-28 per-ADS estimates · 2026-10-22 · Drillr earnings_calendar (vendor consensus) · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[2] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 performance indicators · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[3] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 managerial income statement and ROAE series · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[4] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 earnings release executive summary · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[5] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 NPL formation, write-offs and renegotiated portfolio · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[6] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 quarterly highlights and cost of risk · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[7] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 client NII mix effect and spread series · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[8] BSBR 20-F filed 2026-02-27 · history and Santander Group relationship · 2026-02-27 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=20-F

[9] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-31 · Banco Santander exchange offer for Santander Brasil minorities · 2026-07-31 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[10] BSBR 20-F filed 2026-02-27 · business segments · 2026-02-27 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=20-F

[11] BSBR 20-F filed 2026-02-27 · Global Wholesale Banking operating income 2025 · 2026-02-27 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=20-F

[12] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 expanded loan portfolio by segment and individuals products · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[13] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 consumer finance and auto partnerships · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[14] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 payroll and personal loan reduction · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[15] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-03-30 · 2025 consolidated performance (reference form) · 2026-03-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[16] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-09-01 · 1H26 IFRS consolidated income statement · 2026-09-01 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[17] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-05-01 · 1Q26 results summary · 2026-05-01 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[18] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-09-01 · 1H26 management report · 2026-09-01 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[19] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 capital ratios · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[20] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 spread, fees and cards · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[21] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 fee lines: current account, asset management, insurance, loan-loss series · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[22] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 headcount, branches and other operating expenses · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[23] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 general expenses and efficiency ratio · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[24] BSBR 20-F filed 2026-02-27 · competition from neobanks and non-traditional providers · 2026-02-27 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=20-F

[25] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 client NII annual drivers and market NII · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[26] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 over-90-day NPL by segment · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[27] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 NPL series and 15-90 day ratio · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[28] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-07-29 · 2Q26 fee table and current-account holders · 2026-07-29 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[29] BSBR 6-K filed 2026-09-22 · exchange offer registrations and F-4 filing · 2026-09-22 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001471055&type=6-K

[30] Reuters 2026-07-29 · Santander Brasil's net profit down 17.6% in Q2, missing estimates · 2026-07-29 · Reuters · https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/santander-brasils-net-profit-down-176-q2-missing-estimates-2026-07-29/