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[RACE] Ferrari: Q3 2026 Earnings Test U.S. Shipments and Mix-Driven Margins

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Published 27 min read

Summary

Ferrari's Q2 2026 EBIT rose 9.5% to €605 million at a 31.2% margin on 128 fewer cars; Q3 earnings test whether U.S. shipments recover while mix holds margins.

Ferrari, the Italian luxury carmaker that earns most of its money selling sports cars and also runs a Formula 1 team and a lifestyle brand, is scheduled to report Ferrari Q3 2026 earnings on 2026-11-03 for the Third quarter 2026 (three months ended September 30, 2026), according to the Drillr earnings calendar[1]. In the latest disclosed quarter, the second quarter of 2026, Ferrari shipped 3,366 new cars, 128 fewer than the 3,494 a year earlier, yet net revenues still rose 8.4% to €1.938 billion (10.6% at constant currency), EBIT reached €605 million at a 31.2% margin, and diluted earnings per share were €2.62 versus €2.38[2]. On July 30 the company raised its 2026 guidance to net revenues of about €7.60 billion, adjusted EBITDA of at least €2.97 billion, adjusted EBIT of at least €2.26 billion (a margin of at least 29.5%), adjusted diluted EPS of at least €9.68 and industrial free cash flow of at least €1.55 billion[2]; management said the guidance assumes personalization will exceed 20% of full-year cars and spare parts revenue and a USD/EUR rate of about 1.16[3]. Analyst estimates compiled by Drillr on October 23 put third-quarter revenue at about €1.924 billion (5 analysts, range €1.906 billion to €1.951 billion), EBIT at about €544 million and EPS at about €2.40 (only 2 analysts); the estimates table does not label its currency, but the magnitudes match Ferrari's euro reporting[4].

Three things matter most in these results. The first is whether U.S. shipments recover: Ferrari delivered only 695 cars in the U.S. in the second quarter, 154 fewer than a year earlier, while EMEA took 210 more, and management attributed the gap to new models reaching nearby markets first during the changeover, so a third quarter that still runs well below last year in the U.S. would put that explanation under pressure[2][3]. The second is whether model mix and personalization keep supporting margins: full-year guidance minus first-half actuals implies at least €1.107 billion of second-half EBIT, or roughly a 29% margin, and almost all of second-quarter EBIT growth came from a €122 million mix contribution, so the third-quarter mix line will show whether that cushion is still there[2]. The third is whether cash keeps up with shareholder returns: the cash-flow guidance requires at least €621 million in the second half, Ferrari started a third buyback tranche of up to €250 million on September 2, and the industrial business had already moved from net cash to €131 million of net debt by the end of June, so third-quarter cash flow and September-end net debt will show whether buybacks are starting to rely on borrowing[2][5].

Company Background and Business Structure

Ferrari reports a single operating segment and splits revenue into cars and spare parts, sponsorship, commercial and brand, and other, with car sales by far the largest piece. In 2025 net revenues were €7.146 billion, of which cars and spare parts contributed €6.005 billion, about 84%; sponsorship, commercial and brand contributed €820 million, about 11%; and other revenues made up the remaining €321 million or so[6]. Other revenues include U.S. car financing, where subsidiary FFS Inc held a financial services portfolio of €1.613 billion at the end of 2025, all originated in the United States[6], as well as revenue from renting engines to other Formula 1 teams[2].

Ferrari's lineup is tiered into range models, special series, limited-edition Supercars and limited-edition Icona cars, and prices differ sharply across the tiers. The F80 Supercar began deliveries in the fourth quarter of 2025 and the Daytona SP3 Icona finished deliveries in the third quarter of 2025; both categories sell at significantly higher prices than the rest of the portfolio because of their exclusivity and performance[6]. In the second quarter of 2026 the portfolio included 6 combustion-engine and 7 hybrid models, representing 69.8% and 30.2% of shipments, with deliveries rising for the 12Cilindri, the Purosangue, the 296 Speciale family and the still-ramping Amalfi and 849 Testarossa, while the 296 GTS, Roma Spider and SF90 XX family declined as planned phase-outs[2]. Two months after the launch of Luce, Ferrari's first fully electric car, management said order intake was in line with plans and came from both repeat customers and new buyers[3].

Ferrari sells through dealers but controls allocation itself, which means regional shipment figures reflect allocation choices as well as demand. At the end of 2025 Ferrari sold in more than 60 markets through 181 authorized dealers operating 195 points of sale; the largest dealer accounted for about 3.0% of shipments and the 15 largest for about 25%, and the company allocates cars using expected market developments, dealers' historical sales, current dealer order books and end clients' average waiting time, collecting advances on limited editions and some range models and recognizing that revenue when the cars ship[6]. In 2025 about 84% of new cars went to clients who already owned at least one Ferrari, and about 56% to clients who owned several[6].

Ferrari's production and geographic exposure are concentrated in a few critical points. Despite low volumes, production draws on more than 60,000 product codes from about 500 suppliers, and the company began building a new paint shop in 2024 so it can handle more personalization in-house[6]; management said on the second-quarter call that construction is on schedule[3]. Geographically, the U.S. accounted for 25% of 2025 shipments and 28% of cars and spare parts revenue, and from August 1, 2025, imported cars entering the U.S. faced an overall 15% tariff; Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan took 941 cars in 2025, or 6.9% of shipments, of which 584 went to Mainland China[6].

Financial History and Current Position

Over the past three fiscal years Ferrari kept raising revenue and margins while shipments stayed essentially flat. According to the 2025 annual report, net revenues grew from €5.970 billion in 2023 to €6.677 billion and €7.146 billion, EBIT rose from €1.617 billion to €1.888 billion and €2.110 billion, and the EBIT margin expanded from 27.1% to 28.3% and 29.5%; over the same period EBITDA increased from €2.279 billion to €2.772 billion and net profit from €1.257 billion to €1.600 billion, while shipments were 13,663, 13,752 and 13,640 cars, with 2025 down 0.8%[6]. Industrial free cash flow in 2025 was €1.54 billion[2].

Ferrari returned most of its 2025 cash to shareholders, leaving the industrial business with almost no net debt. In 2025 the company approved €532 million of dividends and completed €785 million of share repurchases, ending the year with net industrial debt of only €32 million; group net debt was €1.417 billion, of which €1.385 billion belonged to financial services[6]. In other words, group-level debt comes mainly from U.S. car financing rather than from carmaking itself.

In the first quarter of 2026 the changeover began to weigh on shipments, but cash flow stayed strong. Management said on the call that first-quarter revenue was close to €1.85 billion and industrial free cash flow exceeded €650 million[7]; the quarterly report showed 3,436 shipments against 3,593 a year earlier, industrial free cash flow of €653 million, €33 million more than a year earlier, and net industrial cash of €388 million at March 31[8].

In the second quarter of 2026 revenue and profit kept growing, but cash flow slowed sharply and the industrial business moved into net debt after dividends and buybacks. Cars and spare parts revenue was €1.629 billion, up 8.1%; EBITDA was €755 million at a 39.0% margin, net profit €463 million and industrial free cash flow €276 million; after paying €599 million of dividends and buying back €209 million of stock, net industrial debt stood at €131 million on June 30[2]. For the first half, net revenues totaled €3.786 billion, up 5.8%, EBIT was €1.153 billion at a 30.5% margin (30.6% a year earlier), industrial free cash flow was €929 million (versus €818 million) and investment in property, plant, equipment and intangibles was €489 million; starting with the second quarter, Ferrari excludes withholding taxes from industrial free cash flow, so comparisons across periods need care[2].

Operating Model

Ferrari grows revenue mainly by earning more per car, not by selling more cars. Revenue breaks down into cars and spare parts (shipments times average revenue per car, including personalization, plus spare parts), sponsorship, commercial and brand (sponsorships, Formula 1 commercial revenue allocated by the previous season's team ranking, licensing and lifestyle), and other revenues such as U.S. car financing and engine rentals[6]. In the second quarter shipments fell by 128 cars while cars and spare parts revenue rose 8.1%; by region, EMEA added €157 million and the Americas €18 million, while Rest of APAC lost €28 million and Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan lost €25 million[2]. Full-year revenue guidance of about €7.60 billion minus first-half revenue of €3.786 billion implies second-half revenue of about €3.81 billion[2].

Ferrari's own EBIT bridge explains changes in operating profit, and mix and price are the largest positive driver. EBIT equals revenue minus cost of sales, SG&A and R&D; cost of sales was 48.3% of revenue in 2025, down from 49.9% in 2024, and 2025 EBIT rose €222 million, with mix contributing €215 million, other activities such as racing and lifestyle €142 million and volume €6 million, partly offset by SG&A, currency and R&D drags of €81 million, €35 million and €25 million[6]. Because limited editions and Supercars carry higher margins and are recognized as revenue at shipment, quarterly margins move with delivery timing; the company has also flagged that new-model production will raise depreciation and amortization and that brand, racing and digital spending will increase[2].

Ferrari's cash flow depends on profit, working capital and capital spending, and nearly all of it ends up with shareholders. Industrial free cash flow is roughly industrial EBITDA minus cash taxes and interest, plus or minus working-capital changes, minus capital expenditure; in the second quarter profitability supported cash flow, partly offset by capex, net cash interest and taxes and a working-capital outflow[2]. On the uses side, Ferrari announced at its October 2025 Capital Markets Day a share repurchase program of about €3.5 billion for 2026 to 2030 and raised its dividend payout ratio from 35% to 40% of adjusted net profit starting with the 2025 results[8].

Industry and Competitive Position

Ferrari's edge in luxury performance cars rests on brand scarcity and residual values rather than scale. The company names Lamborghini, McLaren, Aston Martin, Rolls-Royce and Bentley as its main competitors, plus Porsche, Mercedes-Benz and Land Rover in certain segments; it says the resilience of a car's value after a period of ownership is an important competitive dimension among similar luxury cars, because higher resilience lowers total cost of ownership and promotes repeat purchases, and it regards this as a strong advantage for Ferrari[6]. With about 84% of new cars going to existing clients, that repeat-purchase mechanism is the core of demand[6].

Because Ferrari deliberately caps volume, its competitive position is tested through mix and launch cadence, and the available material offers limited direct comparison with peers. Shipments were essentially flat at 13,663 cars in 2023 and 13,640 in 2025, and the company says it will continue its controlled volume and growth strategy, launching an average of four new models a year from 2026 to 2030[6]. Ferrari does not disclose price, profit or order counts by model or region, and the available material contains no comparable competitor financials, so Ferrari's pricing premium over peers cannot be quantified and its competitiveness can only be tracked through its own shipment, mix and margin series.

Core Debates

Shipments fell by 285 cars in the first half and U.S. deliveries dropped 18% in the second quarter; once the new models reach the U.S. in the third quarter, can shipments stabilize and recover?

This question matters because about 84% of Ferrari's revenue comes from cars and spare parts, and 2026 is a year of major model changeover. First-half shipments were 6,802 cars, 285 fewer than a year earlier; in the second quarter U.S. deliveries were only 695, down 154 or about 18%, while EMEA took 1,856 cars, 210 more[2]. If U.S. shipments remain well below last year in the third quarter, the market will need to reconsider U.S. demand and tariffs rather than treat the gap as changeover timing.

The company's evidence currently supports the changeover explanation. On the second-quarter call management said there are no underlying demand or supply-chain issues in the U.S., that the decline comes purely from the changeover and from higher personalization lengthening production time per car, and that shipments will ramp up progressively as new-model production scales, following Ferrari's usual cadence of serving nearby EMEA markets first; the order book covers all of 2027, and the 296 Speciale and 12Cilindri families are sold out for their entire production run[3]. U.S. deliveries in the first quarter were 929, up about 8% from 861, which suggests U.S. demand had not weakened before the second quarter[8]; in the second quarter cars and spare parts revenue in the Americas still rose €18 million[2].

The alternative explanation, still unresolved, is that the 15% U.S. import tariff and higher car prices have begun to slow ordering and are being masked by the changeover. Part of the second-quarter increase in cost of sales came from U.S. import tariffs[2], and the U.S. accounted for 28% of cars and spare parts revenue in 2025[6]. The financial transmission runs as follows: old models phase out and new models go to EMEA first, so deliveries to distant markets such as the U.S. dip temporarily while personalization adds hours per car; shipments fall year over year, and the volume line in the first-half EBIT bridge subtracted €30 million; once new models ramp up in the U.S., shipments and the high-value U.S. country mix should recover together and lift cars and spare parts revenue[2].

The third-quarter regional shipment table can separate the two explanations. Watch whether total shipments reach at least about 3,265 cars, whether U.S. deliveries return above 780 and ideally near 900, whether cars and spare parts revenue keeps growing at around 8%, and whether management confirms the timing of the two new models due before year-end[3]. If U.S. deliveries keep falling by more than 15% and the company starts citing demand, price or tariffs, the view that the changeover is only temporary would fail; a delay in new-model launches would also prolong the shipment gap.

Fewer cars, more profit: can the F80 and personalization keep third-quarter EBIT margin above 29%?

This question determines how much cushion remains in Ferrari's raised full-year profit guidance. Ferrari shipped 285 fewer cars in the first half, yet EBIT rose 5.3% to €1.153 billion because each car sold for more, with higher F80 deliveries and a larger personalization contribution[2]; management said personalization accounts for about 20% of cars and spare parts revenue, ahead of expectations[3]. On that basis Ferrari raised full-year EBIT guidance in July to at least €2.26 billion, which implies at least €1.107 billion of second-half EBIT at roughly a 29% margin, but SG&A, R&D and depreciation all rise in the second half, so mix gains must be large enough to cover them[2].

The second-quarter EBIT bridge shows that mix more than covered every other drag. Mix contributed €122 million (net of higher U.S. tariffs and industrial costs) and R&D added €7 million, while currency, SG&A and volume subtracted €32 million, €28 million and €13 million, lifting the EBIT margin to 31.2% from 30.9% a year earlier[2]. First-half mix totaled €203 million, implying about €81 million in the first quarter[2]; management said second-half price and mix will exceed the first half, average selling price will be similar to the first half, and the special-series share of second-half shipments will not change significantly from the first half's 13%[3].

What remains unresolved is how much of the second-quarter margin can last. An alternative reading holds that the second-quarter margin partly reflected temporarily low depreciation during the changeover and concentrated F80 deliveries, so that once new models enter production and the F80 cadence steadies, the second-half margin could slip back to 29% to 30%; the company's own guidance confirms higher depreciation and amortization and more brand, racing and digital spending[2]. The financial transmission runs from F80 deliveries, a personalization share above 20% and higher prices on new models to a positive mix line that offsets volume, currency and SG&A drags and ultimately sets quarterly EBIT and margin.

The third-quarter mix line and personalization share can distinguish the two readings. Watch whether third-quarter EBIT reaches at least about €530 million with a margin above 29%, whether the mix line in the EBIT bridge exceeds €80 million, whether personalization stays above 20%, and whether the currency impact avoids a marked widening. If mix falls below the first quarter's roughly €81 million, personalization drops below 20%, or the currency drag widens beyond €50 million, the two reasons Ferrari gave for raising guidance would be weakening[2].

A weaker Formula 1 ranking has slowed sponsorship and commercial revenue; can that line grow again in the third quarter without brand spending eating into profit?

This question matters because non-car businesses have been an important source of Ferrari's profit growth over the past two years. Sponsorship, commercial and brand revenue rose from €572 million in 2023 to €820 million in 2025, and in the 2025 EBIT bridge other activities such as racing and lifestyle contributed €142 million, second only to mix[6]. The Formula 1 prize fund is paid largely according to each team's championship ranking, and Scuderia Ferrari finished fourth in the 2025 Constructors' Championship with 398 points[6], which reduces its 2026 commercial share.

Current evidence shows this revenue slowing while costs have not come down with it. Sponsorship, commercial and brand revenue was €218 million in the first quarter, up 13.9%[8], and €209 million in the second quarter, up only 2.2%, which the company attributed to higher sponsorships partly offset by lower Formula 1 commercial revenues; the first-half total was €427 million, up 7.9%[2]. Other revenues rose 31% to €100 million in the second quarter thanks to engine rentals to other Formula 1 teams, partly offsetting the slowdown, while SG&A reduced EBIT by €28 million in the second quarter and €40 million in the first half, including costs tied to better 2026 in-season ranking assumptions[2].

What remains unresolved is whether the second-quarter slowdown is a one-time step down or a trend. One reading is that it reflects only the one-time cut in Formula 1 payments based on the previous season's ranking, and that new sponsorships will bring the third quarter back to mid-to-high single-digit growth; the other is that sponsorship and lifestyle growth itself is decelerating and the third quarter will stay near zero growth. In July Ferrari still confirmed that full-year racing and lifestyle revenues will be higher than in 2025, alongside increased brand investment and higher racing and digital spending[2]; the financial transmission runs from new sponsorships, lifestyle products, Formula 1 payments and engine rentals into non-car revenue, while brand investment and ranking-related accruals push up SG&A, and the difference flows into EBIT.

Whether third-quarter revenue on this line exceeds last year's level can directly separate the two readings. Watch whether sponsorship, commercial and brand revenue returns to about €228 million, a year-over-year increase of about 8%, whether other revenues hold near €90 million, and whether the SG&A drag on EBIT stays within €40 million. If this revenue declines year over year for two consecutive quarters, or the cost drag keeps widening, non-car businesses would turn from a source of profit growth into a drag.

Ferrari guides to at least €1.55 billion of industrial free cash flow, leaving €621 million still to generate in the second half; with capex rising and buybacks continuing, can third-quarter cash keep pace?

This question matters because Ferrari returns nearly all its industrial free cash flow to shareholders, so the pace of cash generation determines whether buybacks can continue without adding debt. In 2025 the company paid €532 million of dividends and bought back €785 million of shares[6], and from 2026 it is executing a five-year repurchase program of about €3.5 billion with a payout ratio raised to 40%[8]. Through August 28, 2026, Ferrari had repurchased 1,701,184 shares under the program for about €511 million, and on September 2 it began a third tranche of up to €250 million, expected to end no later than December 16 and funded from available cash[5].

Current evidence shows profit rising but second-quarter cash conversion weakening noticeably. First-half industrial free cash flow was €929 million, €111 million more than a year earlier, but €653 million of it came in the first quarter[8] and only €276 million in the second, where profitability was partly offset by capex, net cash interest and taxes and a working-capital outflow; first-half investment in property, plant, equipment and intangibles was €489 million; after €599 million of dividends and €209 million of buybacks, the industrial business swung from €388 million of net cash at the end of March to €131 million of net debt at the end of June, a €519 million change[2]. Full-year guidance of at least €1.55 billion minus the first half's €929 million leaves at least €621 million to generate in the second half[2].

What remains unresolved is whether the second-quarter cash weakness is seasonal or persistent. One reading is that it reflects seasonal inventory build ahead of the summer shutdown and that the third quarter will return to around €350 million; the other is that changeover inventory and higher capex will keep depressing cash conversion and leave the full year near the bottom of guidance. The financial transmission runs from adjusted EBITDA, minus cash taxes and interest, plus or minus working-capital swings from changeover inventory and limited-edition advances, minus capex, to industrial free cash flow, which after buybacks sets the direction of net industrial debt; note also that from the second quarter Ferrari excludes withholding taxes from industrial free cash flow, so comparisons with prior-year figures use a different basis[2].

Third-quarter industrial free cash flow and September-end net debt can distinguish the two readings. Watch whether third-quarter industrial free cash flow reaches at least €310 million and ideally more than €365 million, whether net industrial debt on September 30 stays at or below €300 million, whether capex roughly holds the first half's average pace of about €245 million per quarter, and whether the third buyback tranche proceeds as planned. If cash generation falls short of the buyback pace, net industrial debt will keep rising; if Ferrari cuts its cash guidance or slows buybacks, the sustainability of its shareholder-return commitment would need to be reassessed.

Risks and Falsifiers

The brand and product-strategy risk is that Luce, the first fully electric model, and a faster launch cadence could erode scarcity and used-car values. The exposure sits in repeat purchases and the order book: about 84% of 2025 new cars went to existing Ferrari clients, and residual-value resilience is a core competitive advantage the company itself lists[6]. If Ferrari keeps confirming that the order book covers the end of 2027 and that Luce orders are in line with plans[3], with no sign of deliberate production cuts or longer delivery times to support prices, this concern would not hold.

The U.S. shipment risk is that U.S. deliveries fail to recover after the changeover, exposing the effect of tariffs or prices on U.S. demand. The U.S. accounted for 28% of cars and spare parts revenue in 2025, about €1.68 billion[6], and second-quarter U.S. deliveries were down 154 cars year over year[2]. If third-quarter U.S. deliveries reach at least 900 and Americas revenue returns to year-over-year growth, this risk would be largely falsified.

The currency risk is that a weaker U.S. dollar and Japanese yen widen the foreign-exchange headwind and offset mix gains. Currency already reduced first-half 2026 EBIT by €68 million[2], and management said only a small portion of 2027 exposure is currently hedged, leaving results dependent on future spot rates[3]. If the third-quarter currency impact stays within €30 million and the company keeps its USD/EUR assumption of about 1.16, this risk would have limited impact on the current understanding.

The racing-performance risk is that weak Formula 1 results depress both next year's commercial payments and the team's appeal to sponsors. Sponsorship, commercial and brand revenue was €820 million in 2025, about 11% of total revenue, and Formula 1 prize money is allocated by team ranking[6]. If this revenue returns to roughly 8% year-over-year growth in the third quarter and Ferrari maintains its view that racing and lifestyle revenues will exceed 2025[2], this risk would not have materialized.

The cash risk is that capex and changeover inventory depress cash conversion and push buybacks toward debt funding. First-half investment was €489 million and second-quarter net industrial debt rose by €519 million because of dividends and buybacks[2], while the third tranche is up to €250 million[5]. If third-quarter industrial free cash flow reaches at least €365 million and September-end net industrial debt is below €131 million, this risk would be falsified.

What to Watch Next

  • U.S. shipments and the changeover: from a second-quarter base of 3,366 total shipments and 695 U.S. deliveries (down 18%), U.S. deliveries back above 780 and near 900 would support the changeover explanation, while a further U.S. decline of more than 15% blamed on demand or tariffs would falsify it.
  • Cars and spare parts revenue and launches: from €1.629 billion (up 8.1%) in the second quarter, growth near 8% and on-time launches of the two new models before year-end would confirm the path; delays would extend the shipment gap.
  • Mix and margin: from second-quarter EBIT of €605 million at 31.2% and a €122 million mix contribution, third-quarter EBIT of at least about €530 million, a margin above 29% and mix above €80 million would confirm; mix below about €81 million would weaken the case.
  • Personalization and currency: personalization above about 20% would confirm; a share below 20% or a currency drag beyond €50 million (first half: €68 million) would weaken it.
  • Racing and brand: from €209 million (up 2.2%) and a €28 million SG&A drag in the second quarter, a return to about €228 million with the cost drag within €40 million would confirm; two consecutive quarters of year-over-year decline would falsify.
  • Cash and buybacks: from second-quarter industrial free cash flow of €276 million and June-end net industrial debt of €131 million, third-quarter cash flow of at least €310 million and net debt at or below €300 million would confirm; a cut to cash guidance or slower buybacks would falsify.

Conclusion

Ferrari's business model is to cap volume and raise the value of each car: it shipped 13,640 cars in 2025, essentially the same as in 2023, while its EBIT margin climbed from 27.1% to 29.5%[6]; in the first half of 2026 it shipped 285 fewer cars yet grew EBIT 5.3% to €1.153 billion, but second-quarter industrial free cash flow fell to €276 million and the industrial business moved to €131 million of net debt after dividends and buybacks[2]. The key unresolved relationship is whether the changeover shipment gap can be recovered in the U.S., and whether margins from mix and personalization can hold the roughly 29% second-half threshold as depreciation, costs and currency rise, while cash keeps pace with buybacks.

Outside interpretation so far covers only the pricing side of that relationship. Jefferies analyst Ephrem Joseph, as reported by Proactive Investors on August 17, 2026, argued that strong results at the August Monterey classic car auctions show that "demand from new collectors is strengthening" and that used Ferrari inventory continues to tighten, which supports Ferrari's ability to increase the contribution of non-range models such as limited and special series and to further reinforce its pricing power with the help of two model launches before year-end[9]. That view points in the same direction as management's statement that second-half price and mix will exceed the first half, and it bears on the mix and margin debate; but auction results are a collector-market signal and cannot directly prove third-quarter new-car mix, which the mix line in the third-quarter EBIT bridge will test. Since the July 30 results, this is the only substantive independent interpretation available, so the U.S. shipment, sponsorship revenue and cash-and-buyback debates can for now be judged only on the company's own disclosures.

If the third quarter shows U.S. deliveries back above 780, a mix contribution above €80 million with personalization above 20%, renewed growth in sponsorship, commercial and brand revenue, and industrial free cash flow of at least €310 million with September-end net debt at or below €300 million, the current understanding that the changeover is temporary and mix is enough to cover rising costs would be materially strengthened. Conversely, if U.S. deliveries keep sliding and the company starts citing demand or tariffs, the mix line falls below first-quarter levels, the currency drag widens, or cash falls behind buybacks and net debt keeps rising, that understanding would weaken and the cushion in full-year guidance would narrow with it.

Sources

[1] RACE earnings calendar updated 2026-10-25 · 2026-10-25 · Drillr earnings calendar

[2] RACE Q2 2026 6-K filed 2026-07-30 · 2026-07-30 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001648416&type=6-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[3] RACE Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-30 · 2026-07-30 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[4] Drillr analyst estimates RACE Q3 2026 retrieved 2026-10-23 · 2026-10-23 · Drillr analyst estimates · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[5] RACE 6-K filed 2026-09-01 · 2026-09-01 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001648416&type=6-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[6] RACE FY2025 20-F filed 2026-02-19 · 2026-02-19 · 20-F · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001648416&type=20-F&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[7] RACE Q1 2026 earnings call 2026-05-05 · 2026-05-05 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[8] RACE Q1 2026 6-K filed 2026-05-05 · 2026-05-05 · 6-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001648416&type=6-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[9] Jefferies view on Ferrari via Proactive Investors 2026-08-17 · 2026-08-17 · Jefferies · https://www.themarketreporter.co.uk/companies/news/1097131

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