[CHRN] ChronoScale: Can a One-Customer GPU Cloud Hold Its Revenue Run Rate?

ChronoScale Holdings Corporation (NASDAQ: CHRN) rents GPU computing capacity by the hour for artificial intelligence, machine learning and other high-performance workloads, and as of 31 May 2026 it had exactly one customer, Together AI, which uses capacity across all three of its colocation centres [1]. The company owns no data centres. It rents roughly 14 MW of third-party colocation space in Colorado, Minnesota and Utah [2], fills that space with company-owned NVIDIA H100 GPUs — 6,144 deployed as of 31 May 2026, with chip supply dependent on a single major supplier [3] — and sells dedicated access at a fixed per-GPU per-hour rate billed and paid monthly under a master agreement most recently renewed effective 1 March 2026 for a twelve-month initial term, after which it rolls over in sixty-day periods that either side can end with written notice [4]. The next results are scheduled for 2026-09-21 and cover fiscal 2027 first quarter, the three months ended 31 August 2026 (2026-06-01 to 2026-08-31) [5]. The most recent complete figures on the record are still those of the fiscal year ended 31 May 2026: revenue of $71.604 million, down from $84.4 million, against cost of revenues of $88.691 million, so the service itself ran a gross loss of roughly $17.087 million on the way to a $37.497 million operating loss and a $50.320 million net loss [6]; operating cash flow swung from $7.2 million used a year earlier to $39.1 million provided [7], and the year closed with $9.664 million of cash against $47.571 million of finance-lease principal falling due within twelve months [8]. The only forward-looking guidance the company itself has given concerns capacity and corporate actions: an approximately 50 MW AI compute deployment with Microsoft using NVIDIA GB300 systems and liquid cooling, targeted for completion in the first calendar quarter of 2027 [9], whose term was extended from two years to three on 27 August 2026 [10]; and the sale of the Legacy Ekso exoskeleton business, now held for sale and expected to be divested during fiscal year 2027 [11].

Three things in the coming report matter more than the rest. First is revenue itself: fiscal 2026's $71.604 million works out to an implied quarterly average of about $17.901 million, and if the deployed fleet is unchanged at 6,144 GPUs [3], a figure near that average would indicate the March 2026 renewal left the rate flat, while a figure well below it would indicate the rate has already been negotiated down [4]. Second is where the money comes from: the Microsoft agreement requires the company to procure, install and deliver large-scale GB300 clusters on a fixed delivery schedule, the same annual report states that the capital involved exceeds existing cash resources, and a missed delivery date triggers daily delay credits [12]; the only disclosed backstop is a demand note of up to $100.0 million from controlling shareholder Applied Parent, of which $7.0 million had been drawn as of 1 July 2026 [13]. Third is whether cost falls below revenue: much of the fiscal 2026 reduction in cost of revenues came from renegotiating equipment finance leases to a five-year amortisation period and pushing lease payments out to fiscal year 2028 [14], so the real test is whether depreciation and amortisation, $60.340 million in fiscal 2026, has stopped falling and gross profit still arrives [6].

Company Background and Business Structure

ChronoScale's financial statements today are really those of Applied Digital's cloud business. On 5 May 2026 Applied Digital contributed Applied Digital Cloud Corporation into the exoskeleton maker Ekso Bionics Holdings, which was renamed ChronoScale Corporation, and a holding-company reorganisation on 1 July 2026 placed ChronoScale Holdings Corporation above it as successor issuer; when the transaction closed, Applied Parent and its Contributor subsidiary beneficially owned approximately 97% of the common stock, legacy Ekso shareholders held about 3%, and the fiscal year end moved from 31 December to 31 May [15]. Because the cloud business is the accounting acquirer, the fiscal 2026 statements describe the cloud business rather than the exoskeleton company, and any historical series carrying the former Ekso Bionics ticker describes a different business altogether [1]. The company's principal place of business is now Menlo Park, California [16].

Two businesses sit inside the company, but only one of them is being run. The Cloud Business operates through ChronoScale Corporation on a simple model: rent the rack space, install company-owned GPUs, sell dedicated access; the company neither owns data centres nor sells software [1]. In fiscal 2026 that business produced approximately 99.5% of revenue from a single customer, Together AI, under a master terms of service agreement first signed in December 2023 [4]. The second business is Legacy Ekso, which designs and sells rehabilitation exoskeletons and which the board classified as held for sale on 29 May 2026, with divestiture planned during fiscal 2027 [11].

The asset side shows how this business is financed. The GPUs were largely not bought but obtained through equipment finance leases, which is why $122.509 million of finance-lease right-of-use assets sit on the balance sheet against only $32.081 million of owned property and equipment [8]. The GPU services agreement signed with Microsoft on 6 August 2026 points to a deployment of an entirely different order: a single dedicated facility, approximately 50 MW, NVIDIA GB300 NVL72 systems and advanced liquid cooling [9][16], with the term extended from two years to three on 27 August [10]. The company describes this expansion as a four-layer platform — a leased infrastructure layer it calls the NeoCloud Platform, a GPU-as-a-Service compute layer, a per-token inference platform it calls Token Factory, and implementation services — while stating plainly in the same annual report that these layers are not yet reflected in the results for the fiscal year ended 31 May 2026 [17].

Financial History and Current Position

The comparable history is short, and it rises steeply before falling back. Revenue grew from $29.0 million in the fiscal year ended 31 May 2024 to $84.4 million in fiscal 2025 as four additional GPU clusters were deployed, then fell about 15% to $71.604 million in fiscal 2026 [6]. The business has never covered the cost of the capacity it sells: cost of revenues was $115.308 million in fiscal 2025 and $88.691 million in fiscal 2026, still above revenue in the same period, leaving a gross loss of roughly $17.087 million [6]. Operating expenses contracted alongside it, with selling, general and administrative expense falling from $24.813 million to $19.812 million, the operating loss narrowing from $55.331 million to $37.497 million and the net loss narrowing from $72.730 million to $50.320 million [6].

The cost improvement is concentrated in the leased GPU fleet itself. Depreciation and amortisation was $60.340 million in fiscal 2026 against $80.656 million a year earlier; operating lease expense was $21.034 million against $30.922 million; finance-lease interest was $9.519 million against $16.826 million [6]. All three fell for the same immediate reason: the company renegotiated the majority of its computing equipment finance leases to extend the amortisation period to five years, better aligned with expected useful life, and subsequently extended lease durations again, pushing finance lease payments out to fiscal year 2028 [14].

Cash flow improved by more than the income statement did, but its composition has to be taken apart. Operating activities moved from $7.2 million used in fiscal 2025 to $39.1 million provided in fiscal 2026, investing outflows rose from $1.4 million to $25.2 million, and financing turned into a $6.6 million outflow [7]. The company attributed part of that operating swing to changes in operating assets and liabilities, and changes of that kind reverse in later periods [7].

The balance sheet remains tight. Cash closed at $9.664 million against $2.398 million a year earlier, total current liabilities fell from $157.628 million to $86.891 million, and finance lease liabilities totalled $58.300 million, of which $47.571 million is due within twelve months, compared with $133.407 million in the prior year [8]. Over the same period finance-lease right-of-use assets fell from $195.495 million to $122.509 million while owned property and equipment rose from $10.922 million to $32.081 million, which indicates the company has begun shifting some equipment from leasing to outright ownership [8].

What has happened since the year end all points to a single source of funds. On 1 July 2026 the company drew $7.0 million under Applied Parent's demand note, a facility of up to $100.0 million in aggregate [13]. Legacy Ekso, now held for sale, contributed a $1.020 million loss from discontinued operations in fiscal 2026 [11], while related-party expense charged by Applied Parent rose from $0.878 million to $2.912 million, so the parent shows up on both the funding and the cost side [6].

Operating Model

Revenue is essentially rent, and the formula is short. The company leases about 14 MW of colocation space, installs its own H100 GPUs and gives the customer dedicated access to defined clusters, so revenue equals contracted GPUs multiplied by hours in the period multiplied by the fixed per-GPU per-hour rate, with no usage-based upside and no software or services line [1][4]. In fiscal 2026 that formula produced $71.604 million of revenue from 6,144 GPUs and one customer [3][6]. Revenue can therefore move in only three ways: the contracted fleet grows or shrinks, the rate changes at renewal, or a second customer appears [4].

Almost all of the cost of delivering that compute is fixed before the customer uses it. Cost of revenues consists of colocation rent and energy, operating lease expense and amortisation of the finance-leased GPU fleet, totalling $88.691 million in fiscal 2026, of which depreciation and amortisation alone was $60.340 million [6]. Because those obligations are written into signed contracts, they do not fall when billed hours fall, and the company itself warns that certain fixed costs under its lease and service arrangements are incurred even if customer demand for its cloud services does not materialise as expected [18]. A lower renewal rate or an idle cluster therefore flows almost one-for-one into the operating loss.

Two more relatively rigid items sit below gross profit. Selling, general and administrative expense of $19.812 million includes management services fees charged by Applied Parent as a percentage of revenue plus fixed corporate fees [15], and below that, finance-lease interest of $9.519 million carries the $37.497 million operating loss down to the $50.320 million net loss [6].

Cash and earnings travel separate paths in this company, and the fork is the finance leases. Because the GPUs are leased, their amortisation is a non-cash charge inside cost of revenues while principal repayment sits in financing activities, which is how fiscal 2026 produced $39.1 million of net cash from operating activities alongside a $50.320 million net loss [6][7]. The company has also begun buying equipment outright rather than only leasing it, lifting investing outflows to $25.2 million [7]. On top of that, the customer has historically made advance deposits based on anticipated future usage to finance the equipment it intends to lease, which flatters working capital but is refundable if the company fails to meet the contract requirements or to deliver clusters to the customer's satisfaction [19].

Four disclosure boundaries constrain this model. The per-GPU per-hour rate is not disclosed, so the direction of price can only be inferred from revenue while holding the GPU count constant [3]. Fiscal 2026 was not reported by quarter on the new 31 May fiscal year end, so every quarterly yardstick used here is the full-year figure divided by four rather than a disclosed quarterly number [6]. Pre-combination periods were prepared on a carve-out basis with Applied Digital corporate expenses allocated in, which management says may not reflect standalone costs [15]. And the Microsoft deployment's contract value, tranche sizes, upfront payments and delay-credit rates are all undisclosed, so it can be tracked only indirectly through leased capacity, investing cash flow, financing drawn and any credits the company reports [12]. These are limits on inference, not evidence that the underlying activities are small.

Industry and Competitive Position

ChronoScale's position in the industry is that of a small specialist GPU cloud operator — a neocloud — competing for AI training and inference workloads against hyperscale clouds and a crowded field of similarly financed GPU landlords [1]. Its stated advantage is operational: it says it was among the first platforms to deploy NVIDIA H100 GPUs, demonstrating that it can source, integrate and operate next-generation infrastructure ahead of broad adoption [3].

The structural weaknesses are equally clear in the same annual report. The company leases rather than owns its data centres [2], buys chips from one major supplier [3] and sells capacity to one customer [1], so it holds pricing power at neither end of the chain. It warns explicitly that capacity in older GPU generations can face repricing pressure as newer generations arrive [20], and it writes in its customer-concentration risk factor that it may be compelled to lower its lease prices or risk losing its only Cloud business customer [21].

The company's answer is to move up the chain, but so far only the capacity end is real. All three colocation sites hold deployable capacity beyond what is currently contracted, and the company intends to offer that capacity both to its existing customer and to prospective customers with similar high-performance computing requirements, which it says may reduce customer concentration over time [22]. The rest of the four-layer platform — GPU-as-a-Service, the Token Factory inference platform and implementation services — is, by the company's own statement, not yet reflected in fiscal 2026 results [17]. The relationship with Applied Digital cuts both ways: the parent supplies management services, a demand credit line of up to $100.0 million and credibility with counterparties [13], and it also controls roughly 97% of the votes [15].

Core Debates

Does the Cloud Business hold its fiscal 2026 revenue run rate in the first period reported after the Together AI Agreement renewed on 1 March 2026, with the H100 fleet unchanged?

This question comes first because almost all of the company's revenue rests on one contract. A single customer produced approximately 99.5% of fiscal 2026 revenue, priced at a fixed per-GPU per-hour rate on a fleet of about 6,144 NVIDIA H100 GPUs [1][3][4]. Because colocation rent, energy and finance-lease amortisation are fixed against signed agreements, every dollar not collected because of a lower renewal rate falls almost intact into the gross loss [18]. The twelve-month initial term that began on 1 March 2026 is the only contractual protection over the entire revenue base; after it, the agreement renews in sixty-day increments that either party can stop with written notice [4].

The available evidence supports two readings at once. Fiscal 2026 revenue was $71.604 million, down from $84.4 million the prior year, while the deployed fleet stood at 6,144 GPUs and the customer count stayed at one [3][6]. One reading is that the rate was fixed and the fleet unchanged, so the run rate is stable. The other is that the year-over-year decline itself shows the rate has already been negotiated down once, meaning the March 2026 renewal reset the base lower and the next reported period lands below the fiscal 2026 implied quarterly average rather than on it — the company's own warning about repricing pressure in older GPU generations is what supports that reading [20]. The annual report does not break fiscal 2026 into quarters, so the filing alone cannot settle the question, and the next reported period is the first observation that separates the two [6].

The financial transmission is short. Contracted GPUs multiplied by hours and by the fixed rate produce Cloud service revenue, while colocation, energy and finance-lease amortisation do not fall when billed hours fall, so a change in revenue passes almost one-for-one into gross profit and is then amplified in the operating loss [6][18].

Four observations are therefore worth watching: reported Cloud revenue against the $17.901 million implied quarterly average; whether the deployed GPU count is still 6,144, which is what makes a revenue change readable as price rather than volume [3]; any disclosure of a second contracted customer, or of GPU-as-a-Service or Token Factory capacity actually being sold [22]; and any amendment to the fixed per-GPU per-hour rate, or a notice of termination, before the initial term ends around the end of February 2027 [4]. In the other direction, revenue at or above the implied average on an unchanged fleet would falsify the repricing reading, and a disclosed second customer would falsify the claim that revenue continuity depends entirely on one agreement. Note, though, that the company has not committed to disclosing the fleet count every period; if it does not, a revenue change cannot be attributed to price or volume at all [3].

Can ChronoScale show disclosed financing and a first accepted GB300 tranche before the Microsoft Deployment's fixed delivery schedule starts imposing daily delay credits?

The scale of this agreement is more than three and a half times the company's own current footprint. Approximately 50 MW compares with the roughly 14 MW of rack space it holds today [2][9], and it is also the first obligation the company has taken on that costs money if it is not met: delivery runs to a fixed schedule, a missed date creates daily delay credits, and Microsoft may terminate a tranche or the whole agreement and reclaim upfront payments already made [12]. The company states in the same annual report that the capital required exceeds its existing cash resources, and it closed fiscal 2026 with only $9.664 million of cash [8][12].

Only three sets of facts can be checked today. The partnership was entered into on 6 August 2026 for approximately 50 MW using NVIDIA GB300 NVL72 systems and advanced liquid cooling, targeted for completion in the first calendar quarter of 2027 [9][16], with the term extended from two years to three on 27 August 2026 [10]. The only disclosed source of funds is Applied Parent's demand note of up to $100.0 million, on which $7.0 million had been drawn as of 1 July 2026 [13]. And fiscal 2026 investing outflows were $25.2 million against a fleet that has historically been obtained through equipment finance leases rather than purchases [7].

The company's framing is that financing is obtainable and the schedule achievable. An equally defensible reading is that a company with $9.664 million of cash whose only committed lender is its controlling shareholder may not be able to place binding sole-source GPU orders fast enough, in which case the first observable consequence is not revenue but a delay credit [12][13]. What separates the two readings is whether the next report shows committed third-party financing, and whether net cash used in investing activities runs well above the $6.3 million implied quarterly average of fiscal 2026 [7].

Four things are worth watching specifically: any committed debt or equity financing disclosed for the deployment, and whether it comes from third parties or from further draws on the parent's note [13]; net cash used in investing activities against the $6.3 million implied average, the first hard evidence that binding GPU orders have been placed [7]; whether leased colocation capacity moves above 14 MW, and whether the added capacity is contracted or idle [2][18]; and any accrued delay credit, tranche termination or refund to Microsoft [12]. Committed financing plus a tranche delivered on schedule would falsify the claim that financing is the binding constraint, while a disclosed delay credit would falsify the claim that the fixed schedule is being met. It is worth remembering that tranche-level progress has no committed disclosure cadence: as of the most recent current report on 27 August 2026 the number of tranches accepted by Microsoft was still zero, and the next period may simply say nothing about it [10][12].

Did the fiscal 2026 gross loss narrow because the leased-GPU cost base is durably lower, or only because lease renegotiations re-profiled the charges — and does cost of revenues fall below revenue in the next reported period?

This company still does not cover the cost of the capacity it sells. Fiscal 2026 cost of revenues of $88.691 million exceeded revenue of $71.604 million, which means the service itself lost $17.087 million before a single dollar of overhead [6]. Whether that gap closes decides whether the Microsoft expansion is being added to an engine that works or one that does not, and it also decides how much additional money the company must raise, because every dollar of gross loss is a dollar the buildout has to find elsewhere [12].

Evidence pointing both ways sits in the same annual report. Cost of revenues fell from $115.308 million to $88.691 million, depreciation and amortisation fell from $80.656 million to $60.340 million, and operating cash flow swung from $7.2 million used to $39.1 million provided [6][7]. But the company also discloses that it renegotiated the majority of its equipment finance leases to extend the amortisation period to five years and later extended lease durations again, pushing finance lease payments out to fiscal year 2028 [14], and it attributed part of the operating cash swing to changes in operating assets and liabilities [7].

The way to separate the two is to watch depreciation and amortisation alongside gross profit. An improvement that arrives while the amortisation charge is flat is operating; one that arrives only because the charge fell again is not [6][14]. At the same time, finance-lease principal is repaid through financing activities, so operating cash flow overstates what the business actually retains: $47.571 million of finance-lease principal falls due within twelve months against $9.664 million of cash [8].

Four numbers are therefore the ones to read: whether cost of revenues falls below revenue and turns the gross loss into gross profit [6]; depreciation and amortisation against the $60.340 million fiscal 2026 charge, and whether any further lease renegotiation is disclosed [14]; operating cash flow against the $9.8 million implied quarterly average, and how much of it is attributed to working capital [7]; and the current portion of finance lease liability read together with closing cash rather than separately [8]. Cost of revenues still above revenue would falsify the claim that the fiscal 2026 reduction is enough to reach gross profit; a further disclosed renegotiation would make it untenable to read any improvement as operating; and because cost components are disclosed annually in the lease notes, a single interim period may not show what drove a change at all [14].

Risks and Falsifiers

Control and the only committed funding come from the same party. Applied Digital and its subsidiary beneficially own approximately 97% of the common stock, making ChronoScale a controlled company [15], and its only disclosed committed credit line is a demand note from that same shareholder: $7.0 million drawn out of up to $100.0 million of capacity, repayable on demand, with Applied Parent having agreed only not to demand repayment before 2027-08-20 [13]; related-party expense over the same period rose from $0.878 million to $2.912 million [6]. What would falsify this dependence is disclosure of a committed third-party credit facility, or an equity raise that funds the deployment without further draws on the note.

The reported entity still contains a business management intends to exit. The Legacy Ekso exoskeleton business was classified as held for sale on 29 May 2026 and the company expects to complete the divestiture during fiscal year 2027, but the sale terms are not disclosed [11]. The financial exposure is the $1.020 million loss from discontinued operations in fiscal 2026, plus currently unquantifiable proceeds, disposal costs or impairment if the sale completes on different terms or does not complete within fiscal 2027 [6]. Completion of the divestiture on disclosed terms, or a board decision to retain the business, would settle it.

Revenue continuity depends on a contract that can be ended in sixty days. After the initial term expires around the end of February 2027, the Together AI agreement renews only in successive sixty-day periods that either party can stop with written notice [4]. The exposure is approximately 99.5% of $71.604 million of revenue [1], set against a fixed cost base that produced a $17.087 million gross loss even with that revenue fully in place [6]. Disclosure of a second contracted Cloud customer generating at least 10% of revenue, or a renewal beyond the initial term at unchanged pricing, would falsify the concentration reading.

The Microsoft deployment turns execution risk into cash risk for the first time. The company must fund GPU hardware, networking and data-centre buildout that it says exceed its existing cash resources, on a fixed delivery schedule concentrated in a single facility and a sole-source supplier [12]. The exposure includes daily delay credits against revenue, termination of a tranche or of the whole agreement, and refunds of upfront payments already received [19], against $9.664 million of cash at 31 May 2026 [8]; the company says these risks could affect its ability to continue as a going concern [12]. Disclosure of committed financing sufficient for at least the first tranche, together with a tranche accepted on or before its required delivery date, would falsify the concern.

The two best-looking numbers of fiscal 2026 rest on the same renegotiation. Positive operating cash flow and lower cost of revenues both depend on the lease renegotiation that pushed finance lease payments into fiscal year 2028 [14], while $47.571 million of finance-lease principal still falls due within twelve months. The exposure is that this $47.571 million is repaid through financing activities and therefore never appears in the $39.1 million operating inflow [7], against $9.664 million of closing cash [8]. Two consecutive reported periods of positive gross profit and positive operating cash flow, with the amortisation charge flat and no further renegotiation disclosed, would falsify the reading that this is a paper improvement.

What to Watch Next

On the single-customer renewal rate:

• Cloud revenue against the $17.901 million implied quarterly average of fiscal 2026. Flat or higher on an unchanged fleet falsifies the repricing reading; well below it indicates the renewed rate has been cut.
• The deployed GPU count and the customer count, last disclosed at 6,144 GPUs and one customer as of 31 May 2026. A second contracted customer would falsify the single-agreement dependence; no fleet disclosure at all would make price and volume impossible to separate.

On the Microsoft GB300 deployment:

• Committed financing, against a demand note of up to $100.0 million with $7.0 million drawn. Third-party committed financing plus a first tranche delivered on schedule would falsify the claim that financing is the binding constraint.
• Net cash used in investing activities against the $6.3 million implied quarterly average of fiscal 2026. A figure far above it would show that binding GPU orders have been placed.
• Leased colocation capacity against roughly 14 MW, and tranches accepted, which stood at zero as of 27 August 2026. Any accrued delay credit would falsify the claim that the fixed schedule is being met.

On lease cost and cash conversion:

• Cost of revenues against revenue, last reported at $88.691 million against $71.604 million. Cost still above revenue would show the fiscal 2026 reduction was not enough to reach gross profit.
• Depreciation and amortisation against the $60.340 million fiscal 2026 charge, and any further disclosed lease renegotiation, which would make it untenable to read an improvement as operating.
• Operating cash flow against the $9.8 million implied quarterly average, and the current portion of finance lease liability of $47.571 million read together with closing cash of $9.664 million. Two consecutive periods of positive gross profit and positive operating cash flow with amortisation flat would falsify the paper-improvement reading.

Conclusion

Stripped to its essentials, ChronoScale is a company that installs leased GPUs in leased rack space and rents the clusters to one customer at a fixed rate. In fiscal 2026 that structure produced $71.604 million of revenue against $88.691 million of cost of revenues, a $17.087 million loss at the service level, a $50.320 million net loss, and closing cash of $9.664 million against $47.571 million of finance-lease principal due within twelve months [6][8]. The unresolved relationship is a single one: the cost base is contractually locked, while revenue depends on the rate inside an agreement that can be ended in sixty days [4], and the company must simultaneously find money for a deployment more than three times its current size that costs it money if it misses its dates [12].

At this point, independent outside judgement on the company is close to blank. Since the annual report of 19 August 2026, the third-party material that can be found consists mainly of automated filing summaries and trade-press coverage of the Microsoft announcement rather than independent evaluation; the substantive outside analyses that do exist were written before the annual report, when the company had no standalone financial statements of its own, and several of them cite revenue and margin figures that actually belong to the former Ekso Bionics exoskeleton business — a direct consequence of the series being incomparable across the combination [15]. There is therefore no outside disagreement to weigh here, and what a reader has to work with is the company's own disclosure [1].

Materially changing the current understanding requires a combination of observations rather than any single number. In the strengthening direction: revenue above the $17.901 million implied average on an unchanged fleet, cost of revenues falling below revenue while the amortisation charge stops declining [6], and committed third-party financing paired with a first GB300 tranche delivered on schedule and accepted [12]. In the weakening direction: revenue below the implied average, another lease renegotiation [14], or the appearance of daily delay credits alongside continued draws on the parent's note [13]. Any one of those on its own says little; two of the three together would turn the question from whether this business can stand on its own into how long the funding lasts.

Sources

[1] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — Cloud Business overview · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[2] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — data center footprint · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[3] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — deployed GPU fleet and suppliers · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[4] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — pricing and contract renewal terms · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[5] US earnings calendar entry for CHRN dated 2026-09-21, last updated 2026-09-15; fiscal-quarter dating follows the 31 May fiscal year end adopted at the May 2026 business combination and disclosed in the fiscal 2026 Form 10-K. · 2026-09-15 · earnings calendar

[6] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — FY2026 consolidated income statement values · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[7] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — cash flow commentary · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[8] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — FY2026 consolidated balance sheet values · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[9] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — Microsoft strategic partnership · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[10] CHRN 8-K 2026-08-27 — Microsoft term extended to three years · 2026-08-27 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1549084/000149315226040398/0001493152-26-040398-index.htm

[11] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — Legacy Ekso held for sale · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[12] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — Microsoft delivery penalties and financing dependence · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[13] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — Applied Parent Grid Note · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[14] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — finance lease renegotiation · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[15] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — Applied Digital control and Business Combination · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[16] CHRN 8-K 2026-08-27 — 50 MW deployment press release · 2026-08-27 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1549084/000149315226040398/0001493152-26-040398-index.htm

[17] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — growth strategy platform layers · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[18] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — colocation fixed-cost expansion risk · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[19] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — customer advance deposits · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[20] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — GPU pricing pressure risk · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[21] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — customer concentration risk · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm

[22] CHRN 10-K 2026-08-19 — spare capacity and consumption models · 2026-08-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001549084/000162828026058018/chrn-20260531.htm