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[OMC] Omnicom: Q3 2026 Earnings Test for Media Growth After PepsiCo

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Summary

Omnicom grew core revenue 6.1% organically to $5.995 billion in Q2 2026 with a 17.8% core margin; Q3 tests whether media can stay at double digits after losing PepsiCo.

Omnicom is a holding company that provides media planning and buying, creative advertising, healthcare marketing, public relations and experiential marketing to many of the world's largest advertisers[1]. Omnicom's Q3 2026 earnings call is scheduled for 2026-10-20 and will cover the third quarter of 2026, the three months ended September 30, 2026[2]. In the latest reported period, the second quarter of 2026, reported revenue was $6.56 billion, revenue from core operations (excluding businesses being sold) was $5.995 billion with 6.1% organic growth, the core Adjusted EBITA margin was 17.8%, up 1.9 percentage points from the prior-year combined basis, and adjusted EPS was $2.65, up 29.3%[3][4][5][6]. On the second-quarter call, management raised full-year core organic growth guidance from 4%-4.5% to about 5%, guided to full-year non-GAAP diluted EPS growth of more than 15% on a 2025 Omnicom-only base of about $8.65 (roughly $9.95 or more), and said currency would reduce reported core revenue by about 1% in the third quarter while businesses slated for disposal would still contribute about $300 million of third-quarter revenue[7][8][9]. As of 2026-10-15, the analyst consensus compiled by Drillr from four analysts was $2.669 for third-quarter adjusted EPS and $6.214 billion for reported revenue; the revenue figure includes businesses held for sale and cannot be compared directly with core revenue, and seven analysts put full-year adjusted EPS at $10.41[10].

Three things matter most in the third-quarter report. First, whether core organic growth holds the roughly 5% full-year pace: the second quarter's 6.1% was driven mainly by media, which is 52.5% of core revenue and grew more than 10%, but the third quarter has less World Cup work and PepsiCo moved its global media business to Publicis in early September[11][12][13]. Second, whether the high single-digit decline in creative advertising narrows: management attributes the decline to the pain of merging overlapping networks and brands, and the third-quarter rate will test whether that explanation holds or whether clients are really moving creative budgets to AI and in-house teams[14][15]. Third, whether the core margin can again rise by about 2 percentage points year over year: expansion was 2.4 points in the first quarter and 1.9 points in the second, which the company credits mainly to cost synergies from the IPG merger, while part of the savings is being reinvested in the AI platform and pitches are pressuring prices[16][5][17][18].

Company Background and Business Structure

Omnicom completed its acquisition of IPG on November 26, 2025, and now runs the networks of both the original Omnicom and IPG[19]. Under US GAAP, Omnicom is the acquirer and IPG is consolidated only from the closing date, so the 2025 annual report includes just one month of IPG results and 2026 reported figures cannot be compared directly with the prior year[19][20]. Management therefore measures performance on a "core operations" basis, which excludes businesses already sold or held for sale and restates 2025 figures as if Omnicom and IPG had been combined[16]. The company's technology base is its Omni platform, with Acxiom supplying data and identity capabilities, and in February 2026 the board authorized up to $5 billion of share repurchases[21][22].

Starting in 2026, the company reports revenue in five disciplines, and media accounts for more than half[23]. In second-quarter core revenue, Integrated Media (media planning and buying, performance media, digital commerce, and data and identity) was $3.148 billion, or 52.5%; Advertising (creative) was $942.6 million, or 15.7%; Health was $555.9 million, or 9.3%; Public Relations was $679.1 million, or 11.3%; and Experiential & Other was $669.2 million, or 11.2%. Businesses disposed of or held for sale added another $567.5 million of revenue in the same quarter[11]. The businesses being sold sit mainly in the Advertising and Experiential & Other disciplines and are carried at net realizable value[24].

How revenue is recognized determines how much of reported revenue is pass-through purchasing cost. In most businesses Omnicom acts as an agent and books commissions or fees on a net basis; in some media-buying businesses, when it controls the buying process and contracts directly with the media vendor, it acts as principal and books revenue on a gross basis, with the matching purchases recorded as third-party service costs[25]. In the second quarter, third-party service costs were $1.522 billion, or 23.2% of reported revenue, while salary and related costs were $2.967 billion, or 45.2%, which shows that this remains a people-driven business[26].

Geographic and client exposure is fairly spread out, though the US share is high. In second-quarter core revenue, the United States was 59.0%, Euro Markets and Other Europe 13.8%, the United Kingdom 9.3%, Asia Pacific 9.0%, and the Middle East and Africa only 2.1%[11]. The largest client was about 2.4% of 2025 revenue and the top 100 clients about 54.2%; for the twelve months to June 2026 those figures were 2.0% and about 52.5%[27][28]. By client industry, pharma and health is the largest at about 18%, and automotive is about 10%[12].

Financial History and Current Position

Merger charges sharply depressed reported profit in 2025. Revenue for 2025 was $17.27 billion, up 10.1%, including one month of IPG[20]. Because the company booked $1.247 billion for severance, real estate impairment and contract termination, $547.1 million to write businesses for sale down to net realizable value, and $347.3 million of transaction and administrative costs, GAAP operating income fell from $2.2746 billion in 2024 to $444.7 million[29][30]. Net income attributable to Omnicom swung from $1.4806 billion in 2024 to a $54.5 million loss, and diluted EPS went from $7.46 to a loss of $0.27[31].

Core growth and margins have both improved in 2026. First-quarter reported revenue was about $6.2 billion and core revenue about $5.6 billion with 3.9% organic growth; core Adjusted EBITA was $833.5 million and the margin rose from 12.4% to 14.8%, while GAAP diluted EPS was $1.35 and adjusted EPS $1.90[32][16]. Second-quarter reported revenue was $6.5625 billion and core revenue $5.995 billion, with 6.1% organic growth ($339.0 million of organic increase on a prior-year combined core base of $5.5919 billion) and another 1.1% from currency[4]. In the same quarter, GAAP operating income was $922.5 million and diluted EPS $2.08; reported Adjusted EBITA was $1.1273 billion at a 17.2% margin, and core Adjusted EBITA was $1.0688 billion at 17.8%[3][33].

For the first half as a whole, core organic growth was 5.0%, and core Adjusted EBITA rose from $1.5405 billion to $1.9023 billion, taking the margin on core revenue from about 14.2% to about 16.4%[4][34]. The gap between adjusted and GAAP results comes mainly from merger-related intangible amortization and integration costs: second-quarter adjusted EPS excluded $87.1 million of after-tax amortization, $38.0 million of after-tax integration and transaction costs, and $35.3 million of after-tax severance and repositioning costs[6].

Cash and debt have moved more sharply than profit. Operating cash flow in the first half of 2026 was negative $932.4 million, including a $2.4344 billion use of operating capital, while free cash flow as the company defines it (excluding working-capital changes) was $1.502 billion[35]. Over the same period the company repurchased $2.9882 billion of stock, paid $481.5 million of common dividends and spent only $115.1 million on capital expenditures, and cash and equivalents fell by about $3.5 billion from the end of 2025[22][36]. At the end of June, Omnicom held $3.3 billion of cash against $10.2 billion of gross long-term debt, had an undrawn $3.5 billion revolving credit facility, and reported a credit-agreement leverage ratio of 2.4 times, below 2.6 times at the end of 2025[9][37].

Operating Model

Revenue can be broken into client marketing budgets times Omnicom's share times the way it charges. Commissions and fees are booked net, while experiential work, field marketing and some media buying done as principal are booked gross, so for the same client budget, a shift toward gross-booked media buying raises reported revenue and dilutes the margin[25]. Core organic growth equals the year-over-year change in core revenue minus the currency effect, measured against a combined Omnicom-plus-IPG core base that is restated whenever the disposal list grows[4][16]. Revenue is seasonal, typically lower in the first and third quarters and higher in the second and fourth, so the third quarter should be compared mainly with the prior-year quarter rather than with the second quarter[28].

On the profit side, the key variable is people cost as a share of revenue. Operating income equals revenue minus salaries, third-party service and incidental costs, occupancy and other costs, SG&A, depreciation and amortization, and severance and repositioning; in the second quarter these were 45.2%, 23.2% and 3.4%, 7.7%, 3.2%, 2.6% and 0.7% of reported revenue[26]. The company manages to Adjusted EBITA, which adds back acquired-intangible amortization, integration costs and severance and repositioning, so cost synergies show up in the margin mainly through lower salary and occupancy costs, usually taking one to several quarters after layoffs and office consolidation to appear fully[5][38].

Cash is dominated by the working-capital cycle and lags noticeably. Omnicom pays media vendors on behalf of clients, so both receivables and payables are large; in the first half, accounts payable fell by $2.2782 billion, the main source of the working-capital outflow, which typically reverses by year-end[39][36]. In addition, $341.0 million of severance and contract-termination liabilities remained at the end of June after $328.5 million of cash payments in the first half, so merger costs already recognized under GAAP will keep flowing out as cash in later quarters[40]. On buybacks, about $3 billion of the $5 billion program was complete by the second quarter, the company plans about $500 million more in 2026 and full completion by the end of the first quarter of 2027, and the shrinking share count lifts EPS beyond what profit alone delivers[9].

Industry and Competitive Position

Marketing services are dominated by a handful of global holding companies, and clients increasingly consolidate work with larger, more complete providers. Management argues that before the merger Omnicom's headline growth was held back by low-growth businesses, and that the combined portfolio now focuses on faster-growing areas while shifting from a holding company to an integrated operating company that can offer clients cross-capability solutions[41]. In the second quarter, Omnicom expanded work with existing clients including American Express, General Mills and Uber, and set up a centralized growth team to win new clients[21].

Greater scale has not eased competitive pressure. On the second-quarter call, management acknowledged that the new-business pitching environment is "extremely competitive," with aggressive pricing from peers[18]. In early September, PepsiCo moved its global media business to Publicis after more than 25 years with Omnicom, although Omnicom still does extensive creative, sports and PR work for PepsiCo[13]. That shows scale in media does not guarantee that large clients stay, and competitors are equally able to take on global media accounts.

AI is both a selling point and a risk the company lists in its annual report. Management says AI and agentic workflows make campaign delivery more efficient, that cost savings are passed through to clients, and that clients reinvest most of those savings in more marketing spending[42]. Yet the 10-K also states that if clients build their own AI capabilities, Omnicom's services could become less attractive[15]. Because discipline growth rates are given only as ranges on the call and the company does not disclose gross-booked media revenue, the available material is not sufficient to measure Omnicom's share shifts against peers precisely.

Core Debates

Since absorbing IPG, media has become more than half of Omnicom's revenue, and its growth reached double digits in the second quarter, lifting core organic growth to 6.1%. The third quarter has less World Cup work, and in early September PepsiCo moved its global media business to Publicis. Can media keep growing at double digits and hold core organic growth at or above the roughly 5% full-year guidance?

This debate decides whether the full-year growth guidance holds. Integrated Media was 52.5% of second-quarter core revenue and is the main source of core organic growth[11]. First-half core organic growth was 5.0%, the same as the raised full-year guidance of about 5%, which means the second half must keep the same pace[4][7]. Third-quarter core growth will show whether the second-quarter acceleration was a lasting share gain or the result of one-off projects and a few client expansions.

The evidence shows the second-quarter acceleration came from media, but one-off factors were also at work. Core organic growth rose from 3.9% in the first quarter to 6.1% in the second; management said Integrated Media grew organically by more than 10% (high single digits in the first quarter), Experiential & Other grew more than 10% on the FIFA World Cup, PR grew mid-single digits, Health was flat and Advertising fell high single digits[32][12][43]. Management credits the growth to expanding services with existing clients and a new centralized new-business team, and says disposals are freeing the portfolio from low-growth businesses[21][41]. The alternative reading is that the acceleration came partly from one-off events such as the World Cup and that the core basis itself flatters growth by excluding slow businesses; according to trade press reports, PepsiCo's global media business has moved to Publicis, which will cut the media base after the handover, though the company has not disclosed the timing or amount[13].

The financial transmission runs through several links. Advertisers' media budgets and demand for AI-driven performance marketing lead clients to consolidate media planning, buying, data and commerce with the larger Omnicom Media; media commissions, fees and gross-booked media-buying revenue then rise, feeding Integrated Media core revenue, core organic growth and reported revenue[21][25]. Third-party service costs were 23.2% of second-quarter reported revenue, above 22.9% for Omnicom alone a year earlier; the 10-Q attributes part of the 68.4% first-half increase in third-party service costs to constant-currency growth in Integrated Media, so the ratio offers an indirect read on whether gross-booked media buying is expanding[26][44].

The third-quarter report can confirm or weaken this view but may not settle it. The points to watch are whether core organic growth is at least 4% and whether it reaches 5%, whether the call still describes Integrated Media growth as double digits, whether the company discloses the timing and revenue effect of the PepsiCo media handover, and whether third-party service costs rise noticeably as a share of reported revenue. Core organic growth below 4% would mean the second-quarter acceleration came mainly from one-off projects, and media growth back in single digits would mean the share gains from the merger did not last. Because the handover may not be fully visible until 2027, even double-digit media growth in the third quarter would answer the question only in part.

Since the merger, Omnicom's creative advertising business has declined for two straight quarters, falling at a high single-digit rate in the second quarter. Management says this reflects folding together networks such as BBDO, TBWA and DDB and retiring overlapping brands, not a structural problem. Will the decline narrow in the third quarter and show that this is reorganization rather than clients moving creative budgets to AI tools and in-house teams?

Creative advertising is the only discipline in clear decline and the business most directly exposed to AI substitution. Advertising was 15.7% of second-quarter core revenue, and at that size a high single-digit decline subtracts roughly 1.2-1.4 percentage points from core organic growth[11][12]. Whether the decline narrows determines whether it can be treated as a one-time restructuring cost.

Current figures show the discipline stalling and losing share. Second-quarter Advertising core revenue was $942.6 million, essentially flat with $943.4 million in the first quarter, while total core revenue grew about 6.8% sequentially, and the discipline's share of core revenue fell from 16.8% to 15.7%[11][45]. Management attributes the decline to integrating Omnicom and IPG advertising assets, retiring overlapping brands and selling small, low-growth advertising businesses in underperforming markets, and in the second quarter it added more advertising businesses to the disposal list, with about 60% of the addition coming from advertising[14][46]. The alternative reading is that clients are using generative AI and in-house teams to replace some creative and production work, a risk the 10-K itself lists; if so, the decline will not narrow much even after the brand integration is complete[15].

Changes in this revenue line affect the financials in two ways. Merging overlapping creative networks and brands, selling low-growth businesses, and AI reducing client demand for traditional creative and production labor all change client counts, project volumes and unit pricing, which feed Advertising core revenue and core organic growth[14][15]. If revenue falls faster than staffing adjusts, the discipline's profit is also squeezed. The disposal list changes the measurement basis as well: the more low-growth assets are moved out of core, the more any improvement in core growth comes from exclusion rather than from the remaining business getting better[46][24].

The third-quarter report needs to be read for the growth rate, the dollar amount and the disposal list together. The points to watch are whether the call describes third-quarter Advertising organic growth as narrowing to mid-single-digit declines or better, whether Advertising core revenue holds near $920 million, and whether the disposal list grows again and third-quarter revenue from businesses being sold comes in at about $300 million[9]. A decline of 10% or more would undercut the reorganization explanation and point to structural shrinkage, and a further expansion of the disposal list would mean part of the core improvement comes from removing weak businesses. Because the call gives only ranges, the report may not cleanly separate the reorganization effect from AI substitution.

After absorbing IPG, Omnicom raised its core margin by 2.4 and 1.9 percentage points year over year in the first and second quarters through job cuts, brand consolidation and shared back offices. More than half of this year's $900 million cost-synergy target has been delivered, but the company is putting part of the savings back into its AI platform, and new-business pitches are pressuring prices. Can the core margin still rise by about 2 percentage points in the third quarter?

Cost synergies are the main source of this year's adjusted EPS growth. Second-quarter core Adjusted EBITA rose $181.4 million year over year, which the company attributes mainly to cost synergies, and full-year adjusted EPS guidance calls for growth of more than 15%[5][7]. The prior-year quarter contained no synergies, so the size of third-quarter margin expansion directly tests whether savings are being retained or consumed by reinvestment and price cuts.

The evidence shows the margin expanding, but by a smaller amount. The core Adjusted EBITA margin was 14.8% in the first quarter (12.4% a year earlier), 17.8% in the second (15.9%), and about 16.4% for the first half (about 14.2%)[16][5][34]. The company says more than half of the $900 million annual synergy target was delivered in the first half, that 75%-80% of the full target should be achieved by year-end, and that the cumulative target is $1.5 billion by mid-2028[47]. Reported salary and related costs were 45.2% of revenue, close to 45.5% for Omnicom alone a year earlier, and the 10-Q says it expects that ratio to be roughly in line year over year[26][44]. Severance, repositioning and integration costs excluded in the second quarter were $87.1 million, down from $154.8 million a year earlier[5][38]. The alternative reading is that expansion already narrowed from the first quarter to the second, that management is reinvesting part of the synergies in the Omni AI platform, and that pitching is intense with peers cutting prices; if these factors absorb most of the incremental synergies, third-quarter expansion could fall to around 1 percentage point[17][18].

Synergies pass through several deductions before reaching EPS. Consolidating more than 20 agency brands, cutting jobs, sharing offices and unifying HR and IT platforms lower salary and occupancy costs; after reinvestment in the Omni AI platform and pitch discounts, the remainder shows up in core Adjusted EBITA and the margin, and the share-count reduction from buybacks then adds to adjusted EPS[48][17][9]. Severance and integration costs hit GAAP profit but are excluded from adjusted results and paid in cash in later quarters, so improvement in the adjusted margin and improvement in cash flow are out of step[40].

The third-quarter report can test this debate fairly directly. The points to watch are whether year-over-year core Adjusted EBITA margin expansion is at least 1.9 percentage points or drops below 1 point, the cumulative synergies the company discloses and whether it reaffirms the $900 million target, whether severance, repositioning and integration costs stay below the second quarter's $87.1 million, and whether the guidance for full-year adjusted EPS growth above 15% is maintained. Expansion below 1 percentage point would mean synergies are being offset by reinvestment and price cuts, and a cut or delay to the synergy target would remove the main support for the EPS guidance. Because the company does not disclose synergies quarterly, the gap between "75%-80% by year-end" and "on track for the $900 million target" may remain unresolved[47].

Risks and Falsifiers

The first risk is that seasonal working-capital outflows combined with heavy buybacks drain cash and raise debt. First-half 2026 operating cash flow was negative $932.4 million with a $2.4344 billion working-capital outflow and $2.9882 billion of buybacks, cash fell by about $3.5 billion from the start of the year, gross long-term debt was $10.2 billion, and the credit-agreement leverage ratio was 2.4 times against a 3.5-times cap[35][22][36][37]. The annual report also warns that the agencies' operating cash flow directly affects the company's liquidity and access to financing[49]. Positive third-quarter operating cash flow, a cash balance that stops falling sharply and leverage held below 2.5 times would ease this concern.

The second risk is that conflict in the Middle East and broader macro uncertainty lead clients to delay or cut marketing spending. Second-quarter core revenue in the Middle East and Africa was $127.6 million, or 2.1%, down by double digits because of the regional conflict, and management said this adds macro uncertainty that weighs on client marketing sentiment[11][18]. Clients can cut spending on short notice, so the risk passes straight through to revenue[28]. If core revenue growth in major regions such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe does not slow noticeably in the third quarter and management does not cut its full-year organic growth guidance, the risk has not materialized.

The third risk is that the loss of large media accounts and pitch discounts weaken growth in media. The exposure is Integrated Media, with $3.148 billion of second-quarter core revenue; for the twelve months to June 2026, the top 100 clients were about 52.5% of revenue and the largest client about 2.0%[11][28]. The loss of PepsiCo's global media business and the intense pitching environment management described are concrete forms of this risk[13][18]. If Integrated Media still grows organically at double digits in the third quarter and the company does not lower its roughly 5% full-year organic growth guidance, the current understanding stands.

The fourth risk is that clients use generative AI or in-house teams to replace creative and production services, causing a structural decline in creative advertising revenue. The exposed lines are Advertising revenue of $942.6 million in the second quarter, 15.7% of core revenue, and the related creative staffing costs[11][15]. If the third-quarter Advertising decline narrows to mid-single digits or better and the company adds no further advertising disposals, the risk is not yet confirmed.

The fifth risk is that synergy savings are offset by AI platform reinvestment, pitch discounts and integration disruption, slowing margin expansion. The exposure is core Adjusted EBITA of $1.0688 billion in the second quarter and the guidance for full-year adjusted EPS growth above 15%; management also noted that long-term AI technology costs remain uncertain and that combining two large companies requires continued integration investment[5][17][18]. If third-quarter core Adjusted EBITA margin expansion is at least 1.9 percentage points and the synergy target is maintained, the risk has not materialized.

What to Watch Next

  • Media growth: core organic growth was 6.1% in the second quarter, 3.9% in the first and 5.0% for the half[4]. Watch whether the third quarter is at least 4% and reaches 5%; below 4% would suggest the second-quarter acceleration came mainly from one-off projects.
  • Media growth: Integrated Media grew organically by more than 10% in the second quarter[12]. Watch the growth description and the timing and revenue effect of the PepsiCo handover; a return to single digits would mean share gains did not last.
  • Media growth: third-party service costs were 23.2% of reported revenue, against 22.9% a year earlier[26]. A noticeable rise would indicate that more growth is coming from gross-booked media buying.
  • Creative advertising: Advertising fell at a high single-digit rate on $942.6 million of core revenue[11]. Watch whether the decline narrows to mid-single digits and revenue holds near $920 million; a decline of 10% or more would point to structural shrinkage.
  • Creative advertising: about $300 million of third-quarter revenue is expected from businesses being sold, out of a disposal list with $3.5-$3.6 billion of annualized revenue[9][46]. A larger list would mean part of the core improvement comes from removing weak businesses.
  • Synergies and margin: core Adjusted EBITA margin rose 1.9 percentage points in the second quarter and 2.4 points in the first[5][16]. Watch whether expansion is at least 1.9 points or falls below 1 point; below 1 point would mean synergies are being offset by reinvestment and price cuts.
  • Synergies and margin: more than half of the $900 million target was delivered in the first half, and full-year EPS growth is guided above 15%[47][7]. A cut or delay to the target would remove the main support for the EPS guidance.
  • Cross-cutting risk: first-half operating cash flow was negative $932.4 million and leverage was 2.4 times[35][37]. Positive third-quarter cash flow with leverage below 2.5 times would ease the cash pressure.

Conclusion

Since absorbing IPG, Omnicom's business has been driven by two things: whether media, more than half of core revenue, can keep growing at double digits, and whether merger cost synergies keep turning into margin. Second-quarter core organic growth of 6.1%, a 17.8% core Adjusted EBITA margin and 29.3% adjusted EPS growth show both levers working in the first half[4][5][6]. But creative advertising is still shrinking, first-half operating cash flow was negative $932.4 million, buybacks are consuming cash, and the core basis itself shifts as the disposal list changes, so the durability of growth and the quality of profit are not yet fully proven[14][35][46].

Since the second-quarter report, the main outside view with independent reasoning is The Drum's September 4 analysis of the PepsiCo, Publicis and Coca-Cola media moves[13]. The article argues that PepsiCo's shift of its global media business to Publicis removes the most obvious conflict of Omnicom serving both Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, while Omnicom still does extensive creative, sports and PR work for PepsiCo; it cites Bank of America's view that Omnicom is unlikely to be invited to pitch for Coca-Cola's media business because it remains on PepsiCo's roster, and notes that Omnicom is competing in PepsiCo's separate global review of AI marketing transformation capabilities[13]. This outside reading bears directly on the first debate: it implies the gap in the media base is hard to fill soon by winning Coca-Cola, which contrasts with management's emphasis on existing-client expansion and its new-business team; beyond this analysis, the coverage found since the second-quarter report was mostly results recaps, holdings changes and executive news, leaving no other independent view to cross-check against.

Later observations need to read operating and financial data together. If third-quarter core organic growth is at least 5%, Integrated Media is still at double digits and the Advertising decline narrows to mid-single digits, while core margin expansion is at least 1.9 percentage points and operating cash flow turns positive, the current view that the merger is lifting both share and margins would be clearly strengthened. Conversely, if core organic growth falls below 4%, media growth returns to single digits or the company discloses a material revenue effect from the PepsiCo handover, the Advertising decline reaches 10% or more, or margin expansion falls below 1 percentage point and the synergy target is cut, that view would be weakened.

Sources

[1] OMC 10-K filed 2026-02-20 · business overview · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29989/000002998926000006/

[2] Drillr earnings calendar (updated 2026-10-15) · OMC 2026-10-20 call · 2026-10-15 · Drillr earnings calendar

[3] OMC 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 highlights · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000018/a2026q2earningsrelease.htm

[4] OMC 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 core revenue change · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000018/a2026q2earningsrelease.htm

[5] OMC 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 core adjusted EBITA · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000018/a2026q2earningsrelease.htm

[6] OMC 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 adjusted EPS · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000018/a2026q2earningsrelease.htm

[7] OMC Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · guidance · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

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[9] OMC Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · dispositions and buyback · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[10] Drillr analyst_financial_estimates (updated 2026-10-15) · OMC quarter ending 2026-09-30 · 2026-10-15 · Drillr analyst_financial_estimates · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[11] OMC 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 core revenue by discipline and region · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000018/a2026q2earningsrelease.htm

[12] OMC Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · discipline and region growth · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[13] The Drum 2026-09-04 · The questions left unanswered by the Pepsi-Publicis-Coke media merry-go-round · 2026-09-04 · The Drum · https://www.thedrum.com/news/the-questions-left-unanswered-by-the-pepsi-publicis-coke-media-merry-go-round

[14] OMC Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · advertising decline Q&A · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[15] OMC 10-K filed 2026-02-20 · technology and AI competition risk · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29989/000002998926000006/

[16] OMC 8-K filed 2026-04-28 · Q1 2026 core adjusted EBITA · 2026-04-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000008/a2026q1earningsrelease.htm

[17] OMC Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · synergy reinvestment Q&A · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[18] OMC Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · stated risks · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[19] OMC 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · Merger with IPG · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000019/omc-20260630.htm

[20] OMC 10-K filed 2026-02-20 · 2025 revenue · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29989/000002998926000006/

[21] OMC Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · client expansion and new business · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[22] OMC 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · share repurchases · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000019/omc-20260630.htm

[23] OMC 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · nature of services · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000019/omc-20260630.htm

[24] OMC 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · assets held for sale · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000019/omc-20260630.htm

[25] OMC 10-K filed 2026-02-20 · principal vs agent · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29989/000002998926000006/

[26] OMC 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · operating expenses as a percentage of revenue · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000019/omc-20260630.htm

[27] OMC 10-K filed 2026-02-20 · client concentration · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29989/000002998926000006/

[28] OMC 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · seasonality and client concentration · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000019/omc-20260630.htm

[29] OMC 10-K filed 2026-02-20 · merger charges · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29989/000002998926000006/

[30] OMC 10-K filed 2026-02-20 · 2025 results of operations · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29989/000002998926000006/

[31] OMC 10-K filed 2026-02-20 · 2025 net income · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29989/000002998926000006/

[32] OMC 8-K filed 2026-04-28 · Q1 2026 core operations · 2026-04-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000008/a2026q1earningsrelease.htm

[33] OMC 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 core operations table · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000018/a2026q2earningsrelease.htm

[34] OMC 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · H1 2026 core operations · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000018/a2026q2earningsrelease.htm

[35] OMC 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · H1 2026 free cash flow · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000018/a2026q2earningsrelease.htm

[36] OMC 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · cash sources and requirements · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000019/omc-20260630.htm

[37] OMC 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · debt covenant and ratings · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000019/omc-20260630.htm

[38] OMC 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · integration and repositioning costs · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000019/omc-20260630.htm

[39] OMC 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · change in operating capital · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000019/omc-20260630.htm

[40] OMC 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · severance and repositioning liability · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000019/omc-20260630.htm

[41] OMC Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · growth sustainability Q&A · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[42] OMC Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · AI savings Q&A · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[43] OMC Q1 2026 earnings call 2026-04-28 · discipline trends · 2026-04-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[44] OMC 10-Q filed 2026-07-29 · salary and service costs commentary · 2026-07-29 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000019/omc-20260630.htm

[45] OMC 8-K filed 2026-04-28 · Q1 2026 core revenue by discipline · 2026-04-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000029989/000002998926000008/a2026q1earningsrelease.htm

[46] OMC Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · disposition portfolio Q&A · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[47] OMC Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · synergy guidance · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[48] OMC Q1 2026 earnings call 2026-04-28 · synergy and buyback targets · 2026-04-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[49] OMC 10-K filed 2026-02-20 · liquidity and credit rating risk · 2026-02-20 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29989/000002998926000006/

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