[LVS] Las Vegas Sands: Q3 2026 earnings preview on Macao margins and buybacks

Las Vegas Sands (LVS) runs integrated resorts only in Macao and Singapore, earning revenue from gaming, hotels, food and beverage, malls and conventions, and its Q3 2026 earnings call on Macao margins and buybacks is scheduled for 2026-10-21, covering the third quarter 2026, the three months ended September 30, 2026 [1]. In the latest disclosed period, the second quarter of 2026, net revenue was $3.154 billion, slightly below $3.175 billion a year earlier, net income attributable to shareholders was $373 million, diluted EPS was $0.53, and consolidated adjusted property EBITDA fell 16.1% to $1.119 billion [2][3]; Macao property EBITDA fell 24.0% to $430 million and Marina Bay Sands fell 10.3% to $689 million [3]. The company does not give quarterly revenue or EBITDA guidance. Ten analysts compiled by Drillr put consensus third-quarter net revenue at $3.398 billion (range $3.388 billion to $3.418 billion), about 8% above the second-quarter actual, while 11 analysts put consensus EPS at $0.74 (range $0.69 to $0.82) and consensus EBITDA stands at $1.187 billion [4]. The EPS consensus is compiled on an adjusted basis and the EBITDA consensus does not state its basis, so neither can be compared directly with the GAAP EPS and property EBITDA figures above [4].

Three things matter most in these results. First, whether Macao volume growth turns back into profit: second-quarter Macao non-rolling drop rose 15% year over year, but payroll and other expenses rose 18.2%, and hold-adjusted EBITDA of about $517 million put the margin at about 26.7%, down from 29.6% in the first quarter [5][6][7]; whether third-quarter costs flatten and adjusted EBITDA recovers will directly test management's statement that expense growth has slowed [8]. Second, how durable Marina Bay Sands' post-renovation earnings are: first-quarter EBITDA of $788 million came with an unusual $17.965 billion of rolling chip volume, and after rolling volume fell back to $9.269 billion in the second quarter, adjusted EBITDA was about $652 million [9][10][5]; whether non-rolling drop and room rates keep growing in the third quarter will show how much of this profit comes from a broad customer base and how much from a few large players. Third, how buybacks are funded: the company repurchased about $788 million of stock in the second quarter, and net debt stayed roughly flat in the first half only because it collected a $1.264 billion loan [11][12]; the change in net debt at the end of September will show whether buybacks of $700-800 million a quarter have started to rely on borrowing.

Company Background and Business Structure

Las Vegas Sands is an integrated resort operator that depends entirely on two Asian markets. Having sold its Las Vegas properties and operations, the company now runs five Macao properties through its roughly 74.8% stake in Sands China — The Venetian Macao, The Londoner Macao, The Parisian Macao, The Plaza Macao and Four Seasons Macao, and Sands Macao — and wholly owns Marina Bay Sands (MBS) in Singapore [13][14]. Each resort is treated as an operating segment. The Londoner Macao is the company's largest themed property on the Cotai Strip, and in the second quarter of 2025 the company finished converting the Sheraton into the Londoner Grand with 2,405 newly renovated rooms and suites, while also completing the suite renovation of Tower 3 at Marina Bay Sands [15][14]. Because minority shareholders hold about 25% of Sands China, a corresponding share of Macao profit does not belong to Las Vegas Sands shareholders.

Singapore delivers more than half of property profit from about 40% of revenue. In 2025 the Macao segments together generated $7.470 billion of net revenue and $2.310 billion of adjusted property EBITDA, a 30.9% margin, while Marina Bay Sands generated $5.590 billion of net revenue and $2.922 billion of adjusted property EBITDA, a 52.3% margin and about 56% of property EBITDA [16]. The profit mix inside Macao is also shifting: in 2025 The Londoner Macao's EBITDA rose 43.3% to $778 million, while The Venetian Macao fell 13.4% to $946 million and The Parisian Macao fell 26.6% to $218 million [16]. By revenue type, 2025 casino revenue was $9.789 billion, about 75% of net revenue, with rooms at $1.422 billion, food and beverage at $644 million, mall at $801 million, and convention, retail and other at $361 million [17].

Gaming revenue is set by volume, win rate and reinvestment, and the company measures volume across three types of play. Rolling Chip play covers VIP players and is measured by non-negotiable chips wagered and lost; Non-Rolling Chip play covers mostly mass and premium mass players and is measured by drop; slots and electronic tables are measured by handle [18]. Actual win rate times volume gives gross gaming revenue, and only after discounts, commissions, loyalty points and other reinvestment does the company recognize net casino revenue [19]. Both markets depend on visitors from mainland China, Hong Kong and Southeast Asia; Macao gaming operates under a ten-year concession that expires in December 2032, and Marina Bay Sands' gaming license expires in April 2028 [20][21].

Financial History and Current Position

Revenue has grown for three straight years since the pandemic, and almost all of the profit increase has come from Singapore. Net revenue rose from $10.372 billion in 2023 to $11.298 billion in 2024 and $13.017 billion in 2025; net income attributable to shareholders was $1.627 billion in 2025, up from $1.446 billion in 2024, and diluted EPS was $2.35 [17]. Adjusted property EBITDA was $5.232 billion in 2025, up 19.5% from $4.379 billion in 2024, with Marina Bay Sands adding $870 million (up 42.4%), while Macao fell $17 million, or 0.7%, despite higher revenue and market share, a decline the company attributed to higher marketing and payroll costs in a competitive environment [16][22]. On cash flow, 2025 operating cash flow was $3.023 billion, capital expenditure $1.168 billion, buybacks $2.217 billion, dividends and noncontrolling-interest payments $833 million, and a further $483 million went to buying more Sands China shares [23][21][24].

The first two quarters of 2026 show that quarterly profit swings widely, driven mainly by hold and a few large players. First-quarter net revenue was $3.585 billion and property EBITDA $1.421 billion, with Macao up 18.3% to $633 million and Marina Bay Sands up 30.2% to $788 million [25][26]. Second-quarter property EBITDA fell to $1.119 billion: Macao, hit by its largest-ever rolling hold disadvantage, reported $430 million, or about $517 million at expected hold, while Marina Bay Sands reported $689 million, or about $652 million after adjusting for above-expected rolling hold [3][5][27]. On the company's figures, the hold adjustment to second-quarter consolidated property EBITDA totaled +$50 million (Macao +$87 million, Marina Bay Sands -$37 million), compared with -$87 million in the second quarter of 2025 [28].

Changes in the balance sheet come mainly from heavy buybacks rather than weaker operations. First-half operating cash flow was $1.413 billion, capital expenditure $526 million, buybacks $1.541 billion, and dividends and noncontrolling-interest payments $530 million; in May the company collected early repayment of the $1.264 billion seller financing loan from the sale of its Las Vegas assets [29][12]. At June 30, 2026, debt principal was $15.402 billion and cash and equivalents $3.376 billion, for net debt of about $12.026 billion, roughly flat with about $12.086 billion at the end of 2025 (debt of $15.927 billion and cash of $3.841 billion) [30][31][32]. Over the same period shares outstanding fell from 675 million to 648 million, and equity attributable to shareholders was only $581 million [31].

Operating Model

Revenue depends first on premium players' volume and hold, and second on whether rooms can host high-value guests at higher rates. Revenue can be read as gaming revenue (volume × win rate − reinvestment discounts) plus room revenue (available rooms × occupancy × average daily rate), plus food and beverage, mall rents and conventions [18]. Volume and hold reach revenue within the quarter, while investments in suites and entertainment take several quarters to show up in the customer mix and room rates: after Marina Bay Sands finished its suite renovation in May 2025, room revenue in the second quarter of 2026 was still rising on higher rates [33]; the renovation of all 2,900 rooms at The Venetian Macao began in March 2026, will take about 400 to 500 rooms out of inventory per quarter on average through 2027, and is scheduled for completion by Chinese New Year 2028 [34].

Property margins are set mainly by each market's tax rates and by reinvestment and staffing. Property EBITDA equals net revenue minus gaming taxes, payroll and other expenses including marketing; Macao levies a 35% special gaming tax on gross gaming revenue plus a 5% contribution to government-designated uses, so Macao margins usually run between 25% and 32% [35]. Singapore applies a 9% goods and services tax to gross gaming revenue and then a tiered casino tax of 8% to 22% for premium and mass players, which leaves Marina Bay Sands margins around 50% to 55% [36]. In the second quarter of 2026, Macao's gaming taxes, payroll and other expenses were $716 million, $354 million and $290 million, against $249 million, $207 million and $235 million at Marina Bay Sands [6]. Property EBITDA becomes net income after corporate expense ($74 million in the second quarter), development expense ($43 million), depreciation and amortization ($350 million), interest ($189 million) and income tax [2].

The order in which cash is spent sets how large buybacks can be. Gaming is settled mostly in cash, so property EBITDA converts quickly into operating cash flow, which was $3.023 billion in 2025 [23]. That cash goes in turn to capital expenditure, interest, dividends and Sands China minority distributions, and only the remainder supports buybacks; in both 2025 and the first half of 2026, buybacks exceeded free cash flow, with the gap covered by $1.86 billion of net debt proceeds and the $1.264 billion loan collection respectively [24][12]. From 2026, rising spending on the Marina Bay Sands expansion further squeezes the share of this chain available for buybacks [37].

Industry and Competitive Position

Macao is an oligopoly of six concessionaires in which Sands is the largest, but competition is eroding its margins. The six are Sands China, Galaxy, Wynn Macau, MGM, Melco and SJM, and Sands has the largest hotel room and convention footprint on Cotai [38]. In the second quarter of 2026, Sands China's mass gross gaming revenue grew 8% year over year, about twice the market's 4%, and it took about 26% of VIP rolling volume [5]. Management also acknowledges that Macao's growth comes mainly from the premium segment, where competition remains intense, and the company has added table hours, service levels and reinvestment to win share, so Macao EBITDA fell in 2025 even as revenue grew [34][39].

Singapore is a concentrated, lower-tax market and Sands' most profitable asset, but the comparison is limited. Singapore has only two casino licenses; after its suite renovation, Marina Bay Sands grew property EBITDA 42.4% in 2025 and is building an expansion with a total cost of about $8.0 billion, including a luxury hotel tower, premium gaming areas and a live entertainment arena of about 15,000 seats [16][40]. The company discloses only its own figures and competitors' margins and reinvestment levels are outside the verifiable record, so whether share gains come at the expense of margin can only be judged indirectly from the relationship between Sands' own costs and revenue, and the reinvestment rate itself is not disclosed [39].

Core Debates

Can Sands turn its Macao volume gains back into profit after stepping up service and reinvestment?

This question decides whether Macao can turn from a drag on profit back into a source of growth. Macao contributes about 57% of segment revenue yet has weighed on profit for two years: in 2025 Macao revenue grew while EBITDA fell 0.7%, and reported EBITDA fell 24.0% in the second quarter of 2026 [16][3]. Management reaffirmed its long-term target of $700 million in quarterly Macao EBITDA, and that target, the return on The Venetian Macao renovation and outside concern about premium mass competition all depend on whether spending stops expanding as revenue grows [41].

Volume is clearly growing, but costs are rising in step. In the second quarter, non-rolling drop across the five Macao properties totaled $7.188 billion, up 15.0%, rolling volume was $7.570 billion, up 73%, and slot handle was $6.454 billion, up 30% [42][43][5]. Payroll and other expenses for the quarter totaled $644 million (payroll $354 million, other $290 million), close to $641 million in the first quarter but 18.2% above $545 million in the second quarter of 2025 [6][44][45]. At expected hold, second-quarter Macao EBITDA was about $517 million on adjusted revenue of about $1.937 billion, a margin of about 26.7%, below the first quarter's adjusted $618 million and 29.6% margin and below the 2025 quarterly average of about $578 million [28][7][16].

How spending turns into profit sits at the center of this debate. The transmission runs from more table hours, sales and service staff and reinvestment, to more premium mass and VIP wagering, to gross gaming revenue at the win rate, to net casino revenue after reinvestment discounts, and finally, after gaming taxes of about 40% and payroll and marketing costs, to Macao property EBITDA [39][46]. Management's explanation is that the second quarter is seasonally the weakest of the year, compounded by the World Cup and the largest-ever rolling hold disadvantage, and that the big expense step-up is complete, so Macao operating expense growth will slow significantly in the second half and margins will expand as revenue grows [27][8]. The alternative explanation is that premium mass competition requires ever-higher reinvestment, so share gains come at the expense of margin; the current data cannot separate the two, because the hold adjustment covers only rolling play, and The Venetian Macao's second-quarter non-rolling win rate of 20.4%, below 23.5% a year earlier, means the adjusted figure still contains some luck [42].

The third quarter offers the most direct test. The points to watch are whether hold-adjusted Macao EBITDA returns above $578 million with a margin back at 29.6%; whether payroll and other expenses stay within $662 million; whether non-rolling drop growth still exceeds market mass growth; and whether rooms out of service at The Venetian Macao stay at 400 to 500 with an unchanged completion date [34]. If adjusted EBITDA comes in below $517 million, or expenses keep rising, volume growth has not turned into profit, competition requires continued escalation, and management's plan for flattening costs would be falsified.

Is Marina Bay Sands' post-renovation earnings power broad-based, or does it depend on a few big players and favourable hold?

The profit base at Marina Bay Sands sets the floor for the company's overall profit and cash. It contributed about 56% of 2025 property EBITDA from about 40% of revenue and is the main cash source for buybacks and the $8.0 billion expansion, yet its quarterly EBITDA swings between $650 million and $800 million [16][40]. How much of that is stable earnings power determines which quarter readers should treat as the base.

The renovation has produced durable demand, but quarterly profit is heavily driven by rolling volume. In the second quarter, Marina Bay Sands non-rolling drop was $2.597 billion, up 10.0%, and $5.522 billion for the first half, up 18.4%; the average daily rate was $982, up 10.6%, and occupancy was 95.6% [10][47]. First-quarter EBITDA of $788 million, however, came with $17.965 billion of rolling volume, up 124%; second-quarter rolling volume fell back to $9.269 billion, up only 3.6%, and the reported margin dropped from 55.3% a year earlier to 49.9% [9][10]. At expected hold, second-quarter EBITDA was about $652 million on adjusted revenue of about $1.331 billion, a margin of about 49.0%, below about $688 million and about 53.5% in the second quarter of 2025 and below the 2025 quarterly average of about $731 million [28][5][16].

The customer mix determines whether renovation spending turns steadily into profit. The transmission runs from suite renovations and entertainment that attract high-value guests, to higher premium mass drop, VIP rolling volume and room rates, to gaming revenue plus room and food revenue, and, after tiered gaming taxes, payroll and other expenses, to Marina Bay Sands property EBITDA [33][6]. Management attributed the second-quarter decline to seasonally softer tourism and fewer high-value visits during the June World Cup [27]. The alternative explanation is that premium players are highly concentrated, a few customers' visits decide the quarter, and costs have already risen to match a higher revenue level: Marina Bay Sands payroll and other expenses rose about 17% year over year in the second quarter [6][45].

Non-rolling drop and room rates separate the two explanations better than rolling volume does. In the third quarter, the points to watch are whether hold-adjusted EBITDA returns above $731 million; whether non-rolling drop growth holds around 10%; how rolling volume moves from the second quarter's $9.269 billion; and whether payroll and other expenses exceed $455 million [10]. If adjusted EBITDA falls below $652 million, or rolling volume and non-rolling drop slow together, post-renovation earnings power is receding and premium demand is weakening.

Can Sands keep buying back roughly US$700-800 million a quarter without adding debt while expansion spending rises?

Buybacks are an important source of EPS growth, and their funding determines how long they can last. Over the last 11 quarters the company has repurchased 16.3% of its shares, and in July 2026 the board raised the remaining authorization to $6.0 billion and extended it to July 21, 2029 [13][11]. Yet equity attributable to shareholders has fallen to $581 million, the Marina Bay Sands expansion has a total cost of about $8.0 billion with about $3.0 billion incurred by the end of June, and the Macao concession requires an investment plan of at least 35.84 billion patacas (about $4.44 billion) by December 2032 [31][37][20].

The past year and a half shows free cash flow falling short of shareholder returns. In 2025, operating cash flow of $3.023 billion less capital expenditure of $1.168 billion did not cover $2.217 billion of buybacks and $833 million of dividends and noncontrolling-interest payments, and the gap was filled mainly by $1.86 billion of net debt proceeds [23][24]. In the second quarter of 2026, operating cash flow was about $682 million (the first half's $1.413 billion less the first quarter's $731 million) and buybacks were about $788 million (the first half's $1.541 billion less the first quarter's $753 million), leaving a quarterly funding gap of about $766 million excluding the loan collection [29][48]. Net debt stayed roughly flat in the first half only because of the one-time $1.264 billion loan collection [12].

Whether buybacks can continue depends on every link in the cash chain. Property EBITDA, after interest, tax and working capital, becomes operating cash flow; capital expenditure on the Marina Bay Sands expansion and The Venetian Macao renovation comes out next, then dividends and Sands China minority distributions, and the remaining cash supports buybacks, with any shortfall adding to net debt [29]. Management said it will keep repurchasing aggressively, arguing that buybacks reduce the share count and add to EPS [41]. The alternative is that seasonally stronger third-quarter cash flow plus lower capital expenditure covers most of the buyback, with net debt rising only slightly; it is not yet possible to tell which will occur, and the pace of expansion spending will also affect the outcome [8].

Third-quarter net debt and buyback amounts can separate the two directly. The points to watch are the change in net debt at the end of September against about $12.026 billion at the end of June; third-quarter buybacks and shares outstanding; third-quarter operating cash flow and capital expenditure; and whether the Marina Bay Sands expansion's total cost or early-2031 opening changes [30][8]. A rise in net debt of more than $500 million would show buybacks relying on borrowing, and an increase in the expansion's total cost would further compress room for buybacks.

Risks and Falsifiers

Hold volatility can push a single quarter away from the operating trend, and the exposed line is consolidated property EBITDA. The hold adjustment totaled +$50 million in the second quarter of 2026 (Macao +$87 million, Marina Bay Sands -$37 million) and -$87 million in the second quarter of 2025, while in the first quarter of 2026 it was -$15 million for Macao and +$6 million for Marina Bay Sands [28][49]. Management notes that premium play is concentrated among a small number of large patrons, so quarterly hold volatility is unavoidable but averages out over time [27]. If the hold-adjusted trend moves in the same direction as reported figures and mass win rates return near their trailing twelve-month average, the second-quarter deviation was indeed just luck.

Operations are concentrated in Macao and Singapore and depend on visitors from mainland China and Southeast Asia, which exposes all revenue. The company has no operating properties outside the two markets; the Macao concession expires in December 2032 and Marina Bay Sands' gaming license expires in April 2028 and must be renewed [20][21]. If the visitation and volume the company discloses in both markets keep growing and the concession and license renewals meet no obstacles, this concentration risk has not turned into actual loss.

Premium mass competition in Macao may force reinvestment and staffing to keep rising, which exposes Macao property EBITDA and margin. Second-quarter Macao payroll and other expenses rose about $99 million year over year, almost exactly the year-over-year decline in adjusted EBITDA [6][45][46]. If third-quarter payroll and other expenses stay at or below $662 million while adjusted EBITDA returns above $578 million, competitive cost pressure has peaked.

Premium customers at Marina Bay Sands are concentrated, so a few players' visits and hold decide quarterly profit, which exposes Marina Bay Sands property EBITDA. The hold adjustment was -$37 million in the second quarter and +$6 million in the first, while rolling volume fell by about $8.7 billion from the first quarter to the second [28][49][9][10]. If third-quarter non-rolling drop grows at least 10% year over year and adjusted EBITDA is at least $731 million, earnings power rests on a broader customer base.

Running buybacks and the expansion at the same time could push net debt higher, which exposes net debt and interest expense. Second-quarter interest expense was $189 million, and excluding the loan collection the quarter's funding gap was about $766 million [2][29]. If net debt at the end of September is within plus or minus $200 million of the end of June while quarterly buybacks are at least $500 million, buybacks can be sustained without adding leverage.

What to Watch Next

• Macao volume into profit: hold-adjusted Macao EBITDA was about $517 million (26.7% margin) in Q2 2026 versus about $618 million (29.6%) in Q1. A return above $578 million supports management; below $517 million means growth is not turning into profit.
• Macao costs: payroll and other expenses were $644 million in Q2, up 18.2%. Staying at or below $662 million signals flattening; further increases signal continued escalation.
• Macao share and renovation: non-rolling drop was $7.188 billion, up 15.0%, with 400-500 Venetian rooms out of service. Growth lagging the market or a renovation delay would weaken the share argument.
• Marina Bay Sands earnings power: hold-adjusted EBITDA was about $652 million (49.0%) in Q2 against a 2025 quarterly average of about $731 million. Above $731 million points to broad earnings; below $652 million points to decline.
• Marina Bay Sands mix: non-rolling drop of $2.597 billion (+10.0%), rolling volume of $9.269 billion, and a $455 million threshold for payroll and other expenses. Both forms of play slowing together would signal weaker premium demand.
• Buyback funding: net debt was about $12.026 billion at the end of June and Q2 buybacks about $788 million. A change within plus or minus $200 million with buybacks of at least $500 million is sustainable; an increase above $500 million means borrowing.
• Expansion: about $3.0 billion incurred of an approximately $8.0 billion total, opening in early 2031. A higher total cost would compress buyback capacity.

Conclusion

Las Vegas Sands' profit depends on premium players' volume and hold in its two markets and on what it spends to win them, and the key unresolved relationship is whether Macao volume growth can turn back into profit once costs flatten. In 2025 the company earned $13.017 billion of net revenue and $5.232 billion of property EBITDA, but nearly all of the increase came from Marina Bay Sands, while Macao profit fell despite higher revenue [17][16]. In the second quarter of 2026, Macao adjusted EBITDA was about $517 million at a margin of about 26.7%, Marina Bay Sands adjusted EBITDA was about $652 million, and the company was still buying back about $788 million of stock a quarter with net debt of about $12.026 billion [5][11][30].

Outside interpretations after the second-quarter results focused on Macao but with opposite emphases. JP Morgan's DS Kim, Selina Li and Lindsey Qian said that even after adding back $87 million of unfavourable rolling hold, Sands China's adjusted second-quarter EBITDA of $517 million was still more than 5% below their estimate, that it is hard to separate signal from noise, and that the key is whether high-end demand softness is temporary or persistent; they also noted that operating expenses rose only 1% sequentially and the hold-adjusted reinvestment rate was roughly flat quarter on quarter, so cost discipline held up better than feared [50]. Morgan Stanley's Praveen Choudhary and Anson Lee did not see Sands China consistently gaining EBITDA share despite intense reinvestment since June 2025, estimated that second-quarter reinvestment as a share of mass rose to 26.6%, up 340 basis points year over year, with operating expenses up 18% year over year, and said they remained concerned about industry margins in the second half [51]. Both treat costs as the key variable; they differ in that JP Morgan sees sequential costs already flattening while Morgan Stanley weighs the year-over-year rise in reinvestment intensity more heavily. Both are interpretations, mapping onto the management and competitive-pressure explanations in the first core debate, while the Marina Bay Sands and buyback-funding debates drew almost no independent commentary after the second-quarter results.

The combination that would materially strengthen the current understanding is third-quarter Macao adjusted EBITDA back above $578 million with payroll and other expenses at or below $662 million, Marina Bay Sands non-rolling drop growing about 10% with adjusted EBITDA back above $731 million, and the change in net debt at the end of September held within plus or minus $200 million. Conversely, if Macao costs keep rising while adjusted profit stays below $517 million, Marina Bay Sands rolling volume and non-rolling drop slow together, and net debt rises by more than $500 million because of buybacks, the current understanding would be clearly weakened.

Sources

[1] Drillr earnings calendar (updated 2026-10-15) · LVS 2026-10-21 call · 2026-10-15 · Drillr earnings calendar

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[20] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-07-24 · Macao Investment Plan status · 2026-07-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000085/

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[24] LVS 10-K filed 2026-02-06 · 2025 financing cash flows · 2026-02-06 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000013/

[25] LVS 8-K filed 2026-04-22 · 1Q26 net revenues and EBITDA by property · 2026-04-22 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001300514&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[26] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-04-24 · segment adjusted property EBITDA 1Q26 · 2026-04-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001300514&type=10-Q&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[27] LVS Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-22 · stated risks · 2026-07-22 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[28] LVS 8-K filed 2026-07-22 · 2Q26 hold-adjusted impact · 2026-07-22 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001300514&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[29] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-07-24 · cash flow summary 1H26 · 2026-07-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000085/

[30] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-07-24 · debt 30 June 2026 · 2026-07-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000085/

[31] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-07-24 · balance sheet 30 June 2026 · 2026-07-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000085/

[32] LVS 10-K filed 2026-02-06 · 2025 summary and liquidity · 2026-02-06 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000013/

[33] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-07-24 · room revenues and Venetian renovation · 2026-07-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000085/

[34] LVS Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-22 · Macao operating update · 2026-07-22 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[35] LVS 10-K filed 2026-02-06 · Macao concession gaming tax · 2026-02-06 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000013/

[36] LVS 10-K filed 2026-02-06 · Singapore casino tax · 2026-02-06 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000013/

[37] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-07-24 · MBS Expansion Project status · 2026-07-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000085/

[38] LVS 10-K filed 2026-02-06 · Macao market and competition · 2026-02-06 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000013/

[39] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-07-24 · Macao summary 1H26 · 2026-07-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000085/

[40] LVS 10-K filed 2026-02-06 · MBS Expansion Project · 2026-02-06 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000013/

[41] LVS Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-22 · Macao target and buyback Q&A · 2026-07-22 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[42] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-07-24 · Venetian Macao gaming statistics 2Q26 · 2026-07-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000085/

[43] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-07-24 · Londoner to Marina Bay Sands gaming statistics 2Q26 · 2026-07-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000085/

[44] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-07-24 · segment revenue and expense detail 1H26 · 2026-07-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000085/

[45] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-07-24 · segment revenue and expense detail 2Q25 · 2026-07-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000085/

[46] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-07-24 · segment EBITDA drivers 2Q26 · 2026-07-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000085/

[47] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-07-24 · room statistics 2Q26 · 2026-07-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1300514/000130051426000085/

[48] LVS 10-Q filed 2026-04-24 · cash flow summary 1Q26 · 2026-04-24 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001300514&type=10-Q&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[49] LVS 8-K filed 2026-04-22 · 1Q26 hold-adjusted impact · 2026-04-22 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001300514&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[50] GGRAsia 2026-07-23 · JP Morgan on Sands China 2Q26 luck-adjusted EBITDA · 2026-07-23 · JP Morgan · https://www.ggrasia.com/sands-china-2q-ebitda-miss-too-large-to-ignore-amid-worst-ever-vip-luck-analysts

[51] GGRAsia 2026-07-23 · Morgan Stanley on Sands China reinvestment and EBITDA share · 2026-07-23 · Morgan Stanley · https://www.ggrasia.com/sands-china-2q-ebitda-miss-too-large-to-ignore-amid-worst-ever-vip-luck-analysts