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[HLT] Hilton: Q3 2026 earnings preview on RevPAR and fee growth

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Summary

Hilton grew Q2 2026 RevPAR 3.9% and management and franchise fees 6.4% to $976 million; Q3 tests whether its roughly 4% RevPAR guide reflects durable demand or a World Cup lift.

Hilton is a global hotel company built mainly on franchising and management contracts: it rarely funds hotel construction itself and earns its money from royalties tied to room revenue and management fees tied to hotel revenue and profit[1][2]. Hilton's Q3 2026 earnings, covering the third quarter of 2026, ending September 30, 2026, are scheduled for 2026-10-27[3]. In the latest disclosed quarter, the second quarter of 2026, system-wide comparable RevPAR (revenue per available room) rose 3.9% on a currency-neutral basis, Adjusted EBITDA was $1,054 million and diluted EPS adjusted for special items was $2.29[4]; management and franchise fees reached $976 million, up 6.4% year over year[5][6]. On July 28, Hilton guided third-quarter system-wide comparable RevPAR growth of approximately 4.0%, Adjusted EBITDA of $1,035 million to $1,055 million, net income of $502 million to $516 million and adjusted diluted EPS of $2.28 to $2.34, with full-year RevPAR growth guided at 3.0% to 3.5%[7]. Analyst forecasts compiled by Drillr as of October 13, 2026 put the third-quarter adjusted EPS consensus at $2.35 (range $2.30 to $2.42, 14 analysts) and the quarterly total revenue consensus, including owner cost reimbursements, at $3.367 billion (8 analysts)[8].

Three things matter most in this report. The first is whether the roughly 4% RevPAR guidance is delivered and turns into fee growth: U.S. RevPAR rose 5.4% in the second quarter[9], yet management and franchise fee growth had already slowed from 10.4% in the first quarter[10] to 6.4%, and management acknowledged that underlying growth, excluding the World Cup and calendar effects, is only 2% to 2.5%[11]; the third-quarter report can show whether that strength came from events or from durable business demand. The second is whether development speeds up after Hilton cut fees for owners: net unit growth fell from 6.7% at the end of 2025[12] to 6.1% at the end of June 2026[13], while Hilton cut loyalty program fees and launched Hilton Rise discounts in the second quarter[14], so net room additions at the end of the third quarter will show whether those concessions bought faster openings. The third is whether the drag from the Middle East conflict and owned-hotel renovations narrows or widens: Middle East and Africa RevPAR fell 29.5% in the second quarter[9], incentive management fees fell from $75 million to $69 million[5], and ownership segment Adjusted EBITDA fell from $57 million to $45 million[15], and these two items were the main reasons second-quarter profit growth lagged RevPAR.

Company Background and Business Structure

Hilton runs a large network of brands and members rather than a portfolio of owned hotels. As of December 31, 2025, its system had 9,158 properties and 1,351,351 rooms, including 114 Hilton Grand Vacations (HGV) timeshare properties[16]; its Hilton Honors loyalty program had 243 million members, up 15% from a year earlier[17]. Its brands run from luxury names such as Waldorf Astoria and Conrad down to midscale brands such as Hampton and Home2 Suites, and in 2026 it opened the first Apartment Collection properties[18] and launched Undergraduate by Hilton for student housing[19]. Member scale and direct booking channels are the core resources Hilton sells to owners and the main reason owners keep paying its fees.

The management and franchise segment produces almost all of Hilton's profit, and it collects fees without being allocated corporate costs. At the end of 2025, franchised hotels numbered 8,125 with 1,050,900 rooms, and managed hotels numbered 873 with 264,760 rooms[16]; franchisees build and run their hotels with their own capital and pay Hilton a monthly royalty based on a percentage of room revenue, plus program fees for marketing, reservation systems and quality assurance[1]. Hilton runs managed hotels on behalf of owners, collecting a base management fee based on hotel gross revenue and an incentive management fee based on hotel operating profit, and some contracts require the owner to clear a return threshold first[2]; licensing fees from co-branded credit cards and HGV are also booked in this segment[20]. In 2025, the management and franchise segment produced $3,575 million of Adjusted EBITDA, the vast majority of the $3,752 million combined segment total[21].

The largest revenue line on the income statement does not actually earn a profit, and the ownership segment that holds real assets is small. In 2025, cost reimbursement revenue was $7,085 million against reimbursed expenses of $7,550 million[22]; under the contracts this money pays for system costs such as marketing, reservations and the loyalty program, and it nets out over time. The ownership segment consists of 46 owned or leased hotels with 15,287 rooms, 37 of them in Europe and 5 in Asia Pacific[16]; owned-hotel revenue was $1,233 million in 2025[22], while segment Adjusted EBITDA was only $177 million[21].

Hilton's system is heavily concentrated in the U.S., and its cash needs are very light. As of June 30, 2026, the U.S. accounted for 63% of system-wide rooms[23], while rooms outside the U.S. made up about 36% in 2025[24]. Hilton needs almost no capital spending to build hotels; its main cash uses are contract acquisition costs (key money) paid to owners to win signings, interest, and billions of dollars of annual buybacks and dividends, and in 2025 operating cash flow was $2,129 million while investing activities used only $190 million[25].

Financial History and Current Position

Hilton's total revenue has grown steadily over the past three years, but fee revenue excluding reimbursements is what reflects the real size of the business. Total revenue was $10,235 million, $11,174 million and $12,039 million in 2023 through 2025; excluding $7,085 million of cost reimbursement revenue, 2025 revenue was $4,954 million, including $376 million of base and other management fees, $313 million of incentive management fees and $1,233 million of owned-hotel revenue[22]. Franchise and licensing fees reached $2,780 million that year, up 6.9%[20], making them the fastest-growing and most important revenue line.

Profit growth in 2025 was masked by a higher tax charge, but cash generation still strengthened. Net income was $1,461 million in 2025, below $1,539 million a year earlier, mainly because income tax expense rose from $244 million to $611 million; over the same period Adjusted EBITDA rose 8.6%, from $3,429 million to $3,725 million[26]. Operating cash flow was $2,129 million, up 5.8%[25], and Hilton repurchased about 12.5 million shares for $3.2 billion during the year[27].

Growth continued into the first half of 2026, but profit growth slowed clearly in the second quarter. First-half total revenue was $6,278 million, compared with $5,832 million a year earlier[5]; first-half net income was $865 million, compared with $742 million[28]. In the second quarter, management and franchise fees rose 6.4% and adjusted diluted EPS was $2.29, compared with $2.20 a year earlier[6]; second-quarter net income was $482 million and Adjusted EBITDA was $1,054 million, up 4.6% year over year[4], a clearly slower pace than in the first quarter and the first half.

Leverage on the balance sheet is rising because shareholder returns keep exceeding free cash flow. As of June 30, 2026, Hilton had $13.4 billion of debt outstanding at a weighted average interest rate of 5.03%[29]; net debt was $12,380 million, up from $11,489 million at the end of 2025, and net debt was 3.2 times trailing twelve-month Adjusted EBITDA[28]. In the first half, operating cash flow was $1,090 million, buybacks were $1,787 million, dividends were $69 million and new borrowings were $1,565 million[30]; Hilton's full-year capital return guidance is approximately $3.5 billion[7].

Operating Model

Hilton's revenue breaks down into several fee lines, each set by a different driver. In the second quarter of 2026, total revenue consisted of $808 million of franchise and licensing fees, $99 million of base and other management fees, $69 million of incentive management fees, $311 million of owned-hotel revenue, $72 million of other revenue and $1,982 million of cost reimbursement revenue[5]. Franchise royalties roughly equal franchised hotels' room revenue multiplied by the royalty rate, and room revenue equals comparable RevPAR multiplied by available room nights, plus revenue from newly opened hotels[1]; base management fees move with managed hotels' gross revenue, while incentive management fees move with their operating profit, and some contracts must first clear an owner return threshold[2]. Licensing fees grow with co-branded credit card cardholders and spending and with HGV timeshare revenue, while termination fees are recognized once when a hotel leaves the system.

The key to the profit model is that the management and franchise segment carries no corporate costs, so fee revenue is almost directly segment profit. In the second quarter of 2026, management and franchise segment Adjusted EBITDA was $1,009 million and ownership segment Adjusted EBITDA was $45 million[15]; company Adjusted EBITDA equals the two segments minus corporate general and administrative expense, which Hilton guided at approximately $400 million for full-year 2026[7]. Reimbursed revenue and expenses net out over time, but individual quarters carry timing gaps: in the second quarter, reimbursed expenses were $2,008 million, $26 million more than reimbursement revenue, which depresses GAAP operating income, and net income also bears $183 million of quarterly interest expense[5].

The cash model is asset-light: fees are collected monthly, and the main outflows are contract acquisition costs, interest and shareholder returns. In 2025, operating cash flow was $2,129 million and investing outflows were only $190 million[25]; contract acquisition costs net of refunds were $51 million in the second quarter of 2026 and $77 million in the first half[31]; interest expense was $620 million in 2025[21]. Returns above free cash flow are funded with new borrowing, and Hilton issued senior notes in July 2025, December 2025 and May 2026[32].

Each driver reaches the financial statements with a different lag. A change in RevPAR shows up in royalties and base management fees within the month, with almost no delay; a new hotel starts paying royalties as soon as it opens, but pipeline projects take years to become open rooms; incentive management fees are usually calculated on a calendar year of hotel profit[2], so changes in margins tend to show up later. Contract acquisition costs leave first as cash and are then amortized as a reduction of revenue, an amortization charge of $17 million in the second quarter[33].

Industry and Competitive Position

The global hotel brand industry Hilton competes in is concentrated among a few companies, and its demand is shaped by both seasons and the economic cycle. In its annual report Hilton names Accor, Choice Hotels, Hyatt, IHG, Marriott and Wyndham as its primary global competitors[34]. Hotel revenue is usually lowest in the first quarter, and demand follows macroeconomic indicators with a lag[35]; because hotel operating costs are largely fixed, owner profits fall faster than revenue when demand weakens, which directly affects owners' willingness to build new hotels or convert to a new brand.

Hilton's competitive advantage shows up in its development scale and brand portfolio. In 2025, Hilton opened 97,000 rooms, added 81,100 net rooms and ended the year with a pipeline of 520,500 rooms[12]; in the second quarter of 2026 it signed about 43,000 rooms, its second-largest quarterly signings ever, with 35% in luxury and lifestyle brands and more than 70% outside the U.S., and signings grew 20% year over year in the Caribbean and Latin America, where Hilton holds only a 3% market share[19]. This shows that Hilton can still bring new owners into its system through its brands and members, and that international markets leave room to expand.

Hilton's weakness is its heavy reliance on U.S. demand, and the available disclosures do not support a precise peer comparison. U.S. RevPAR fell 0.8% in 2025 because of lower inbound international travel and macroeconomic uncertainty that cut business travel[36], and with the U.S. holding 63% of system rooms, that kind of swing flows directly into fee revenue. Hilton's annual report lists its competitors without giving their RevPAR, net unit growth or fee rates, so Hilton's relative strength can be judged only qualitatively.

Core Debates

Can Hilton deliver its roughly 4% third-quarter RevPAR guidance and lift management and franchise fee growth back above the second quarter's 6.4%?

This question matters because RevPAR sets Hilton's main revenue almost proportionally. Hilton's franchise royalties are a percentage of hotel room revenue[1], and the management and franchise segment contributed $3,575 million of the $3,752 million of segment Adjusted EBITDA in 2025[21]. System-wide RevPAR rose only 0.4% in 2025 and fell 0.8% in the U.S.[36], then recovered to 3.9% in the first half of 2026[6]; whether that recovery continues in the third quarter determines how credible the full-year Adjusted EBITDA guidance of $4,040 million to $4,080 million is[7].

Second-quarter data show that faster RevPAR did not fully translate into faster fee growth. System-wide RevPAR rose 3.9% in the second quarter, with occupancy at 74.9%, up 1.0 percentage point, and average daily rate at $166.97, up 2.5%; U.S. RevPAR rose 5.4% with occupancy of 77.3%[9]. RevPAR at comparable franchised hotels rose 4.6% and added $26 million of franchise fees, but termination fees were $17 million lower than a year earlier[37]; licensing fees added $34 million, compared with only $8 million in the first quarter[37][38]. As a result, management and franchise fees rose 6.4%, from $917 million to $976 million[5], below the first quarter's 10.4%, and that first-quarter rate had included a $32 million increase in termination fees[10][38].

The transmission runs from demand to comparable hotels' occupancy and rates, and then proportionally into royalties and management fees, while licensing and termination fees are add-ons unrelated to RevPAR. Management attributed the roughly 4% third-quarter RevPAR guidance to the World Cup and favorable holiday timing, and guided that the fourth quarter will fall below the full-year range because of the calendar and the U.S. midterm elections[7]; management also said underlying growth is only 2% to 2.5%[11], and that midscale and upper-midscale brands swung from negative growth last year to 4% to 6% growth in the second quarter, a change it tied to midweek business travel by small and medium-sized businesses[39]. What remains unresolved is how much of this U.S. strength is one-off demand from the tournament and the calendar: an outside commentator argued that World Cup demand appeared only briefly around matches and that corporate travelers avoided host cities[40].

In the third-quarter report, watch whether system-wide RevPAR reaches about 4%, how it splits between occupancy and rate, and whether U.S. RevPAR stays above 4%; also watch year-over-year growth in management and franchise fees, and how much of the increase management attributes to comparable hotels, net hotel additions, termination fees and licensing fees. An observable falsifier is this: if third-quarter RevPAR comes in below 3%, or management and franchise fee growth again falls below 6.1%, the second quarter's U.S. strength more likely came from the tournament and the calendar than from a durable recovery in business demand.

After cutting fees for owners, can new openings lift Hilton's net unit growth from 6.1% back above 6.5% and keep adding franchise fees?

In years when RevPAR grows only in the low single digits, net unit growth is Hilton's most predictable source of fee growth. System-wide RevPAR rose only 0.4% in 2025, yet franchise and licensing fees grew 6.9%, with net hotel additions contributing $60 million[20]. Hilton's annual capital return of approximately $3.5 billion rests on this kind of growth that needs no hotel construction funded by Hilton[7], so if net unit growth slows, or must be bought with more contract acquisition spending, the quality of the business changes.

Development data show openings accelerating, but net unit growth still declining. Net unit growth fell from 6.7% at the end of 2025[12] to 6.3% at the end of March 2026[10] and 6.1% at the end of June[13]. Hilton opened 24,100 rooms and added 21,600 net rooms in the second quarter, with openings up 50% from the first quarter[18], when net additions were only 10,900 rooms[10]; it approved 42,900 new rooms in the second quarter, bringing the pipeline to 541,300 rooms[4], and U.S. construction starts grew more than 40% year over year[19]. Net hotel additions added $15 million of franchise fees in the second quarter and $12 million in the first[37][38].

The transmission runs from owners' financing conditions and willingness to convert, to openings and exits, and on to net unit growth and new royalties, while fee cuts and contract acquisition costs are the price Hilton pays for that growth. In the second quarter Hilton cut loyalty program fees for most hotels and launched Hilton Rise, which gives program fee discounts to hotels that deliver consistently strong guest experiences, and said the two together add 75 to 100 basis points of margin for owners[14]; contract acquisition costs net of refunds were $51 million in the second quarter, up from $42 million a year earlier[31], and full-year 2025 cash spending on them was $231 million[25]. What remains unresolved is whether these concessions buy faster openings: another reading is that owners' profits have been squeezed by two years of inflation and weak RevPAR, and that Hilton is using fee cuts and contract acquisition costs merely to hold its existing pace of development; Hilton has not disclosed how the fee cuts affect its own fees or profit.

In the third-quarter report, watch net unit growth at quarter end, quarterly openings, net room additions and the share of conversions; the increase in franchise fees from net hotel additions in management's discussion; the pace of contract acquisition costs against the full-year guidance of approximately $300 million for capital spending and contract acquisition costs[7]; and new approvals and the pipeline. An observable falsifier is this: if net unit growth is still below 6.0% at the end of the third quarter, or the franchise fee increase from net hotel additions falls below $12 million while contract acquisition costs keep rising, the fee cuts have not bought faster openings.

Will the drag from the Middle East conflict and owned-hotel renovations narrow or widen in the third quarter?

Incentive management fees and the ownership business are small, yet they were the main reasons second-quarter profit growth lagged RevPAR. In 2025, incentive management fees were $313 million and owned-hotel revenue was $1,233 million[22], together about 13% of total revenue; in the second quarter incentive management fees fell 8% and ownership segment Adjusted EBITDA fell by $12 million[15]. Hilton's full-year guidance already absorbs a Middle East drag of more than $20 million and a $20 million to $25 million drag from renovating three owned hotels[41], and the third quarter will test whether those amounts are enough.

Second-quarter regional data show the conflict hit managed hotels much harder than franchised ones. Middle East and Africa RevPAR fell 29.5%, with occupancy down 16.1 percentage points to 53.0% and average daily rate down 8.1%[9]; China RevPAR fell 2.2% because of government restrictions on group travel[42]. RevPAR at comparable managed hotels rose only 1.9%, far below the 4.6% at franchised hotels, and Hilton attributed the decline in incentive management fees to conflict in certain regions[37]. Ownership revenue fell 6.3%, mainly because of lower revenue at hotels that underwent or are undergoing renovation[43]; three major owned hotels, in Munich, Amsterdam and Tokyo, are closed or undergoing major renovation in 2026[41].

The transmission runs from geopolitical conflict and travel restrictions to lower occupancy and rates at managed hotels; with high fixed costs, hotel profit falls faster, and that flows into incentive fees calculated on profit, while renovations cut owned-hotel revenue and costs together and ultimately reduce ownership segment Adjusted EBITDA. Hilton has narrowed its full-year Middle East RevPAR outlook to a decline in the high single digits to low double digits and said the second quarter's roughly 30% decline was better than earlier expectations[44], which implies improvement in the second half; the Middle East accounts for about 2% of annual openings, so the conflict could also slow openings there[45]. What remains unresolved is whether the entire second-quarter decline in incentive fees came from the conflict: another possibility is that costs are also eroding managed-hotel margins, and because hotel-level profit and owner return thresholds are not disclosed, only the third-quarter relationship between managed-hotel RevPAR and incentive fees can separate the two.

In the third-quarter report, watch RevPAR in the Middle East and Africa and in China, comparable managed-hotel RevPAR, the year-over-year change in incentive management fees and management's explanation for it, ownership segment Adjusted EBITDA and the progress of the three renovations, and whether Hilton revises its estimate of the Middle East and renovation impact on full-year Adjusted EBITDA. An observable falsifier is this: if Middle East RevPAR is still down more than 20% in the third quarter and incentive management fees fall more than 8% year over year, the Middle East deduction built into the full-year guidance may be too small.

Risks and Falsifiers

The first risk is that interest expense rises quickly as new notes are issued and an interest rate swap expires, while Hilton keeps leverage high to fund roughly $3.5 billion of shareholder returns. Second-quarter interest expense was $183 million, compared with $151 million a year earlier, an increase of about 21%[5]; the increase came mainly from notes issued in July 2025, December 2025 and May 2026, and from an interest rate swap that expired in March 2026[32]. At the end of June, net debt was 3.2 times trailing twelve-month Adjusted EBITDA[28], and $600 million of notes mature in April 2027[29]; if third-quarter interest expense growth slows to within 10% and net debt to Adjusted EBITDA stays at or below 3.2 times, this concern weakens.

The second risk is that Chinese government restrictions on group travel keep Asia Pacific's largest single market in decline and weigh on fees from managed hotels in the region. Asia Pacific RevPAR rose only 1.2% in the second quarter[9], with China down 2.2%[42], and Asia Pacific is where Hilton's managed hotels are most concentrated, with 391 managed hotels at the end of 2025[16]. This risk falls first on base and incentive management fees; if China RevPAR returns to positive growth in the third quarter, the current concern about China would be falsified.

The third risk is that the World Cup and holiday shifts merely pulled demand into the third quarter, leaving underlying RevPAR at the 2% to 2.5% management described[11], and that the fourth quarter could fall below 2% under an unfavorable calendar and the midterm elections. That would weigh on both management and franchise fees and the full-year Adjusted EBITDA guidance of $4,040 million to $4,080 million[7]; based on the second quarter, when 4.6% RevPAR growth at comparable franchised hotels produced a $26 million royalty increase, each 1 percentage point of comparable franchised RevPAR is worth roughly $6 million of franchise fees per quarter[37]. If third-quarter RevPAR is at least 4% and Hilton keeps its view that the fourth quarter will not fall below 2%, this risk is falsified.

The fourth risk is that fee cuts for owners and higher contract acquisition costs do not buy faster openings, and instead lower fees per room while consuming cash. The exposed lines are the increase in franchise and licensing fees from net hotel additions, which was $60 million in 2025[20], and the $231 million of cash spent on contract acquisition costs in 2025[25]. If net unit growth is at least 6.5% at the end of the third quarter, the franchise fee increase from net hotel additions is at least $15 million, and quarterly contract acquisition costs stay at or below $100 million, this concern is falsified.

The fifth risk is that the Middle East conflict persists or spreads to more markets, keeping pressure on incentive management fees and local openings. The exposed line is incentive management fees, which were $69 million in the second quarter, down 8% year over year[5]; Hilton estimates the Middle East conflict will reduce 2026 Adjusted EBITDA by more than $20 million[41], and the region accounts for about 2% of annual openings[45]. If the Middle East and Africa RevPAR decline narrows to within 15% in the third quarter and incentive management fees return to year-over-year growth, this risk is falsified.

What to Watch Next

  • RevPAR and fee conversion: system-wide RevPAR was up 3.9% and U.S. RevPAR up 5.4% in the second quarter, against third-quarter guidance of about 4.0%. Watch the occupancy and rate split and whether the U.S. holds above 4%; RevPAR below 3% would point to event- and calendar-driven demand.
  • Management and franchise fee growth: 6.4% ($976 million) in the second quarter versus 10.4% in the first. Watch the separate contributions of comparable hotels, net additions, termination fees and licensing fees; growth below 6.1% again would weaken the demand-recovery reading.
  • Development pace after fee cuts: net unit growth was 6.1% at the end of June, with 21,600 net rooms added in the second quarter. Watch openings, net additions, the conversion share and the pipeline; net unit growth still below 6.0% at quarter end would suggest the fee cuts did not speed up openings.
  • Franchise fees from net additions and contract acquisition costs: $15 million and $51 million respectively in the second quarter. Watch whether the increase holds and how spending tracks the roughly $300 million full-year guidance; an increase below $12 million alongside rising acquisition costs would be negative.
  • Middle East and incentive fees: Middle East and Africa RevPAR was down 29.5% and incentive management fees were $69 million (down 8%) in the second quarter. Watch the link between managed-hotel RevPAR and incentive fees and management's explanation; a Middle East decline still above 20% with incentive fees down more than 8% would mean the deduction is too small.
  • Ownership segment: Adjusted EBITDA was $45 million in the second quarter versus $57 million a year earlier. Watch the three renovations and any revision to the full-year impact estimate; a drag beyond $20 million to $25 million would pressure guidance.

Conclusion

Hilton's business is driven by three quantities: comparable-hotel RevPAR, net room additions and managed-hotel profit, which flow through royalties, new franchise fees and incentive management fees into a management and franchise segment that carries almost no costs. In the second quarter of 2026, system-wide RevPAR rose 3.9%, management and franchise fees rose 6.4% to $976 million and adjusted diluted EPS was $2.29[5][6]; at the end of June, net debt was $12,380 million and leverage was 3.2 times[28], while Hilton was still running on a full-year capital return of approximately $3.5 billion[7]. The central unresolved relationship is whether the roughly 4% third-quarter RevPAR guidance reflects a durable recovery in business demand or a short-lived lift from the World Cup and the calendar, and whether development after the fee cuts can push net unit growth back above 6.5%.

Among outside interpretations published after the second-quarter results, a CRE Daily commentary by Valerija I. stands in direct contrast to management's account[40]. Management attributed the third-quarter RevPAR acceleration to the World Cup, holiday timing and a recovery in midweek travel by small and medium-sized businesses[7][39]; the author argued that the World Cup hotel boom "proved short-lived," that many brands saw "only moderate demand spikes surrounding major World Cup games," that corporate travelers avoided host cities and that leisure guests booked short, event-driven stays, and also noted that Hilton's third-quarter adjusted EPS guidance of $2.28 to $2.34 sat below the $2.43 consensus compiled by Investing.com at the time, reading the post-earnings share price drop as a sign of muted expectations for the second half of 2026[40]. This view maps directly onto the first core debate, but it is an outside interpretation, not a fact; the third-quarter adjusted EPS consensus compiled by Drillr now stands at $2.35[8], already closer to Hilton's guidance range than the figure the commentary cited.

The combination that would materially strengthen the current understanding is third-quarter system-wide RevPAR of about 4% with the U.S. above 4%, management and franchise fee growth back above 6.4%, net unit growth stabilizing and rising, and a narrower Middle East RevPAR decline with incentive management fees growing again. Conversely, if RevPAR comes in below 3%, fee growth again falls below 6.1%, net unit growth drops below 6.0% while contract acquisition costs keep rising, and interest expense keeps growing at a double-digit pace, Hilton's current mix of growth and capital returns would come under greater pressure.

Sources

[1] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · franchise contract economics · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[2] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · management contract economics · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[3] Drillr earnings calendar (updated 2026-10-13) · HLT 2026-10-27 release · 2026-10-13 · Drillr earnings calendar

[4] HLT 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 results highlights · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000042/q22026earningsrelease.htm

[5] HLT 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 statements of operations · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000042/q22026earningsrelease.htm

[6] HLT 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 overview · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000042/q22026earningsrelease.htm

[7] HLT 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · 2026 outlook issued with Q2 results · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000042/q22026earningsrelease.htm

[8] Drillr analyst_financial_estimates (updated 2026-10-13) · HLT quarter ending 2026-09-30 · 2026-10-13 · Drillr analyst_financial_estimates · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[9] HLT 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 operating statistics by region and segment · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000042/q22026earningsrelease.htm

[10] HLT 8-K filed 2026-04-28 · Q1 2026 results highlights · 2026-04-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000031/q12026earningsrelease.htm

[11] HLT Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · underlying RevPAR and Q3/Q4 cadence · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[12] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · 2025 development activity · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[13] HLT 10-Q filed 2026-07-28 · H1 2026 development table · 2026-07-28 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000043/hlt-20260630.htm

[14] HLT Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · owner profitability initiatives · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[15] HLT 10-Q filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 segment Adjusted EBITDA · 2026-07-28 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000043/hlt-20260630.htm

[16] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · property summary by region 2025 · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[17] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · business overview and Hilton Honors · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[18] HLT 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 development · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000042/q22026earningsrelease.htm

[19] HLT Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · development activity · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[20] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · 2025 fee revenue drivers · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[21] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · segment Adjusted EBITDA 2023-2025 · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[22] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · consolidated statements of operations 2023-2025 · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[23] HLT 10-Q filed 2026-07-28 · U.S. share of system rooms · 2026-07-28 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000043/hlt-20260630.htm

[24] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · international room share · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[25] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · 2025 cash flows · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[26] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · 2025 Adjusted EBITDA reconciliation · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[27] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · 2025 share repurchases · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[28] HLT 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · net debt and TTM Adjusted EBITDA · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000042/q22026earningsrelease.htm

[29] HLT 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 balance sheet and capital return · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000042/q22026earningsrelease.htm

[30] HLT 10-Q filed 2026-07-28 · H1 2026 cash flows · 2026-07-28 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000043/hlt-20260630.htm

[31] HLT 8-K filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 capital expenditures and contract acquisition costs · 2026-07-28 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000042/q22026earningsrelease.htm

[32] HLT 10-Q filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 interest expense drivers · 2026-07-28 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000043/hlt-20260630.htm

[33] HLT 10-Q filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 segment revenues · 2026-07-28 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000043/hlt-20260630.htm

[34] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · competition · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[35] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · seasonality and cyclicality · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[36] HLT 10-K filed 2026-02-11 · 2025 RevPAR by region · 2026-02-11 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000007/hlt-20251231.htm

[37] HLT 10-Q filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 fee revenue drivers · 2026-07-28 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000043/hlt-20260630.htm

[38] HLT 10-Q filed 2026-04-28 · Q1 2026 fee revenue drivers · 2026-04-28 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000032/hlt-20260331.htm

[39] HLT Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · midscale demand turnaround · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[40] CRE Daily 2026-07-30 · Hilton Q2 Results Edge Out Estimates Amid Lukewarm Demand · 2026-07-30 · CRE Daily · https://www.credaily.com/briefs/hilton-q2-results-edge-out-estimates-amid-lukewarm-demand/

[41] HLT Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · Middle East and owned-hotel headwinds · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[42] HLT 10-Q filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 RevPAR drivers by region · 2026-07-28 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000043/hlt-20260630.htm

[43] HLT 10-Q filed 2026-07-28 · Q2 2026 ownership revenues and expenses · 2026-07-28 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1585689/000158568926000043/hlt-20260630.htm

[44] HLT Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-07-28 · regional outlook · 2026-07-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[45] HLT Q1 2026 earnings call 2026-04-28 · Middle East exposure · 2026-04-28 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

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