[EBAY] eBay: Q3 2026 earnings preview on GMV growth, take rate and margins

eBay runs a global third-party marketplace where individual and business sellers list goods and buyers purchase them at a fixed price or by auction, and the company earns most of its revenue from transaction fees, seller advertising and shipping services[1]. According to the Drillr earnings calendar, eBay will report third quarter 2026, the three months ended September 30, 2026, on 2026-10-28[2], and the eBay Q3 2026 earnings question is whether GMV growth and margins hold as last year's one-off boosts fade. In the latest disclosed period, the second quarter of 2026, eBay's GMV (gross merchandise volume) was $22.398 billion, up 15% as reported and 14% FX-neutral, net revenue was $3.134 billion, up 15%, the non-GAAP operating margin was 28.5%, and non-GAAP diluted EPS was $1.60[3]. On its August 5 earnings call, management guided third-quarter GMV to $22.0-$22.4 billion, up 10%-12% FX-neutral, of which 7%-9% is organic and about 2.5 points come from Depop, with non-GAAP operating income up 1%-5% at a 25.1%-25.6% margin and non-GAAP EPS of $1.36-$1.42[4]; net revenue guidance is $3.07-$3.12 billion, up 8%-10% FX-neutral[5]. The analyst consensus compiled by Drillr stands at $3.112 billion of third-quarter revenue (14 analysts, range $3.082-$3.182 billion) and EPS of $1.411 (16 analysts, range $1.391-$1.461), both in the upper half of the company's guidance[6]; the full-year 2026 EPS consensus is $6.143 (19 analysts)[7].

Three things matter most in these results. The first is whether organic GMV growth stays inside the 7%-9% guidance range: GMV grew 14% in the first half, management attributed the third-quarter slowdown mainly to lapping strong 2025 bullion demand and the 2025 U.S. Klarna installment-payment launch[4], and U.S. GMV still grew 24% in the second quarter[8], so whether the slowdown is a base effect or falling demand depends on whether the U.S. and the focus categories hold up. The second is the take rate: first-party advertising grew 24% FX-neutral in the second quarter and kept the take rate at 13.99%, the same as a year earlier[9], and once Depop, a buyer-fee business whose revenue contribution is smaller than its GMV contribution, is consolidated in the third quarter, whether advertising can still support the take rate decides whether revenue keeps pace with GMV. The third is margin: management guided the third-quarter non-GAAP operating margin to 25.1%-25.6%, about 3 points below the second quarter's 28.5%[4], while transaction losses had already risen to 4.2% of revenue in the second quarter[10], so how much of those 3 points is deliberate spending on Depop and C2C, and how much is rising core-marketplace cost, decides whether faster GMV turns into profit growth.

Company Background and Business Structure

eBay is a pure third-party marketplace that holds no inventory, and its value lies in connecting a huge range of non-standard goods with buyers worldwide. Founded in 1995 and based in San Jose, California, it had 135 million active buyers and 2.5 billion live listings at the end of 2025[11]. Beyond ebay.com and its local sites, it runs the trading-card marketplace TCGplayer, the high-end collectibles auction house Goldin and the Nordic secondhand platform Tise, and in February 2026 it agreed with Etsy to buy the C2C fashion marketplace Depop for $1.2 billion in cash; the deal closed on July 30 and eBay paid $1.4 billion including preliminary price adjustments[12]. The platform offers AI-assisted listing, seller financing (Seller Capital has helped partners provide more than $1 billion in cumulative funding), first-party advertising tools, managed shipping and one-click trading-card grading and resale through a partnership with PSA[13].

The company has a single reporting segment, and its revenue falls into marketplace revenue and advertising revenue. Marketplace revenue consists mainly of final value fees, listing and feature fees, foreign exchange fees, store subscriptions and shipping fees, net of discounts, coupons and other incentives; advertising revenue is mostly first-party fees that sellers pay to promote listings, plus a small amount of third-party advertising[14]. In 2025 marketplace revenue was $9.107 billion, up 5%, and advertising revenue was $1.993 billion, up 22%, making advertising the faster-growing source of new revenue[15].

The U.S. is carrying more of the business, while international markets are growing much more slowly. The U.S. generated 52% of net revenue in 2025[15], while about 51% of that year's GMV came from outside the U.S.[11]; by the second quarter of 2026, U.S. revenue was $1.757 billion, up 26%, or 56% of the total, while international revenue was $1.377 billion, up only 3%[16]. In recent years the company has concentrated resources on "focus categories" such as collectibles, motor parts, refurbished goods and authenticated luxury[17], and it has built the live-shopping channel eBay Live, whose GMV grew roughly eightfold year over year across seven markets in the second quarter, while it extended its latest AI listing tool, Magical Listing, to all new and returning sellers in the U.K. and Germany[18]. Seller proceeds settle through eBay's payment system but are not counted as revenue, and the collection risk shows up as transaction losses from buyer protection, unauthorized card chargebacks and non-delivery chargebacks[19].

Financial History and Current Position

eBay's revenue reaccelerated in 2025 after years of going sideways. According to Drillr's annual financial series, net revenue was $10.420 billion in 2021, fell to $9.795 billion in 2022, and was $10.112 billion in 2023 and $10.283 billion in 2024. In 2025 net revenue rose to $11.100 billion, GMV grew 6% FX-neutral and the take rate was 13.94%, up 0.17 points[15], with full-year GMV of nearly $80 billion[11].

The 2025 profit and cash figures show a high-margin platform that returns most of its cash to shareholders. Cost of net revenue was $3.169 billion and gross profit $7.931 billion, a gross margin of about 71.4%; the GAAP operating margin was 20.5%, net income was $2.031 billion and diluted EPS from continuing operations was $4.26[15]. Cash from continuing operations was $2.009 billion that year, while the company repurchased $2.500 billion of stock, paid $531 million in cash dividends and issued $1.994 billion of commercial paper[20].

The 2026 quarterly figures show that faster growth has reached the profit line. In the first quarter GMV was $22.197 billion, up 18% as reported and 14% FX-neutral, net revenue grew 19% (17% FX-neutral), the GAAP and non-GAAP operating margins were 19.8% and 29.4%, non-GAAP EPS was $1.66 and free cash flow was $898 million[21]. In the second quarter GAAP operating income was $676 million at a 21.6% margin (17.6% a year earlier) and non-GAAP operating income was $893 million (versus $771 million) at a 28.5% margin[22]; GAAP and non-GAAP diluted EPS were $1.21 and $1.60[3], and the GAAP effective tax rate fell to 17.1% from 22.6% a year earlier[23].

Cash flow improved sharply in 2026, but the Depop payment then used part of the cash pile. Second-quarter operating cash flow was $549 million, capital spending $223 million and free cash flow $326 million, and first-half free cash flow was $1.224 billion versus only $203 million a year earlier[24], mainly because cash paid for income taxes fell by $794 million[25]. In the second quarter the company repurchased $310 million of stock and paid $138 million in dividends, ended the quarter with $4.9 billion of cash and non-equity investments and had about $2.0 billion of repurchase authorization left[23]; in June it used $750 million of commercial paper to repay $750 million of maturing notes, and in July it paid $1.4 billion in cash for Depop[26].

Operating Model

eBay's revenue equals GMV times the take rate, and GMV in turn depends on active buyers, purchase frequency and average order value. The company defines the take rate as net revenue divided by GMV, and its revenue comes mainly from that take rate on paid GMV[11]; on the first-quarter call management said U.S. GMV growth was balanced among active buyers, items sold and average selling price[27]. Several forces push the take rate in opposite directions: higher advertising penetration and higher volume and better rates in the U.S. net shipping program lift it[9], the switch of U.K. managed shipping to net accounting from 2026 changed how revenue and gross margin are recorded[27], and fee-free C2C selling, low-fee whole-vehicle sales and Depop's buyer-fee model pull the average down[28]. A change in GMV shows up in revenue in the same quarter, while gains in advertising adoption feed into the take rate over several quarters.

Operating profit depends on how much revenue remains after payment processing, marketing, product development and transaction losses. Non-GAAP operating income excludes stock-based compensation, amortization of acquired intangibles, restructuring, legal matters and transaction-related costs[22]; in 2025 sales and marketing took 22% of net revenue, product development 15% and general and administrative 11%, and transaction losses were $396 million[15]. In the second quarter of 2026 the rise in cost of net revenue came mainly from $44 million more in payment processing, $20 million more in promoted offsite advertising and $16 million more in data center costs[29], marketing program costs rose $81 million year over year, and $31 million of the transaction-loss increase came from unfavorable fraud and recovery rates[19]. The platform model lets most of the revenue from GMV growth drop to profit, but new businesses such as managed shipping, whole vehicles, live commerce and Depop also push up payment, loss and marketing costs, which is the backdrop to the 25.1%-25.6% third-quarter margin guidance[4].

Cash flow is driven mainly by platform revenue, less cash spent on marketing, employees, payment processing and taxes[25]. Cash goes first to buybacks, then dividends and acquisitions: in 2025 eBay repurchased $2.500 billion of stock and paid $531 million in dividends[20], in July 2026 it paid $1.4 billion for Depop, and it refinanced part of its maturing debt with commercial paper[26]. The timing of tax payments can swing quarterly cash flow sharply, and the first-half 2026 improvement came mainly from taxes rather than from a sudden change in operations.

Industry and Competitive Position

eBay competes in a market whose formats keep changing, and its rivals are not only general e-commerce sites. Its annual report lists alternatives including traditional retailers and their online arms, online retailers, direct-to-consumer brands, classifieds platforms, social media, new live-commerce ventures and home shopping networks; consumers can buy and sell on Facebook Marketplace, compare prices on Google Shopping or buy directly on Instagram and TikTok, and the company acknowledges that some consumers, including younger ones, may prefer these formats to eBay's mostly fixed-price and auction-style listings[30].

eBay's strengths lie in its vast range of non-standard goods and its trust services, but in individual categories it faces more focused rivals. The annual report notes that competitors focused on specific goods may be better at building buyer and seller communities, while eBay's growth strategy increasingly relies on focus categories whose buyers and sellers often have distinct product and service needs[17]. In response the company has added one-click card grading, AI-enhanced discovery and eBay Live[13]; management said regular live sellers see median GMV growth about three times that of non-live sellers, and first-time live collectible buyers spend 70% more than comparable non-live buyers, with more than half of that extra spending happening outside live events[31].

C2C secondhand fashion is the most competitive arena and the one that best explains the Depop deal. On the second-quarter call management warned that intense competitive investment in C2C and fashion recommerce could pressure share and growth[32]; it also said U.S. C2C secondhand fashion has only low-single-digit online penetration and that Depop already runs an established buyer-fee model[28]. Outside commentary names Vinted as the main rival[33]. The comparison has limits: the company does not disclose GMV, revenue or profit by category, and the available materials contain no directly comparable peer operating figures, so eBay's relative position in each category can only be judged indirectly from growth rates and management commentary.

Core Debates

eBay grew GMV 14% in the first half, and guided organic growth down to 7%-9% for the third quarter as it laps last year's bullion demand and Klarna launch. Can the U.S. and its focus categories hold growth inside that range rather than fall below it?

This question matters because GMV drives almost all of eBay's revenue, and the acceleration of the past three quarters has led the market to view it through a growth lens. As-reported GMV growth rose from 6% in the second quarter of 2025 to 10% in the fourth quarter, 18% in the first quarter of 2026 and 15% in the second, with U.S. GMV up 24% in the second quarter[8]. If the acceleration came mainly from one-offs such as bullion and installment payments, the slowdown from the third quarter on would be steeper than guided.

The evidence shows broad sources of growth, but it also includes temporary factors. Second-quarter GMV was $22.398 billion, with the U.S. at $11.688 billion, up 24% (27% in the first quarter), international up 6% and active buyers at 136 million, up 2%[8]; focus-category GMV grew 26%, exceeded 40% of total GMV for the first time and supplied most of the growth, C2C GMV grew more than 20%, U.S. active buyers rose 6% and international GMV grew 4% on an organic FX-neutral basis[34]. The year-earlier base for the third quarter is GMV of $20.105 billion in the third quarter of 2025 (up 10% at the time), including $9.872 billion in the U.S. (then up 13%)[8], against net revenue of $2.820 billion[35].

The transmission runs from active buyers times purchase frequency and order value to GMV, and from GMV times the take rate to marketplace revenue and net revenue. Management said in the first quarter that bullion demand was a transitory boost to GMV[27], the third-quarter organic guidance explicitly strips out the bullion and Klarna comparisons[4], and the 10-Q noted that growth improved sequentially across all major categories in the second quarter[9]. The alternative view is that the 2025-2026 acceleration leaned heavily on the trading-card boom, bullion prices and installment-driven order values, and that once these fade against tough comparisons U.S. growth will quickly return to single digits; U.S. GMV and focus-category growth can separate the two readings, because U.S. growth near 12% with focus categories above 15% points to a base effect, while a sharp joint slowdown points to falling demand.

What remains unresolved is how much bullion and Klarna contributed to the third-quarter 2025 base, since the company has published no figure and the effect can only be tested indirectly through organic guidance, and the focus categories are described only in call commentary. In the results, watch whether organic FX-neutral GMV growth lands in the 7%-9% range and at or above 8%, whether U.S. GMV grows at least 12% and international keeps its second-quarter improvement, whether the focus categories' growth and share are still described as the main engine, and whether net revenue lands within the $3.07-$3.12 billion guidance[5]. Organic growth below 7%, U.S. GMV growth below 10% or focus-category growth below 10% would overturn the view that the slowdown is only a base effect.

First-party advertising grew 24% in the second quarter and kept eBay's take rate at 13.99%. With Depop consolidated from the third quarter, can advertising keep the take rate at or above 13.90%?

This question matters because, as GMV growth slows, the take rate decides whether revenue keeps up. Advertising has been the main source of take-rate gains, growing 22% in 2025 while marketplace revenue grew only 5%[15], while Depop, fee-free C2C selling and whole-vehicle sales all pull the average take rate down.

Advertising and shipping services held the take rate in the second quarter. Net revenue was $3.134 billion on GMV of $22.398 billion, a 13.99% take rate unchanged from a year earlier, and the company said revenue growth came from higher GMV, higher first-party advertising penetration and higher volume and better rates in the U.S. net shipping program, with first-party ad growth driven by wider adoption and attribution changes that improved ad conversion[9]. Marketplace revenue was $2.538 billion, up 13%, and advertising revenue was $596 million, up 24%[36]; first-party ad revenue was $570 million, up 24% FX-neutral, and total advertising equaled 2.7% of GMV[23], compared with $555 million, up 28%, and 2.6% in the first quarter[21]. Management said 3% ad penetration is only a midterm goal, not a ceiling[28]. For the year-earlier comparison, the take rate in the third quarter of 2025 was about 14.03% ($2.820 billion divided by $20.105 billion)[35][8], and 13.94% for full-year 2025[15].

The take rate works like this: seller ad adoption and conversion, including attribution, set first-party ad revenue; final value fees minus fee waivers and promotions, plus shipping and payment services, set marketplace revenue; and the two divided by GMV give the take rate. The company's third-quarter guidance already shows Depop's dilution, since Depop adds about 2.5 points to GMV growth but only about 1.5 points to revenue growth[4]. The alternative view is that the attribution change produced only a one-time lift, that ad growth will drift back toward GMV growth, and that Depop and fee-free C2C will keep pushing the take rate down; the gap between first-party ad growth and the growth of marketplace revenue and GMV can separate the two readings.

What remains unresolved is how much of the ad growth came from the attribution change, which the company has not quantified, and Depop's own take rate has not been disclosed. In the results, watch whether the take rate is at or above 13.90% and how the company splits out the Depop effect, whether first-party ad growth is at least 20% FX-neutral, whether total advertising stays at or above 2.7% of GMV, and whether the gap between marketplace revenue growth and GMV growth widens. A take rate below 13.80%, first-party ad growth below 16% or marketplace revenue growth more than 3 points below GMV growth would overturn the view that advertising can offset structural dilution.

eBay guided its third-quarter non-GAAP operating margin to 25.1%-25.6%, down from 28.5% in the second quarter. Are those three points a deliberate investment in Depop and C2C, or a sign that core costs such as transaction losses are rising?

This question matters because eBay has long turned low-single-digit revenue growth into double-digit EPS growth through buybacks and margin gains. For the third quarter management guided non-GAAP operating income up only 1%-5% and EPS of $1.36-$1.42, and full-year operating income up 10%-12% with Depop a roughly 2-point headwind[4]; if the margin pressure comes from core costs rather than controllable investment, the operating leverage from faster GMV will be eaten away.

Second-quarter cost data already show two kinds of pressure. The non-GAAP operating margin was 28.5% versus 28.3% a year earlier[22] and 29.4% in the first quarter[21]; transaction losses were $133 million, about 4.2% of revenue, versus $86 million, about 3.2%, a year earlier, first-half transaction losses were $271 million, about 4.4%, and sales and marketing was $697 million, about 22.2%, versus $586 million, about 21.5%[10]. Of the increase in transaction losses, $31 million came from unfavorable buyer and seller fraud and recovery rates and $14 million from higher volume, while the rise in sales and marketing came mainly from $81 million more in marketing program costs[19], and payment processing costs rose $44 million[29]. For comparison, full-year 2025 transaction losses were $396 million, about 3.6% of revenue[15].

The margin transmission runs like this: consolidating Depop and acquiring C2C users bring marketing and integration costs, fraud and recovery rates set transaction losses, payment volume sets cost of revenue, and these cost ratios together set the non-GAAP operating margin and then EPS. Depop closed on July 30 for $1.4 billion[12], management said its near-term investment dilutes 2026 operating income and EPS[32], C2C GMV grew more than 20% in the second quarter[34], and management also said Depop investments are generating strong returns and that it has no plans to change eBay's U.S. fee structure[28]. The alternative view is that most of the margin decline comes from fraud losses, managed shipping and payment costs that rise structurally as new businesses grow, and from subsidy competition with rivals such as Vinted in C2C fashion, rather than from a one-time Depop investment; the change in transaction losses and sales expense as a share of revenue in the third quarter can separate the two readings.

What remains unresolved is that official materials do not separately state the third-quarter 2025 non-GAAP operating margin base, and Depop's and C2C's profit contributions are not disclosed. In the results, watch whether the non-GAAP operating margin lands in the 25.1%-25.6% range and at or above the midpoint, whether transaction losses fall back to 4.2% of revenue or less, whether sales and marketing exceeds 24% of revenue, and how fast C2C grows and how much Depop actually adds to GMV. A margin below 25.1%, transaction losses at or above 4.5% of revenue or C2C growth below 10% would overturn the view that the decline is mainly deliberate investment.

Risks and Falsifiers

The takeover approach and shareholder activity are a risk that directly creates costs. GameStop made a non-binding $125-per-share cash-and-stock acquisition proposal on May 3, and eBay's board rejected it on May 12 as "neither credible nor attractive"[37]; in its 10-Q the company said it cannot predict whether that party or others will take further action, and that responding could bring substantial legal, advisory and public relations costs and divert management attention[38]. The exposure sits in general and administrative expense, where second-quarter non-GAAP adjustments already included $25 million of transaction-related costs[22], and share price volatility can also affect the pace of scheduled buybacks[32]. If no new costs or shareholder proposals tied to the approach appear in the third-quarter report or after, and the company keeps its planned buybacks, this risk would be falsified.

Lower cash would weaken the boost that buybacks give to EPS. Cash and non-equity investments were $4.9 billion at the end of the second quarter, with about $2.0 billion of repurchase authorization left[23]; cash fell further after the $1.4 billion Depop payment in July, and in June the company replaced $750 million of maturing notes with commercial paper[26]. Management acknowledged that lower cash balances reduce net interest income and partly offset the benefit of buybacks to EPS growth[32], so the exposed lines are interest and other income, buyback volume and EPS. If third-quarter net interest income and the buyback pace are not clearly below first-half levels and no new long-term debt is added, this concern would be falsified.

Falling demand is the risk that hits GMV and net revenue most directly. If speculative categories such as trading cards and bullion cool, U.S. growth could quickly return to single digits against tough comparisons and the focus categories would no longer carry overall growth; the year-earlier base is third-quarter 2025 GMV of $20.105 billion and net revenue of $2.820 billion, so each point of lost organic growth means about $200 million less GMV[8][35]. Management itself noted that lapping strong bullion demand would slow second-half growth as expected[32]. If third-quarter organic growth is at least 8% and U.S. GMV growth at least 12%, this risk would be falsified.

Monetization dilution would leave revenue growth persistently behind GMV. If the lift from the attribution change fades and ad growth slows while low-fee transactions from Depop, fee-free C2C and whole vehicles gain share, the take rate would keep falling; on quarterly GMV of about $22.2 billion, each 0.1-point drop in the take rate means about $22 million less quarterly revenue[4]. The $1.993 billion of 2025 advertising revenue was the main source of take-rate gains[15], so ad growth is the key thing to watch for this risk. If the third-quarter take rate is at least 13.90% and first-party ad growth at least 20% FX-neutral, this risk would be falsified.

Rising costs and competitive subsidies could push down margins in the core marketplace as well as at Depop. If fraud and recovery rates keep worsening, managed shipping and payment costs keep rising and the company spends more on marketing to win C2C fashion sellers from rivals such as Vinted, the pressure would land on non-GAAP operating income ($893 million in the second quarter) and EPS ($1.36-$1.42 guided for the third quarter)[4]; management also warned that competitive investment in C2C and fashion recommerce could pressure share and growth[32]. On a rough quarterly revenue basis, each 0.5-point rise in transaction losses as a share of revenue means about $15.5 million less quarterly profit[10]. If the third-quarter non-GAAP operating margin is at least 25.35% (the guidance midpoint) and transaction losses are no more than 4.2% of revenue, this risk would be falsified.

What to Watch Next

• GMV slowdown, base effect or falling demand: organic FX-neutral GMV growth was 14% in the second quarter of 2026 against a third-quarter 2025 base of $20.105 billion; watch for 7%-9% and at least 8%, and treat anything below 7% as falsifying.
• U.S. GMV growth was 24% in the second quarter of 2026 against a third-quarter 2025 base of $9.872 billion; watch for at least 12%, with below 10% falsifying.
• Focus-category GMV grew 26% in the second quarter and exceeded 40% of GMV; watch growth and share and whether they remain the main engine, with growth below 10% falsifying.
• Can advertising hold the take rate: the take rate was 13.99% in the second quarter of 2026 and about 14.03% in the third quarter of 2025; watch for at least 13.90% and the Depop split, with below 13.80% falsifying.
• First-party ad growth was 24% FX-neutral and total advertising was 2.7% of GMV; watch for growth of at least 20% and share of at least 2.7%, with growth below 16% falsifying.
• Where the margin decline comes from: the non-GAAP operating margin was 28.5% in the second quarter against 25.1%-25.6% guidance; watch for at least the midpoint, with below 25.1% falsifying.
• Transaction losses and sales and marketing were about 4.2% and 22.2% of revenue; watch whether losses fall back to 4.2% or below and whether sales and marketing exceeds 24%, with losses at or above 4.5% falsifying.
• C2C grew more than 20% in the second quarter and the third quarter is Depop's first consolidated quarter; watch C2C growth and Depop's actual GMV contribution, with C2C growth below 10% falsifying.

Conclusion

eBay's business is driven by GMV times the take rate, and over the past year it has moved from years of stagnation to double-digit growth while keeping high margins and strong cash flow. In the second quarter of 2026 GMV was $22.398 billion, up 14% FX-neutral, net revenue was $3.134 billion, the non-GAAP operating margin was 28.5% and first-half free cash flow was $1.224 billion[3][24]; yet third-quarter guidance cuts organic GMV growth to 7%-9% and the margin to 25.1%-25.6%[4]. The central open relationship is how much of the slowdown is only the bullion and Klarna base effect, whether advertising can offset the take-rate dilution from Depop and similar businesses, and whether the margin decline is deliberate investment or a structural rise in core costs.

Independent readings since the second-quarter report are scarce: the Drillr research library added no new eBay report in that period, and the two views retained both come from the same October 12 Stocktwits article. Morgan Stanley analyst Nathan Feather called live commerce "the missing piece" explaining eBay's recent acceleration, estimated that eBay Live accounted for at least 40% of fiscal 2026 GMV growth and said live commerce could add about 4 points to annual GMV growth over 2026-2030[39]; that view attributes the acceleration to a durable new channel rather than to one-offs such as bullion and Klarna, which bears on the first debate, though the company itself has disclosed only that eBay Live GMV grew about eightfold and not its share of the total[18]. Wells Fargo, by contrast, sees continued risk to EPS growth as the company keeps investing in live commerce, C2C and other new opportunities while competing with Vinted, and its fiscal 2027 EPS view sits 8% below the analyst consensus[33], which bears on the third debate by treating the margin decline as an ongoing investment and competition cost. Both firms accept that the new channels are driving growth; they differ on whether that spending turns into EPS, and these are outside interpretations, not facts or a vote.

The combination that would clearly strengthen the current understanding is third-quarter organic GMV growth of at least 8% with U.S. growth of at least 12%, a take rate of at least 13.90% with first-party ad growth of at least 20%, and a non-GAAP operating margin of at least 25.35% with transaction losses back below 4.2% of revenue. Conversely, organic growth below 7% and a take rate below 13.80%, together with a margin below 25.1% and transaction losses above 4.5%, would show that the acceleration relied more on one-offs and that margin pressure comes from core costs, and the current understanding would need a clear downward revision.

Sources

[1] EBAY 10-K filed 2026-02-19 · business model and revenue sources · 2026-02-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000027/

[2] Drillr earnings calendar (updated 2026-10-18) · EBAY 2026-10-28 · 2026-10-18 · Drillr earnings calendar

[3] EBAY 8-K filed 2026-08-05 · 2Q26 financial highlights · 2026-08-05 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001065088/000106508826000174/exhibit991erebayq22026.htm

[4] EBAY Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-05 · Q3 and full-year guidance · 2026-08-05 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[5] EBAY 8-K filed 2026-08-05 · Q3 2026 business outlook · 2026-08-05 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001065088/000106508826000174/exhibit991erebayq22026.htm

[6] Drillr analyst_financial_estimates (updated 2026-10-16) · EBAY quarter ending 2026-09-30 · 2026-10-16 · Drillr analyst_financial_estimates · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[7] Drillr analyst_financial_estimates (updated 2026-10-16) · EBAY FY2026 · 2026-10-16 · Drillr analyst_financial_estimates · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[8] EBAY 8-K filed 2026-08-05 · five-quarter GMV and active buyers · 2026-08-05 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001065088/000106508826000174/exhibit991erebayq22026.htm

[9] EBAY 10-Q filed 2026-08-06 · 2Q26 take rate and revenue drivers · 2026-08-06 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000177/

[10] EBAY 10-Q filed 2026-08-06 · 2Q26 income statement and operating expenses · 2026-08-06 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000177/

[11] EBAY 10-K filed 2026-02-19 · GMV, take rate and active buyers · 2026-02-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000027/

[12] EBAY 8-K filed 2026-08-05 · Depop acquisition closing · 2026-08-05 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001065088/000106508826000174/exhibit991erebayq22026.htm

[13] EBAY 10-K filed 2026-02-19 · seller tools, advertising and eBay Live · 2026-02-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000027/

[14] EBAY 10-K filed 2026-02-19 · marketplace and advertising revenue definitions · 2026-02-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000027/

[15] EBAY 10-K filed 2026-02-19 · 2025 consolidated results · 2026-02-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000027/

[16] EBAY 10-Q filed 2026-08-06 · 2Q26 net revenues by geography · 2026-08-06 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000177/

[17] EBAY 10-K filed 2026-02-19 · Focus Category specialist competitors · 2026-02-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000027/

[18] EBAY 8-K filed 2026-08-05 · 2Q26 business highlights · 2026-08-05 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001065088/000106508826000174/exhibit991erebayq22026.htm

[19] EBAY 10-Q filed 2026-08-06 · 2Q26 transaction loss and marketing drivers · 2026-08-06 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000177/

[20] EBAY 10-K filed 2026-02-19 · 2025 cash flows and capital returns · 2026-02-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000027/

[21] EBAY 8-K filed 2026-04-29 · 1Q26 results and advertising · 2026-04-29 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001065088&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[22] EBAY 8-K filed 2026-08-05 · 2Q26 non-GAAP operating income reconciliation · 2026-08-05 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001065088/000106508826000174/exhibit991erebayq22026.htm

[23] EBAY 8-K filed 2026-08-05 · 2Q26 advertising, margin, cash and capital returns · 2026-08-05 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001065088/000106508826000174/exhibit991erebayq22026.htm

[24] EBAY 8-K filed 2026-08-05 · 2Q26 free cash flow · 2026-08-05 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001065088/000106508826000174/exhibit991erebayq22026.htm

[25] EBAY 10-Q filed 2026-08-06 · 1H26 operating cash flow drivers · 2026-08-06 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000177/

[26] EBAY 10-Q filed 2026-08-06 · 2Q26 debt refinancing and Depop payment · 2026-08-06 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000177/

[27] EBAY Q1 2026 earnings call 2026-04-29 · bullion, buyers and gross margin · 2026-04-29 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[28] EBAY Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-05 · Q&A advertising penetration and Depop · 2026-08-05 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[29] EBAY 10-Q filed 2026-08-06 · 2Q26 cost of net revenues drivers · 2026-08-06 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000177/

[30] EBAY 10-K filed 2026-02-19 · competition from social, live commerce and ecosystems · 2026-02-19 · 10-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000027/

[31] EBAY Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-05 · eBay Live, C2C and Germany · 2026-08-05 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[32] EBAY Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-05 · risks · 2026-08-05 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[33] Stocktwits 2026-10-12 · Wells Fargo on eBay EPS risk · 2026-10-12 · Wells Fargo(经 Stocktwits 报道) · https://stocktwits.com/news-articles/markets/equity/ebay-stock-morgan-stanley-names-e-bay-top-pick-calls-live-commerce-the-missing-piece-wells-fargo-flags-eps-risks/cZxI9dVRB8T

[34] EBAY Q2 2026 earnings call 2026-08-05 · segment and revenue performance · 2026-08-05 · earnings-call · https://gateway.drillr.ai/mcp/private

[35] EBAY 8-K filed 2026-08-05 · five-quarter net revenues · 2026-08-05 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001065088/000106508826000174/exhibit991erebayq22026.htm

[36] EBAY 10-Q filed 2026-08-06 · 2Q26 net revenues by activity · 2026-08-06 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000177/

[37] EBAY 8-K filed 2026-05-12 · board rejects GameStop proposal · 2026-05-12 · 8-K · https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001065088&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40

[38] EBAY 10-Q filed 2026-08-06 · unsolicited acquisition proposal risk factor · 2026-08-06 · 10-Q · https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508826000177/

[39] Stocktwits 2026-10-12 · Morgan Stanley on eBay Live · 2026-10-12 · Morgan Stanley(经 Stocktwits 报道) · https://stocktwits.com/news-articles/markets/equity/ebay-stock-morgan-stanley-names-e-bay-top-pick-calls-live-commerce-the-missing-piece-wells-fargo-flags-eps-risks/cZxI9dVRB8T